X. THE CHARACTER AND VALUE OF THE FISHERIES ON THE COAST OF LABRADOR AND THE BANKS OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND THE INCREASING DEMAND FOR FOOD-FISHES TO SUPPLY THE WANTS OF THE PEOPLE.

The inshore fishing along the coast of Labrador are the best we have in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, while that along the southern and western shores of Newfoundland is far better than any along the coasts of Novia Scotia or New Brunswick.

Our plenipotentiaries who negotiated the treaty of 1818 mention these facts to show that we lost nothing of value when we gave up the inshore fisheries of Nova Scotia, and gained much advantage by having access to the shores of Labrador, as will hereafter appear in this report.

Mr. Sabine, in his report to the Secretary of the Treasury, in 1852, gives a very interesting account of the fisheries on the northeastern coast, from which we make the following extracts, found in Senate Ex. Doc. 22, second session Thirty-second Congress:

An account of the fishing-grounds has been reserved for the conclusion. Of those near our cities, and visited for the purpose of supplying our markets with fish to be consumed fresh, it is unnecessary to speak. Those within the limits of British America, and secured to us by treaty, as well as those on the eastern coasts of Maine, are less generally known and may properly claim attention. Of the distant, Newfoundland is the oldest. That vessels from Boston fished there as early as the year 1645 is a fact preserved in the journal of Governor Winthrop. The "great bank," which has been so long resorted to, is said to be about 200 miles broad and nearly 600 miles long. In gales the sea is very high, and dense fogs are prevalent. The water is from 25 to 95 fathoms deep. The edges of the bank are abrupt and composed of rough rocks. The best fishing-grounds are between the latitudes of 42° and 46° north. The "bankers." as the vessels employed there are called, anchor in the open sea, at a great distance from the land, and pursue their hazardous and lonely employment, exposed to perils hardly known elsewhere. The fish are caught with hooks and lines, and (the operations of splitting and dressing performed) are salted in bulk in the hold, from day to day, until the cargo is completed. The bank fish are larger than those taken on the shores of Newfoundland, but are not often so well cured. The first American vessel which was fitted for the Labrador fishery sailed from Newburyport toward the close of the last century. The business, once undertaken, was pursued with great energy, and several hundred vessels were engaged in it annually previous to the war of 1812. A voyage to Labrador, unlike a trip to the Banks of Newfoundland, is not without pleasant incidents, even to landsmen. The coast is frequented for a distance of 10 or 12 degrees of latitude. It has been preferred to any other on account of its security and a general certainty of affording a supply of fish. Arriving in some harbour early in June, an American vessel is moored and remains quietly at anchor until a full "fare" has been obtained, or until the departure of the fish requires the master to seek another inlet.

The fishing is done entirely in boats, and the number usually employed is one for about 30 tons of the vessel's register. Here, under the management of an Experienced and skilful master, everything may be rendered systematic and regular. As soon as the vessel has been secured by the necessary anchors, her sails and light rigging are stowed away, her decks cleared, her boats fitted, and a day or two spent in fowling and sailing, under color of exploring the surrounding waters and fixing upon proper stations for the boats, and the master announces to his crew that they must try their luck with the hook and line. Each boat has now assigned to it a skipper or master, and one man. At the time designated, the master departs with his boats. to test the qualities of his men, and to mark out for them a course for their future procedure.

Nothing could be more injurious to men, who are brought into such intimate association by their common right of fishing on those distant shores, than a policy of their governments which would cause them to make reprisals, the stronger against the weaker.

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Hon. Robert J. Walker, whose ability as a statesman is nowhere seriously questioned, in a letter to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, dated April 24, 1868, thus describes the value of the fisheries as sources of food supply. He says:

But there are other most important considerations connected with extended coasts and great fisheries. The fisheries are capable of furnishing more and cheaper food than the land.

The reasons are

(1) The ocean surface is nearly four times that of the land, the area being 145.000,000 square miles of ocean surface to 52,000,000 of land.

(2) The ocean everywhere produces fish, from the equator to the pole, the profusion of submarine animals increasing as you go north up to a point but 433 miles from the pole and believed to extend there, whereas, in consequence of mountains, deserts, and the temperature of the surface of the earth in very high latitudes, less than half its surface can be cultivated so as to produce food in any appreciable quantities.

(3) The temperature of the ocean, in high latitudes, being much warmer than that of the land surface, there is increased profusion of submarine animal life, especially in the Arctic and Atlantic Seas, where, on account of extreme cold, the land surface produces no food. In warm latitudes the deep-sea temperature diminishes with the depth, until a certain point, below which it maintains an equable temperature of 40° Fahrenheit. The temperature of the ocean in latitude 70° (many degrees warmer than the land surface) is the same in all depths. There are wonderful provisions for the multiplication of animal life in the ocean, and it moderates both heat and cold. These are additional reasons in favor of the existence of a Polar Sea, filled with a far greater profusion of submarine animal life than any other seas, and, as a conseqence, possessing far the best fisheries. Indeed, as fish progress northward, on account of the better ocean temperature there, as also, because the marine food there is more abundant, there can be little doubt that the open Polar Sea will furnish fisheries of incredible value.

