hose, on the contrary, who thought that small establishments were best calculated both for the continuance cf peace, and for the renewal of war it it should be necessary, would have also an opportunity of delivering their sentiments. The words In his majesty's speech are general, as ought to be; and the question lert entirely open to future consideration, and the extent of the establishment will be such as the Le may from the circumstances of the country think right. One of Entlemen who had preceded him sened to consider the tone of the address too warlike, considering the at power of France upon the Continent. Another, on the contry, who seemed for the same reason to consider it too pacific, spoke of the declining state of our manufactre, and thought that on that account, we should be induced to commence the war he hoped however that it would never be considered a ground for going to war, because our manufactures were ain as prosperous a state as we Cid wish. Those who disapposed of the peace altogether, ight be consistent, if they now ted to break it: but those who Pad in the general approbation it twith, both from the parliament the country, could hardly now, wita consistency, view the definitive Pity in a light very different from at they did when it was first It was obvious, that if we Feed the war with France, the Est natural way of carrying it ea with success, would be again to tap session of those places which bad coded. Now to give up Fan, merely to take them again, Would place both the makers and approvers of the peace, in a very ridiculous point of view. However ardently he wished to see peace preserved throughout Europe, yet he would by no means say, that we were not justified in going to war on a mere point of honour; but before he could assent to this country provoking a war on the ground of its injured honour, he must have the case made out, and proved to his satisfaction. He would allow, that the preservation of national honour, as well as the principles of self defence, often made wars unavoidable; if however, at the present inoment, no such strong case could be made out, he thought that there could not be a time, in which circumstances were less favourable to beginning a war. He wished to know whether France was for ever to be considered our rival? Whether we were to be always, even when apparently at peace, in such a state of rivality as bordered upon hostility? This country appeared to him, never to have a fairer chance of superiority, than at the epoch of the present peace. As to the French navy, the most timid had ceased to dread it. The general objects of the French government were, it appeared to him, to revive commerce, and improve its commercial and manufacturing system, by imitating the means which have raised this country. ought such rivalship to give us any alarm? We had gotten the start of them, and would doubtless be able long to keep the lead. Every step that France takes in this course, will be an advantage to the manufactures and commerce of this country. In a contest of this kind with France, we had every prospect of being successful. The case must therefore If so, therefore be made out very strongly to him, before he could consent to engage in a military war, in preference to a commercial one: he thought that the house could not so far have forgotten the event of the last ten years war, as to wish a renewal of it: that was a war too carried on with the co-operation of several German princes, and which in its commencement afforded some hope of success, but yet that war might be described, war, merely because it continued in the same situation. Knowing the fact, seeing it, and stating it, we were content to make peace; and if we are to feel our national honor much hurt by any infringement of the peace, we must on the other hand be as cautious not to give offence, as we are resolute not to receive any. Leaving this "unsatisfactory state of Europe" out of the question, he would ask what insults had France offered to this country, or what inSpe lata, eventu tristia.” fractions she had committed of the He must for ever repeat, that the treaty of Amiens? He really thought, only reasons which could justify us that if we were so little influenced in wishing to change a state of peace by considerations of justice and pofor war, would be either our self-licy, as to be resolved upon the represervation, or what is equally dear to us, the preservation of ourhonor. Had France either injured the one or the other? One gentleman has said, that since the signing of the definitive treaty, France has not appeared to entertain sentiments conformable to our interests or wishes. Did any man suppose that when we had made peace with the first consul of France, he was immediately to become our friend, and that he would have a great consideration for our interests? Those who made the peace expressed a very different sentiment, and allowed that "Europe was in a very unsatisfactory state." No man more regretted than himself the aggrandizement of France, nor wished more sincerely that it had been prevented; but at the same time he considered this aggrandizement as one of the greatest aggravations of the conduct of the lite ministers. But if we were content to make peace when we açknowledged Europe to be in an