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her husband, and I go and do anything for her." He signed his name to a receipt for rent, and looked after the property. The defendant never denied her husband's authority as agent, and does not deny it in her evidence. His denial of his agency is rather of the legal conclusion of the fact. He admits the service rendered for his wife in connection with the property, and declares that they were rendered, not as an agent, but as a husband. He may be possibly ignorant of the fact that a busband may be a wife's agent, and, when he acts as such with her consent, she will be liable therefor, and chargeable with notice which he had of matters pertaining to the subject of his agency. There is no evidence supporting defendant's crossdemand. In our opinion, the court below ought to have granted the relief prayed for by plaintiff. The decree dismissing plaintiff's petition is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a decree in accord with this opinion, or, at plaintiff's option, such a decree may be entered here.

CLAY COUNTY V. PALO ALTO COUNTY.
(Supreme Court of Iowa. May 25, 1891.)
SETTLEMENT OF PAUPER-RELIEF OF POOR - LIA-
BILITY OF COUNTIES.

1. Under Code Iowa, § 1352, providing that "any person having attained majority, and residing in this state one year without being warned as herein provided, gains a settlement in the county of his residence," and that "legitimate minor children follow and have the settlement of their father," a minor, emancipated by agreement with his father, cannot by residence acquire an independent settlement.

2. Code Iowa, § 1366, provides that all claims and bills for the care and support of the poor shall be certified by the township trustees, and paid by the supervisors of the county. Section 1358 provides that the county where the settlement is shall be liable to the county rendering relief for all reasonable charges and expenses in. curred in the relief and care of a poor person. Held that, though the claims paid by the county rendering relief were not certified by the township trustees, the county could recover all reasonable charges and expenses from the county of the pauper's settlement.

3. Under Code Iowa, § 1365, providing that the poor shall apply to the trustees of the town where they may be, it is sufficient to authorize relief if the application is made on their behalf. Appeal from district court, Kossuth County: GEORGE H. CARR, Judge.

port said John Finn, but neither the board of supervisors of Clay county nor the trustees of Herland township had knowledge thereof. That in July, 1885, the said John Finn left the residence and home of his father with the intention of not returning to Palo Alto county, lowa. That, prior to his leaving, he and his father, David Finn, signed articles of agreement, in which it was agreed that said John Finn should have his time until he attained his majori-· ty, and he was not to look to his father for support, and his father was not to be liable for his debts; a notice of which agreement was duly published in the Palo Alto Pilot, a weekly newspaper published in defendant's county, of which notice the board of supervisors nor trustees aforesaid had actual knowledge. Upon leaving Palo Alto county the said John Finn went to Clay county, Iowa, and hired out to work for a resident of northern Clay county, and worked for him until the spring of 1886, when he went into the southern part of the county, and hired out to John Mates as a farm hand, where he remained until he was taken sick in the spring of 1887. That the notice written by the auditor of Clay county to the county aduitor and board of supervisors of Palo Alto county, copies of which are set out in the deposition of A. D. Franklin, and filed herein, are now lost, and cannot be found. That there was never any record made of any action by the board of supervisors of Palo Alto county, Iowa on the notices last above referred to. That David Finn is the father of John Finn, and is now, and has been, a resident of Palo Alto county, Iowa, for the past six years; and he, the said David Finn, has had during the said six years no other residence or legal settlement." The plaintiff (by agreement of parties to thus present the question) moved to strike from the stipulation the italicized part, on the ground that it was immaterial; and the court sustained the motion. Upon the remaining facts, with others undisputed, the court instructed the jury that the legal settlement of John Finn was in the defendant county. The case on other issues was tried to a jury, that returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and from a judgment thereon the defendant appealed.

Thomas O'Conner and Clark & Call, for appellant. A. C. Parker, for appellee.

Action to recover for medical services, care, and supplies furnished one John Finn, a poor person, whose alleged settlement is in the defendant county. The following stipulation of facts was filed in the case: "It is hereby agreed and stipulated as a part of the facts in the above-entitled cause as follows: That John Finn is now 19 years of age. That he is unmarried, and never has been married. That he is the same person to whom the medical aid, care, and attendance of Dr. Chas. McAllister was furnished which was the basis of this action, as well as the person to whom M. C. Johnson furnished care, etc., now filed herein. That up to the time said matters and things were furnished he was sick and unable to work, and had no means of support of his own. That his fathering attained majority, and residing in this

had ample means with which to sup

GRANGER, J. 1. The action of the court in striking from the stipulation, and holding that the settlement of Finn was in the defendant county, presents the first question for us to determine. Appellant's contention in this respect is that the facts stricken from the stipulation show John Finn had been emancipated from his father, and, being emancipated, it was competent for him to make or create a new settlement in another county. Some provisions of our Code are important in this connection. Chapter 1 of title 11 treats "of the settlement and support of the poor." tion 1352 is a part of chapter1 and provides: "Legal settlements may be acquired in the counties as follows: (1) Any person hav

