principle to which they subscribe with such ready acqui

escence. •

'Referring the examination of the principle itself to an- 8119. other place, as has been already mentioned, it will be suf- A confederficient to remark here, that in the sense of the author who ate republic has been most emphatically quoted on the occasion, it proposed. would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the union; but would not militate against their all being comprehended in ONE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT. And this is the true question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.

"It is very probable," says he, "that mankind would have been obliged, at length, to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they not contrived a kind of constitution, that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC.

"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, capable of increasing by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united body.

""A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal corruption. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.

"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.

"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the 1 Spirit of Laws, Vol. 1, b. IX, c. I.

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confederate states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, these are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, the confederates preserve their sovereignty.

""As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each, and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of large monarchies."

'I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages, BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN A LUMINOUS ABRIDGMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE UNION, and must effectually remove the false impressions which a misapplication of the other parts of the work was calculated to produce.'1

I leave the reader to collect what sort of government it was that Hamilton believed was about to be formed by 'the new constitution,' and that he was so anxious the states should adopt.

The fact is undeniable, that a CONFEDERACY OF THE STATES, a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, after the model given by Montesquieu, was in the minds of all who favored the adoption of the new constitution. The ideas of those who speculated on the dismemberment of the union, as Hamilton himself informs us, seemed generally turned towards three confederacies; one consisting of the four nothern, another of the four middle, and a third of the five southern states. And he, opposing to that scheme the advantages of one confederate government,' did not scruple to argue that in the event of so many confederacies, each would require a government not less comprehensive than the one proposed."

Madison said: 'The immediate object of the Federal Constitution, is to secure the UNION of the THIRTEEN PRIMITIVE STATES, which we know to be practicable; and to add to THEM such OTHER STATES, as may arise in their own bosoms or in their neighborhoods, which we cannot doubt to be 1 The Federalist, No. 9.

2 The Federalist, No. 13, p. 59.

equally practicable." "The leaders of the Revolution formed the design of a great CONFEDERACY, which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If they erred most in the structure of the UNION, this was the work most difficult to be executed; this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of your convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate and to decide.''

ernment.

And what, according to Hamilton, was the great advan- 121. Adtage to be secured by the federal system? In a CONFED- vantages of a federal govERACY,' he says, 'the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments; and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress. It may safely be received. as an axiom in our political system, that the state governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority.'3

The two opposite ideas of the time, were, on the one hand, that of a league between the states, offensive and defensive, with a general council or congress clothed with powers to act on the states but not on their citizens; and that, on the other hand, of a confederation of the states in a common government for common interests and general purposes, formed on the model of the state governments, and possessed of certain enumerated powers, and acting immediately, within the sphere assigned to it, on the citizens of all the states. The first was favored by the states-right party; the last was the plan proposed by

1 The Federalist, No. 14, p. 63.

2 Id. pp. 64-65.

3 Id. No. 28, p. 126.

? 122. Legislation for States condemned.

the new constitution, and advocated by the authors of 'The Federalist.' The objections of the state-rights advocates, were chiefly directed against a consolidation of the states into one political body; and the whole reasoning, tenor and spirit of 'The Federalist,' go to show, that to answer those objections, so far as they went to the proposed constitution, was one of the principal designs of that work. It was, as we have said, also in issue, whether there ought to be only a single confederacy of the states, or two or more; and this also entered into some of the discussions.

The state-rights party particularly objected to the immediate action of the federal government, on the citizens of the states. Hamilton answered as follows: 'If we still adhere to the design of a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, or, which is the same thing, of a SUPERINTENDING POWER, under the direction of a COMMON COUNCIL, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a LEAGUE and a GOVERNMENT; we must extend the authority of the union to the PERSONS of the citizens-the only proper objects of government." (Note his definition of a national government.) The concurrence of THIRTEEN DISTINCT SOVEREIGN WILLS is requisite under the confederation, to the complete execution of every important measure that proceeds from the union. It has happened, as was to have been foreseen. Congress at this time scarcely possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till the states can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute for the present shadow of a federal government. Each state, yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or convenience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall on our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins. The tendency of the principle of legislation for states or communities in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we

1 The Federalist, No. 15, pp. 68-69.

2 Id. pp. 70-71.

have made of it, is equally attested by the events which have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind, of which we have any account, in exact proportion to its prevalence in those systems.

Of all the confederacies of antiquity which history has handed down to us, the Lycian and Achæan leagues, as far as there remain vestiges of them, appear to have been most free from the fetters of that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those which have best deserved, and have most liberally received, the applauding suffrages of political writers. This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphatically, be styled the parent of anarchy; it has been seen, that delinquencies in the members of the union are its natural and necessary offspring; and that whenever they happen, the only constitutional remedy is force, and the immediate effect of the use of it, civil war.'1

ble.

'It seems to require no pains to prove, that the states 123. Coerought not to prefer a national constitution, which could cion of states only be kept in motion by the instrumentality of a large impracticaarmy, continually on foot to execute the ordinary requisitions or decrees of the government. And yet this is the plain alternative involved by those who wish to deny it the power of extending its operations to individuals. Such a scheme, if practicable at all, would instantly degenerate into a military despotism: but it will be found in every light impracticable. . . . Whoever considers the populousness and strength of several of these states singly at the present juncture, and looks forward to what they will become, even at the distance of half a century, will at once dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme, which aims at regulating their movements by laws, to operate upon them in their collective capacities, and to be executed by a coercion applicable to them in the same capacities. A project of this kind is a little less romantic than the monstertaming spirit, attributed to the fabulous heroes and demigods of antiquity.

'Even in those confederacies, which have been composed The Federalist, No. 16, pp. 71-72. See 13, ante.