certainty, that partiality and remissness, in matters of the most vital importance; that instability and change, which marked the footsteps of each form, they successively assumed, would, never, have produced so long a train of ills at home, and which could not fail of equally spreading, to the other side of the waters of the Atlantic. That restraints of a most grievous nature, bent down the inhabitants of Spanish America, was plain and manifest; these were only to be removed, by a radical extirpation, and this was not to be done, by the sacrifice of the rights of others. The long and unrepining sufferings of the ultramarine provinces, required a compensation; and the new governments were bound to give it, as a reward for the blood, cares, toils, and calamities, occasioned by the misconduct of the old one. Above all, they were entitled to a patient and unbiassed hearing; the whole of which, if Spain had granted, she might now have told her tale to the world, with a good grace, and England might have believed her; but, complaints and invectives, ill become those, who were the first aggressors.

In Spanish America, at any period of these unfortu nate dissentions, there was to be found, a sincere disposition to conciliation and adjustment, which certainly might have been improved, so as to meet any just and liberal plan, the legislature of Spain, might have urged, of England have recommended. Ineffectual, also, as we shall soon shew, all the exertions of the American deputies in the Cortes, to have been, to obtain redress for their constituents, on a basis, legal and equitable, it' cannot be denied, that amidst the heat of so cruel a warfare, there existed, on the part of the very insurrec

tional chiefs, a readiness, not only to stop the effusion of blood, but, also, to enter on some definitive and permanent arrangement. Hidalgo, chief of the Mexican insurrection, on 31st of October, 1810, sent two generals to Venegas, to treat for peace; the only terms of which were, to restore the Junta and local authorities of the capital, and to form a strong cantonment of troops, on some of the leading positions from Vera Cruz, the des cent of the French, being at that time, dreaded. Rayon, when at Zacatecas, likewise, solicited Calleja to agree to the formation of a Junta or Congress, consisting of Europeans and Americans, respectively elected by the provinces; on which terms, he offered to lay down his arms. He barely received for answer, that if he laid them down, he should be comprehended in the general indult published by government; that is, his life should be spared. Some time since, a solemn offer was made by the Mexican deputy in the Cortes, to obtain money for the Peninsular cause, in loans, by mortgag, ing the mines as a security; provided Spain would guarantee the ulterior independence of the ultramarine provinces, in the only case, of herself being conquered; as an assurance of that kind, by convincing them, that it was not intended to bind them to the car of Napoleon, would make them cease to be impatient, and the public mind being thus tranquillized, peace and confidence would be restored, and suspended agriculture and the working of the mines, would be continued. This proposal, as all others had been, was not only rejected with, disdain, but, also, treated as revolutionary; and an offer, liberal and disinterested in itself, and only suggested in consequence of that prevailing anxiety of the

inhabitants of Spanish America, to know what was to be their future fate, in case of a misfortune, which all thought unavoidable, but which each deplored, became a fresh motive of persecution, and an additional plea for further excesses.

The Junta of Sultepec, in March, 1812, sent to the Viceroy of Mexico, a plan for peace, which was intended as a basis of reconciliation, and as a means of preventing further effusion of blood. This was accompanied by a plan for war, amounting to a proposed compact between the contending parties, respecting the manner in which the war was to be carried on; in order, that an end might be put to so many atrocities, as were continually committing. Both were rejected with disdain, but, as their contents are highly illustrative, and tend to corroborate some of my chief premises, I annex them in my Appendix, under the head of G, together with their accompanying manifest; particularly, as they will throw considerable light on the exertions of the Spanish American deputies in the Cortes, to bring about some plan of pacification and mutual adjustment, a subject on which we shall presently enter. On many other occasions, a sincere disposition to accommodation, was manifested, on the part of the Creoles, which we shall have occasion to notice in the progress of this exposé. But, whilst Spain appeared determined, not to submit her controversy with the ultramarine provinces, to the mediation of a third power, England bore with the greatest tameness, every rebuff in her offers of mediation; which she, apparently, undertook, rather as a political experiment, than as a measure of urgent necessity, in which every possible engine was to be set to work, and every strenuous means of success,

employed. Every pacific disposition, was overlooked, and no rational mode of explanation, was suggested. The government of Cadiz, preferred war, blockades, threats, and persecutions, and in vain, did one of the American deputies, in the Cortes insist, that it was cruel and inhuman, to send out troops to make war upon brethren, without having previously appropriated an hour, to fix on some means of conciliation, or even given their rights and the basis of their conduct, a fair and unbiassed discussion. Rancour and animosity now flamed high, the Cadiz merchants formed a Junta out of their war faction, which contributed by loans to the expence of the equipments, and, thus, resolved to maintain by force, what must, necessarily have been ceded, if the ultramarine provinces had been heard and redressed. Ah! one moment's reflection, on the part of the Cadiz Regency, and timely exertion on that of England, would have prevented all these calamities; and in, like manner, one week of moderation, justice, and impartiality in the Cortes of Spain, would have done more towards the pacification of Spanish America, than all the armies, the monopolists could send over, or all the engines of terror and vengeance, they could set to work. Yet, on the precipice on which Spain, then, stood, it was evident, that every means ought to have been essayed, in order to prevent the effusion of human blood, and the wider spread of anarchy and confusion; nor was it less essential to husband her own troops and resources, when her very existence, at home, was at stake.

Thus, has Spain by her own illiberality, placed her American provinces in the greatest danger; by her rashness, she has been plunged into a war of extermination,

and, during the most momentous period of her struggle against France, she has been cut off from those resources, which would have rendered success more easy and certain. The united interests of both countries, were however sacrificed to puuctilio, to clashing interests, and to the most grovelling of all passions. If Spanish America, laboured under grievances, and the government at home, was unable to redress them; it might, at least, have confessed their existence, and acknowledged its own inability, then to attend to their removal. But time has not been wanting, since there has been sufficient to overturn the fundamental laws of the realm, and to frame a constitution, on a basis, that could neither bring permanent bap piness and tranquillity, to one portion of the monarchy, or the other. The reform of the colonial system of Spain, was an object of clear and unequivocal importance, and in it, the enlightened and virtuous citizen, could not fail to concur. Its defects were plain and well known, and a practical declaration of rights, or a comprehensive decree, would have sufficed for their extinction. And was there no time for this? In granting a free trade, a disposition to be just, would have been evinced; but even this was denied, though of its equity and necessity, no great contrariety of sentiment could prevail. The wise and thinking part of the community, those, who unbiassed by 'local ties and prejudices, could trace the existing evils to their real source, strongly, recommended the incorporation of such principles, into the political and governing system of Spanish America, as might correct obvious vices. If Spain had time for nothing else, she had at least plenty, to devise some uniform system in the commercial relations of both parts of the