Foster v. The Commissioners of Pilotage of Moblle. not surrendered their power over the subject, and may exercise it independently of any control or interference of the general * government; and there has been much controversy, and [* 244] probably will continue to be, both by the bench and the bar, in fixing the true boundary line between the power of congress under the commercial grant and the power reserved to the States. But in all these discussions, or nearly all of them, it has been admitted, that if the act of congress fell clearly within the power conferred upon that body by the constitution, there was an end of the controversy. The law of congress was supreme. These questions have arisen under the quarantine and health laws of the States-laws imposing a tax upon imports and passengers, admitted to have been passed under the police power of the States, and which had not been surrendered to the general government. The laws of the States have been upheld by the court, except in cases where they were in conflict, or were adjudged by the court to be in conflict, with the act of congress. Upon the whole, after the maturest consideration the court have been able to give to the case, we are constrained to hold, that the act of the legislature of the State is in conflict with the constitution and law of the United States, and therefore void. The judgment of the court below is reversed. PHINEAS O. FOSTER and others, Plaintiffs in Error, v. THE COMMISSIONERS OF PILOTAGE OF MOBILE. 22 H. 244. THE PRINCIPLES OF PRECEDING CASE APPLIED TO TOW-BOats. A steamboat licensed and enrolled under the act of 1793, engaged in towing and lightering between the lower bay of Mobile and the city, is engaged in the coasting trade; and the act of 1854 of the Alabama legislature is unconstitutional and void as applied to such a vessel. The doctrines of the preceding case govern this. WRIT of error to the supreme court of Alabama. This case, though similar to the preceding one, and argued by the same counsel, was supposed to differ, in that the tow-boat was engaged exclusively in domestic commerce. The case is well stated in the opinion. * Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court. [245] This is a writ of error to the supreme court of the State of Alabama. Foster v. The Commissioners of Pilotage of Mobile. The case is, in all respects, like the one just decided, except it is insisted that the steamboat was employed as a lighter and tow-boat upon waters within the State of Alabama, and therefore engaged exclusively in the domestic trade and commerce of the State. According to the admitted state of facts, this boat was engaged in lightering goods from and to vessels anchored in the lower bay of Mobile, and the wharves of the city, and in towing vessels anchored there to and from the city, and, in some instances, towing the same beyond the outer bar of the bay, and into the Gulf to the distance of several miles. This boat was duly enrolled and licensed to carry on the coasting trade at the time she was engaged in this business, and of the seizure under the State law. It also appears from the answer, and which facts are admitted to be true, that the port of Mobile is resorted to and frequented by ships and vessels, of different size in tonnage, engaged in the trade and commerce of the United States with foreign nations and among the several States; that the vessels of small size and tornage are accustomed to come up to the wharves of the city, and discharge their cargo, but that large vessels frequenting said port cannot come up, on account of the shallowness of the waters in some parts of the bay, and are compelled to anchor at the lower bay, and to discharge and receive their cargo by lighters; and that the steamboat of claimants was engaged in lightering goods to and from said vessels, and in towing vessels to and from the lower bay and the wharves of the city. [* 246] *It is quite apparent, from the facts admitted in the case, that this steamboat was employed in aid of vessels engaged in the foreign or coast wise trade and commerce of the United States, either in the delivery of their cargoes, or in towing the vessels themselves to the port of Mobile. The character of the navigation and business in which it was employed cannot, be distinguished from that in which the vessels it towed or unloaded were engaged. The lightering or towing was but the prolongation of the voyage of the vessels assisted to their port of destination. The case, therefore, is not distinguishable in principle from the one above referred to. Judgment of the court below reversed. Collins v. Cleveland. SIDNEY E. COLLINS, Appellant, v. WILLIAM F. CLEVELAND and others. 22 II. 246. THIS is a suit to set aside a conveyance of real estate, on the ground of a fraudulent advantage taken of the ignorance of complainant of the value of the property, and other facts material to the contract. Its discussion turned wholly upon the weight of evidence, and no principle of law is decided in the case. APPEAL from the circuit court for the southern district of Alabama. The facts are very fully stated in the opinion. Mr. Sewall, for appellant. Mr. Smith and Mr. Benjamin, for appellees. * Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court. [* 247] This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Alabama. The bill was filed by Collins, to set aside certain conveyances of a tract of land situate in the city of Mobile, and particularly a deed from him to the defendants, bearing date the 15th February, 1851, on the ground of fraud and imposition in the procurement of said conveyances. The pleadings and proofs are very voluminous, the pleadings alone covering nearly one hundred, and, including the proofs, exceeding five hundred, closely printed octavo pages. The bill is very inartificially drawn, being stuffed with minute and tedious detail of what might have been proper evidence of facts constituting the ground of the complaint, instead of a concise and orderly statement of the facts themselves. This has led to an equally minute and extended statement of the grounds of the defense in