In the vital and important matter of armament the English ships possessed a great advantage. The deliberate policy of Drake and those who were developing the new sailing navy had been to increase the gun-power with a view to the adoption of new tactics. They proposed to substitute heavy gun fire at a distance for the musket, pike, and sword at olose quarters. All recent changes in the armaments had been made with this object, and had tended to add to the size of the guns and the weight of the broadside. It was this superior fighting power, coupled with superior skill rather than superior speed, which gave the advantage to the Elizabethan seamen. History is repeating itself, and the tendency now is to increase the size of the gun and the weight of the broadside with a view to increasing decisive ranges. The whole course of the war showed that the English personnel were greatly superior to the Spanish. Not only was this true of the subordinate officers and seamen, but especially so of the leaders. Drake was undoubtedly the greatest seaman of his age, and he was supported by such men as Hawkyns, Frobisher, and Fenner, who were second only to him. The superiority seems to have been largely due to the difference of the spirit which animated the two countries at this time. England was aglow with the spirit of the renaissance. She was the England of Spenser, of Shakespeare, and of Francis Bacon, seething with the spirit of in quiry and of the new learning the England of individual initiative. On the other hand, Spain embodied the spirit of the counter-reformation, which discouraged inquiry and repressed individuality. Her Government was an autocracy, which interfered in the smallest details and was centralised to an extreme degree, with the result that the control, authority, and responsibility of the executive officers were weakened, and corruption prevailed to an extent almost beyond belief. The war was, in fact, a struggle between cultured individuality and ignorant, corrupt despotism, which can be best understood by reference to the almost exact parallel afforded by the present war between cultured Japan and ignorant Russia. an It has been already explained that when day broke on the 21st the English found themselves to windward with the wind at W.N.W. They soon bore down to the attack and concentrated on the windward Spanish ships, which seem to have hauled to the wind on the port tack to receive them. Being faster and more weatherly, the English seem to have ranged past in more or less line ahead, pouring a superior fire into the more slowly moving Spaniards, who, with their inferior gunpower and lack of tactical skill, were unable to make an effective reply. Two attacks were made, neither being pressed home, and the English fleet then assumed an expectant attitude to windward. Medina Sidonia's orders were to join Parma, and not to fight Drake unless attacked. He therefore now bore up, leaving this unbeaten enemy to follow and harass him. This sealed the fate of the expedition, for its only hope of success lay in first destroying the English fleet. Howard and Drake followed, ready to pick up stragglers or fight if opportunity offered. On the 23rd there was an action off St Alban's Head, followed by another off Portland on the 24th, and a third off the Wight on the 25th, which last seems to have frustrated any intention they may have had of seizing an anchorage off that island. On the 27th the Armada anchored off Calais. The result of these actions had established the superiority of the English in fighting power. The Spaniards had lost three capital ships, including two flag-ships, and had been so harassed during their retreat that their morale must have been seriously impaired. Howard and Drake anchored to windward, and were joined by Seymour with his light division. Medina Sidonia had obeyed Philip's orders: he had joined Parma, and might have overpowered Seymour alone, but so long as Howard was present, and undefeated, Parma could not move. On the night of the 28th eight improvised fire-ships were sent in and completed the Spanish demoralisation. Medina Sidonia signalled his fleet to cut their cables, which they did. In the morning they were off Gravelines, closely followed by the English, who drove them with great loss into the North Sea, whence such as were not wrecked made their way northabout home to Spain. The Spanish losses were enormous: of the 130 ships which left Corunna 63 were reported as lost; the loss of life was in still greater proportion, and must be reckoned in thousands. The English losses were insignificant: their ships were uninjured, and the number of their killed and wounded amounted to only sixty in all. The disparity and the losses may be usefully compared with those at the recent battle of Tsushima. The leading features of the war between England and Spain 1587-88 have been given in some detail, because the lessons which they teach have been confirmed and extended not only during the Nelsonian era, but by the experience of the steam-propelled navies of the present day. The attempted invasion of Great Britain by Napoleon in 1804-5 bore a striking resemblance to the "enterprise of England" arranged by Philip the Second. The whole resources of France, with assistance from Holland, Belgium, Italy, and Spain, were devoted to the undertaking during more than two years, and were directed by the greatest military genius of the age. The army of Napoleon, like that of Parma, was assembled on the shores of the Channel, at ports where the sea passage would be the shortest and the uncertainties of the the In voyage the least. For Dun- to sea. The result was kirk and Nieuport were substi- striking vindication of tuted Boulogne and other great Elizabethan seaman. adjacent harbours as ports of 1587 he had counselled seizing embarkation. The transports a base and maintaining a were again to be small oar- squadron on the coast of Spain, propelled craft, but in much with a view to a vigorous greater numbers, as the invad- offensive. Instead of following army was to muster one ing his advice а defensive hundred and thirty thousand attitude was assumed, with men. Like the fleet of Medina the result that the Spanish Sidonia, the capital ships to navy was allowed to concencover the passage of the trans- trate, and the Armada actually ports across the narrow seas reached the narrow seas. In were to come from various 1805 his strategy was followed Mediterranean and Atlantic in every particular. Gibraltar ports, among which they were was already a British possesnecessarily distributed to ob- sion, and was of great service tain facilities for shipbuilding as a base for the ships emand repair. ployed in the Mediterranean. The British fleets assumed the offensive, and defeated the enemy before they could concentrate and reach the Channel. In 1588 the British success was largely due to superior armaments and superior skill. In 1805 no such superiority in armaments existed, as the ships were practically equal. Success in this case seems to have