Epicurus was of Opinion, That not the leaft Part of Happinefs confifts in living exempt from Fear; and that this Happiness can be attain'd only by the Knowledge of Na ture: Terrores Animi, tenebrasque neceffe 'st, Non Radii Solis, non lucida tela diei Difcutiant; fed Naturæ Species, Ratioque. Lucrer. lib. 1. V. 147. A These Bugbears of the Mind, this inward Hell, Their Beams abroad, and bring the darksom Soul to Day. Epicurus writes thus to Pythocles: Μὴ ἄλλο τὶ τέλῷ ἐκ το μετεώρων γνώσεως, εἴτε ντ' συναφίω λεγομβύων, εἴτε αὐτοτελῶς, να μίζειν δὲν εἶναι, ὅπερ αταραξίαν, κ πίσιν βέβανον, καθάπερ τὲ ἐπὶ τῶν 2017 And Cicero fays, that by the Knowledge of the Nature of all Things, we are eas'd of Superftition, we are deliver'd from the Fear of Death, we are not difquieted by the Ignorance of Things, which alone is often the Cause of our moft horrid and amazing Terrours. Omnium natura cognita levamur fuperftitione, liberamur mortis metu, non conturbamur ignoratione rerum, è qua ipfa existunt horribiles fæpe formidines, lib. 1. de Fin. Epicurus afferts, That all the Fears that difturb the Minds of Men, proceed from the Belief of Providence, and of Punifhments after Death, which laft is a neceffary Confequence of the former. For who is the Man, that believing that God takes Care of him, does not Day and Night dread the Divine Majefty? See Cicero in Lucullus. This was the Opinion of that mistaken Man, who was wife and knowing in a mad and foolish Philofophy: Against whom, whoever undertakes to difpute, will engage himself in a moft ridicu lous Attempt: For whofoever favours fo abfurd an Opini on, plainly wants common Senfe, and is fit Company only for Lunaticks. The Care and Protection of a gracious Prince, or of a kind Parent, deliver us from Fear and Sorrow, nor do we dread the Good Will of courteous and charitable Men. Whence then this Horrour, to think that we are taken Care of by a moft beneficent and Almighty Deity? Lucretius Lucretius proposes this abfurd Opinion in this firft Book, and after having prepar'd his Reader by an artful Introdu ction, he illuftrates and adorns the Subject, of which he had unhappily made Choice. Ver. 181. He endeavours to prove by ten Arguments, That Nothing is made of Nothing, and that Nothing returns into Nothing. I confefs he is ingenious in the Invention, and copious in the Explication of them, but he does by no means come up to the Matter: For let us grant, I. That every Thing can not proceed from every Thing. II. That Things are produc'd at fixt and certain Seafons: III. That they require Time to grow: And, IV. Matter to make them grow. V. That Bounds are fet to Strength and Life. VI. That the Earth becomes more fertile by Culture, and by the Induftry of Men. VII, That nothing dies, unless itbe diffolv'd by fome Force, VIII. That Animals can not be born daily, unless they be renew'd by certain Seeds. IX. That one and the fame Strength is not able to diffolve all Things: And, X. laftly, That Nature does not produce any Thing, unless fhe be affifted by the Death of another; Let us, I fay, grant all this, and what will it avail Lucretius? Will he conclude, that the Seeds themselves were not made of Nothing? Or that No. thing is order'd by the Will and Providence of the Deity? He can rationally conclude neither; and thus his ten Arguments come to Nothing: Not indeed for any want of Wit or Artfulness on his Part, but thro' the Weakness of the Cause it self, which he undertook to support. Ver. 316. He admirably well defends his fubtile and mi. nute Seeds against fuch as believe their Senfes only: And, v. 381. he evinces, that there is a Void, by four Arguments, than which no Man yet ever brought more convincing. I have never seen any thing that could be reply'd to the first and fourth of them: But indeed the fecond and third are not of the fame Validity. Ver. 472. He confirms by two Arguments, that Nothing is, befides Body and Void: And whatever elfe others allow to be Things, he confines to the Clafs of Accidents; which fubfift, and are diftinguifh'd from Body and Void by the Imagination only. But here he cunningly fuppofes what he ought to prove: That Body only can act and fuffer, touch, and be touch'd: For the Souls of Men, and all immaterial