(4) The ocean produces food in all latitudes for the support of animal submarine life. These are squid (the principal food of the whale), also abundance of nutritious sea-grasses, etc., upon which the fish feed. Besides, as the earth is more and more cultivated, and farms, as well as towns and cities, drained by creeks and rivers to the seas, the submarine food is correspondingly augmented. Even in mid-ocean the phosphorescence observed there is produced by the presence in the water of myriads of living animals.

(5) Whilst the earth produces food by plowing its surface only a few inches deep, the ocean supples myriads of fish, tier on tier, thousands of fathoms deep. Thus, the registered take of herrings in the Scotch fisheries, in 1861, was 900,000,000, whilst that of Norway, in the latitude of Iceland and Greenland, was far greater.

Perhaps, however, the main reason why the ocean produces so much more food for man than the land is, that whilst land animals only give birth to one or two of their young at a time, some fish produce millions of ova, to be matured into life. Thus, a female cod has been found to contain 3.400.000 ova; and other fish ova varying from several millions to 36,000. Hence, the vast success attending the increased production of fish by transfer, by sowing the spawn, and other methods known to ichthyology.

Nothing could more certainly lessen the food supply of the people, which, after all, is the basis of all human progress, than to promote strife amongst fishermen visiting the same waters. A policy that leads to such a result is an injustice to the human family.

No wealth, national or personal, can be justly earned when it comes from diminishing the supply of human food.

With all our vast excess of cereals and of animal food we still need all the fish we can gather from the oceans and seas for the comfort and economy of living, especially among the industrial classes of our rapidly increasing population. The Atlantic and Pacific fisheries rank in importance along with the production of beef, mutton, and pork as a source of food supply, and as a competitive element in the food markets even of this abundant country.

Our fishing rights and liberties along the coasts of Labrador and Newfoundland, as fixed by the treaty of 1818, are rights to be enjoyed in common with the British people, and are such as no other nation has. They are partnership rights, in the intimate character of the association, in their labors and privileges, of our fishermen with theirs. No two nations were ever drawn into a closer relationship, or one in which good-will and mutual forbearance were more. essential to the profitable pursuit of a great industry, than that established between us by the joint struggles of the colonies, confirmed by the treaty of 1783, and renewed, as to ports of Labrador and Newfoundland, almost without restriction, by the treaty of 1818. As to this, by far the most essential part of the rights reserved to us in that treaty, we can no more preserve and enjoy its value to us, under the plan of reprisals, through retaliatory laws, upon British commerce, than copartners can promote their joint business interests by each one attempting constantly to destroy the value of the other partner's share in the venture.

Our vessels and theirs are anchored side by side in the bays, or follow the same schools of fish, and capture them wherever they are found along these coasts. One fisherman entices the fish around his vessel with bait and another comes in and takes what he can with his lines or nets, just as if the whole business was a copartnership. If these vessels belong to countries that are arrayed in commercial hostility based upon retaliatory laws and ready to break out, upon slight provocation, into a war their friendly association will be impossible.

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XI. THE USE OF FLEETS TO INTERPRET A TREATY.

Under the misunderstandings of the past we have on both sides sent fleets to these waters to protect our fishermen against each other and against the unfriendly conduct of the local governments; fleets to enforce agreements that the governments concerned could not expound by a mutual understanding.

If these questions are left open, and commercial war is inaugurated through measures of retaliation, how many ships and guns is it supposed will be needed to keep the peace between our fishermen on the coasts of Labrador and Newfoundland?

The danger in this direction does not come from the desire of either Government to promote a war, but from their inability to prevent its initiation through the personal hostilities of men associated in the use of common rights and privileges, and stimulated by rivalries which are encouraged by laws of retaliation enacted by their respective Governments.

These are some of the dangers against which this treaty wisely makes safe provision.

XII. THE AREA YIELDED BY THE DELIMITATIONS OF THIS TREATY, AS COMPARED WITH THOSE YIELDED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON THEIR CONSTRUCTION OF THE LIMITS OF OUR RENUNCIATION " UNDER THE TREATY OF 1818.

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It is alleged by some that this treaty yields to the British Government 50,000 square miles of exclusive fishing-grounds beyond what we yielded in the treaty of 1818.

Taking the contention of the United States that no headland theory is to be found in the treaty of 1818, and that the exclusive fishing limit is a line 3 miles from the shore, at low water, that enters all harbors, bays, and creeks that are more than 6 miles wide at the entrance, and follows the sinuosities of the coast thereof, this estimate of the area surrendered in this treaty is greatly exaggerated.

This is the narrowest limit to which we have confined our renunciation in the treaty of 1818, of the common right of fishery, in our contentions with Great Britain.

The total area as to which we renounced the common right of fishing, according to this construction of that treaty, is 16,424 nautical square miles.

