in the name of the people of England, that the General, the officers, and the soldiers, have merited the national thanks; and the Speaker of the House of Commons transmits to the General in chief the thanks rendered to the army by the legislative body. If a monument ought to be erected to the memory of a departed hero, the parliament expresses its wish, which it transmits to the supreme chief of the executive power, who orders the erection of the memorial. The King, the source of all honour, confers a peerage on the descendants of Abercromby: but, when he desires to annex to it an annual pension, he makes the demand of the Commons, because they alone have the right to consent to any new charges imposed on the people;-and the House accedes to the wish of the Prince.

Thus we see the parliament of England, as great and as generous as the Roman senate, confer on those warriors, who have deserved well of their country, recompences worthy of a great nation.'

It is contended, however, immediately afterward, that these honours have been sometimes debased by being bestowed on unworthy objects and trivial actions.

Policy of England in reference to her Colonies.

The British government looks on the greater part of her foreign possessions only as advanced posts, intended to supplant, during peace, the commerce of her rivals; in order to destroy the marine of other nations, and to facilitate an invasion of the territory of any people who may become her enemy. Thus the rock of Heligoland at the entrance of the Baltic, and those of Gibraltar and Malta, the one at the opening and the other in the middle of the Mediterranean, are both expensive establishments in all respects: but they are at the centre or in the defiles of European navigation; and nothing should prevent the conquerors of the sea from displaying there the standard of their sovereign.

The Cape of Good Hope was to Holland what the Isle of France was to us, a military station of the highest importance; and these two posts form in some degree the military foci of the navigation of the East Indies. England knows the value of these positions; and, even if their former possessors, in their fortunate revenge, should carry their victorious ships into the Thames and the Medway, I doubt whether the cabinet of St. James's would consent to the restitution of these two important stations.'

In the chapter on the English Cavalry, we find some curious statements and observations. It appears that in England there are sixteen horses for every hundred human beings, whereas in France there are only seven to every hundred. The breed of the French horses is also much inferior to those of this country; and they are said to owe their superior quality to the care which is taken of them by the English

horse

horseman; who, it is observed, cherishes nearly as much as the Mameluke and the Arabian the companion of his fatigue. This amelioration of the English race of horses, says M. ĎuPIN, is the happy fruit of only a few years of attention, and affords us a striking example, which ought to excite the emulation of every friend of the public good and of the national glory. Since 1815, our studs have degenerated to the most deplorable condition.'-The harness used in this country is also a subject for panegyric: but the English horse-soldier, although able to mount and to manage his horse, is not adroit in the use of his arms, and in this respect is far below the French cavalier. We suppose that M. DUPIN learned this fact from some of the cavaliers who escaped from the field of Waterloo.

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Foreign Troops. On this subject, interesting to the author probably from considerations and reflections on the Swiss Guards, he enters at considerable length; and he vindicates the British from certain accusations and insinuations, generally circulated and credited in France: namely, that we were indebted for most of our successes to the mercenary troops in our pay, which composed a large portion of our regiments; and that those regiments in particular, which were composed of foreigners only, were always placed in the van, and in all difficult and dangerous situations.

In 1812, the British ministry incorporated in the 10th light dragoons a certain number of Germans who were made prisoners in the midst of French troops. The parliament immediately took the alarm, and a most animated discussion ensued on the employment of foreigners in the national ranks. "To mix them in the same regiment with Britons," General Tarleton proudly exclaimed, "is to mix base metal with silver, or with pure gold. Let the government maintain as many foreigners as it pleases, but always leave to them the title of mercenaries."

The ministers, unable to resist these attacks, proposed to submit to the Commons a statement of all foreigners enrolled in the English regiments; from which it appeared that, in an army of 200,000 Britons, only 31 officers and 393 privates were foreigners, and these last were mostly men of colour and musicians. I insist on this point, because it is believed on the Continent that the troops of Great Britain are in a large part mercenaries.'

After some other remarks, highly complimentary to this country, M. DUPIN again observes; 'It was therefore through great ignorance or very bad faith that many men, during the last war, continually represented to us that the British army was composed of mixed hordes, which the genius of a Hannibal alone would be able to conduct par la ruse to victory: they required for this end no such famous leader.

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Distinctive Characters of the Troops of England, Scotland, and Ireland.

The Englishman is habituated to the most substantial food; roast beef, strong beer, little bread, and some potatoes: this is his usual diet; and he must have it whether he be in camp or in a town, or at least equivalent food; he goes on well only on this plan, but so kept he can support great fatigue.

The Scotsman, fed in his own country with little or no meat, with fish, herbs, potatoes, and oatmeal, is more sober and not less robust than the Englishman, and can better resist privations. The native of a rigorous and cold climate, he dreads only the ravages of too high a temperature. The lowland Scotsman has these advantages and this inconvenience in comparison with an Englishman; and the same comparison holds between the highlander and the Scotsman.

:

The Irishman, fed with potatoes, vegetables, and sometimes with a little meat, has, like the Scots soldier, but slight care for his subsistence. He is also tall in stature, and possesses great bravery he may be called a French grenadier, but a grenadier stupified by the wretched constitution of his country. He is too often noisy, drunken, quarrelsome, and debauched; while the Scotsman is methodical, reserved, and measured both in his words and in his actions.'

