concern themselves. "The judiciary can only inquire. "The judiciary can only inquire whether the means devised in the execution of a power granted are forbidden by the Constitution. It cannot go beyond that inquiry without intrenching upon the domain of another department of government. That it may not do with safety to our institutions." 7 The power of Congress to legislate being conceded, the wisdom or expediency of the manner in which the power is exercised is held to be beyond judicial criticism or control.8 Finally, the courts are guided in their judgments by the rule that every reasonable presumption shall be in favor of the validity of a questioned legislative act. As the Supreme Court have said in an important case: "The declaration [that an act of Congress is void] should never be made except in a clear case. Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt." The rule of construction that has last been stated has especial application to acts of Congress. When the con 7 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1125; 38 L. ed. 1047; Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; 48 L. ed. 679; McCray v. U. S., 195 U. S. 27; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769; 49 L. ed. 78; Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506; 19 L. ed. 264. 8 Treat v. White, 181 U. S. 264; 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611; 45 L. ed. 853; Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493; 46 L. ed. 713. 9 Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457; 20 L. ed. 287. This doctrine has been repeatedly declared. Whether it has always been followed there is room for doubt. For an especially acute discussion of this principle of construction see Thayer, Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law (published originally in Harvard Law Review, republished in the volume entitled Legal Essays, 1908). See also Political Science Quarterly, XXIV, 193, article "Growth of Judicial Power," by W. F. Dodd. stitutionality of a State law is involved, the principle is not always applicable. If the question at issue is as to whether a given power resides in the Federal Government or in the States, the fact that a State legislature in its enactment has asserted that it is vested in the States, raises no presumption in favor of the validity of this claim. The Supreme Court in passing finally upon this point is not called upon to review the act of a co-ordinate department, but has to decide between the conflicting claims of two governments, and, quite properly, feels itself at liberty to decide the point as an original proposition; namely, upon the basis of its own judgment as to what is the most reasonable construction of the constitutional provisions involved. If, however, the State law, whose constitutionality is questioned, is with reference to a matter admittedly within the province of the States, and the question is simply whether the power has been properly exercised, there is held to be a strong presumption that the act is constitutional. Thus, for example, if it be a question. whether the States have a power to regulate interstate commerce, or to tax a national bank, or to naturalize aliens, or enact bankruptcy laws, there is no presumption in favor of the constitutionality of acts in which. the State power is asserted. If, however, it is a question, for example, whether the police powers, admittedly belonging to the States, have been constitutionally exercised, the presumption is that they have been so exercised. When the Federal Supreme Court is called upon to consider the constitutionality of a State law as determined by its conformity with the Constitution of the State, the State Constitution is construed as having for its general purpose the placing of limitations upon the powers of the legislature; whereas, of course, the Federal Constitution is viewed as a grant of legislative poiver. In other words, whereas the Federal legislature is construed to have only those powers granted to it expressly or impliedly by the Federal Constitution, the State legislatures are considered to possess all powers not expressly or impliedly withdrawn from them by the Federal or respective State Constitutions. In those cases in which the courts of the States are called upon to consider the constitutionality of the acts of their own lawmaking bodies, as tested by the Federal or their own State Constitutions, they of course have to deal with the acts of a department of government coordinate in power with themselves; and, therefore, hold themselves, or at least should hold themselves, bound in all cases to give to the laws that same benefit of rational doubt which the Federal Supreme Court gives to acts of Congress. The presumption of constitutionality which attaches to an act of Congress is increased when the legislative interpretation has been frequently applied during a considerable number of years, or when it dates from a period practically contemporaneous with the adoption of the Constitution, or when, based upon a confidence in its correctness, many and important public and private rights have become fixed.10 The Supreme Court has, however, never held itself absolutely bound by a legislative or executive construction (political questions excepted) however long acquiesced in, or however nearly contemporaneous in its first statement with the adoption of the Constitution.11 10 Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53; 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279; 28 L. ed. 349. 11 Swift v. United States, 105 U. S. 691; 26 L. ed. 1108. The doctrine is carefully reviewed in Fairbanks v. United States, 181 U. S. 283; 21 Sup..Ct. Rep. 648; 45 L. ed. 862. Extrinsic evidence Generally speaking, in the construction of the Constitution the well-known distinctions between latent and patent ambiguities, and between the use of extrinsic and intrinsic evidence apply. When the language of the instrument is itself indefinite or is such that more than one meaning may, by grammatical construction, be drawn from its terms, the courts base their determinations upon the language and provisions found within the four corners of the instrument, and without resort to extrinsic evidence. The governing point is as to what is actually written. If a given power may rationally, logically, and grammatically be construed as granted by a given provision, then it is of no countervailing force to adduce the fact that such was not the intention of those by whom the instrument of government was established. Technical terms When, however, there is no ambiguity of grammatical construction, but the words themselves require definition, recourse is properly had to extrinsic evidence. Here it is necessary to learn from extrinsic sources the meanings usually attached to these words at the time the Constitution was framed and, presumably, by those who framed and adopted the Constitution. Examples of such technical terms are "letters of marque and reprisal," "ex post facto," "bill of attainder," "bankruptcy,” “admiralty," "equity," "direct tax," "duties," "imposts," "excises," "piracy," "habeas corpus," ," "citizen," "alliance," "confederation," "republican form of government,' famous crime," "commerce," etc. The technical term "treason" is defined in the Constitution itself. " "in As has been repeatedly declared by the courts the best rule for interpreting the technical terms employed in the Constitution is to give to them the meaning which they had at the time that instrument was framed and adopted. When the terms are technical law terms they are to be given the meaning attached to them in the English common law.12 In a few instances, however, the Supreme Court has refused to give to technical terms the meanings attached to them in 1789 by the common law. This has been so especially with reference to the words "admiralty” and "bankruptcy" both of which terms have been given a broader meaning than that furnished by the English law. The interpretative value of debates in constitutional conventions When it is necessary and proper to resort to extrinsic evidence in interpreting the Constitution, an important source of such evidence is to be found in the history of the events which led up to its adoption. Of special importance are the recorded proceedings of the convention which drafted, of the State conventions which ratified, and the public utterances of the men who played an important part in the establishment of, the Constitution. Resort is, however, to be had to these sources only where latent ambiguities are to be resolved. Cooley has stated, in a manner not to be improved upon, the weight properly to be ascribed to these records. He says: "When the inquiry is directed to ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to be accomplished by a particular provision, it may be proper to examine the proceedings of the convention which framed the instrument. When the proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision, the aid will be valuable and satisfactory; but when the question is one of abstract 12 In South Carolina v. U. S., 199 U. S. 437; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110; 50 L. ed. 261, many illustrations of the application of this rule are |