a government in which they were not represented, and which would become their natural enemy. Had there been a powerful aristocracy, had there been many free commercial cities,—had there been a great national church, holding political power; it would have been necessary to the peace of the nation, that these powers be represented in Congress. But, as it happened, there was no aristocracy, there was no powerful church, there were no independent cities, there were only two recognized powers, first, the body of the nation, peersspeaking one language, and forming that equal band of freemen who fought the battle of the revolution, and, second, the governing bodies of the States. These latter demanded representation, and received it in the SENATE.

In a government composed in this manner of all the elements of national power, an authority less than imperial cannot be supposed to exist, nor would it require a labored argument to show, that the authority thus constituted is as great as the nation can require, in any exigent of peace or

war.

Containing, in the House, the authority derived from the consent of all the citizens; in the Senate, that which is derived from the governing bodies of the States; and in the Executive, an union of both ;and all limited, and strictly subordinated, by a Constitution, anterior and superior to it, this government stands superior in rank and in kind, to that of any one of the States.

After such a view, the old idea of the federation, that Congress is the creature and tool of the State Governments, falls quite to the ground.

Though it be unquestionably true, then, as the Senator declares, "that the States are constituent parts of the common federal government of the Union, and as such are equals in all respects both in dignity and rights,' ," "this relation in which they tasnd to each other furnishes a strong presumption," not only that they have no combined or separate authority over the territory which extends to the prohibition of slave property; but farther, that the States, separately or in combination, have no power whatever over the territories; since this power lodges properly in Congress and the Executive; and only by their

votes in the Senate have the States any influence in the matter. Senators, in the performance of their duty, defend the rights of their several State governments, but it may well be asked, what good they hope to effect by using a language that implies for the representation of States, in the Senate, a power which belongs to them only in conjunction with the House and the Executive?

And here, in the midst of other matter for question, we stumble upon a new doctrine offered by Mr. Calhoun,—that slave property, "the only species of property recognized," says he, "by the Constitution, (!)—was also "the only one that entered into its formation as a political power," (!) -"and this is the only one that is put under the express guarantee of the Constitution," he adds. And this is offered as a member of an argument limiting the power of Congress over slavery in the territory!

To this the reply is simple,-first, that the word slave' is not used in the Constitution at all, and that it is not literally true that the Constitution recognizes slave property. The Constitution assumed no power over slavery in the States, and would neither recognize, nor not recognize, it. But when it came to apportion representation by population, it was obliged to reckon in all descriptions of persons, without naming them. Democracy professes to believe that a property representation is a false and unjust representation. It is, therefore, necessary for Democracy to explain this slave representation by another theory; and to say that not property, but the life and safety of the slave and his master, taken together as one family, or system, was looked to in the apportion

ment.

After touching upon the foregoing, Mr. Calhoun then repeats the question. "But if it cannot be found in either-if it exists at all, the power must be looked for in the compact which binds these States together in a federal Union. Does that instrument contain any provision which gives the North the power to exclude the South from a free admission into the territories of the United States with its peculiar property, and to monopolize them for its own exclusive use?" To which we reply as before, that the Constitution does not know of

any such power as the North, or the South, or the East, or the West. These are very loose terms, and mean much or little according to the mood we are in. It is, therefore, necessary to substitute for the above question, the following:

of royal charters, to the independent colonies, or to the powers of Europe. They became the property of the nation, after the Revolution, by acts of cession on the part of Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, New York, and other States, and by purchase from France and Spain. The charters of the lands of several of the

Mr. Calhoun several times repeats the question, "where is this absolute power of the North to exclude the South to be found?" To which we reply again, nowhere, and repeat, as before, that North and South are not recognized powers in the government or in the nation. Again, he argues on the passage concerning "rules and regulations :"