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state one year without being warned as

hereinafter provided, gains a settlement in the county of his residence. * (4) Legitimate minor children follow and have the settlement of their father, if he have one; but, if he have none, then that of his mother." Other subdivisions of the section provide for the settlement of married women with their husbands, and those abandoned by them, of illegitimate minors, of minors whose parents have no settlement, and of minors bound as apprentices and servants; but there is no provision for minors who are emancipated, except that the settlement of legitimate minor children follow that of their father. It thus appears that no person can obtain a settlement under the poor-laws of the state (with the exceptions stated) unless he has attained his majority. While a minor, emancipated, may have some additional rights or privileges, he does not from that fact alone attain his majority. Code, § 2237, provides: "The period of minority extends in males to the age of twenty-one years, and in females to that of eighteen years; but all minors attain their majority by marriage." Authorities are cited to the effect that "when children lose the settlement of their father under the poorlaws by contracting some relations so as permanently and wholly to exclude the parental control by acquiring a new settlement, they are said to be emancipated." The legal proposition goes to what constitutes emancipation; but appellant seems to rely on the incidental fact that it shows the settlement of a minor independent of that of his father, that is, that such a fact may be. That might be true in this state. Suppose a minor is bound as an apprentice or servant under subdivision 7 of the section cited, (1352,) he would acquire a new settlement, and the effect would be emancipation. It is an exact application of the law cited. But it does not follow that, because a new settlement results in emancipation, emancipation results in a new settlement, or one independent of the father. We think the district court did not err in holding that the legal settlement of Finn was in the defendant county; and hence that it was not error to strike from the stipulation.

2. The amount of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant county was $363.50, of which amount the plaintiff paid to one Dr. McAllister, for medical services, the sum of $297. The allowance to Dr. Mc. Allister was allowed and paid by the plaintiff's board of supervisors without a certificate from the township trustees, as contemplated by Code, § 1366, as follows: "All claims and bills for the support of the poor shall be certified to be correct by the proper trustees, and presented to the board of supervisors, and, if they are satisfied that they are reasonable aud proper, they are to be paid out of the county treasury." The district court, in effect, held that such certificate was not essential to plaintiff's right of recovery, and instructed the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the reasonable charges and expenses, as shown by other evidence in the case; and this is a ground of complaint, and in presenting the point it

says: "What we claim is that we are entitled to certain official evidence that the services were rendered, and that the charges were reasonable and proper." The law in support of appellant's theory is Code, § 1366, which provides that "all claims and bills for the care and support of the poor shall be certified to be correct by the proper trustees, and presented to the board of supervisors," etc. In Sloan v. Webster Co., 61 Iowa, 738, 17 N. W. Rep. 168, it is held that a certificate in conformity to the section is essential to plaintiff's right of recovery, that is, that the absence of such a certificate is a legal ground of refusal. The question before us in this case is, is the section a limitation on the right of the board of supervisors to allow a claim without such certificate? The query is definitely answered in the negative in Collins v. Lucas Co., 50 Iowa, 448, where it is said that the board “may waive the trustees' certificate if satisfied of the truth of all the certificate would show." This holding appellant does not question, but insists that Clay County had no right to waive such proofs for the defendant county. The law which is the basis of plaintiff's right of action is found in Code, § 1358, as follows: "The county where the settlement is shall be liable to county rendering relief for all reasonable charges and expenses incurred in the relief and care of a poor person." We are unable to discern a reason why the board may not waive the trustee's certificate in a case where the relief furnished is on behalf of another county, as well as where it is furnished to one having a settlement in that county. The measure of plaintiff's right of recovery is not what is paid for relief, but for reasonable charges and expenses. The defendant county would not be bound by the certificate of the trustees, nor would the plaintiff county be protected by such a certificate if the amount therein stated was unreasonable. It is not the policy of the law to permit the county furnishing the relief to also furnish the evidence by which the amount of its recovery is to be determined. We think the court did not err in its manner of submitting the question to the jury.

3. The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that "before the trustees were authorized to extend aid the person must make application for relief to said trustees, and they must determine that he is a proper subject for relief," etc. The claim is based on Code, § 1365, which provides: "The poor shall make application for relief to the trustees of the township where they may be, and if the trustees are satisfied that the applicant is in such a state of want as requires relief at the public expense they may afford it," etc. It is said that there is no evidence that John Finn ever made application to the trustees for relief. There is, however, evidence that one John Mates made application for him, and that the trustees ordered the relief to be furnished. Such an application is sufficient under the law.

4. There is a complaint that under the evidence the charges of Dr. McAllister are shown to be too high, in that he charged the county full prices for visits to Finn,

when he had other patients in the same locality. The question of the reasonableness of the charges was submitted to the jury, and under the state of the evidence we are not warranted in interfering. The judgment is affirmed.

KNAPP V. GREENWOOD et al. (Supreme Court of Iowa. May 26, 1891.) MECHANICS' LIENS-FORECLOSURE AGAINST AGENT CLOTHED WITH TITLE-QUIETING TITLE.

