than that of giving illustration and interest to those principles; and that to invent principles with a view to particular cases, whether with the motive of attacking or arraigning a transitory cabinet, is a baseness which will scarcely be attributed to THE FRIEND by any one who understands the work, even though the suspicion should not have been precluded by a knowledge of the author. ESSAY XI. Ja, ich bin der Atheist und Gottlose, der einer imaginären Berechnungslehre, einer blosen Einbildung von algemeinen Folgen, die nie folgen können, zuwiderlügen will, wie DESDEMONA sterbend log; lügen und betrügen will, wie der für Orest sich darstellende PyLADES; Tempel raub unternehmen, wie DAVID; ja, Aehren ausraufen am Sabbath, auch nur darum, weil mich hungert, und das Gesetz um des menschen willen gemacht ist, nicht der Mensch um des Gezetzes willen. JACOBI an FICHTE. Translation.—Yes, I am that Atheist, that godless person, who in opposition to an imaginary Doctrine of Calculation, to a mere ideal Fabric of general Consequences, that can never be realized, would lie, as the dying DESDEMONA lied;* lie and deceive as PYLADES • Emelia.-0 who hath done This deed? Desd. Nobody. I myself. Farewell. Commend me to my kind Lord.-O-farewell. when he personated Orestes; would commit sacrilege with DAVID; yea and pluck ears of corn on the Sabbath, for no other reason than that I was fainting from lack of food, and that the Law was made for Man and not Man for the Law. JACOBI's Letter to FICHTE. If there be no better doctrine, I would add! -Much and often have I suffered from having ventured to avow my doubts concerning the truth of certain opinions, which had been sanctified in the minds of my hearers, by the authority of some reigning great name: even though in addition to my own reasons, I had all the greatest names from the Reformation to the Revolution on my side. I could not, therefore, summon courage, without some previous pioneering, to declare publicly, that the principles of morality taught in the present work will be in direct opposition to the system of Othello.-You heard her say yourself, It was not I. Emilia.-THE MORE ANGEL SHE! the late Dr. Paley. have deferred to a future time, if my opinions on the grounds of international morality had not been contradictory to a fundamental point in Paley's System of moral and political Philosophy. I mean that chapter which treats of GENERAL CONSEQUENCES, as the chief and best criterion of the right or wrong of particular actions. Now this doctrine I conceive to be neither tenable in reason nor safe in practice: and the following are the grounds of my opinion. This confession I should First; this criterion is purely ideal, and so far possesses no advantages over the former systems of morality: while it labours under defects, with which those are not justly chargeable. It is ideal: for it depends on, and must vary with, the notions of the individual, who in order to determine the nature of an action is to make the calculation of its general consequences. Here, as in all other calculation, the result depends on that faculty of the soul in the degrees of which men most vary from each other, and which is itself most affected by accidental advantages or disadvantages of education, natural talent, and acquired knowledge the faculty, I mean, of foresight and systematic comprehension. But surely morality, which is of equal importance to all men, ought to be grounded, if possible, in that part of our nature which in all men may and ought to be the same: in the conscience and the common sense. Secondly this criterion confounds morality with law; and when the author adds, that in all probability the divine Justice will be regulated in the final judgment by a similar rule, he draws away the attention from the will, that is, from the inward motives and impulses which constitute the essence of morality, to the outward act: and thus changes the virtue commanded by the gospel into the mere legality, which was to be enlivened by it. One of the most persuasive, if not one of the strongest, arguments for a future state, rests on the belief, that although by the necessity of things our outward and temporal welfare must be regulated by our outward actions, which alone can be the objects and guides of human law, there must yet needs come a juster and more appropriate sentence hereafter, in |