unsatisfactory situation, we certainly would not be justified in going to commencement of war, we should find it difficult to get a pretext for it, As to the disposition of the people of this country, without pretending to be a better judge than other gentlemen, yet it was his opinion that there never was a time when the cry for war was less the sense of the people of England, than at the present moment, A supposed cry of the people of England was set up, which in fact only proceeded from a coalition of newspapers, who probably wished for war, as the means of selling more of their papers. Mankind had been sacrificed to the interest of princes and parties, but dreadful indeed would be the state of a country, if nations were to be driven into war, merely to serve the private interests of publishers of newspapers, This would be one of the most base and ignoble causes for which two countries ever went to war. There was another description of persons who gained by war; namely, those who by money bargains, stock-jobbing, loans, contracts, and other means which war affords, accumu late arre fortunes in a few years of r. He would rather from his soul that the blood of his fellow creatures ald flow to gratify the ambition of an Alexander, than that certain persons should infamously make it the source to enrich their coffers. We had terminated the war in which cad been so long engaged, hapP: we had preserved our antient donions, and had acquired others; in other respects we had not been so fortunate, as Europe was still left in an unsatisfactory state. He sincerely hoped however, that administration still approved of the peace they had made. (A cry of hear, hear.) Some supposed that miniss only made peace because their administration was young, and they sed to secure it: he for his part should impute to them no such unworthy motives, and was convinced tat they then acted with sincerity. The power of France was certainly greater than he or any Englishman lawish it, but that was no ground Although we going to war. not be pleased with the proViens of the treaty of Luneville, - at the time it was concluded we were not in a situation to interfere at a. settling the affairs of Germany. I would be monstrous then, if after positively refused to have any tag to do with the treaty of Lunee. we were now to quarrel about the execution of the details of that ty between France and the emof Germany. He concluded oping that the sense of the naLight be to retain the advanfaces of the peace they had made. Mr. Canning said, there was one p which must be pretty univery approved of, namely, the syspreparation which ministers He thought it necessary to adopt. had generally approved of the peace which had been made, but if every thing was conciliation on our side, and we shewed a disposition to bear every insult from the French govern ment, in such case the conduct of government was blameable. If citer ministers had instigated the unfortunate Swiss to a hopeless resistance, or if they only made a weak and ill-judged remonstrance in their favour, in such case their conduct was very blameable. How they had acted in those respects could be collected from no other source but public report. He certainly at the present time approved of the measure of recruiting our exhausted army, and dismantled fleet. It was when Piedmont was incorporated with France that our army was disbanded, and the allotments of Germany were perhaps the effect of our dismantling our navy. He could not but totally disagree with Mr. Fox, who attributed all the calamities of the war to the late administration; and he was prepared to maintain that the situation of the country was not so calamitous as it was represented, at the time when his majesty's late ministers retired from office. It was that administration who had planned the armament which the quarrel with the northern nations made necessary; and it was that administration who prepared and sent forth the Egyp tian expedition, which contributed so materially to the peace. He did not mean to blame the conduct of the present ministers; but they began with this advantage, that they could claim all the merit of the success of their expeditions; whereas if they had failed, it was the late ad ministration ministration which must have borne the blame. He was an advocate for such a state of preparation as would always leave us at liberty to put forward such a degree of strength and energy, as would now, and at all times, be sufficient to check all the hostile designs of the French government. Lord Hawkesbury observed, that although the address appeared to be unanimously approved of, yet the grounds upon which different gentlemen supported it were very different. He could not agree entirely with what had fallen from either the hon. gentleman (Mr. Fox), or the right honourable gentleman (Mr.Canning) who had just sat down. He himself had said on the conclusion of peace, that it was right to close the accounts of war; but that still they must look forward with a watchful jealousy to prevent any future encroachments on the part of France. The right hon. gentleman (Mr. Canning) who was not present at the discussion of the preliminary and definitive treaties, had certainly misconceived the grounds on which they had been defended by his majesty's