principle in theory, if not in practice, that private property belonging to enemy subjects is not to be confiscated, but enemy subjects carrying on business of the kind specified will, because of the loss suffered, fail to see the difference, evident to the Allies, between sequestration and control, on the one hand, and confiscation on the other. Measures are to be taken to wind up some of these undertakings and to realize the assets, and the proceeds of such "realizations" are to remain "sequestrated or under control." It would be obviously unfair to state, or indeed to leave it to be inferred, that sequestration or control is equivalent to confiscation. It is not in form and perhaps not in effect, and yet the losses will doubtless be great and burdensome to the persons involved.

In furtherance of the policy to prevent trade with the enemy, and especially to prevent trade in articles of contraband, or indeed in articles which might be used by the noncombatant population, a recommendation of a very important and drastic kind is made which affects not only the subjects or citizens of the Allies, but also the interests and conduct of neutrals. Thus, uniform lists of absolute and conditional contraband are to be drawn up, and their export is to be forbidden by the mother countries, the dominions, colonies, and protectorates of the Allies. This provision is restricted to the Allied countries. The next, however, directly affects neutrals, although the measures in form, though not in effect, only concern the Allies.

It is foreseen by the Allies that articles exported from their countries to neutral countries may be re-exported from these latter to enemy countries and thus indirectly but nevertheless in fact find their way to the enemy. Therefore, licenses are to be refused to subjects or citizens of the Allies to export commodities to neutral countries unless there are in such countries "control organizations approved by the Allies," or unless, in the absence of such organizations, special guarantees are given limiting the quantities to be exported and placing the transaction under the supervision of Allied consular officers. These provisions are of very great importance because of the fact that British vessels control the carrying trade of the world, and by refusing licenses to vessels to trade with neutral ports, neutrals are largely restricted to their home market unless they agree to regulate their foreign commerce in such a way as may suit the interests or pleasure of the Allies. Regulations of this kind are apparently necessary to complete the policy of blacklisting, referred to supra, p. 832, in connection with that matter.

Temporary Measures to be Devised and Carried into Effect by the Allies During the Period of Reconstruction after the War

In the first place, as has already been stated, the losses of the Allied countries through acts of destruction, spoliation, and unjust requisition "are to be made good," and the Allies pledge themselves "to secure the restoration to those countries, as a prior claim, of their raw materials, industrial, agricultural plant and stock, and mercantile fleet." These are unusual provisions, but as the Allies are making common cause against the Teutonic Powers and their allies, it seems equitable that the Allied Powers should make good the losses suffered for a common

cause.

Leaving out the question of the favored nation treatment for the moment, which forms the second division under this heading, the Allies pledge themselves to secure for themselves "their natural resources' during the period of reconstruction, and undertake for this purpose "to establish special arrangements to facilitate the interchange of these resources."

In the next place, to protect their commerce and industry, agriculture and navigation against "economic aggression, resulting from dumping or any other mode of unfair competition," the Allies agree to subject commerce with the enemy Powers to special treatment during a period of time either by prohibiting altogether the importation of goods of enemy origin, or subjecting its importation "to a special regime of an effective character." During this period, the ships of enemy Powers are to be subjected to special conditions, to be agreed upon through diplomatic channels; and finally, special measures are to be taken jointly or severally to prevent within their respective territories enemy subjects from exercising "certain industries or professions which concern national defense or economic independence."

The Allies accept the doctrine that all treaties of commerce between them and their enemies are ended by the war. They recognize that a provision in their treaties giving favored-nation treatment would inure to the benefit of the Teutonic Powers and their Allies. Therefore they agree that the treaties during the period of economic reconstruction shall be framed in such a way, and for a time to be agreed upon, that their former enemies shall not obtain the benefit of the favored-nation clause. It is recognized that provisions of this kind will bear unequally upon the Allied Powers, but that as it is in their common interest that these

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provisions be put into effect, the Allied Powers "assure each other, so far as possible, compensatory outlets for trade" in such cases.

Permanent Measures of Mutual Assistance and Collaboration The measures of a permanent kind which the conference recommended are even of more importance than those relating to the duration of the war and to the period of reconstruction. They are stated in general terms, but with sufficient definiteness to make it clear that the Allies contemplate at least for the present an economic and commercial union; that they regard themselves as an economic or commercial unit, and that the measures to be framed and to be carried into effect are to be based upon the conception of the permanent interests of the Allied Powers considered as an economic commercial unit. Thus, the Allies are to take the necessary steps, and without delay, "to render themselves independent of the enemy countries" in so far as "raw materials and manufactured articles" are concerned which they may deem "essential to the normal development of their economic activities." The measures are to assure not only the independence of the Allies in the matter of sources of supply, but also the independence of their "financial, commercial, and maritime organization." Undertakings may be subsidized, directed or controlled by the governments. Scientific or technical research may be encouraged by financial assistance. National industries and resources are to be developed. Customs duties or prohibitions of a temporary or permanent character may be imposed; or finally, lest there might be doubt, "a combination of these different methods" may be employed.

