Page images
PDF
EPUB

WEI-HAI-WEI.

ITS VALUE AS A NAVAL STATION.

ALL the world knows that about a year ago Great Britain became practically mistress of Wei-hai-wei. It was then in the possession of the Japanese, who had captured it from China, as the last act of the drama of the Chino-Japanese war, and it was held by them for more than two years, pending the payment of the war indemnity owed them by China. The financial arrangements having been settled, it was made over to Great Britain on lease for a term of years, or "for as long as Russia continues to hold Port Arthur" -a possession which she also holds on lease from an unwilling landlord. The terms of both these leases must be regarded as somewhat ponderous diplomatic jokes. As if there was the smallest probability of Russia ever leaving Port Arthur!-unless some one stronger than her should drive her out: and give her four or five years to consolidate her forces and secure her position, and it will then be a very large undertaking for any combination of Powers to drive her out. The British joke is the more humorous but the less dignified of the two. There seems to be something small and mean in a great nation seizing a slice of territory of a friendly Power, as a set-off against the seizure of another slice by a Power assumed to be unfriendly, and then saying to the world, "I shall hold this as VOL. CLXV.-NO. MIV.

long as Russia holds that." The expression used to justify this action is our old friend "the balance of power." It is a useful diplomatic expression, and may cover much or little. In the present case it would appear to cover little, and to be of a doubtful and temporary nature.

No one who has watched carefully the march of events in the Far East can imagine for one moment that the possession of Wei-hai-wei by the British as a "secondary naval base" will keep Russia out of Peking, if she wants to go there. Russia can wait. That sums up the whole question. We may adjust the balance for the moment by seizing Wei-haiwei, and by keeping a squadron of warships in the China seas slightly superior to that of Russia. But beyond this what have we to throw into our

scale of the balance, while Russia is completing her railways and absorbing Manchuria? We are about to erect a few small batteries on the island at Wei-hai-wei: Russia had the guns, ammunition, and mountings for the fortification of Port Arthur shipped on board board the steamers of her volunteer fleet, and some of them actually on the China station, before she seized Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan. She can wait when it suits her, and she can be prompt when it suits her. Four months after

3 Z

she had seized Port Arthur she had made it practically impregnable to attacks from the sea, and by the month of December had 16,000 troops there, so that even a greatly superior army acting from the land side would have had a tough job to get the Russians out of it. Six months after Great Britain had taken possession of Wei-hai-wei, she sent 150 marines out there to guard the island and the mainland territory: and now, twelve months after the occupation, there is not a fort reconstructed nor a gun mounted! This comparison of the action of the two Powers cannot possibly pass without comment from the other Great Powers (including Japan, which is certainly a Great Power in the Far East), and it is small wonder if we hear them expressing doubts as to whether Great Britain is in earnest, and intends to remain at Wei-hai-wei, even on the very peculiar terms upon which she has obtained her lease of it. So long as any shadow of a doubt remains on this subject, capital will not flow towards our new territory, and it will not be developed. People remember Port Hamilton.

The insertion in the lease of the clause, that we only intend to stay at Wei-hai-wei so long as Russia remains at Port Arthur, was undoubtedly a feeble act, unworthy of a strong Conservative Government, and thus unworthy of the country. Not that there is the smallest doubt about the permanence of Russia's occupation. That is not the point: the point is, that the insertion of such contingent terms

indicated a feebleness of purpose inconsistent with the fixed policy of a great Power which possesses vast interests in China interests which surpass those of all other nations combined.

even

It was not to be supposed that Great Britain could for ever continue to hold the practical monopoly of the trade of the Far East which she has for many years enjoyed. No sensible men (with the exception of the British China merchants) could imagine that other nations would not sooner or later strive to get for themselves a fair share of such a lucrative business. It would have been too much to expect from poor weak human nature commercial human nature-to suppose that the British China merchants would acquiesce quietly in an invasion of their trade monopoly in their own special field of operations. They did not acquiesce quietly, but, on the contrary, filled the world with their outcry at the iniquity of foreigners in wishing to trade with China. Their ostensible grievance was based upon the well-known fact that all foreigners hedge in their spheres of influence with a cheval-de-frise of tariffs intended to exclude all competition with their own merchants, and especially to exclude Great Britain, with its hateful principles and practice of free trade; but their real grievance was the prospect of any competition with their practical monopoly of the China trade. Their alarm was probably in great measure unfounded. Like many other good and modest men, they

underrated their own powers, and forgot, or failed to take note of, the fact that British merchants have proved themselves capable when they wake up of holding their own in trade, even against hostile tariffs.

Our able Minister at Peking had a most difficult game to play, for there can be very little doubt now that the absolute seizure of Port Arthur by the Russians was a surprise for the British Government. The Government probably thought in a vague sort of way that Russia would eventually get Port Arthur: but it was not prepared for the sudden grab; and, like an unexpected check at chess, it took them flat aback. They talked big about the 66 open door"; sent powerful squadron to Chefoo (opposite to Port Arthur, and about seventy miles from it); and finally they pounced upon Wei-hai-wei, and took possession of it upon the terms above mentioned.

a

When the Russians' carefully laid schemes are ripe for execution, their strategic railways finished, Manchuria Russianised, Vladivostock and Port Arthur rendered absolutely impregnable from sea attack, and the Czar, irritated and disappointed at the general rejection of his disarmament proposal (we fully appreciate the rashness of prophecy), and urged onwards by the advice of ambitious Ministers and generals thirsting for glory, shall make up his mind to march his armies on Peking -how, we ask, will the mere occupation of Wei-hai-wei by

the British, the presence there of a few hundred white troops, a few thousand British-drilled yellow ones, and half-a-dozen first-class battleships riding in the roadstead or cruising in the Gulf of Pechili, hinder the Russians from marching on Peking, with a result which cannot for one moment be doubtful?