the several answers of the defendants. In looking closely, however, into the case, and into the nature and grounds of the relief sought, and principles upon which it must be sustained, if at all, it will be found that the questions really involved, as well as the material facts upon which their determination depend, are few and simple, and call for no very extended discussion. The father of Collins, the complainant, died in 1811, seized of an interest in the tract of land in dispute. He left three sons, the complainant being then some two years old. The tract subsequently passed into the possession of one Joshua Kennedy, by collusion between Inerarity, the administrator of Collins the elder, and Kennedy, the latter also afterwards * obtaining [* 248 ] Collins v. Cleveland. a deed of the land from the heirs at law by fraudulent representations. In 1844, Thompson, one of the defendants in the present suit, residing in the city of Mobile, and having some knowledge of the original title of Collins to the land, and of the means by which the heirs had been deprived of it, visited the complainant, then residing in Texas, and being the only surviving heir, with a view to purchase his title, or to obtain an arrangement with him in respect to it, so that a suit might be instituted for the recovery of the estate. An arrangement was agreed to accordingly, and a conveyance of the land executed by the complainant and his wife to Thompson; also, a power of attorney, authorizing him to institute suits for the recovery of the land-Thompson, at the same time, executing a bond of indemnity to the complainant against all costs and responsibilities, in consequence of the suit. The complainant was to receive $10,000, in the event of a recovery. A suit was subsequently instituted in the name of the complainant against the heirs of Kennedy, in April, 1844, in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Alabama; was heard upon the pleadings and proofs at the April term of the court, in 1847, and a decree rendered in his favor; which, on an appeal to this court, was affirmed at the December term, 1850. The case, as reported in this court, will be found in the 10th How. p. 174. The litigation extended over a period of some seven years; and, in the progress of it, besides Thompson, who had made the original arrangement with the complainant, three other persons had become interested, and had contributed their services and money in bringing it to a successful termination. After the affirmance of the decree in this court, and confirmation of the title in complainant, all the parties concerned met in the city of Mobile, at the office of the solicitors, for the adjustment of their respective claims to the property recovered. Its value had increased, during the progress of the suit, from about $100,000, according to the estimate, to some two or three times that amount. The complainant had originally stipulated for the sum of $10,000. [249] In this adjustment, one-third of the whole estate was set apart to him, and one-sixth to each of the other four persons. Conveyances according to this division were executed on the 15th February, 1851. The complainant, therefore, according to the general estimate, received $100,000, and the other four associates $50,000 each. * Now, the fraud alleged in the bill, and which is mainly relied on for setting aside this adjustment and division of the estate between Collins v. Cleveland. the parties, is placed upon two grounds: 1. In obtaining the deed of the land, powers of attorney, and other stipulations relating to the title, dated the 13th January, 1844, preparatory to the institution of the suit in which the property was recovered; and 2. In the adjustment and division of the property among the several parties above mentioned, after the recovery had taken place, and which was consummated by the deed of 15th February, 1851. 1. It is insisted, on behalf of the complainant, that, at the time he executed the deed, powers of attorney, and the other writings, in 1844, he was unacquainted with the value of the property or the condition of the title; that Thompson, who procured these instruments, and the authority to commence the suit, was well acquainted with both; that he fraudulently depreciated the value of the property, and exaggerated the difficulties and expense attending the litigation, and thereby deceived the complainant. This is the substance of the charge. There is, however, a very brief but most conclusive answer to it, upon the pleadings and proofs in the case. It is that Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, whose firm had been subsequently employed by Thompson to bring the suit against the heirs of Kennedy, declined the retainer, and refused to have anything to do with it, unless the complainant should not only be made sole plaintiff in the suit, but should have a substantial interest in the estate sought to be recovered; should attend as the party in interest in conducting the proceedings, and take part in the preparation for trial; and insisted that the preliminary arrangement made by Thompson, including the deed of the property and agreement for the payment of the $10,000, should be abrogated and given up. All of which was agreed to by Thompson and the other parties concerned; and the suit was commenced and carried on to a final [* 250 ] determination, under this new arrangement. The complainant attended, and participated in the preparation of the case, assisted in procuring and in the examination of the witnesses, and admits, in his bill, that he attended every term of the court at Mobile, while the cause was pending, and until the decree in his favor. The whole arrangement, therefore, between the parties, in respect to the property, entered into with a view to the institution of the suit, which is complained of, having been given up, and a new ɔne substituted, which was not only unexceptionable, but highly equitable and just, as concerned the complainant, the charge of fraud and imposition depending upon it, even if originally it had any foundation, falls with it. We shall not stop to inquire into the |