act of barbarism fit only for savages. It would be as contemptible and odious as for a Government, conducting a naval war to fire, in these days, on a hospital-ship, attested by her colour and flag, and filled exclusively with the sick, wounded, or dying, their surgeons and nurses. Such hospital vessels are now, by the common consent of civilized nations, as I am told, even more perfectly and completely neutralized than are hospitals and tents on land over which floats the yellow flag. It is impossible not to recognize how justly my colleague, Mr. Bayard, has portrayed the inhumanity and brutality with which certain Canadian officials treated defenseless American fishermen during the last summer, even those who had gone out of their way to rescue Canadian sailors, and, having entered a Canadian bay to safely land those they had saved, attempted to procure food to sustain their own lives.

It is true that we complain of and denounce, as in violation of the treaty of 1818, the "restrictions" enforced by Canadian statutes and officials under the pretence of preventing our fishermen from "taking, drying, or curing fish," in the prohibited Canadian bays or harbors, but those "restrictions" are not complained of or denounced because restricting commercial privileges. The complaint and denunciation are because the "restrictions" violate the fishing rights secured to our fishermen by the treaties.

I am advised, and concede, that up to President Jackson's proclamation of October 5, 1830, set forth on page 817 of the fourth volume of the United States Statutes at Large, this Government had not even commercial privileges for its vessels in Canadian ports. We had such privileges as colonists; we lost them as colonists; we regained them in 1830 by an arrangement of legislation finally concerted with Great Britain, which was the result of an international understanding, that was in effect a treaty, although not technically a treaty negotiated by the President, ratified by the Senate, signed by the parties, and the ratifications formally exchanged by them. That must be so, for British colonial policy, after the treaty of peace in 1783, which secured the independence of the thirteen American States, notoriously excluded all foreign vessels from trading with British colonies on this continent. The treaty of 1794 was careful to declare that it should not, as to commercial privileges, "extend to the admission of vessels of the United States into the sea-ports, harbours, bays, or creeks of His Majesty's said territories" on the continent of America. The events which preceded the war of 1812 and that war, confirmed and enforced the exclusion. After the Treaty of Ghent we endeavored, by retaliatory laws, to counteract and change that policy. The fishery treaty of 1818 was concluded in October of that year, and, in April of the same year, Congress enacted a law which was described in the official documents of the day as enforcing a policy of non-intercourse by British vessels between ourselves and ports closed by British laws against our vessels. On May 15, 1820, Congress invigorated that law of 1818 by a new enactment, against every vessel, owned in whole or in part by British subjects, if coming or arriving by sea from any place in Lower Canada, or New Brunswick, or Nova Scotia, or the Islands of Newfoundland, St. John's, or Cape Breton, or from any British possession on this Continent. We forbade, under pain of forfeiture, the entry, or attempted entry, of any such vessel into our ports. We interdicted the importation

into the United States from any of the foregoing British dependencies, of any articles not produced therein. We excluded the importation by anybody of all articles excepting the produce of each colony respectively imported by itself.

In 1823 Congress suspended the provisions of the laws of 1818 and 1820 in respect to certain British colonial ports, and authorized importation of colonial produce in certain British vessels coming directly therefrom, but only on the one condition that similar produce might be imported in our vessels to our country on equal terms, and that the British vessels thus admitted into our ports be navigated by a master and at least three-fourths of the mariners British subjects. The law of 1818 said not a word about American vessels, or any other vessel excepting British vessels, but, as I have noted, the law of 1820 prohibited the importation of any merchandise from a British colony on this continent unless it was the growth of the colony where laden, and was brought directly to us. Nothing is said therein of exportation from us of merchandise in vessels not British.

The reason of the change in 1823 in our policy was that in 1822 England changed her policy, and permitted American-built vessels, lawfully navigated, to import certain goods directly to the West Indies. Hence we declared that the law of 1823 should remain in force so long only as the enumerated British colonial ports were open to our vessels by the British law of June 24, 1822, but if closed the President was empowered to revive our laws of 1818 and 1820. The British ports were closed to us by an act of Parliament on July 5, 1825, and the President thereupon, on March 17, 1827, proclaimed ours closed as before.

