districts elect a number of senators in proportion to their popu lation, except in the four states specified.

/ The above arrangement and the adjustment of these districts opens a door to a considerable degree of intrigue and m. nagement, and invites to chicane and fraud- in one word, to the political sin which I have styled Gerrymanderism.

The injustice lies in so arranging the counties, in the forma tion of districts, as to produce the effect stated in the second paragraph.

To accomplish this sinister purpose, counties are frequently united to form a senatorial district, which have no territorial connexion, being separated from each other by an intervening county, sometimes by two or three. Of this heinous political sin, both federalists and democrats, as I have said, have Leen guilty.

The state of Massachusetts was depicted, two or three years since, as a sort of monstrous figure, with the counties forming the senatorial districts, displayed on this unprincipled plan.— It was called a Gerrymander,* in allusion to the name of the late vice-president of the United states, then governor of that state. Hence, I derive the term Gerrymanderism. To those who gave the title of Gerrymander, it might not unaptly be said men of glass, throw no stones."

To enable the reader to form a correct idea of the extreme and flagrant injustice that may be perpetrated in this mode, without any apparent violation of law or constitution, I will explain how the minority may be enabled to rule the majority, so far as respects the senatorial branch of the legislature.

I suppose a case. Six counties, cach containing 1,000 voters, are to be formed into three senatorial districts, each to elect four senators. These districts may be so contrived, that the party predominant in the legislature at the time of arranging them, whether federal or democratic. with 2,320 voters, shall have eight sensors; and the other, with 3,680, shall have only four, and, nevertheless, every elector of the whole 6,000 shall exercise the right of suffrage.

You may well be amazed, reader. But it is so. Such is the political juggle and hocus pocus, that our public men of both

The federatists, who have always been very adroit in political christenings, endeavoured. by the use of this name, to cast the odium exclusively on their antagonists, as if they themselves were immaculate on this subject. The idea is unsound.

The Boston felks are said to be full of notions. They have been pretty notional, or the subject of the English language, which they have amplified, I will not venture to say improved, with many such queer words.

parties too frequently play to acquire or to perpetuate an undue

share of power.

I now state the number of voters of each of the six counties, to which I give the following names:

I might have styled the parties big-endians and little-endians. The name is of no importance.

Now for a display of political legerdemain-in order to ena

ble the minority to rule the majority:

District No. 1-formed of Erie and Porter counties.

District No. 2-formed of Champlain and Macdonough,

District No. 3-formed of Jackson and Perry.

Thus, as I have stated, a minority of 2,320 inhabitants have twice as many senators as the majority of 3, 680-their candidates having been successful in the two first districts. In the first district the democratic minority is 970-in the second 980, which are wholly lost. And the majority in the third district is 1730, whereas 1010 would have equally secured the election.It therefore follows, that by this arrangement, there are 970, 980, and 620 democratic votes absolutely thrown away.

This is an extreme case. Injustice, carried to such flagrant extent, does not often occur. The instances, however, of this kind, but of an inferior degree, are by no means unfrequent. It thence happens that a senate is sometimes democratic, while the house of representatives in the same state is decidedly federal; and vice versa.

This political arithmetic, like every other science, has its arcana. The grand and unerring rule is to make your own minorities and majorities as small, and those of your adversaries as large, as possible. In other words, to throw away as few votes on your own side, as many on the other, as in your power. This fraudulent practice admits but of one effectual remedy. Senatorial districts ought to be formed of counties and parts of counties quite contiguous to each other, so that all those who vote for each senator shall be residents of the same neighborhood.

There is another political fraud, of which both parties have been occasionally guilty, and which deserves the severest reprobation. It has respect to the choice of members of the house of representatives of the United States, and electors of the president and vice-president.

For these very important operations, there is not, although reason and justice loudly call for it, a fixed and permanent rule. The legislatures of the individual states have the power of deciding upon the mode, and as it respects the representatives, upon the time of the election. Hence, flagrant injustice is frequently perpetrated.

These elections are sometimes by districts, in the same manner as the state senators are elected! at others, by a general ticket.

The last mode is extremely unfair and incorrect. It deprives the minority altogether of any share in the representation.

A short statement will fully evince the extreme injustice and Inequality of a general ticket for members of congress, or electors of president.

Massachusetts is entitled to members of the house of
representatives of the United States,

Total-93

Suppose either of the parties, federal or democratic, to have a very small majority in each of these states, say 2,000 votes; suppose also the whole number of votes in the four states to be 300,000. The result will be, that if the elections be by general tickets, 154,000 voters will secure the entire representation, which is more than half the whole number of members of congress-and that the remaining 146,000 have no representative. this idea might be pursued to a great extent. But I leave it to the pen or pencil of the reader.

Instances have frequently occurred in the different states, of the mode of election being changed on the spur of the occasion, to suit the momentary purposes of party or faction. 'The most recent case that has occurred, was in the state of NewJersey in 1812. From the organization of the general government till the year 1800, the members of the house of representatives of the United States had been elected in that state by districts. In 1800, the federalists had a majority in the legisla ture, and calculated on a majority of votes in the whole state.In order, therefore, to engross the whole representation to them-selves, on the eve of the election, they repealed the district law, and passed an act for electing the representatives by a ge-neral ticket. Contrary to their calculations, the democratic ticket prevailed then and in every subsequent election, till the year 1812. In the latter year, the federalists having a temporary ascendency in the state legislature, one of their first acts was to repeal the general election law, which they had them-selves enacted, and to restore the election by districts, which they had formerly repealed. And by Gerrymandering the state to suit their views, they gained four out of the six representatives; whereas by a general ticket they would not have obtain ed one.

Another reprehensible procedure, emanating from the same laxity of principle, respects elections by our legislative bodies

M. m. 2

When the politics of the two branches of a legislature are different, there is frequently a struggle about the mode of election -whether by a joint or a concurrent vote. The senate, being the less numerous body, are, in the case of a joint vote, merged and lost in the greater number of the house of representatives. They are, therefore, strenuous supporters of a concurrent vote, in which their influence is equal to that of the co-ordinate branch. The other house, confiding in its numbers, is equally zealous for a joint vote, wherein it will have the ascen· dency. The state of Pennsylvania was, many years since, for a considerable time unrepresented in the senate of the United States, in consequence of a struggle of this kind-neither party being disposed to concede to the other.

It is a grand desideratum to have all these points clearly and explicitly defined by the constitutions. There should be as little temptation to fraud, and as little safety in the perpetration of it, as possible.

CHAPTER LXXI.

State of representation in Massachusetts. Wretched system of representation in Maryland and Virginia. Rotten boroughs.

It may not be improper here to introduce an analogous subject respecting the representation in the state of Massachusetts. The men who framed the constitution of that state were probably as highly enlightened and respectable as any equal number of men ever convened for such a purpose. But they nevertheless committed some very egregious errors which are really astonishing. Thd most conspicuous was neglecting precisely to fix the number of representatives in the more numerous branch of the legislature. The consequence is, that its numbers have fluctuated in the most extraordinary and incredible degree. There have been, I believe, as many as 700-at other times, not half the number. And the town of Boston has had a small army of representatives, no less than forty-four-being a greater number than the whole senate and house of representatives of the state of Delaware-than the entire senate of South Caroli na, or Pennsylvania-and than the assembly of New Jersey.

This defect in their representative system arises from a flaw in the constitution, respecting the choice of members of the house of representatives-instead of the imperative, they shall elect, the phrase is, they may elect.