are not great. The experience really an education in itself. of the Japanese navy during It is noteworthy that by such the present war has proved a competent observer as Prothat steam fleets in time of fessor Main of the Portsmouth war pass quite as much time College the men produced in at sea as did the sailing fleets. the past were considered to It is believed that the crews of have an extraordinary capacity certain ships did not set foot for hard mental work when on shore for months. Ships a distinct object was to be may be somewhat less uncom- gained. fortable now than they were in the past, but life on land is now more luxurious, so that the differences between life afloat and ashore are unchanged. It is this that tells the restraint and confinement especially rather than the absolute amount of discomfort.

Another well-known and important advantage of going

sea young is that boys acquire quickly the habit of command and a knowledge of men and things, coupled with a quickness of eye and a readiness of resource which do not come so easily later in life. This argument only holds in the case of those who are allowed to take their proper share in the duties of the ship, as was the practice in the past. Unfortunately there arose a custom of abandoning this practical training in favour of mere book knowledge. This was brought about largely by the pressure of men who, having little or no sea experience, were unable to appreciate the value of practical training. These argued that naval officers were not taught to think under the old system. It was forgotten that they were trained to observe, and acquired habits of order and a knowledge of men and things which was

to

It will be interesting and useful to trace the gradual change in naval education which has taken place during the last century. At the close of the French war in 1815 cadets were entered between the ages of 12 and 14. Some were sent straight to sea, others to the college at Portsmouth where they underwent a course of instruction for two years. Between the two classes existed much antagonism, doubtless due to the diverging lines of thought produced by difference of training, and not allayed by the advantages accruing to the successful "Collegians." These advantages varied from time to time. At one period the cadet who passed out first was awarded a gold medal, which carried with it a lieutenant's commission on passing in seamanship at the age of nineteen. This was found to be too great a prize to be won at the age of fourteen or fifteen, and was abolished. In 1835 the maximum reward to the most successful cadet was a silver medal and one year's time. After serving six years at sea, including any sea time allowed for meritorious passing out of the college, and being nineteen years of age, they were ex

amined vivá voce to ascertain fell the Crimean War, and the changes from sail to steam, from smooth-bores to rifled guns, from wooden ships of the line to armoured battleships. If war had been studied, and higher education of the right kind properly encouraged, during the period 1839-59, the reader is asked to reflect on the difference in progress which might have resulted during the eventful period 1859-85,-between 1859, when the Warrior, the first ironclad, was laid down, and 1885, when the imminence of war with Russia exposed the backward state of the navy and initiated the naval renaissance. Quite twenty years are required to give full effect to radical changes in an educational system. Would minds trained to deal with the fundamental principles of war have clung to sails quite so long? or misreading the lessons of the American Civil War, have sanctioned the building of ships fit only for coast defence? or have failed to acquire a thorough knowledge of the new motive power? or have depreciated the efforts of the late Admiral Colomb to direct naval thought to the study of tactics and strategy? It is a noteworthy fact that the neglect to study war systematically continued until the year 1900, when the Board of Admiralty directed a war course to be started at Greenwich College. It is true that the Order of January 1873 establishing the College for the higher education of naval officers contained this clause :

:

whether their practical know-
ledge was sufficient to qualify
them for the charge of a ship
at sea.
No other qualifications
were required. Beyond the
above two years at the Ports-
mouth College - which was
abolished in 1837-and the
desultory instruction given by
naval instructors to the limited
number of midshipmen borne in
large ships, no further educa-
tional facilities were given.
The officers produced were good
practical seamen, and the so-
called "Collegians" possessed
a grounding in mathematics,
navigation, and cognate sub-
jects; but the majority lacked
the knowledge of the higher
branches of their profession,
including war, which their pre-
decessors had acquired during
the long struggles of the
eighteenth century. War and
its requirements dropped more
and more out of sight during
the long peace.
The leading
men were left to educate them-
selves, and did so. The Admir-
alty gave them no assistance
or encouragement until 1839,
when men began to have a
glimmering of the necessity
for a higher education. The
Portsmouth College was then
reopened, not for cadets but
for a certain number of
officers and mates who were
to be instructed for one year.
The education given was nar-
row, and was limited chiefly
to mathematics, navigation,
astronomy, steam, and fortifica-
tion. War was not studied,
and the importance of naval his-
tory was quite unappreciated.

To the men thus trained

10. Naval history and tactics, including naval signals and steam evolutions. But so little attention was paid to this that it was not included in the Regulations dated November 1888. The Navy was too much occupied with questions connected with the material to trouble about such matters as strategy and tactics! May this not have been due to the influence of the "Collegians," whose mathematical training would fit them to deal with questions connected with ships and their fittings, but would neither help them much in the study of war nor turn their thoughts in that direction? The late Sir Cooper Key, the most distinguished "Collegian," was the first President of the Greenwich College, and, as has been shown by the late Admiral Colomb, never fully understood the fundamentals of naval strategy. This must have been due to some extent to his education,

as his ability and capacity were undoubted. It is significant that he was First Sea Lord in 1885, and had been so since 1879. May it be that the Navy's distrust of the "Collegians" was to some extent well founded in that the higher education which they favoured was not of the right kind?

The Crimean War reacted powerfully on the naval mind, and paved the way for many innovations steam, armour, and the rifled gun-and for educational reform. The system of entry and education, which had enjoyed a struggling existence from the year 1729 until its abolition in 1837, was again introduced in 1857. But instead of the Portsmouth College, a harbour trainingship-eventually the Britannia -was used. The age on entry remained practically the same from 1815 until 1898, when a material increase was made. The facts are as follows:

Age on going to sea.

14 to 16

13

11 15

14

" 15

14

15

15
11 16
1519 1610

"I

these appear to have passed through the Portsmouth Academy, with its two years' course of instruction.

It may be noted that during the eighteenth century the age on going to sea varied between ten and seventeen, those who did not join the Academy em- Up to the time of actually barking generally younger than going to sea no great difference those who did. Keppel was existed between the College ten; Rodney, Hawke, and Nelson, system of 1815 and the twelve; Jervis, thirteen; Dun- Britannia course of 1898. It can and Keith, fifteen; Dun- is true that in 1868 a sea-going donald, seventeen. Not one of training-ship was introduced,