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My distinguished predecessor in this Department, Mr. Gallatin. was in that year the American Minister at London, and the following extract from his note to our Department of State, dated September 11, 1827, exhibits the situation as seen by him:

Mr. Huskisson said it was the intention of the British Government to consider the intercourse of the British colonies as being exclusively under its control, and any relaxation from the colonial system as an indulgence, to be granted on such terms as might suit the policy of Great Britain at the time it was granted. I said every question of RIGHT had on this occasion been waived on the part of the United States, the only object of the present inquiry being to ascertain whether, as a matter of mutual convenience, the intercourse might not be opened in a manner satisfactory to both countries. He (Mr. H.) said that it had appeared as if America had entertained the opinion that the British West Indies could not exist without her supplies, and that she might, therefore, compel Great Britain to open the intercourse on any terms she pleased. I disclaimed any such belief or intention on the part of the United States. But it appeared to me, and I intimated it, indeed, to Mr. Huskisson, that he was acting rather under the influence of irritated feelings on account of past events, than with a view to the mutual interests of both parties.

The irritation in England appears to have resulted from the insertion in our law of 1823 of the word "elsewhere" in the second section, and the incident is so suggestive of watchfulness at present that I add herewith a statement of the history of that legislation made in the Senate by Senator Smith, of Maryland, a few years afaterwards:

During the Session of 1822 Congress was informed that an act was pending in Parliament for the opening of the colonial ports to the commerce of the United States. In consequence, an act was passed authorizing the President (then Mr. Monroe), in case the act of Parliament was satisfactory to him, to open the ports of the United States to British vessels by his proclamation. The

act of Parliament was deemed satisfactory, and a proclamation was accordingly issued and the trade commenced. Unfortunately for our commerce, and I think contrary to justice, a Treasury circular issued directing the collectors to charge British vessels entering our ports with the alien tonnage and discriminating duties. This order was remonstrated against by the British minister (I think Mr. Vaughan). The trade, however, went on uninterrupted. Congress met, and a bill was drafted in 1823 by Mr. Adams, then Secretary of State, and passed both Houses, with little, if any, debate. I voted for it, believing that it met, in the spirit of reciprocity, the British act of Parliament. This bill, however, contained one little word, "elsewhere," which completely defeated all our expectations. It was noticed by no one. The effect of that word “elsewhere" was to assume the pretensions alluded to in the instructions to Mr. McLane. The result was that the British Government shut their colonial ports immediately and thenceforward. This act of 1822 gave us a monopoly (virtually) of the West India trade. It admitted free of duty a variety of articles, such as Indian corn, meal, oats, peas, and beans. The British Government thought we entertained a belief that they could not do without our produce, and by their acts of the 27th of June and 5th of July, 1825, they opened their ports to all the world, on terms far less advantageous to the United States than those of the act of 1822.

President Adams alluded to the subject, in his annual message for 1827-28 in these terms:

At the commencement of the last session of Congress they were informed of the sudden and unexpected exclusion by the British Government of access, in vessels of the United States, to all their colonial ports, except those immediately bordering upon our own territory. In the amicable discussions which have succeeded the adoption of this measure, which, as it affected harshly the interests of the United States, became a subject of expostulation on our part. the principles upon which its jurisdiction has been placed have been of a diversified character. It has at once been ascribed to a mere recurrence to the old long-established principle of colonial monopoly, and at the same time to a feeling of resentment, because the offers of an act of Parliament, opening the colonial ports upon certain conditions, had not been grasped at with sufficient eagerness by an instantaneous conformity to them. At a subsequent period it has been intimated that the new exclusion was in resentment because a prior act of Parliament, of 1822, opening certain colonial ports, under heavy and burdensome restrictions, to vessels of the United States, had not been reciprocated by an admission of British vessels from the colonies, and their cargoes, without any restriction or discrimination whatever. But be the motive of the interdiction what it may, the British Government have manifested no disposition, either by negotiation or by corresponding legislative enactments, to recede from it; and we have been given distinctly to understand that neither of the bills which were under the consideration of Congress at their last session would have been deemed sufficient in their concessions to have been rewarded by any relaxation from the British interdict. The British Government have not only declined negotiation upon the subject, but, by the principle they have assumed with reference to it, have precluded even the means of negotiation. It becomes not the self-respect of the United States either to solicit gratuitous favors or to accept as the grant of a favor that for which an ample equivalent is exacted.

The affair aroused so much emotion in the country that it entered as an element into the Presidential election which came on soon afterward and resulted in the choice of General Jackson. The opponents of the administration of President Adams insisted that the concerted legislation, and the subsequent negotiations attempted at London by that administration, miscarried because an entrance of our vessels into British Colonial ports was demanded as a right and not as a privilege. It is that distinction which has led me to emphasize the doings of a half century ago.

