The United States v. Berreyesa's Heirs.

became possessed of the land in 1834, under the authority of the governor, Figueroa, and occupied it with his family, until 1842. In that year he presented a petition to the governor, representing these facts, and complained that his neighbor Larios had disturbed his enjoyment and repose, and desired that there might be granted to him two sitios, from the house of Larios to the Matadera, with all the hills that belong to the Canada. He says that he served the country in the army for twenty-four years and upwards, without receiving pay, and that he had with him eleven children.

A reference was made of the petition to the justice of the pueblo, who called Larios before him, and an agreement was then made between the parties in reference to the division line.

*This report was returned to the governor, who directed [* 500] that a title should issue to the applicant, and that the expediente be remitted to the departmental junta, for its approval. The decree and titulo describe a parcel of land included within natural boundaries; but in the conditions, it is confined to a single league in quantity.

Subsequently to this, Berreyesa complained to the governor of the limitation, insisting that his petition had been for two leagues, and that he had returned the grant to have it corrected. The governor directed the proper inquiries, and the result was to concede the prayer of the petitioner; but, for some reason, the grant did not issue.

The board of commissioners confirmed the claim of the petitioners for one square league; and this decree was confirmed by the district court on appeal, and it ordered the land to be located, according to the description and within the boundaries set out in the original grant, and delineated in the map contained in the expediente, to both of which reference is made for a more particular description. The genuineness of this grant and the fulfillment of the conditions are fully established, and the validity of the claim is unquestionable.

The appellees have requested the court to give instructions relative to the location and survey of this grant, similar to those found in the case of the United States v. Fossatt, 20 Howard. But no question was decided in the court below upon the location of the lines of the tract, and it would be irregular for this court to assume that the action of the court will not conform to the established rules on the subject. The decree of the district court has not been called in question by the appellees; and should any difficulty arise in the location of the grant, it will be competent for the appellees to invoke the aid of that court.

Decree affirmed.

Gridley v. Wynant.

RUEL C. GRIDLEY and others, Appellants, v. David Wynant.

23 H. 500.

EQUITY-TRUSTS-MARRIED WOMEN AS TRUSTEES.

1. A married woman may receive and convey title to land without joining her husband, provided no right of his, legal or equitable, is affected by the conveyance.

2. The fact that the conveyance to her in trust for her son in law was made to defraud his creditors, gives her heirs no right to question the title of an innocent purchaser for value from her.

APPEAL from the district court for the district of Iowa. The matter decided is fully stated in the opinion.

Mr. Grant, for appellants.

Mr. Smith, for appellee.

[* 501] *Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court. The appellee filed this bill to enjoin the appellants from prosecuting a suit to recover a parcel of land in his possession and to quiet his title against their claim as heirs at law of Sarah A. Blakely, deceased. He charges in his bill that he purchased the land from William B. Beebe, and paid to him the purchase money, and that Mrs. Blakely made him a deed at the request of Beebe, who was her son in law, and for whose use and benefit it had been conveyed to her with her consent. At the time of her conveyance she was a married woman, and the bill avers that by error, ignorance, or oversight, her husband failed to join in her deed.

The defendants admit that they claim as heirs at law of Mrs. Blakely, and insist that she was under a disability to convey land without the consent of her husband.

They deny that she held the land in trust for Beebe, but insist that even if that were the case the trust was illegal, for [*502] * that Beebe was an insolvent debtor, and the sole design of such a conveyance was to defraud and delay his cred

The

itors. They object that Beebe is a necessary party in the cause. district court granted relief according to the prayer of the bill. The testimony sufficiently establishes the case made by the bill. It appears that Beebe purchased the land from the tenants in fee simple, and that it was conveyed to Mrs. Blakely by his directions, and that this was done because he was in debt, and did not desire the exposure of his property.

That he sold the land to the appellee, and that Mrs. Blakely executed to him titles without joining her husband in the conveyance.

Gridley v. Wynant.

The question arises, whether the heirs at law of Mrs. Blakely can contest the validity of her conveyance. There is no incapacity in a married woman to become a trustee, and to exercise the legal judgment and discretion belonging to that character. A trustee in equity is regarded in the light of an instrument or agent for the cestui que trust, and the authority confided to him is in the nature of a power. It has long been settled that a married woman may execute a power without the co-operation of her husband. Sug. on Pow., 181. Some doubt has been expressed whether, at law, a married woman could convey an estate vested in her in trust, and inconveniences have been suggested as arising from her asserted incapacity to make assurances which a court of law would recognize as valid. And it has been determined that she could not defeat a right of her husband or impose a legal responsibility upon him, by her unassisted act. Lewen on Trusts and Trustees, pp. 89, 90; Sug. on Pow. 192, 196; 2 Spence Eq. 31. But within the scope of her authority a court of equity will sustain her acts, and require those whose co-operation is necessary to confirm them. In the present instance, her deed was within the scope of her authority and duty. She did not defeat an estate to which her husband was equitably entitled, nor does he claim adversely to it. The complainants are her own children, her heirs at law, who are seeking to divest of his estate a bona fide purchaser, and to acquire one for themselves one to which their mother had no claim in equity or good conscience. Nor can the appellants avail themselves

*

of the illegality of the consideration on which their [*503] mother became the trustee for Beebe. The trust has not

only been constituted, but carried into execution. The appellee is not a mere volunteer seeking to enforce its terms, nor does his equity depend upon the validity of the trust for its support. He has an independent equity, arising from his purchase from persons professing to hold a legal relation to each other and to the subject of the contract, and to enforce his right there is no need for any inquiry into the consideration or motives that operated upon these parties to assume their relation of trustee and cestui que trust. In such a case, equity does not refuse to lend its assistance. McBlair v. Gibbes, 17 How. 232.