been attributable superior skill arising out of the strategy which, apart from preventing concentration, confined the enemy to his ports. The result was explained by Thucydides in Perikles' speech to the Athenians concerning the Peloponnesians : To meet and defeat the plans of Napoleon the light squadron of Lord Henry Seymour in the narrow seas found its counterpart in the squadron under Lord Keith, with this important difference that as ships of the line were to be found in the Dutch ports, corresponding capital ships were placed under his orders. These covered his frigates and sloops, which might otherwise have been driven away by the ships of the line, thus leaving the passage free for the flotilla of transports. rons The concentration of the French fleet was prevented by strategy precisely in асcordance with the teaching of Drake. The British squadmaintained a a ceaseless watch off the enemy's ports, and "impeached the joining together" of Napoleon's fleets. Nelson off Toulon and Cornwallis off Brest, not to mention others, stood ready to fight or pursue any ships which put to "They will not easily acquire the art of seamanship; even you yourselves, who have been practising ever since the Persian war, are not yet perfect. How can they, who might run the risk, trusting to their numbers and forgetting their inex perience; but if they are kept off the sea by our superior strength, their want of practice will make them unskilful, and their want of skill timid. Maritime skill is like skill of other kinds, not a thing to be cultivated by the way or at chance times it is jealous of any other pursuit which distracts the mind for an instant from itself." The present Russo-Japanese war again confirms with added emphasis the lessons taught by the Armada campaign, and especially the necessity of being ready to assume the offensive by land as well as by sea without delay. In their maritime aspect these two wars bear a striking resemblance. In both cases the possibility of war had been foreseen for some years, and active preparations had been in progress for some months previous to the outbreak of hostilities. Russia underrated the power of Japan as did Spain that of England, and equally failed to make adequate preparations in time. On the other hand, Japan was better prepared than was England in 1588. Not only was her navy more ready, but her army was equally so, and added to her sea-power a strength which it is difficult to overestimate. Japan broke off diplomatic relations on February 6, 1904. On the same day Togo put to sea from Sasebo with his whole force. About midnight on the 8-9th the Japanese destroyers attacked the Russian fleet lying outside Port Arthur, and seriously damaged two battleships and a cruiser. The attack was as disastrous to Russia, VOL CLXXVIII.-NO. MLXXVII. and as unexpected and farreaching in its effect, as was Drake's attack on Cadiz. Togo had struck the first blow, and had put into the Mikado and "his people courage and boldness not to fear any invasion in his own country." But he intended to continue "to impeach the provisions" of Russia and to remain on the coast, as Drake recommended but was not allowed to do. To this end he established a base on the coast of Korea, and later nearer to Port Arthur at the Elliot Islands, whence he maintained a vigorous offensive against every ship which issued from Port Arthur. Using ships of all classes for the work to which each was suited, he gradually established such an ascendancy in those seas that Russian ships dare not leave the vicinity of the port. Both destroyers and torpedo - boats shared the fate of the battleships, and were eventually "bottled up." While Togo's crews became more skilful and his ships more efficient under the pressure of constant cruising, the Russian officers and men confined to port deteriorated, and probably lost what little skill and nerve they originally possessed. It was a striking example of the teaching of Drake and the practice of St Vincent, and proved that the change from sails to steam has not altered the fundamental principles of war. On February 8, the same day on which the attack on the fleet off Port Arthur was delivered, the Japanese army L began to disembark at Chemulpo. These troops were the advanced-guard of the force which ultimately captured Port Arthur and destroyed the Russian fleet. This could not have been done by the navy alone without the help of the army. The destruction of the Russian fleet was a matter of vital importance, because so long as they were capable of fighting Togo had to reckon with them, and this would have added greatly to the difficulty of dealing with the Baltic fleet. Port Arthur fell on January 2, and he was free to devote his whole attention to Rojdestvensky. Sufficient facts are not yet known to permit a full discussion of the Russian movements and of the battle of Tsushima on May 27; but the general similarity of the conditions to those of the Armada is striking. On putting to sea the Russians, like the Spaniards, were in difficulties, which showed that they were a mere mob of ships commanded and manned by men unaccustomed to the sea, and unskilled not only in working their guns but in managing their ships. They were equally encumbered by a number of store ships, colliers, and other nonfighting vessels. Whether Rojdestvensky was ordered to fight, or, like Medina Sidonia, was directed to try to reach Vladivostok without an engagement, is not known. It was probably fear of missing him and doubts as to his own coal-supply which kept Togo at Tsushima. Analogous reasons for coal substitute provisions-caused Howard to return to Plymouth directly the northerly wind failed him during his dash for the coast of Spain. The accounts of the battle are not yet sufficiently detailed to permit a final judgment, but they indicate that the Russian defeat was primarily due to the same causes as was the defeat of the Armada in 1588-superior gunfire and superior skill. The results confirm the lessons taught by the action of August 10 and by peace experiments. The gun is the only weapon of the battleship. No ship, however large and however thickly armoured, can stand up against the fire of a battleship's broadside properly served. The only efficient reply is a superior concentration of fire, which means as many effective guns as possible, coupled with superior tactics. To what extent the Whitehead torpedo and the asserted Japanese superiority of speed added to the result must remain an open question until the details of the battle are known and analysed. Hasty deductions are much to be deprecated. Unless care is taken, results may be ascribed to superior speed which should be assigned to lack of tactical skill on the opposite side. It is not to be forgotten that conclusions were drawn from the battle of Lissa in 1866 which which misled naval opinion for a generation, a generation, and have since been proved to be entirely unsupported by fact. This rapid sketch may perhaps suggest the thought that, while an altogether sudden and |