as to fugitives from one State of the Union to another, this may be done. Who is a 66 fugitive"

“To be a fugitive from justice . . . it is not necessary that the party charged should have left the State in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution anticipated or begun, but simply that, having within a State committed that which by its laws constitutes a crime, when he is sought to be subjected to its criminal process to answer for his offense, he has left its jurisdiction and is found to be within the territory of another." 11

In Hyatt v. New York, 12 it was definitely held, without qualification, that in order to be a "fugitive from justice" within the meaning of the constitutional clause, and of the statutes relating thereto, the person sought to be extradited must have been actually, and not merely constructively, within the demanding State at the time the crime charged was committed. Furthermore, in this case it was held that one who came into the State on business for a single day eight days after the alleged commission of the crime, and months before indictment found, was not, by his departure therefrom, brought within the terms of the statute providing for extradition.

Fugitive slaves

This clause is practically obsolete. An elaborate examination of the obligations imposed upon the States, and of the extent of their concurrent legislative power in the premises is found in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.13

11 Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291; 29 L. ed. 544. See also Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122; 51 L. ed. 161.

12 188 U. S. 691; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; 47 L. ed. 657.

13 16 Pet. 539; 10 L. ed. 1060.

CHAPTER X

INTERSTATE RELATIONS: COMPACTS BETWEEN THE STATES, AND BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATES

Compacts between the States

The control of international relations being exclusively vested in the Federal Government, it necessarily follows that the several States have no authority to enter into any diplomatic or political relations with foreign powers. Nevertheless, from an excess of caution, the Federal Constitution declares that "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation," and that, "No State shall, without the consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power."

It will be noticed that in the latter of these two constitutional clauses, the qualification "without the consent of Congress" is introduced. There has, therefore, never been any doubt that, when this congressional consent is given, the several States of the American Union may enter into agreements and compacts with one another, so long as their effect is not to create what in political language is termed an "alliance" or "Confederation." Not only this; it has been held that there are a variety of subjects concerning which the several States may enter into agreements with one another without obtaining the consent of Congress.1

1 See the language of the court in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 728; 37 L. ed. 537.

Compact between the States and the United States

Closely connected with the subject of compacts of the States, inter se, is that of compacts between the individual States and the United States.

Of compacts of this character which have been entered into, the greater number have been made at the time the States in question have been admitted as States into the Union, and have attempted to place such States under restrictions not directly deducible from the Federal Constitution, and therefore, restrictions not resting upon the other States. To this extent they have been in violation of the general principle of the equality of the States. This principle, it may be said, is not expressly stated in the Federal Constitution, but would seem to be implied in the general nature of that instrument.2

The Constitution, without distinguishing between the original and new States, defines the political privileges which the States are to enjoy, and declares that all powers not granted to the United States shall be considered as reserved "to the States." From this it almost irresistibly follows that Congress has not the right to provide that certain members of the Union, possessing full statehood, shall have constitutional competences less than those of their sister States. According to this, then, though Congress may exact of Territories whatever conditions it sees fit as requirements precedent to their admission as States, when admitted as such, it cannot deny to them any of the privileges and immunities which the other commonwealths enjoy.

It would seem, as regards the enforcibility of these contracts, that a distinction is to be made between those that attempt to place the State under political restrictions not imposed upon all the States of the Union by the Fed

2 See Political Science Quarterly, III, 425, article by W. A. Dunning, "Are the States Equal Under the Constitution?"

eral Constitution, and those which seek the future regulation of private, proprietary interests, and that these latter, though not the former, may be enforced after the States have been admitted into the Union.3

3 Escanaba v. Lake Michigan Transportation Co., 107 U. S. 678; 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; 27 L. ed. 442; Boln v. Nebraska, 176 U. S. 83; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287; 44 L. ed. 382; Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223; 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 73; 45 L. ed. 162.

CHAPTER XI

THE PERSONS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES: STATUS OF ALIENS

Territorial sovereignty

By international law and by the public law of all civilized States the legal jurisdiction of a State is recognized to extend over all persons for the time being within the districts under its de facto control. The only exceptions, if exceptions they be, are those coming within the principle of extraterritoriality. A State has jurisdiction over not only its native-born and naturalized subjects, but all the subjects of other States permanently or, at any given time, temporarily resident, within its borders.1

Status of aliens

As regards the status of aliens, that is, citizens of other States, who are temporarily or permanently domiciled within a State, it may be said that the fact that they are within its territorial limits makes them, in a broad constitutional sense, members of that State and, therefore, subject to the authority of its laws, though they still remain the subjects or citizens of their native States. In fact, being under the protection of the State where they are, they owe an allegiance to it according to the maxim protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio protectionem.2

1 For a general discussion of the principle of territorial sovereignty, see the case of The Exchange, 7 Cr. 116; 3 L. ed. 287. For the effects of de facto control, see United States v. Rice, 4 Wh. 246; 4 L. ed. 562. Cf. Webster's report on Thrasher's Case, Works, VI, 526. See,

2

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