This picture of Ireland we must consider as too strongly outlined; and, as to the roast beef among the English poor, or even the well fed soldiers, we are afraid that it is not so plentiful as M. DUPIN describes it to be.

Next ensues a statement of the daily rations of a British soldier, his weekly pay, and the annual charge for each man. The dress is then described, and highly commended, particularly the jacket and cap; the latter of which, in consequence of the peak before and behind, the one defending the eyes from the sun, and the other guarding the neck from rain, is said to add much to the comfort of the soldier, while it protects him from many grievous maladies.

Comparison between the Losses of the French and the English Armies during certain Periods of the war.-After a variety of interesting particulars respecting the recruiting and various modes of raising the English regular army, the author thus proceeds:

We have, then, for the mean annual loss of 100,000 English troops, during the last six years of the war, the following results:

It is deserving of observation that this amount does not surpass the annual loss during the whole war of ten years, so much as I per cent.' (M. DUPIN says 9 per cent., but he must mean th per cent.)

'Let us now reflect for a moment on the proportions which we have established. Let it be remarked that, at the same epoch, the French army required for its annual supply not fewer than 150,000 men, while the English army required merely 23,000; and this number, so small, not only replaced all its losses but increased its total 7000 annually.

I have known French officers who have deemed it impracticable to keep armies on foot without a much greater expense of men; and, from the experience which they have drawn from the operations of the Conscription, they suppose it to be impossible to maintain troops complete, and in active service, with a loss of less than one-fifth of the whole number annually.

But, if we reflect on the divers means employed by the English government to administer to the necessities of the soldier, and on the prudence of their military chiefs, who never require from their men any exertion which surpasses the just limits of their powers, we shall cease to be astonished at the comparatively small loss of the British army.'

We might select a great variety of other interesting facts and observations from the first volume of this work: but it is time to turn our attention to the second, in which the author passes in review the entire military establishment of Great Britain; treating in succession of the moral force of the army, of our military schools and asylums, exercises, small arms, the artillery, military arsenals, corps of engineers, fortifications, &c. He commences with an observation frequently made, and which we believe to be very just; viz. that the generality of men judge of the valour of troops, and of the skill of a commander, only by the result of particular actions, or by the general events of a campaign. The victorious army always appears to them heroic; while the vanquished troops, by their defeat, are sure of being placed in an opposite point of view. On this principle, the English army, in the estimation of foreigners, has been sometimes classed among the bravest and best troops of Europe; and at others, as in the case of the repeated defeats of the Duke of York, they have been ranked among the most feeble.'

The latter feeling was very general in the French army at the commencement of the late war, and was encouraged by Bonaparte and all his military chiefs; so that, as we have already stated, any man who had dared to have contended for the valour of the English soldier would have been reckoned a bad Frenchman, and have suffered for his temerity. The author continues:

• The

• The expedition to Egypt took place: a French General, incapable of succeeding to the two great captains who commanded before him, attacked without prudence the troops which he despised; and Egypt was lost. Some years afterward, General Stewart disembarked in Calabria; and General Regnier, who knew, in most cases, how to unite prudence with bravery, suffered himself to be led on by a blind confidence. Apparently dreading nothing so much as being too late to annihilate an enemy so easily vanquished, he did not even allow his troops time to recover from their fatigue. The battle commenced, and the result convinced him that he had imprudently mistaken his foe. The same persuasion lost to the troops of Junot the battle of Vimeira, and, as a consequence, the possession of all Portugal.'

It

That all these battles were lost to the French, we "nothing doubt;" and that the enemy had made a false estimate of the valour of our troops, and the skill of our commanders, is perhaps not less certain: but that a more correct estimate would have changed the fortune of the day we are little disposed to believe, notwithstanding the authority before us. is, indeed, rather amusing to see how M. DUPIN exercises his ingenuity in accounting for the loss of different battles, when the solution of his difficulties might be given in a few words; -the bravery of the English troops, and the skill and valour of their officers.

Peculiar Characteristics of French and English bravery.

In general, the bravery of the British soldier has less of éclat, of impetuosity, and of audacity, than that of our warriors: but it possesses all the energy and advantages of constancy; and it is perseverance, not less than intrepidity, that brings to a termination the bloody struggles of nations, particularly with the troops of the present day. It must be admitted that, after the French, such as they have been in our armies for the last twenty-four years, the English are the most active troops in Europe: but their activity has not in it those prodigious efforts of which we have so many times offered such memorable examples. Yet it is an

activity which admits of no intermission, which is always the same, and which will produce at the end of a given time a sum of results much greater than we might expect from the most brilliant isolated action.

• The British soldier has generally less natural spirit and penetration than a French soldier: but the fixedness of his mind renders his actions more measured. Less distracted with the view of exterior objects, with reflections on the past, or with the hopes and fears of the future, he is always and every where the same. More attentive to actual command, he compensates for the inferiority of his intelligence. Incapable of judging of the great movements which he is executing, and, above all, of those which are made for or against him, the danger of the future never paints itself in his

thoughts;