ministers. His supposition that ministers had relinquished the system, upon which they concluded that treaty, was founded upon a misconception. The principle that was avowed and acted upon at the late treaty, was what would govern his majesty's ministers now, and for the future. It was this, that as far as respected merely the interests of this country, the peace was made on honourable terms; inasmuch as the integrity of the British dominions was preserved: but as to the continent, it was allowed to be unsatisfactory; which was regretted in terms still stronger than had been used to-night. The principle of concluding this peace then was this, that it was better to take the chance of peace than the chance of war, for objects merely continental, unless we had the support of the continental powers. This was the principle upon which his majesty's ministers had acted, on which they now act, and on which they would always be ready to act in future, and to justify themselves. The right hon. gentleman had misunderstood him, when he supposed that he had ever wished that this country should abstract itself from the politics of the rest of Europe. It was impossible that a country connected as this was by commerce, with the interests of all other nations, should ever feel indifferent to what befel these other nations: we could not seperate the politics of this country, from the politics of Europe. Among nations, as well as individuals, those who are great and powerful, have interests to attend to, beyond the mere preservation of their existence. The protection of those who are weaker, is not only a duty, but it is among the most important of their interests. The extent however to which this principle was to be carried, depended on the existing circumstances, and was regulated in a great measure, by expediency. This had been always attended to in the consideration of the line of conduct, which this country should pursue. When Poland was blotted out of the map of the world as an independant nation; it was expediency alone, which prevented our interference. There was no British sovereign, who ever felt a stronger desire to limit the power of France upon the continent, than William the 1 third, and yet he did not think it adviseable for this country to engain a war singly against France, merely for continental objects. Although we should be always prepared to act according to circumstances, yet we could not pretend to Catroul existing circumstances. He must declare it to be his most ided opinion, that if (under the present circumstances of the counryand of Europe) peace could be maistained with honour to ourselves, it would be better than a renewal of the contest. His right friend had also misunderstood when he supposed that he had bed forth desponding language, at the conclusion of the peace. He was sure that if war became necessary, the spirit of the people of this tantry would be always found equal to the contest. As to Switerland, he must say most positively, that the resistance of that country was by no means instigated by the British government; and that no couragement had been held out to them by this country. Some ourable gentlemen, in their piments to Mr. Pitt, appeared consider that the present admitration wanted the firmness neessary to their situation. No man was more disposed to bestow praise the conduct of that gentleman an imself; but events had haped in the latter part of his adstration, which shewed that as not in the power of the test talents to command sucThe right honourable gentlehad described the state of the entry, as most prosperous when he retired from office. He el to have forgotten, that ere was at that time a com bination of almost the whole of Europe against us. He had forgotten the dismay and anxiety which pervaded the public mind before the battle of Copenhagen, and the suc cess of the Egyptian expedition. Some gentlemen seemed to think our navy had been dismantled, and our military force imprudently disbanded; but, in truth, there never was before, a peace in which our naval establishment had been so strong, and that of France so weak. The right hon. gentleman had said that he did not so much regard the conditions of the peace, as the animus in which it was made. As to the animus of France, if we were to wait till it was completely friendly to this country, we must be at war for ever. The policy of ministers was now, and ever had been, to resist any unjust demands from any foreign power; and if a stand must be made, to make it in the first instance. It was their wish to preserve peace as long as they could, consistently with the policy and the general circumstances of Europe. The altered situation of Europe must certainly be a subject of regret to every lover of this country; but it must be acknowledged, that we had it not alway in our power to redress whatever we might feel to be our grievance. He concluded, by trusting that the conduct of his majesty's ministers would always be found consistent with the principles they professed, and would give general satisfaction to the country. Mr Windhars particularly directed his argument against the observations of Mr. Fox, who had formerly praised the French revolution, and who now considered France, merely on the footing of a commercial rival. When 1 |