The objection that Beebe is a necessary party to the bill cannot be supported. Beebe has not claimed adversely to the title of the appellee. The legal title has never been invested in him, nor do the appellants recognize any privity or connection with him. They claim the property discharged of any equity either in his favor or that of the appellee.

Gridley v. Westbrook.

Upon the whole case, the opinion of the court is in favor of the appellee, and the decree of the district court is affirmed.

RUEL GRIDLEY and others, Appellants, v. EDWIN S. WESTBROOK and JAMES P. GUAGER.

23 H. 503.

PRACTICE IN EQUITY IN CASES REMOVED FROM STATE COURTS.

1. Where, in cases removed from the State courts of an equitable character, the pleadings and other proceedings have been according to the State code of practice, this court will decide the case on the merits, when they can be seen from the record. 2. A trustee feme covert may, under the circumstances mentioned in the preceding case, make a valid power of attorney to her son in law to convey, and when wel! executed it will carry the title.

APPEAL from the district court for the district of Iowa.

Mr. Grant, for appellants.

Mr. Wilson, for appellees.

*

[* 504 ] Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court. This suit was commenced in the district court of Jackson county, Iowa, by the appellees, under articles 2025 and 2026 of the code of Iowa, to quiet their title and possession to certain lands in that county against the impending and adverse claim of the appellants, the heirs at law of Sarah A. Blakely, deceased.

The appellants appeared, and answered the petition, and procured the removal of the cause to the district court of the United States for Iowa, under the 12th section of the judiciary act of September, 1789. After the removal of the suit to the district court, the appellants commenced a cross-suit, asserting therein their own title to the land in controversy, and praying for a decree of delivery of the possession to them, and an account of the mesne profits. The original and cross-suit were "consolidated" on the motion of the appellants, and were heard as one suit.

The proceedings in these causes seem to have been framed upon the course of practice prevailing under the code of Iowa; and we have found some difficulty in entertaining the suit, as not conforming to the mode of proceeding prescribed for courts of the United States in chancery proceedings; but as we are enabled to ascertain, from the pleadings and proofs, the matter in dispute between the parties, we shall proceed to adjudicate the questions they present.

The facts disclosed by the proofs show that William B. Beebe,

The State of Alabama v. The State of Georgia.

an insolvent debtor, in order to carry on business without interruption, made purchases and sales of property on his own account, in Iowa, but under the shelter of the name of Sarah A. Blakely, the mother of his wife, a resident of Missouri. To enable him to do so with facility, he procured from her powers of attorney, which conferred authority for that purpose.

* The land described in the petition was purchased by [* 505] Beebe with his own money, and the titles were made for his use to Mrs. Blakely. Subsequently he sold them to one of the parties to the cross-suit (Mrs. Wells) for a valuable consideration, and, as attorney in fact for Mrs. Blakely, executed to her a deed; and the appellees, Westbrook and Guager, claim as purchasers from this person.

At the time of the execution of the deed of Mrs. Blakely, and of her death, she was a feme covert. The appellants insist, that the conveyance to Mrs. Wells in the name of Mrs. Blakely is void, and that they are entitled to hold the lands as heirs at law.

We discover no material variation between the principles applicable in this cause and that of the same appellants and Wynant, which we have just decided. Upon the authority of that case, we determine that the decree of the district court must be affirmed.

THE STATE OF ALABAMA, Complainant, v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA.

23 H. 505.

BOUNDARY BETWEEN GEORGIA AND ALABAMA.

The point in dispute is, whether the boundary is the western bank of the Chattahoochee river or the low-water mark of the west side of that river. This depends on the construction of the line described in the treaty of cession by Georgia to the United States, to wit: "west of a line beginning on the western bank of the Chattahoochee river, where the same crosses the boundary between the United States and Spain, running up said river and along the western bank thereof." Held, that the western bank is the boundary line, that the jurisdiction of the bed of the river is in Georgia, and includes all that part of the soil which is alternately covered and left bare, and which is adequate to contain it at its average and mean stage during the entire year.

THIS was a bill in chancery in this court as of its original jurisdiction. It was brought by the State of Alabama to establish the boundary line with precision between that State and the State of Georgia. The whole case is well stated in the opinion.

It was argued by Mr. Dargan and Mr. Phillips, for complainant. Mr. McDonald and Mr. Gibson, for the State of Georgia.