this, that treason never was, and never will be—and in truth hardly can be propitiated by forbearance. Since the world was formed never did a conspiracy meet with the same degree of impunity. “Our Palinurus slept at the helm." The mutineers had full scope for their activity.

They made their arrangements at leisure, as undisturbedly as if they were engaged in promoting the salvation of the state. To whatever cause this neglect may be ascribed, whether to torpor, inactivity, or reliance on the good sense of the nation, it casts an indelible stain on the administration of Mr. Jefferson.

The last of the errors of that administration which I shall notice, arises from its neglect of enforcing,

The Embargo,

Which was a most efficient weapon for procuring redress from England. Its effects upon her colonies by privations of the necessaries of life-and upon her trade and naval power, by withholding supplies of raw materials and naval stores, were very considerable. And had it been duly enforced, as the duty of the chief magistrate required, it could hardly have failed to impel the British to relinquish those pretensions, which so highly and perniciously infringed our rights. But it was openly and flagitiously violated: and of course its intended operation on England utterly counteracted. It became a mere brutum fulmen. Its effects on this country were highly pernicious. While it curtailed the trade and profits of the fair trader, it enabled smugglers, and those who set the laws of their country at defiance-whose god was gain, to make rapid and unhallowed fortunes. In a word, it sacrificed the interests of some of the best, to those of the very worst members of the community. In proportion as a citizen held the laws sacred-in proportion as he honestly yielded them obedience—in the same proportion did he sacrifice his interests. And by this political arithmetic, in proportion as he disregarded the law-in proportion as he sacrificed the public interest to his thirst of gain-in the same proportion dia he aggrandize himself. The export trade, which was fraudulently carried on to a considerable extent, was wholly in the hands of persons of the latter description. Their vessels, laden with abundant supplies for the British colonies, were very conveniently driven to sea by westerly winds, and forced into the West Indies.

It has been said, in vindicatian of Mr. Jefferson, that he had not sufficient power to enforce the execution of the law. This is utterly incorrect. His powers were amply adequate

for this purpose. But even if this defence were valid, it exonerates him not from the high degree of censure attached to this dereliction of duty. He ought, in that case, to have stated the defect to congress, who had the power of applying, and undoubtedly at his requisition would have applied a remedy.

Besides the non-euforcement of the embargo act, there was a radical error committed by the government in continuing it so long. Its inadequacy to effect the purpose its friends had contemplated, was fully established. And, failing that, its effect was to punish ourselves for the lawless proceedings of others. It ought to have been considered principally as a preparation for war.

The measure substituted for the embargo, that is, the nonintercourse with both belligerents, has been generally regardded by the democrats as a feeble one: and the tenth congress, which made the change, has been on that ground stigmatized by them almost universally, as imbecile and contemptible. This is a most egregious error. It is inconceivable how it could have found such general credence. The non-inter

course law was as bold, as manly, and as energetic a measure as the annals of Christendom can produce for a century. An infant nation, with five or six frigates, and a number of gunboats, forbids the entrance into her ports, under penalty of confiscation, to the vessels of the two most powerful nations in the world; the one absolute by land-the other by sea, and owning a thousand vessels of war! and this is, forsooth, a measure dictated by imbecility! The human mind can hardly conceive a greater instance of folly.

CHAPTER IV.

Bank of the United States. Miserable policy not to renew the Charter.

AMONG the great sins of the democratic party, must be numbered the non-renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States. This circumstance injuriously affected the credit and character of this country abroad-produced a great degree of stagnation, distress, and difficulty at home-and was among the causes of the late embarrassments and difficulties of the pecuniary concerns of the country. Had this bank

&

been in existence, its capital might readily at any time have been increased by Congress, ten, twenty, thirty, or forty millions, so as to aid the government most effectually, and support the national credit.

To the renewal of the charter there were various objections offered, on the ground of inexpediency: but these had not much influence-nor were they entertained by many of the members. The grand difficulty arose from the idea so steadily maintained by most of the democratic party, that the constitution imparted no power to grant charters of incorporation. Many of the members who on this ground voted in the negative, most unequivo cally admitted the expediency of the renewal of the charter.

This constitutional objection was obviated, it would appear, unanswerably. All the departments of the government, legislative, executive and judiciary, had recognized the institution, at various times during the twenty years of its existence.

The courts of different states, and of the United States, had sustained varicus suits brought by the bank in its corporate capacity; by which, so far as depended upon the judiciary, it had had the seal of constitutionality stamped on it. This was a very serious, important, and decisive circumstance.

In addition to this, a democratic legislature of the United States had given it a most solemn sanction. In March, 1804, an act had passed to authorise the institution to establish branches in the territories of the United States, which power was not embraced by the original charter. This act was

passed without a division, when nearly all the members were present. No constitutional objection could have been then suggested; for such members as believed the measure unconstitutional, would indubitably have called for the yeas and nays, in order to record their dissent.