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When President Jackson came to power, Mr. Van Buren instructed Mr. McLane, our minister at London, to endeavor to reopen negotiations on the basis of our willingness to accept as a "privilege" the entry of our vessels into British colonial ports, and

it was successful. Congress, on May 29, 1830, empowered the President, whenever satisfied that England would open to us her West Indian ports, to proclaim our own ports opened to British vessels, and the repeal or suspension of the laws of 1818, 1820, and 1823. On October 5, 1830, President Jackson issued his proclamation admitting British vessels and their cargoes to an entry into our ports from all British colonial ports on or near the American continent. From that beginning came the "privileges" of our vessels in Canadian ports, and it will be observed that the British and the American laws, and President Jackson's proclamation, all used the word "vessels" without any qualifying adjective excluding our fishing vessels.

Few of the incidents of our peaceful commercial diplomacy and legislation are more striking, as it has always seemed to me, than the incidents of this successful effort by President Jackson to promote our carrying trade. Near the end of the first term of that great soldier and ruler of men the mission to London was filled, during the recess of the Senate, by the appointment thereto of Mr. Van Buren. When his nomination came before the Senate its confirmation was resisted by the personal and party opponents of President Jackson, on the ground that the instructions to Mr. McLane, personally dictated by the President (as has since been proven), and which accomplished the recovery of our West India trade, had asked of England as a favor what was due to us as a right, had espoused the British side against the American side as theretofore represented by President Adams, and had imported the result of our Presidential struggle into a diplomatic negotiation with a foreign country. Avowedly on that ground the nomination of Mr. Van Buren was rejected in February of 1832, which rejection aided to lead up to his election to be VicePresident in the autumn of that year, and to be President for four years later.

But that is not all. Mr. Gallatin, on September 22, 1826, wrote from London to Mr. Clay, then Secretary of State, that one of the three points on which we were "vulnerable" was:

3. Too long an adherence to the opposition of her (England's) right of laying protective duties. This might have been given up as soon as the act of 1825 was passed.

In the debate in the Senate on Mr. Van Buren's confirmation, those (including Mr. Webster and Mr. Clay) who condemned the nomination contended that President Adams was right in rejecting the British offer of 1825, because it only covered the carrying trade, as well as our vessels, but left our products subject to protective duties levied by England at her West India Ports!

THE TREATY OF 1815.

A full appreciation of political, diplomatic, and party events from the beginning of our history down to President Jackson's beneficent achievement will make it plain why we have not a treaty with Great Britain to regulate commerce with her Colonies on this continent as we have with British ports and territories "in Europe." There will be found in our Statute-books some thirty treaties between ourselves and foreign Governments stipulating that the vessels of each and their cargoes, shall have free access to all the ports of

the other which are open to foreign commerce. Our treaty of 1815 with Great Britain declares:

There shall be between the territories of the United States of America and all the territories of his Britannic Majesty in Europe a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports, and rivers in the territories aforesaid to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively; also to have and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation, respectively, shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries respectively.

Then, in the second section is this stipulation:

The intercourse between the United States and his Britannic Majesty's possessions in the West Indies, and on the continent of North America, shall not be affected by any of the provisions of this article, but each party shall remain in the complete possession of its rights with respect to such an inter

course.

I am not aware of any treaty, excepting the fishing clauses of the treaty of 1818, to which I have referred, and the treaty of 1871 (to which I will refer hereafter), or of any rule of international law binding on the United States, which now constrains Great Britain to commercial intercourse with ourselves in her Canadian ports. My previous training, and the line of my studies and occupations in this Department, warn me to speak with caution, and subject to correction from my very able and better instructed colleague, Mr. Bayard, on the subject to which your committee has invited my attention, and on which you have requested my opinon; but were the situation reversed, and were England to demand, as a right, commercial access to our ports for Canadian vessels which, for reasons satisfactory to ourselves, we saw fit to exclude, or if Congress were, by legislation conforming to the treaty of 1815, to even exclude British vessels covered by that treaty, I think we should say, and be entitled to say, that such commercial advantages in all our bays, harbors, and ports, from Mount Desert to Cape Cod, and from Cape Cod to Cape Hatteras, belong to us to interpret as strictly, and either to hold exclusively for our own vessels, if we see fit so to do,

or to exchange them for equivalents. That question, touching 408 the commercial relation of all our vessels to open Canadian

ports, I deem quite apart from the relation of our fishing vessels to taking, drying, or curving fish on Canadian coasts under the treaties of 1783 and 1818, and the relation of those vessels to shelter, repairs, wood and water, under the treaty of 1818 while on those coasts.

THE REAL ISSUE.

This long introduction to clear away irrelevant matter, which the necessity of rapid dictation suggested by your letter prevents me from shortening as I could wish, brings me to say that, from the point of view of this Department, Great Britain can, if she deems it for her interest, or necessary for her safety, retreat from the understandings and agreements of 1830. Whether such retreat there from is to be deemed by us an unfriendly act, will depend on its motives and environment. To be sure the arrangement of 1830 was not in