picious, and crafty police, should no longer be the basis of their governing system, and in short, that in the councils of the nation, equity, and justice, belonged to the one, as well as to the other. Was this to be done, by the prolongation of that same colonial system, presented to my reader, in the early pages of this exposé? Were these just restitutions to be made, by aggravating, instead of removing those privations and disabilities, under which the Spanish Americans had so long laboured; or was it to administer equal and impartial justice, to declare war against one half of the monarchy, for no other reason, than, because, it had followed the example of the other, and sought its own security and reform, in the very measures, in which the other, had, so lately, gloried? And if this conduct was opposed to justice, was it not equally in contradiction, with policy and expediency? The colonial regimen, practised by Spain, in the ultramarine provinces, loudly called for reform; the Seville and Cadiz governments, therefore, are, in the first place, answerable for two years negligence; and for no effective relief to Spanish America, being found on their records, from the year 1808 to 1810, the period when the governments of the latter, were transformed. If this is a fact, and also that the situation of the inhabitants of the transmarine provinces, required immediate attention, and particularly the revival of trade; to refuse it by an insulting declaration of war and blockade, was not only to commit the most flagrant act of injustice in the face of the whole world; but it was, besides, to involve the last remnant of Spanish power and influence in the Western hemisphere; it was to sow the seeds of fermenting passions, which would soon unnerve

the strength of the whole nation, and produce a fatal relaxation in every part of the social body; and a war that would deluge its fairest portion, in blood and destruction; and, eventually, drý up both the resources of Spain and her ally.

The motives which first urged the various sections of Spanish America, to resist the control of their viceroys and captain-generals, and to entrust the administra tion of their local concerns, respectively, into the hands of provisional Juntas, the only motives which excited the anger, and called forth the vengeance of the Cadiz. Regency; are, by this time, sufficiently explained and proved. The first movements, it consequently, results, had for object, to escape the shackles of the French, and afterwards, to commence the grand work of reform. The first motive, was even respectable to the most illiberal of Spain, and particularly so to England; and as for the second, who can step forward and say, it was not necessary? The grounds of the first, originated in a merited distrust in the colonial chiefs; who, as before manifested, had given testimony of their bad faith; and had proved by their conduct, that they were not to be trusted. A variety of peculiar circumstances, had added to this want of confidence; and at such a distance, the eventual fate of the Peninsula, was extremely uncertain. What hopes could be consistently entertained, when its then deplorable situation, is considered; or why was Spanish America to be more sanguine in her hopes, when, even the rest of Europe, dispaired? What prospect of reform, did there exist, when two years of apathy, had gone by; during which time, the ultramarine provinces, had only been thought of, to contribute supplies,

and to add to the sounding dignity and parade, of the new rulers of Spain and the Indies. The only govern ment which had raised itself on the anarchy of the mo ment, was now dispersed, and it was uncertain, under what new shape, succeeding despotism would act. How could confidence subsist in Spanish America, when in Spain, all was discomfiture and dismay; when division reigned in the national councils, amongst the military chiefs; and even the allies; when the treasury was exhausted; when the national armies were broken; when the garrison towns and chief provinces, were in the hands of the enemy; when the people were tired of the war; and when in short, the best opportunities of saving the Peninsula, had been lost? All these dilemmas, have, indeed, since been overcome; but this, has not been, by the energies of the Spanish government and people, but, rather, by the perseverance of England, At the period to which I allude, and when the governmental changes took place abroad, nothing but the salvation of Cadiz, preserved the monarchy; and this was, more owing to the zeal and activity of the Duke d'Albuquerque, than to the prompt or prudent measures of the government; and when things had arrived at this low ebb, were the Spanish Americans, also, to wait, till the eleventh hour, or till they had, equally, fallen a prey to a designing foe?

In strict conformity to the laws of the realm and the successive grants of the kings of Spain, we have, before, seen the ultramarine provinces, entitled, and authorized to hold their Cortes, within themselves; yet, when they erect provisional Juntas for local purposes, and for motives the most just and respectable, and in exact imita

tion of those of European Spain; they are warred upon as rebels, and treated as outlaws. War and blockade, is openly declared against them; and after all their testimonies of loyalty, both recent and sincere, after their copious remittances, and finally, after 300 years of affec tion and fellowship, which have been proof against all the instigations of England, they are treated worse, than the very provinces of the Peninsula, which had already bent to the allegiance of the French. If the position be true, that the Spanish Americans were equal in rights with their brethren of the Peninsula, and this relative footing is not only analagous to the spirit of their history, but, also, founded on the most repeated, and express acts of the Spanish legislature; and if as before proved, the person of the king was their sole bond of political union; I fairly ask my reader, what steps the Spanish Americans were to take, when this bond was wrenched from them; when no legal or substantial form of government was established, to replace it; and when, in short, they were equally driven to an emergency, for which, in the sta tutes, no adequate provision could be found? If their conduct then proved any thing, it was attachment and respect to the parent state. Attachment, by not imme diately deposing their chiefs, as soon as the first news of the French invasion, and the loss of their rightful mo narch, arrived out amongst them; thus preferring to wait with patience and forbearance, and this for more than two years, and till their own situation, was not only desponding, but, also, till they found it was in vain to look, any longer, for relief, or redress, to a country, which, in itself, had not even the form of a government, and, which, they supposed, had, already, become a prey

to its enemies. Respect, by following the very example of the Peninsula, when plunged into a similar distress.

The Americans from their distance, as well as from their loss being the greatest, required a temporary and substituted power; was, there, therefore, any other than Juntas, that could be adopted? Was there any other form that could adequately supply their wants, or fulfil their wishes? The Juntas of Oviedo, Seville, and Valencia, as independent bodies, could treat with England, and enter into an alliance, in the name of the whole monarchy, and their right and authority was never doubted. Their creation was the same as those of Spanish America, with this difference, that those of the latter, were in form and in essence, more regular and constitutional; and the urgent circumstances which gave rise to both, were on a parallel. Yet, though equal in rights, and actuated by motives both more honourable and just, the Juntas of Spanish America, are warred upon, because they merely undertake the administration of their own affairs, and consult their own local welfare, without interfering with the rest of the monarchy. The general object of the sections of Spanish America, was to assemble local and provisional Juntas, as well for purposes already expressed, as a kind of preliminary step to the calling of a general congress, of the representatives of each. This, also, was the original plan in Spain, but the Central Junta and Regency, after tasting the sweets of power, were loath to forego it; and, consequently, struggled to retain it, as long as they could; that is, for more than three years. I mention this intention of the Spanish Americans to call a general congress, in case the disasters of the nation continued; in order to repel the charge of individual