316 ANNUAL REGISTER, 1805. should be attached to it, we can must ever regret that it was not Lich, in that unhappy country, The friends and partizans of the n't pretend to ascertain, early on rd-lieutenant and commander in the day of the insurrection; and we chief, endeavoured, in mutual recrimination, to ax on each of thought proper then to set on foot Lose characters. The result may such precautionary measures, as be easily conceived; it was found might, if not entirely have diverted impossible to carry on the neces- the meditated attack, at least have sary business of the administration saved the lives of the innocent of affairs in Ireland, under circum- individuals, who were its vic stances so discordant; consequent tims. The heart sickens at the re chief justice, who might, at the ly general Fox was removed thence; flection, that the venerable lord but as soon as a situation of credit and importance presented itself, it short distance of four miles from was immediately conferred upon the capital, have expected a sumhim-lord Hardwicke was continued in his lieutenancy. The culars of the information receivEnglish government, thus manifest- ed; or the escort of a few draing its intention of hushing up the goons, if any intimation of tumulaffair, and of suppressing all farther tuous assemblage had been com inquiry. From an attentive consideration of the circumstances we have narrated, it must be deduced, that either the government of Ireland was completely surprized, which, under every appearance and even fact, connected with the conspiracy which must have previously come to its knowledge, argues a degree of security totally inconsistent with wisdom or prudence; or, that being well served, and early apprized of the threatened insurrection, it neglected those means which the nature of the case suggested, and which were abundantly within its reach, of guarding against consequences so much to be dreaded. The judgment is thus suspended, between the imputation of incapacity, and one of a far more serious nature. Certain however it is that information of the impending insurrection was given to the government, the extent of which, and the credit that mons to council; or the parti hesitated, between the doubts raised in his mind, by the rumours municated to the lord lieutenant, which were, towards the evening of that fatal day, continually pouring in upon him, and the total silence of government, until the moment when the increase of the former had amounted to conviction, and impelled him, though too late, to seek refuge in the metropolis! the affairs of Ireland, which occur- The latter is a Roman catholic, character, CHAP. XXI. State of Europe.-Effect of the Peace of Amiens upon Spain-PortugalAustria-Prussia-Sweden-Denmark-Italy. Only beneficial in its effects to France.-Discontent of Russia.-War breaks out between England and France.-Ambitious views of Bonaparte on the Turkish Empire in Africa-Europe-and Asia.-Mission of Sebastiani.-Views of Bonaparte frustrated by the War,-Directs his whole attention to the Invasion of Britain.-Vast preparations at Boulogne-At Brest—and at Bayonne.-Levies contributions on Portugal.-Tyranical conduct to the Dutch.-Designs on Germany.-State of the Empire.-French invade and conquer Hanover-Acquiescence of Austria, and Prussia thereto. And why.-Spirited conduct of Denmark.-Insolence of Bonaparte to Russia, and violation of his Treaties with that PowerPosture of Europe at the close of the Year.-Conclusion. THE year of nominal peace which Europe enjoyed in 1802, was to France alone ultimately beneficial. The French government, however it might affect moderation at the treaty of Luneville, never, in point of fact, gave up any of the advantages it had gained in the war over the different powers which had coalesced against her; but on the contrary, through the medium of that peace, contrived to increase both its territory and influence; and in some degree to restore its finances from the derangement, which interior disturbance and the first year's expences of the war had necessarily occasioned. At the close of the year 1802, France was every way more powerful than at its commencement, while on the other hand Europe had grown proportionably weaker. It had been the andeviating system of the French government, while treating with the other powers of Europe, to manifest a specious moderation, but which was followed by the assumption of the most absolute dominion over them. In conformity to this principle, it had some years before signed a peace with Spain on terms apparently equitable; but from the moment of the signature of that peace, Spain descended from the rank of an independant nation, to a state of absolute vassalage. In like manner the treaty of Luneville appeared in its conditions sufficiently reasonable, had France ever intended to have carried them into