The additional area of renunciation under the delimitations of the proposed treaty, now before the Senate, is 1,127 square miles, being 6 per cent. addition to the former area of exclusion.

The total area of bays, creeks, and harbors not more than 6 miles wide at their mouths is about 6,599 square miles, and is included in the above-mentioned measurement of 16,424 square miles.

The British claim as the true construction of the agreement in the treaty of 1818, that it fixed the line within which we renounced the common right of fishery at the distance, measured seaward, of 3 miles from the entrance of all bays, harbors, and creeks of His Majesty's dominions. This would add an area of 3,489 square miles to the exclusive fishing grounds claimed by the British Government, while the area in which we have renounced the common right of fishing in those bays, harbors, and creeks under the proposed treaty now before the Senate is 1,127 square miles.

Thus, under the British contention that Government yields, in this treaty, 3,489 square miles of exclusive fishing waters to the people of the United States as a common fishery, and we yield 1,127 square miles to the British Government as exclusive fishing waters, which we now claim to enjoy with them as a common fishery under our construction of the treaty of 1818, which they refuse to admit.

They yield more than two-thirds of their claim to us, and we yield less than one-third of our claim to them, for the sake of settling forever a dispute that has lasted for seventy years, and has been in every way a costly and disturbing contention to our people. (See official statement from the Coast Survey, marked D.)

If these disputed areas were the richest fisheries in the world, the settlement of our respective rights in them, as arranged in the treaty now before the Senate, should be welcomed by the American people with entire satisfaction.

When we know, from the examination and report of the Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, that this disputed area is of no real advantage to our fishermen, and that this statement is supported by conclusive evidence, furnished by the Halifax Commission, and by Professor Baird, our former Commissioner of Fisheries, no ground seems to be left for the contention of those who oppose this settlement.

XIII. THE VIEWS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AS TO THE PROPER EXECUTION OF THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF MARCH 3, 1887, OP

POSED TO THOSE OF THE CAPITALISTS WHO CONTROL OUR FISHING INDUSTRY AND REAP THE GREATEST ADVANTAGES FROM THEM.

The president of the American Fishery Union, in 1887, brought the subject of retaliation to the attention of the President of the 477 United States, and insisted that it should be applied only to the exclusion of British-American fishing products from the markets of the United States. To that demand the President of the United States replied as follows:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, D. C., April 7, 1887.

GENTLEMEN: I have received your letter lately addressed to me, and have given full consideration to the expression of the views and wishes therein contained in relation to the existing differences between the Government of Great Britain and the United States growing out of the refusal to award to our citizens engaged in fishing enterprises the privileges to which they are entitled either under treaty stipulations or the guaranties of international comity and neighborly concession. I sincerely trust the apprehension you express of unjust and unfriendly treatment of American fishermen lawfully found in Canadian waters will not be realized; but if such apprehension should prove to be well founded, I earnestly hope that no fault or inconsiderate action of any of our citizens will in the least weaken the just position of our Government, or deprive us of the universal sympathy and support to which we should be entitled.

The action of this administration since June, 1885, when the fishery articles of the treaty of 1871 were terminated under the notification which had two years before been given by our Government, has been fully disclosed by the correspondence between the representatives and the appropriate departments of the respective Governments, with which I am apprised by your letter you are entirely familiar. An examination of this correspondence has doubtless satisfied you that in no case have the rights or privileges of American fishermen been overlooked or neglected, but that, on the contrary, they have been sedulously insisted upon and cared for by every means within the control of the executive branch of the Government.

The act of Congress approved March 3, 1887, authorizing a course of retaliation, through executive action, in the event of a continuance on the part of the British-American authorities of unfriendly conduct and treaty violations affecting American fisherman, has developed upon the President of the United States exceedingly grave and solemn responsibilities, comprehending highly important consequences to our national character and dignity, and involving extremely valuable commercial intercourse between the British possessions in North America and the people of the United States.

I understand the main purpose of your letter is to suggest that, in case recourse to the retaliatory measures authorized by this act should be invited by unjust treatment of our fishermen in the future, the object of such retaliation might be fully accomplished by “prohibiting Canadian-caught fish from entry into the ports of the United States."

The existing controversy is one in which two nations are the parties concerned. The retaliation contemplated by the act of Congress is to be enforced, not to protect solely any particular interest, however meritorious or valuable, but to maintain the national honour, and thus protect all our people. In this view the violation of American fishery rights and unjust or unfriendly acts towards a portion of our citizens engaged in this business is but the occasion for action, and constitutes a national affront, which gives birth to or may justify retaliation. This measure once resorted to, its effectiveness and value may well depend upon the thoroughness and extent of its application; and in the performance of international duties, the enforcement of international rights. and the protection of our citizens, this Government and the people of the United States must act as a unit, all intent upon attaining the best result of retaliation upon the basis of a maintenance of national honor and duty.

The nation seeking by any means to maintain its honor, dignity, and integrity. is engaged in protecting the right of the people; and if, in such efforts, particular interests are injured and special advantages forfeited, these things should be