Whether this will take place in five, ten, or twenty years from the date of the seizure of Port Arthur we do not pretend to prophesy. There are physical and political difficulties to be overcome. That the engineers will overcome all the physical ones there cannot be a doubt. If they come to an utterly impracticable river which cannot be bridged, they will just burrow under it, like the Severn tunnel. Give them money enough and they always win against nature in the longrun. And as to the political difficulties, the unswerving tenacity of purpose of successive generations of Russian statesmen, the apparently inexorable law of her expansion wherever she impinges on a softer or more loosely organised community, the ambition of her generals, and the undoubted richness of the prize to be played for, point to the probability of all political difficulties being overcome also.

[ocr errors]

Of one fact we may be perfectly certain,-Russia has not spent enormous sums of money

on

the construction of the trans-Siberian railway for the purpose of developing the resources of her barren possessions in north-eastern Asia! A distinguished British naval

officer, who lately visited China "a purely commercial mission," advocates the organisation of the Chinese army by British officers, and an alliance between Great Britain, America, Germany, and Japan, with the view of preventing Russia from encroaching on the Chinese empire from the north, whilst her ally France is nibbling at the south. This would mean the division of the Powers mentioned into two great hostile camps, each trying to thwart the other at every turn-using all the wiles of diplomacy and the still more persuasive argument of threats upon a feeble Chinese Government to further their own interests and frustrate the schemes of their rivals. There are others, again, who think that Great Britain and Russia being the two principal parties concerned might, without loss of dignity and with much gain to their material interests, come to terms as to the disposal of the yellow man's land; for it can scarcely be doubted that the rapid process of disintegration which has set in since the disastrous defeat of China will lead ere long to large tracts of that ancient empire passing under the complete control, if not under the actual government, of alien Powers. There can be no more closing of China. The oyster has been opened now once for all, and cannot be shut again: all the ancient traditions of exclusiveness must be swept away. Before many years are passed the whole country will be riddled by railways, and the

remotest provinces thrown open to foreign trade. China, as hitherto known to Western nations-that is to say, as a self-governing Power-has already ceased to exist. She is no longer independent. She must do as she is told to do by foreigners. She can exercise no will of her own,-if she could she would shut the door in all our faces; but she knows now that her powers of resistance are gone. For fifty years she has been struggling against the forces of civilisation (barbarism from her point of view), and with that object has strenuously resisted railways, but the game is up now. The barbarians have leaped the great wall and are inside the citadel: further direct resistance is useless, and she can only now exercise her miserable tactics of dilatoriness, delay, and obstruction, by pretending that she does not understand. The only active policy at all open to her is the well-known tactics of our friend the Sultan-that of trying to stir up discord amongst her tormentors, with the hope that while they are employed in tearing each other's eyes out, she may be left in peace until they have finished; but it behoves the statesmen of Europe to see that this policy does not succeed. It will be recorded in the pages of history to the everlasting credit of the present generation of European statesmen if they can divide decently the carcass of the deceased dragon without falling out about it. It was undoubtedly St George who wounded him

unto death, though he did not give him the coup de grâce: this was reserved for the sturdy little pagan of his own blood. The Great Bear smelt the blood from afar, and came hurrying across a frozen continent to get a share of the spoils. He is making a bid for the Lion's share: but if the Lion, and the German and American Eagles (both of whom are hovering over the carcass), are wise enough to keep the peace amongst themselves and to pull together, the Bear will have to be satisfied with a moderate share, and will then, no doubt, pretend that he never wanted more. He is a wily Bear, and likes to get all he wants without fighting; in fact he hates fighting (just at present), and considers it a barbarous and disgraceful way of settling disputes. Yet, while he invites all the other animals to cut their claws, he takes good care not to clip his own; and he never leaves one of his numerous dens unguarded.

To drop metaphor and to return to the subject of our article, the name Wei-hai-wei belongs properly to a miserable, decaying, sixth-rate walled town, at the bottom of a shallow bay opposite to the western end of the island. The so-called harbour of Wei-hai-wei is of very wide extent, though shallow throughout the greater part of its area, and there are only three safe berths for heavy ships during the winter months; but dredging operations have already been commenced, and the deep water area will be rapidly increased, as the bottom is soft and the

Thus the

mud easily removed. harbour as a harbour (a shelter from the weather) can be inexpensively made a first-class one; but this is not the whole question. Wei-hai-wei is within ninety miles of Port Arthur, which Russia is rapidly turning into a first-class fortress, the harbour of which, though small, is completely landlocked, is capable of being made absolutely impregnable from any sea attack, can easily be closed with boom defences, and the ships within it thus rendered safe from torpedo-boat attack. And the harbour itself is admirably adapted to shelter a hundred torpedo-boats, or say, fifty destroyers of the sokol type, a condition of affairs which would in time of war render the anchorage at Weihai-wei untenable by an enemy's ships, no matter how strongly the island might be fortified.

In order to place Wei-hai-wei in a condition of equality with Port Arthur, it is necessary that a breakwater should be built, the estimated cost of which ranges between one and two millions sterling; and this would be exclusive of a dock, factory, repairing-shops, or any of the other adjuncts of a naval depot. It may be that the Government hesitates to propose the expenditure of so large a sum of money upon this remote island in the China Sea; and it has been authoritatively stated that they intend to make of it a "secondary naval base," with repairing-shops, &c. So far so good; and if the said secondary naval base did not happen to be within ninety miles

« ՆախորդըՇարունակել »