When the preceding article was written, I had not sufficiently examined the celebrated repeal, as it is styled, of the orders in council, which is very different indeed, from what I had conceived it. It is liable to strong objections, which I believe have never been fully stated, and of which the public are not probably aware. To enable the reader to comprehend my meaning, and to form his own opinion correctly on a point of such great magnitude, independent of any impression to be

"A suspension of the practice of impressment, pending the armistice, seems to be a necessary consequence. It cannot be presumed, while the parties are engaged in a negociation to adjust amicably this important difference, that the United States would admit the right, or acquiesce in the practice, of the opposite party; or that Great Britain would be unwilling to restrain her cruisers from a practice which would have the strongest tendency to defeat the negociation. It is presumable, that both parties would enter into the negociation with a sincere desire to give it effect. For this purpose it is necessary that a clear and distinct understanding be first obtained between them, of the accommodation which each is prepared to make. If the British government is willing to suspend the practice of impressment From American vessels, on consideration that the United States will exclude British seamen from their service, the regulations by which the compromise should be carried into effect, would be solely the object of negociation. The armistice would be of short duration. If the parties agreed, peace would be the result. If the negociation failed, each would be restored to its former state, and to all its pretensions by recurring to war.

"The President desires that the war which exists between the two countries should be terminated on such conditions as may secure a solid and durable peace. To accomplish this great object, it is necessary that the great subject of impressment, be satisfactorily arranged. He is willing that Great Britain should be secured against the evils of which she complains. He seeks, on the other hand, that the citizens of the United States should be protected against a practice, which,

while it degrades the nation, deprives them of their rights as freemen, takes them by force from their families and country into a foreign service, to fight the battles of a foreign power, perhaps against their own kindred and country."* These proposals were perfectly fair and honorable-and it is to be lamented that Sir J. B. Warren's powers were not extensive enough to allow him to accept them but as they were not thus extensive, it is equally to be lamented that the suspension of impressment was insisted on.

As this is a most important feature in our public proceedings, it is proper to state further, that so sincerely desirous was Mr. Madison to close the breach, that on the 26th of June 1812, only eight days after the declaration of war, he authorised Mr. Russel to make the same proposition to the government of Great Britain. The communication was made to lord Castlereagh by Mr. Russel, in the following words:

London, August 24th, 1812.

"As an inducement to Great Britain, to discontinue the practice of impressment from American vessels, I am authorised to give assurance, that a law shall be passed (to be reciprocal,) to probibit the employment of British seamen, in the public or commercial service of the United States.

"It is sincerely believed, that such an arrangement would prove more effica cious in securing to Great Britain her seamen, than the practice of impressment, 80 derogatory to the sovereign attributes of the United States, and 30 incompatible with the personal rights of her citizens."

This proposition was rejected.

* Message of the President to Congress, Nov. 4, 1812.

made by my statement, I annex the paragraph of the instrament to which I allude, and which I am confident never was generally understood or attended to..

"His royal highness is hereby pleased to declare, in the name and on the behalf of his majesty, that nothing in this present order contained shall be understood to preclude his royal highness the prince regent, IF CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL SO REQUIRE," [mark these words, reader" if circumstances shall so require,"]" from restoring, after reasonable notice, the order of the 7th of January, 1807, and 26th of April, 1809, or any part thereof, to their full effect; OR, from taking, such other measures of retaliation against the enemy, as may appear to his royal highness to be just and necessary."

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This is a most extraordinary clause. The prince regent has received an authenticated document, containing the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, on which he deems himself bound to repeal the orders in council. But in the instrument which he issues on the subject, he expressly reserves the right. of restoring those orders, "if circumstances shall so require." On these "circumstances" he, of course, is to decide, These “circumstances” are wholly independent of “retaliation”—as provision is made in the subsequent part of the paragraph exs pressly for "retaliation" in a distinct clause. It therefore appears that the orders in council were, in strict technical language, never repealed. They were merely suspended till "circumstances should require" their revival.

No candid reader will deny that the above is fair reasoning. This, therefore, cannot be regarded as a “repeal," in the sense in which this nation had a right to expect the orders in council to be "repeuled" according to the British pledge, to proceed pari passu with the repeal of the French decrees. The orders in council might have been "restored" in one month, after the date of this instrument, according to its tenor, "if circumstances should have so required," without our government having any just reason to complain of breach of faith on the part of that of Great Britain. There never was a public document more cau-tiously worded. And had it arrived here previous to the declaration of war, this country would have been perfectly warranted in refusing to regard it as a repeal. To meet and to fulfil the idea held out in the previous pledges of the British government, the repeal ought to have been unconditional, except the reservation of a right to renew the orders in council in the one specific case of the revival of the French decrees.

It is a remarkable fact respecting this repeal, that in the debates upon it in the British parliament, the mighty wrongs inflicted by the orders in council upon this country formed hardly any part of the reasons whereon the adoption of the measure was urged. Even Mr. Brougham, the powerful opponent of

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the orders, and the mover of the address for their "repeal," founded his arguments in his published speech, wholly on the injurious effects experienced in England by the loss of our trade. It is true, he once glances at the injustice of the orders, but it is very slightly and merely incidentally. He does not boldly and magnanimously expose them to reprobation on the ground of the violation of our rights, as Mr. Baring had done in his celebrated pamphlet.

But as the president admitted the instrument to be a repeal, it was, I repeat, to be deeply regretted, that he did not accept the armistice, and trust to subsequent negociation for redress on the subject of impressment. His admission of it in that point of light, precluded him from employing the solid objection to which it was liable.

CHAPTER VI.