"Now, I undertake to affirm, and maintain beyond the possibility of doubt, that, so far from conferring absolute power to govern the territories, it confers no governmental power whatever; no, not a particle. It refers exclusively to territory regarded simply as public lands. Every word relates to it in that character, and is wholly inapplicable to it, considered in any other character but as property. Take the expression 'dispose of,' with which it begins. It is easily understood what it means when applied to lands, and is the proper and natural expression regarding the territory in that character when the object is to confer the right to sell or make other disposition of it. But who ever heard the expression applied to government, and what possible meaning can it have when so applied? Take the next expression, to make all needful rules and regulations.' These regarded separately might indeed be applicable to government in a loose sense; but they are never so applied in the constitution. In every case where they are used in it they refer to property, to things, or some process, such as the rules of the court, or of the House of Congress, for the government of their proceedings, but never to government, which implies persons* to be governed. But, if there should be any doubt in this case, the words immediately following, which restrict them to making 'rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property of the United States,' must effectually expel it. They restrict their meaning beyond the possibility of doubt to territory regarded as property."

The lands which pass under the general title of "Territories belonging to the United States," belonged originally, by virtue

* See page 112 (2).

the lines of these lands crossed each other, so that it had become impossible to make a fair adjustment of the separate claims. Those States that possessed no territory, having made common cause in a war which secured their sister sovereignties in quiet possession, thought it unjust that they themselves should have no share. The controversies on this subject were finally set at rest by acts of cession on the part of several States, by which their private and separate claims to property and juris

diction were vested in the nation. New York was the first to set the example of moderation, and other States followed it at intervals. Out of the territory thus acquired by the people of the United States, were formed the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and others, and the territory west

of these. North Carolina ceded the territory that is now the State of Tennessee. The cession of her own territory by Georgia, in 1802, concluded this difficult series of transactions, by which, more than by any other acts of the States, the nationality of all was settled and confirmed forever.

While the territories remain uninhabited, or are in process of occupation by emigrants, the people of the United States, as a nation, possess a three-fold interest and right in them.

1. First, as the imperial control over all national affairs has been acquired by the act of union or nationalization, which confers upon the general government the powers enumerated and implied by the Constitution.

2. As particular States or foreign sovereigns have ceded their chartered or legitimate sovereignty over their several territories. By these acts of cession, all the powers of a king or a sovereign state over its territory were necessarily transferred to the people or nation of the United States.

3. As owners of the soil, so far

as it has not become the property of individuals, the people, by their Congress, exercise certain rights, limited only by the common rules of ownership, and of purchase and sale.

It appears by this examination, that the authority of the government of this nation is perfect, over the territory which they have acquired, within the guarantees of the Constitution; for it includes the threefold power of imperial control, of state sovereignty, and of ownership.

These three powers of imperial control, of state sovereignty, and of ownership, as they were vested in the nation by a process of law, and are made good by the principles that lie at the foundation of all governments, may, by the same principles, be transferred to other powers; the principles of law and the rule of salutis populi presiding over such transactions in as strict, though in a nobler sense, than over those of individuals.

Thus, if the Congress see fit by treaty to cede the imperial control over any portion of their unoccupied territory to another republic, they can do so; for as they acquired, so they may dispose of the right. Or if government think best to sell the territory which they have in trust for the nation, they can do so without diminution of their imperial and state rights.

And when a certain portion of the national territory is settled by emigrants, able to constitute a government, they can recognize in such persons, and acknowledge by charter or by grant of a constitution, certain rights of franchise and jurisdiction constituting a territorial government, with or without representation in Congress, and limited in such a manner as may seem best; but never with such conditions or limitations affixed, as shall violate rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Finally, if it be shown to Congress that those in whom they did recognize certain rights by granting them franchise and jurisdiction, have so organized their society as to be fully able to protect the inherent liberty of individuals among themselves, to maintain public and private credit, and to administer justice with the requisite authority, Congress may then cede to them in full, that sovereignty which was formerly ceded to the nation, and so constitute them, in every sense of the word, a STATE.

But the peace of society, and the liberty and prosperity of citizens, which governments are intended to maintain, is not established by the sole power of isolated and independent States. Single States, whether free or despotic, standing alone, exist only in a condition of perpetual war, or perpetual alarm.

