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But to return to affairs in the autumn of 1853, after which period Captain Eardley - Wilmot's book becomes more of a naval history than a biography. He gives us no further light on the so-called "massacre of Sinope." Why the Turkish ships were kept at Sinope, courting certain destruction, is one of those mysteries which will probably be never solved. Lyons had arrived at Constantinople a week before the disaster; but even if he or the other admirals had pointed out to the Turks the fatuity of their conduct, it scarcely seems likely that they would have been listened to.

At this time there was not only a council of ambassadors at Constantinople, but a council of admirals as well. As usual, the multitude of counsellors did not tend to action, and for a long time nothing was done. Public opinion at home calling loudly for some kind of demonstration, the combined French and English fleets entered the Black Sea on January 3, 1854, with the object, so the Russians were informed, "of protecting the Sultan's dominions from hostile aggressions." Although war was not yet actually declared, this was virtually an act of war.

The author thus describes Sir Edmund Lyons at this time :

"Though Sir Edmund Lyons had entered upon his sixty-fourth year, he possessed at this period great activity of mind and body. . . . The expression of his countenance denoted a sanguine temperament, with

much decision of character."

VOL. CLXV.—NO, DCCCCXCIX,

Though nominally only second in command, he henceforward practically took the lead in the British fleet.

Captain Eardley - Wilmot never mentions the force which the Russians had in the Black Sea, nor does it appear to have much concerned the allied fleet, since no attempt was made to ascertain either its strength or position. At the same time, comparatively weak squadrons of English and French steamships were detached from the main fleets to patrol the Turkish coast. Sinope was made the headquarters of the Allies. It is interesting to note that Lyons, writing from this place, speaks of the "late attack of the Russians." There is no indication that the officers on the spot regarded the Sinope affair as other than a most legitimate operation of war. of fact, it much resembled the recent destruction of the Spanish squadron at Manila. The cruise of the allied fleets only lasted three weeks, when they returned to Constantinople. Captain Eardley-Wilmot gives some interesting letters that passed between Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and the admirals on the strategical situation. Neither the ambassador nor the admirals appeared to grasp the fact that to prevent the Russians from doing mischief their fleet should be blockaded or masked, and in any case a close watch should be kept upon them. This was not done, but Turkish troops and stores were conveyed into the

As a matter

Ι

One little place Redoute Kaleh was taken with the help of a Turkish force landed for the purpose. Lyons here showed his diplomatic capacity by his success in keeping on cordial terms with the French.

Black Sea by a few steamers, with.
almost as if courting a Russian
attack; but the Russians re-
fused to come out. War did
not actually break out till
April 9, 1854, more than three
months after the allied squad-
rons had been acting together;
but they were still unprepared
for combined action. The
writer remarks—

"Plans for sailing and navigation, to bring different methods of signalling and tactics into harmony, had to be organised; and though much

had been done towards this end

during the time the two squadrons lay together in the Bosphorus, it required a few days after war had been declared to complete them. When people talk glibly about the strength conferred by an alliance, they little knew how difficult it is to make things go smoothly, especially when the forces are acting side by side."

For ten days the fleets did nothing. It was then decided to bombard Odessa. For this purpose seven steamers and one sailing frigate were detached, and threw a number of shells into the storehouses and shorebatteries of Odessa, and then drew off. The effect does not seem to have been great. The fleets remained doing nothing off Odessa for another week, and then blockaded Sevastopol for six days, after which they returned to Varna. In the meantime a small squadron under Lyons, comprising both British and French steamers, raided the coast of Circassia. The Russians most wisely evacuated the smaller ports, and concentrated 8000 men at Anapa, which was therefore far too strong for the squadron to deal

During the months of May, June, and the early part of July, the twenty line-of-battle ships composing the main body of the allied fleets lay at Varna, with little or nothing to occupy them save assisting in the landing of the troops and their stores.

fifteen

The Russian fleet of sail-of-the-line lay unwatched 250 miles off at Sevastopol. On July 19 a council to attack met, and decided Sevastopol. It was only then discovered that nothing was known of the place, and the combined fleet stood across to the Crimea to reconnoitre. The reconnaissance was, however, most cursory; no soundings were taken, and the mouth of the Katscha river, which as a result of this reconnaissance was agreed on as the best place for landing an expedition, afterwards proved unsuitable. Lyons was now given definite charge of all the transport arrangements; and as the home authorities when providing transports had taken no thought as to how the men, horses, and guns were to be landed, the work of providing the necessary boats and pontoons had to be done by the officers of the fleet. The country was fortunate in having under Lyons a young and energetic set of officers. His flag

captain, Mends, especially distinguished himself by the ability with which he arranged the

details of the scheme for landing a large number of men, horses, and guns at one and the same time on an open beach.

In the middle of these preparations came the cholera. The French army lost 4000 men, and in one of their line-of-battle ships 140 men died in three days. The mortality amongst the British did not amount to more than one-fifth of the above, but still it was most severe and discouraging. It was at this trying time that Sir Edmund's cheerfulness and determination to go on was most useful in supporting the waverers. At last, on August 20, it was finally decided that the expedition was to go at once, and September 2 was fixed for the start. Varna was a nasty place for an embarkation, with a heavy swell breaking on an open beach h; but the seamen did marvels. Captain EardleyWilmot quotes a "staff-officer's letter" :

"The sea was very rough, and it took us some time to get alongside, and then no little difficulty in putting the things on to the already frightened horses. I never saw anything like the pluck of the bluejackets. One horse would not allow the slings to be put under him, and kept on lashing out with one hind-leg in a most furious manner (it was too rough to kick with both, or he would have fallen). This beast was delaying the embarkation of the other horses, so one sailor called out to his messmate, Jack, next time he kicks lay hold of his leg,' which Jack very coolly did, and to our utter astonishment the horse stood perfectly still

and only snorted. In another second he was swinging in the air half-way up the ship's side."