Appointment of Mr. Gallatin as Minister to treat with Great Britain. Negociation at Gottenburgh.. Recent neglect of due Preparations.

THE appointment of Mr. Gallatin as minister to treat with the court of St. James, was a very considerable error. This gentleman has had the reputation, probably with justice, of being one of the ablest financiers in this country. For twelve years, he had presided over the financial concerns of the nation, during which period, moderate talents were adequate to the duties of that station. But a crisis had arrived when the abilities of a Colbert, or a Sully, or a Ximenes, might be necessary; and most injudiciously and indefensibly he was then despatched to another hemisphere; and the duties of his devolved ad interim on another officer, whose proper official duties require all his time and all his talents.

This measure was highly preposterous. It was incorrect in the President to confer-it was equally incorrect in the secretary to receive, the appointment. It was the less defensible, from the circumstance, that nearly all the demo. crats in the United States had, in 1794, utterly disapproved of, and declaimed against, the appointment, by General Washington, of Judge Jay, to negociate a treaty with Great Britain, pending his continuance as a judge. It is moreover obvious, that the absence of one judge cannot produce any ma terial inconvenience; as there are always others to supply his

place. But there are high and responsible duties attached to the office of secretary of the treasury, which can never, without very great impropriety, be devolved on a deputy. I pass over all but the transcendent one of remitting fines and forfeitures, too high a power probably to be trusted to any individual whatever, not excepting even a secretary himself.*

Negociation at Gottenburg..

At a period when it was of immense importance to the Uni ted States to close the war as speedily as possible, the president had the alternative of London or Gottenburgh as the scene of negociation. We had been unfortunate by land, through treason, incapacity, or some other cause. It was our interest to accelerate it was that of the British to procrastinate the negociations. The chances from delay were much in their favor. War is, moreover, a component part of their system. Ours is calculated for peace. These observations acquired treble force from a reflection on the disaffection of the Eastern portion of the union, and its aversion to the war. Of course, we ought to have shunned every thing that might cause delay. It was therefore most extraordinary and unaccountable that the president should have chosen Gottenburg in preference to London, under all the obvious delays resulting from the necessity that would probably arise or be pretended, to consult the court of St. James', by the ministers of that court. It appears almost as absurd as it would be to choose the Havanna, or Port Royal, were the negociations to be conducted on this side of the Atlantic. This was the more erroneous, from the consideration that the fate of large portions of our territory, and the lives of hundreds of valuable citizens, might depend upon the delay of a single day.

Shortly after the annunciation of the choice of Gottenburg, there was a paragraph published here, extracted from a London news-paper, stating that twenty mails were then actually due from that place at London, owing to the continued prevalence of adverse winds. This was an unanswerable proof, if any were necessary, of the impropriety of the choice of Gottenburg.

Recent neglect of due Preparations.

Under this head, the president and the heads of departments were still more culpable than under any of the former ones.

See the luminous essays on this subject by W. B. Giles, esq. which are replete with the most convincing and unanswerable arguments.

From the period of the downfal of Bonaparte, and the com plete triumph of Great Britain and her allies, it was obvious to the meanest capacity that her powers of annoyance had increased prodigiously. The immense forces raised to aid the coalition against France were liberated from all employment but against us. And of the disposition of England to continue the war, we had the most convincing indications. The British newspapers were replete with denunciations of vengeance against us, and with statements of immense preparations for our chastisement. And to crown the whole-to remove all possible doubt on the subject-to deprive us and our rulers of all plea in justification of our torpor, and apathy and neglect, an address was published from the lords of the admiralty to the navy, stating, as a reason for not discharging so many seamen as the return of peace in Europe might have warranted, that the war existing with this country for the maritime rights of the British Empire, rendered such a measure improper.

London, April 30th, 1814.

"The lords commissioners of the admiralty cannot announce to the fleet the termination of hostilities without expressing to the petty officers, seamen and royal marines of his majesty's ships, the high sense which their lordships entertain of their gallant and glorious services during the late war. The patience, perseverance and discipline; the skill, courage, and devotion, with which the seamen and marines have upheld the best interests, and achieved the noblest triumphs of our country, entitle them to the gratitude, not only of their native land, which they have preserved inviolate, but of the other nations of Europe, of whose ultimate deliverance their success maintained the hope and accelerated the accomplishment. Their lordships regret the unjust and unprovoked aggression of the AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, in declaring war upon this country, after all the causes of its original complaint had been removed, does not permit them to reduce the fleet at once to a peace establishment But as the question now at issue in this war, is, the maintenance of those maritime rights, which are the sure foundation of our naval glory, their lordships look with confidence to that part of the fleet which it may be still necessary to keep in commission, for a continuance of that spirit of discipline and gallantry, which has raised the British navy to its present preeminence. In reducing the fleet to the establishment necessary for the American war, the seamen and marines will find their lordships attentive to the claims of their respective services. The reduction will be first made in the crews of those ships which it may be found expedient to pay off; and from them the petty officers and seamen will be successively discharged, according to the length of their services; beginning in the first instance with all those who were in his majesty's service previous to the 7th of March, 1803, and have since continued in it. When the reduction shall have been thus made, as to the ships paid off, their lordships will direct their attention to those which it may be found necessary to keep in commission; and as soon as the circumstances of the war will admit, will bring home and discharge all persons having the same standing and periods of service, as those discharged from the ships paid off; so that in a few months the situation of individuals will be equalized; all men of a certain period of service will be at liberty to return home to their families; and the number which it may be still necessary to retain, will be composed of those who have been the shortest time in the service. An arrangement in itself so just, cannot, in their lordships' opinion, fail to give universal satisfaction; and they are induced to make this communication to the fleet, because they think that the exemplary good conduct of all the