For the same reason, therefore, that it is necessary for individuals to combine and form States, it is necessary for States to combine and form EMPIRES. The perfection of any empire, or imperial government, is when the separate free States or kingdoms maintain their liberties, without detriment to the Constitution under which they live, be that a free or a despotic Constitution. The lives of the great lawgivers have been spent in efforts to devise the most perfect systems of union, for groups of independent states or kingdoms.

So far, the form of empires and of state unions is one and the same, be the systems of their government monarchical or free. But in their internal organizations we find them affected by various and opposite principles.

In monarchical empires, as in that of the East under Justinian, founded originally upon force, all power was supposed to flow from the monarch, and his will, under the form of a decree, became and constituted the law.

The reason of this derivation is not hard to find; for in the formation of despotic states we observe that the law of conquest lies at the root of the Constitution; rights and franchises are but allowed, and can be resumed, at the pleasure of the imperial will.

In free empires, on the contrary, or as they are usually styled, United Provinces, States, or Leagues, the rights of each State are supposed to be inherent and inviolable. In our own system, beginning with the individual, we concede to all citizens a necessary and inherent liberty; just as in other Leagues and Unions, or constituted Empires, an inherent and inviolable sovereignty and liberty has been conceded to the separate States or members of the league.

The imperial system of the Union was established on a singular, and hitherto unknown principle; namely, the inherent liberty of the individual, and his inviola

bility by any power not flowing out of the direct necessity for preserving and maintaining rights and liberties in all. Every law, under this system, restraining the liberty of any person, is supposed to be necessary to the safety of all. Thus, if it be shown that the unconstitutional freedom of any person endangers the lives, properties, and liberties of citizens, the spirit of our system requires that such person be not allowed his liberty. And if a territory petition to become a free sovereignty, and it be shown, that the petitioners are not powerful or numerous enough, or sufficiently trained and organized, to maintain credit and justice, a Constitution cannot justly be granted them; for the power of the Union was established for the maintenance of order and liberty, and it cannot resign or cede its power into incompetent hands.

For, while the Declaration and the Constitution are founded on the general idea of an inherent right to liberty in every individual, and of an inherent right to sovereignty in every freely organized body of citizens, living under a regular form of law; necessity, and the nature of things -necessity for maintaining liberty and justice in the whole, and the imperfect nature of man, which often disables him from using and enjoying his equal and inherent rights as man-require that great caution and reserve be used, in recognizing these ideal rights; and that in no case they be admitted in practice, until their reality and capability appears in fact; for by acknowledging rights merely ideal, we do but force nature, and destroy that necessary order and gradation by which society is main tained.

No territory, therefore, can be made a sovereignty until it be proved capable, and notwithstanding all demonstration of inherent rights, no liberties can be conceded; for, indeed, the inherent rights of all are to be considered, and the greater necessity extinguishes the less, according to a maxim -Salus, et libertas, Populi suprema lex.

Whether, therefore, the Constitution specify or not that the nation shall have power over its own territory, is a question of subordinate interest. Such power is inherent in the nature of all government, and, in this particular instance, there is no limit imposed upon it by the Constitution.

In conclusion, we are obliged distinctly to disallow what Mr. Calhoun contends, that the system and spirit of this Government limits its power over its territory in the instance before us.

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Mr. Calhoun asserts that the North are in error in supposing that slave territory will be closed to the white labor of the South; that "there is no part of the world where agricultural, mechanical, and other descriptions of labor, are respected than in the South, with the exception of two descriptions of employment-that of menial and body servants." To this we reply, that it does not affect the question. The facts are that freemen will not work on farms, or any employment, in company with slaves. And that is the reason why it is necessary that territories adapted to free labor be guarded. If slavery will not naturally extend itself above 36° 40', then the South will be no loser by that exclusion; but as it has extended itself much farther, and might, for aught that is known to the contrary, take strong root in regions farther north to the ruin of territories unfitted by nature (like Kentucky) for its existence, it was a measure of safeguard to propose a line of division. As this question can never be " settled," but by the greatest forbearance on both sides, and, as Mr. Calhoun argues, that if it be not settled once for all, ruin must ensue; let us then, in some equitable way, make a good ending of the business, and leave each side to work out its own destiny undisturbed by jealousy of the other.