But work as they would, the British transports were not ready quite as soon as the French, for we had far more cavalry and artillery than they. Under these circumstances the French sailed on September 5, and the British two days afterwards, on the 7th. On the 8th the fleets united. Before this junction the Russians had a splendid opportunity for attack. They were stronger than the French, and were quite unwatched at Sevastopol only 200 miles off; and, as Captain Eardley - Wilmot points out, even if beaten they might have broken up the expedition and defeated its purpose, for that year at any rate.

Now came more delays: the French were not satisfied with the Katscha, and asked for a conference, and a fresh reconnaissance had to be made. This took two days, during which time the expedition anchored in an entirely unprotected anchorage, where bad weather would have been most serious. When the landing - place was decided upon the flotilla weighed, and proceeded to a point some thirty miles or so from the landing-place. Next day they made only a dozen miles or so, and again anchored-this time at Eupatoria. Finally, they arrived at "Old Fort," nine days after the French had started, and seven days after the sailing of the British portion of the flotilla-the distance traversed being about 250 miles.

As Captain Eardley - Wilmot points out, during all this time either bad weather or the Russians might have completely broken up the expedition. And though the landing began in such fine weather that more than half the army was landed in twelve hours, bad weather then set in, and no less than three days were taken in landing the remainder, so that it took four days to put some 50,000 men on shore. This, too, with no opposition whatever, either afloat or ashore, and with the boats of a large fleet to assist. The author does well to point out that an invasion is not quite such an easy operation as some would have us believe. Even after the successful battle of the Alma, the armies were still entirely dependent on the fleets for food and stores, as, indeed, they remained all through the war; and if the command of the Black Sea had at any time passed into the hands of the enemy, the expeditionary force must have surrendered.

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still, without the assistance of the men and guns from the ships, it is probable that the siege would have failed. Altogether, from first to last, 4500 men were landed from the fleet, about 1200 being usually on shore at the same time. Their losses in killed and wounded amounted to 575. About half the guns for the siege batteries were also supplied from the ships.

The one operation in the Crimea in which the navy failed to satisfy those who believe that ships can go anywhere and do anything was the attack on the sea-front of Sevastopol. Captain EardleyWilmot devotes some space to considering the reasons for the attack, and falls foul of Sir E. Hamley because that officer ascribes to Sir E. Lyons' influence over Lord Raglan the very strongly worded request made by the general that the navy should assail the forts. There is no doubt that Sir E. Hamley writes strongly, and in styling Lyons "Lord Raglan's evil genius," or in stigmatising his zeal as "his rash desire to do something effective," he is probably taking an extreme view. On the other hand, as Captain Eardley-Wilmot himself points out, it is clear that Lyons was constantly with Lord Raglan, and that his advice had great influence. Moreover, Hamley was on the spot, and had good opportunities of gauging the effect of Lyons' advice, and Captain EardleyWilmot's evidence is mainly of a negative character, Nor was

this advice always confined to matters maritime. For example, after the battle of the Inkerman "Sir Edmund recommended, however, that our batteries [i.e., the siege-batteries] should reopen fire the next day as if nothing unusual had occurred, and this view prevailed." Though there is no evidence as to Lyons' opinion of the flank - march, it is plain that he thought well of Balaclava, in which, as Captain EardleyWilmot makes clear, he was fully justified, for that insignificant little harbour held 200 vessels safely. The length of road between Balaclava and the British lines was not Lyons business; but on Lord Raglan must rest the responsibility for the final decision as to the base for supplies. Lyons was also in favour of an attack on the forts by the navy. He writes when at Balaclava, "I am naturally very anxious to rejoin the fleet and take part in the attack on the batteries, which should of course take place simultaneously with the assault on Sevastopol by the army." And again his biographer records, "Sir Edmund anticipated the fleet would join in the attack, and no doubt he so expressed himself to Lord Raglan." Sir E. Hamley may have used the epithet "rash rather unguardedly, but other wise I agree with him, especially that Lyons learnt by experience how fruitless such an attack must be. The biographer well points out the conditions necessary for success when ships are pitted against

sea-forts, the most important being that the works should be engaged at close range. This was impossible at Sevastopol, where, moreover, the works were exceptionally strong. To have materially assisted the army in the assault, the ships should have been in a position to enfilade or take in reverse the works to be attacked by the army. To do this it was necessary to go a mile or so past the outer forts and well into the harbour, an impossible achievement, owing to the sunken ships, which, moreover, equally prevented our vessels from coming to close quarters with the inner forts. The only thing left for the fleet to do was to attack the sea-faces of the outer forts; but had every gun here been silenced, it would still have been almost as difficult as before to get into the harbour. Whether either the admirals or the generals realised this at the time is extremely doubtful. Lyons himself was so hard at work at Balaclava that it is probable he did not get time to thoroughly reconnoitre the forts,—indeed, there never seems to have been overmuch reconnoitring in the Crimea at any time. Kinglake, whose detailed account of the attack remains the best that we have, and who is practically uncontradicted so far as the part assigned to the British ships is concerned, supposes that the power of the works was well known, and that the navy generally fully appreciated the difficulty of doing anything really effective.

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