The act was signed by Nathaniel Macon, speaker of the house of representatives; Jesse Franklin, president of the senate; and Thomas Jefferson, president of the United States.

These cases, with others which might be cited, produced this dilemma. They either, as I have stated, afforded a complete recognition of the constitutionality of the charter, or a gross, het palpable violation of the constitution, by the three several grand departments of the government.

-at

nd

I presume it cannot be doubted, that if a charter of incorporation be unconstitutional, every extension of the powers of the corporate body must be equally unconstitutional-perhaps I might go so far as to assert that every act recognizing the charter is in the same predicament. But it is not necessary for my purpose to proceed thus far.

F

It therefore irresistibly follows that every member of congress who voted for the act of March 1804, and afterwards voted against a renewal of the charter, merely on the grounds of unconstitutionality, was guilty of a manifest, if not a criminal inconsistency.*

A circumstance connected with this transaction, rendered the impropriety of the rejection of the application of the bank for a renewal of its charter, still more striking and palpable. The government till the year 1802 held 2200 shares of the stock, which they sold to Sir Francis Baring at 45 per cent. advance, whereby they made a clear profit of $399,600 beyond the par value. Those who purchased of Mr. Baring, and held the stock till the dissolution of the bank, lost all this sum, exclusive of a considerable difference between the dividends and legal interest on the purchase money. They could never have entertained any doubt of the continuance of the charter. They must have conceived it to be as permanent as that of the bank of England. Had they supposed otherwise, they would not have bought at so great an advance. And it would not be easy to satisfy the candid and impartial, that our government could with propriety or justice, make such profit out of their ignorance and their confidence in its integrity and fairness.

CHAPTER V.

Armistice proposed by Admiral Warren.

THE next of the errors of Mr. Madison's administration, that I notice, is the refusal of the armistice offered by admiral Warren, on the 12th of September, 1812, nearly three months after the declaration of war.

Never, probably, was war more just. Never had a country more patiently borne the most humiliating accumulation of outrage and injury than the United States had done. Her character had in consequence fallen in the estimation of mankind. She was universally presumed to be so lost in the sordid pursuit of gain, as to be callous to outrage, to insult, and to contumely. She had appeared to have forfeited all regard to national honor and dignity. Her mendicant ambassadors had been, for years, in vain suing for justice and forbearance at the portals of St.

* For further details on this subject, the reader is referred to "Seven letters to Dr. Seybert en the renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States by M. C.

James' palace. The pusillanimity of the government had become a subject of reproach to the federalists of shame to the democrats. And it was a bye word among the opposers of the administration, that it "could not be kicked into a war." This genteel expression was used in congress by Mr. Josiah Quincey, and was quite common out of doors. It is impossible to forget the torrents of reproaches heaped upon the cabinet at Washington, on this ground. The pusillanimity and cowardice of the federal administration furnished an inexhaustible fund of rhetor ical embellishments to flowery speeches innumerable.

The declaration of war was therefore really as just as any similar document from the days of Nimrod. The expediency of it was, however, not equally clear. The risk was immense. It was putting to hazard the vital interests of eight millions of people, on the very uncertain chances of war. Yet I do not pretend to decide the question of expediency in the negative : for let it be observed, that every argument against this war, would apply with nearly equal force against resistance to any degree of insult, outrage and injury from England; as the chief arguments against its expediency, are predicated upon the immense naval force of that nation, and her consequent means of inflicting incalculable injury upon the United States: and whatever cogency there may be in these arguments, would equally exist let the injuries sustained be what they might.

But whatever might be the justice, necessity, or policy of the war, it was a great error, when the orders in council were repealed, and an armistice offered by the British government, not to accept it. Negociations for the removal of the rest of our grievances might have taken place; and would undoubtedly have been conducted under more favorabble auspices, than those that preceded them; for England having discovered that she had calculated too far on our passiveness, would have been far more disposed to do us justice.

Unfortunately the proposition was rejected—a rejection pregnant with most injurious consequences to us and our posterity.*

* Candor and justice to Mr. Madison require that I should state that he offered to agree to an armistice with Sir John Borlase Warren, on condition that the practice of impressment should be suspended during the negociation. From the letter of the Secretary of State to Sir John on this subject, I annex an extract

"The claim of the British government is to take from the merchant vessels of other countries, British subjects. In the practice the commanders of the British ships of war often take from the merchant vessels of the United States, American Citizens. If the United States prohibit the employment of British subjects in their service, and enforce the prohibition by suitable regulations and penalties, the motive to the practice is taken away. It is in this mode that the President is willing to accommodate this important controversy with the British government: dit cannot be conceived on what ground the arrangement can be refused.