Mr. Calhoun's next argument in order is derived from the clause granting "exclusive legislation" to Congress over the dockyards, arsenals, &c., and "other property belonging to the United States;" which clause he says does not confer what he calls " governmental powers"-a new phrase, and here used in a peculiar sense, in fact, starting a new distinction of powers. "Congress," says the Constitution, "shall exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over the District, &c., and over all places purchased, &c." But says the Senator, Congress may not exercise " 'governmental powers' over places so purchased or ceded. Now of the powers of government there are three kinds, legislative, executive, judicial; they are neces

is the first and necessitates the others; but of any class of powers called governmental we find no record or description.

In regard to the District of Columbia, some doubt still rests in the minds of conscientious legislators whether Congress has full power over it. "But the case is very different in reference to territories," says Mr. C., "lying as they do beyond the limits and jurisdiction of all the States. The United States possess not simply the right of ownership over them, but that of exclusive dominion and sovereignty." A fearful admission! but then on a sudden the Senator recovers his former ground, and starts a new distinction. "6 'It may be proper to remark," says he, "in this connection, that the power of exclusive legislation conferred in these cases must not be confounded with the power of absolute legislation. Absolute power of legislation is always, indeed, exclusive, but it does not follow that exclusive legislation is always absolute. Congress has exclusive power of legislation as far as this government is concerned, and the State legislatures as far as their respective governments are concerned, but we all know that both are subject to many and important restrictions and conditions, which the nature of absolute power excludes." Which places the governments of the States and of the Union upon the same footing, as far as "absolute" power is concerned; the idea of absolute power being thus very justly excluded from that of republican government in any shape; but this does not touch the question whether the nation may not abolish slavery from its territory. On the contrary, if the States have this power in their dominions, though they be not "absolute," much more should the general government, which, though not absolute in any case, being, like the State governments, under the Constitution, is yet vested with the twofold power of State sovereignty and of imperial control over its territory; and in such a view of the matter, Mr. Calhoun's third distinction, like his first and second, falls useless to the ground. He has not yet proved that the Constitution, either directly or by close construction, forbids the general government to exercise those powers which it has acquired over its territory, both by

honestly acquired power; and in this argument we set aside as useless and exploded, the ancient doctrine of "right acquired by conquest;" though if we chose to resort to that doctrine, it would reduce the question to a point that the narrowest understanding might grasp at once.

We now come to the very heart of this subject, to the very policy against which the Senator from South Carolina has opposed this broken chain of suggestion, which he is pleased to regard as a demonstration. By an ordinance of the Confederation in 1787, slavery was excluded from the territory ceded by Virginia. The ordinance, said Mr. Madison, had no constitutional authority; it serves, therefore, only as a landmark to show the opinion of the Congress at that time. It established a precedent for policy only, and not for legal decisions. We regard it only as the first step in the line of a particular policy. By that first step, slavery was excluded from the temperate climates of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, and the territory north-west. That exclusion was the result of the first step of a certain line of policy. It was a compromise, says Mr. Calhoun, conditioning for the delivery of fugitive slaves, as a set-off against the freedom of the territory; and yet he somewhat unguardedly quotes Mr. Madison to prove it valueless; by which procedure he does the slaveholder material injury in removing one of the ancient landmarks of his rights. The history of the transaction does not much help or hinder the arguments on either side. We therefore pass it over. He adds, for all that, that the South acquiesced in the ordinance and observed it strictly; which is a strong proof of its expediency; and now, at this late day, a South Carolina Senator condemns it.

Now follows the Missouri Compromise. The entrance of Missouri as a State was severely contested through the years 181920, when HENRY CLAY ended the war by moving the compromise. It was observed of this statesman, by John Quincy Adams, that in negotiation, and in all difficult affairs where opposite interests and rights were involved, he discovered a peculiar and almost infallible tact: his remedy was always the best that offered. By this compromise he reconciled the two interests