execution; and in the treaty of Amiens, from the moment that the preliminaries were signed which led to it, Bonaparte seemed to consider Great Britain (as well as Spain and Austria) to have fallen from the rank it formerly held to the condition of a secondary secondary power, no longer able to cope with France, or of consequence enough to interfere in the continental relations of Europe. From the first establishment of her republic, France had followed closely the maxim of the ancient Romans, who only gave peace to those nations they were willing to receive as dependant tributaries. Spain was not the only nation that descended from its elevated sphere, and became degraded into insignificance, by a specious peace. The German empire,which had been shaken to its centre by the disastrous events of the war, was still a greater sufferer by the short and deceitful pacification which ensued. By the treaty of Luneville, the independence and freedom of Switzerland, Holland, and the Italian republic, were guarded by the most solemn engagements; but in the short interval of suspended warfare which succeeded, Bonaparte, so far from respecting those stipulations, established his domiaion but the more firmly over those countries, in violation of the faith he had pledged to them and to all Europe. It had been provided in the same treaty, that the brother of the emperor Francis, the grand duke, should be fully indemnified in Germany, for his immense losses in Italy. This stipulation, although most immediately affecting the personal honor and feelings of the emperor, was most share fully evaded. Bonaparte, well aware of the great difficulties that the jarring interests of the different German powers would throw in the way of that plan of indemnities and compensations, on which the treaty of Luneville was founded; had the address to prevail upon the pacific disposition of the emperor of Russia, to co-operate with him in settling the affairs of Germany. The court of St. Petersburgh, anxiously desirous of healing the wounds of Germany, and induced by the hope of restoring the different nations of Europe to permanent tranquillity, and the quiet enjoyment of their independ ence, allowed itself for a season unwittingly to enter into the views and projects of the wily Corsican. Opposed to such mighty powers as France and Russia, the German nation was necessitated to patient acquiescence, and with scarcely an exception, every point that was proposed at Ratisbon, by the French and Russianministers conjunctively, was ratified by the diet. One solitary instance of successful opposition to the determinations of those powers however occurred. Originally, nothing equivelant to his claims was proposed to be given to the archduke Ferdinand for the loss of Tuscany ; But the emperor of Germany had the spirit to protest so often and so strongly against this manifest violation of the treaty of Luneville, that France and Russia at length consented that the bishoprick of Eichstadt should be added to his brother's compensations. This event is principally remarkable, as it is the only stand which Austria has attempted to make against the overbearing influence of France in Ger many, since the cessation of hostilities. The question of the indemnities however having been thus disposed of, the relative situation of Austria to France at the termination of a year of peace, was materially deteriorated; CHAP. XXI. State of Europe.-Effect of the Peace of Amiens upo THE year of nominal peace which Europe enjoyed in 1802, was to France alone ulti mately beneficial. The Fren government, however it might fect moderation at the trea Luneville, never, in point of gave up any of the advar had gained in the war ove ferent powers which had against her; but on the through the medium of contrived to increase territory and influe some degree to reces from the dera interior disturbanc year's expences of cessarily occasion At the close France was ever able to archs of his r Prussia the y power. The ...ised Prussia to such ng the nations of Euabandoned; at his death; ice that period, Prussia, alh constantly increasing in Territory, has visibly declined in importance; insomuch that Europe at present knows nothing of that power, save as the ally and ins strument of France. It may with propriety.be said of this kingdom, and what one of the most accomplish. ed orators of his age applied to France,"If we look upon the mapi of Europe we see. a chasm where once was Prussia." Nor can it be ino expected: from the present aspect of see, things, that a sovereign imbued with the spirit of the great Frederick shall again arise to crown the Prussian name with glory, and hold how with steady hand the balance pow- among the rude and restless nations common of the northaw. On the contrary, it Lu to er than at its com the other ha proportic been the AY appearse |