The general purpose, it would seem, is sufficiently clear. And yet the Allies are careful to state specifically their object, whatever method may be adopted, and this object is, in the words of the recommendation, "to increase the production within their territories as a whole to a sufficient extent to enable them to maintain and develop their economic position and independence in relation to enemy countries." The Allies recognize, apparently, that in order to carry into effect this object and to secure the free, rapid and inexpensive interchange of their commodities, means of communication between them must be improved. Therefore, they provide for "the establishment of direct and rapid land and sea transportation service, at low rates," and they also agree to provide for "the extension and improvement of postal, telegraphic, and other communications."

As previously pointed out, steps were to be taken to secure uniformity in the laws and procedure regarding patents, trade marks, literary and artistic copyright. The Allies recognize that these matters of a technical kind require much care and thought; therefore meetings of technical delegates are to take place in order that the laws may be assimilated, as far as possible, and identical procedure framed.

Time is apparently to be the essence of this contract or agreement. Therefore in the final section, the Powers represented at the Economic Conference recommend that these provisions be put into effect immediately, and "that their respective governments shall take, without delay, all the measures, whether temporary or permanent, requisite to giving full and complete effect to this policy forthwith, and to communicate to each other the decisions arrived at to attain the object." The Allied Powers, although bitterly opposed to the Teutonic countries and their methods, are not above adopting German methods when they seem to be to their advantage. Apparently, the Zollverein, which formerly existed between the German states, and which was such a strong incentive to political union, is to make its appearance on an international scale; and, while permitting free trade or freer trade among the Allied Powers, a tariff wall is to be raised, not only against the Teutonic Powers and their allies, but against other Powers as well. To readjust the commercial relations of the world, reciprocity treaties will need to be concluded, if the Allies carry into effect the recommendations of their Economic Conference.

Leaving aside the far-reaching effects of the Economic Conference and of the economic union which it either puts into effect or foreshadows, the effects of which professed economists can only weigh and consider, it seems to be a pity from the international standpoint that the Allied Powers should agree upon a line of conduct calculated to separate them from instead of bringing them together with their present enemies. The world is larger than the Allies and their interests. There is a society of nations in which each member is necessary to the well-being of the other, and each Power now at war was a party to the solemn recognition by the First and Second Hague Conferences of the "solidarity uniting the members of the society of civilized nations." The things of the spirit have their place in the world, and the co-operation of the nations toward a common goal is more to be desired than the prosperity of any country or of any group of countries. A great French statesman said that the delegates to the Hague Conference were there to unite-not to divide;

and it is more necessary today and in the future to unite the nations in spirit, in thought, in deed. We must live together whether we will or not, and wise statesmanship suggests that the barriers that keep nations apart should be leveled, and that obstacles should not be interposed to their free and untrammelled commerce. We must think of the things we have in common; we must regard our civilization as indivisible. "All are but parts of one stupendous whole,

Whose body Nature is, and God the soul."
JAMES BROWN SCOTT.

THE DEUTSCHLAND

The visit during July of the German commercial submarine Deutschland to these shores raises some interesting problems in policy as well as novel points in international law.

Will the use of this new craft effect a revolution in sea-borne trade during future wars? Is it to the interest of the United States and other commercial Powers to encourage this new method of blockade-running? What should be our national attitude or policy toward the future commercial submarine? What are the interests of humanity in the matter? Should they be dealt with as ordinary merchantmen, subject to the rights of visit and search, or should some new rules and principles of international law be applied to them? These are some of the questions which might be asked concerning this new candidate for a privileged position in international intercourse in time of war.

The Deutschland was, undoubtedly, a vessel of commerce, or merchantman, as decided by our State Department, and entitled to at least the provisional hospitality of our ports. She had been thoroughly searched by the United States Treasury inspectors and by naval experts. She carried no torpedoes or torpedo tubes, and did not even possess the light rapid-fire guns permitted for defensive purposes on commercial vessels.

It is understood that the diplomatic representatives of France and Great Britain filed formal protests at Washington against allowing the German submarine to leave Baltimore, on the ground that the new craft was potentially a war-ship. But no sound reason or evidence appears to have been offered to substantiate this view.

To the international jurist the most interesting question relates to