Subftances contradict this Definition. Ver. 527. He in many Arguments afcribes perfect Soli dity to his Atoms: Nor do I deny it. But there is no Reafon to believe, that therefore they can not be diffolv'd: For the Solidity of the Seeds proceeds from the immediate Contact of their Parts: But in all concrete Bodies the Contact of the Parts is allow'd to be at leaft equal to that, which is between the Parts of the Seeds. And therefore concrete Bodies fhould be equally, and no more liable to Diffolution than the Seeds themselves. The other Arguments, by which he afferts the Eternity of his Atoms, are built on a falfe Suppofition: He affumes what he ought to prove: And when he at length flies to what they call a Mathematical Leaft, v. 630. he indeed preffes hard on his Adverfaries, and reduces them to great Difficulties, but is reduc'd to no lefs Streights himself. Ver. 668. He triumphs over Heraclitus, Empedocles, A naxagoras, and others: At length, v. 960. he imploys a long Difputation, to prove the Univerfe, which confifts of Body and Void, to be infinite: And here he is very copious in his Arguments against the Stoicks, who held a Centre in the infinite Univerfe, and defcribes the Opinions of Epicurus with a great Deal of Eloquence: But they being all built on falfe Suppofitions, fall together to the Ground. Then he banishes the Antipodes, which a truer Philofophy and Experience have long fince recall'd, and fettled in their Antient Abodes. However he fooths with his Arguments the Imagination of Man, which delights to be led away into an Infinite, and never yet fix'd any Bounds to Space, nor ever will dare to do fo The END of the Firft BooK. OF THE NATURE OF THINGS. BOOK II. The Argument of the Second Book. ROM V.1 to v. 63, Lucretius exhorts his Memmius to the Study of Philofophy, which alone can alleviate our Cares and Anxieties, and deliver the Mind from Fears. II. He difputes concerning the Properties or Qualities of his Seeds or Atoms; the firft of which is Motion: That Seeds move is demonftrated from the Generation of Things. But their Motion is downwards; for all Seeds are Heavy. But when Solid Seeds meet, they muft of Neceffity rebound every Way from one another. Thus fome Seeds happen to unite and join together, and thofe, whofe Union is moft clofe, compofe the Things that are hard and dense; but the Seeds whofe Connexion is more loofe, make those that are soft and rare. But fome Seeds never combine into one, but like the Motes which we fee in the Beams of the Sun, are in perpetual Motion, flying to and fro in the Void, and inceffantly ftrike and drive up and down other Atoms and themfelves. Thefe Arguments end at v. 133. III. He explains the Swiftnefs of the Seeds that tend downwards, to v. 160. IV. Then to v. 177, he feverely, according to his ufual Method, falls upon thofe who acknowledge a Divine 2 Land maling Providence. V. He refimes his Argument, and to v. 209, afferts, That all Bodies tend downwards. VI. To v. 280, he fhews, That the Seeds, as they tend downwards, decline a little from the ftrait Line for unless they did fo, nothing at all, at leaft no free Agent could ever be produc'd. VII Then to v. 318, he teaches, That the Seeds ftill move in the fame Motion, in which they have mov'd from all Eternity: And that no Man ought to diftruft this Opinion, because he does not fee the Motion, fincel even the Seeds themselves can not be perceiv'd. Figure is the fecond Property or Quality of the Seeds: And he To vproves, VIII. to v. 454; That all Seeds are not of the fame Figure; but that Come are round, fome fquare, fome fmooth, fome rough, fome hook'd,&c. And he shews at large, What Figures compose bitter Bodies, what fweet, what hard, what foft. IX. To v. 546, That this Variety: of Figures is not infinite, but that the Seeds of the fame Figure are infinite; that it is to fay, that the round are infinite, the Square infinite, &c. X. In the next Place, to v. 678, he proceeds to fhew, That Things are not compos'd of Atoms of the fame Figure; and proves by feveral Arguments, That Compound Bodies contain Seeds of different Figures. XI. Then he teaches, That Seeds have none of thofe Qualities, which we call fenfible, as Colour, Tafte, Cold, Heat, &c. ( i |