Plaintiff gave B. a power of attorney to buy and sell land, to execute mortgages, and, until the sale thereof, to let the land, or to occupy it himself, "and to hold the same in all respects as if he was the absolute owner of the same. B. bought a lot for plaintiff, but did not record the deed, and, with the consent of plaintiff, he built a house thereon for his own use. A mechanic's lien for materials was filed and foreclosed against B., and the lot sold. The lien claimant, supposing that B. was the owner, did not make plaintiff a party. After the time for redemption had passed, the privilege of redeeming was offered to plaintiff, but he refused or neglected to do so. Code Iowa, § 2130, gives a lien for materials furnished under a contract with the owner of the land; and Laws Iowa, 16th Gen. Assem., c. 100, § 10, provides that "every person for whose immediate use or benefit any building is erected shall be included in the words 'owner' thereof." Held, that the plaintiff had no controlling equities, and could not maintain a suit to quiet title against the purchaser at the sale.

Appeal from district court, Mills county; GEORGE CARSON, Judge.

Action to quiet title. Decree for defendants, and the plaintiff appeals.

E. B.

H. C. Watkins, for appellant. Woodruff and L. W. Ross, for appellees.

GRANGER, J. The issues involve the title to lot 12, block 19, in the town of Silver City, Mills county, Iowa. On the 28th day of July, 1885, the defendant Farrell, then sheriff of Mills county, made to the defendant James A. Frazier a deed of said premises, which was the result of a sale in pursuance of a foreclosure judgment of a mechanic's lien in a suit in which defendant C. G. Greenwood was plaintiff, and I. H. Bouton was defendant. The mechanic's lien (foreclosed) was because of lumber sold by Greenwood to Bouton, and used in the erection of a house on the lot in question. The plaintiff, Knapp, was and is a resident of Cayuga county, N. Y. I. H. Bouton was his agent, holding a written power of attorney to buy and sell for him real estate in Iowa. In pursuance of such authority, in May, 1881, Bouton purchased of one Wing lots 10, 11, and 12, the latter being the lot in question, and Wing made a deed thereof to Knapp, which he (Wing) was permitted to retain as security for an unpaid balance of the purchase money of $25, which was paid, and the deed surrendered in the winter of 1884-85 to L. Bouton, son of I. H. Bouton, who placed the deed in the recorder's office without payment of the fee for recording, and it remained without record until July, 1886, when I. H. Bouton paid the fee, and it was recorded. After the purchase of the lots, in May, 1881, I. H. Bouton bought of Greenwood lumber used in constructing the house. Greenwood then understood that Bouton owned

the lots, and Bouton said he was building the house to occupy himself; he was moving in from the country, and was going to practice law. The building was erected, and I. H. Bouton moved into and occupied it until he left the state, and went to Cayuga county, N. Y. This power of attorney (omitting naimportant parts) is as follows: "Know all men by these presents, that I, Henry Knapp, unmarried, of Cayuga county, state of New York, have made, constituted, and appointed, and by these presents do make, constitute, and appoint, Isaac H. Bouton, of Mills county, state of Iowa, my true and lawful attorney, for me, and in my name, place, and stead, to enter into, take possession of, all such lands, tenements, hereditaments, or real estate whatsoever, in Mills county, state of Iowa, to or which I am or may be in any way entitled or interested, and to grant, bargain, and sell the same, or any part or parcel thereof, for such sum or price, and on such terms, as to him shall seem meet, and for me and my name to make, execute, acknowledge, and deliver good and sufficient deeds and conveyances for the same, either with or without covenants of warranty; and, until the sale thereof, to let and demise the said real estate for the best rent that can be procured for the same, or to occupy continuously himself, and to hold the same in all respects as if he was the absolute owner of the same. He shall also have power to purchase additional lands for me, and to execute mortgages in my name for me, to collect, recover, and receive all sums of money which shall become due and owing to me by means of such bargain or sale or lease and demise; giving and granting to the said Isaac H. Bouton, my said attorney in fact, full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fully, to all intents and purposes, as I might or could do if personally present."

The erection of the building on the lot was at the time known to the plaintiff by notice from Bouton. Plaintiff seeks to avoid the foreclosure judgment, and the sale made in pursuance thereof, on the ground that he was not a party in the proceeding, and that he is not bound by the acts and conduct of I. H. Bouton. We think a few practically conceded facts lead to a correct disposition of this case. Having in view the facts that by the power of attorney plaintiff gave to Bouton the right, in regard to the real estate, "to rent the same, or to occupy continuously himself, and to hold the same in all respects as if he was the owner of the same;" and then giving and granting to "him full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fully, to all intents and purposes, as I might or could do, if personally present; and also that the plaintiff knew that Bouton had erected the building, and was using the same,-we are brought to the point to consider the particular facts urged against the validity of the judgment

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and sale. Plaintiff was not a party to the foreclosure proceeding. That proceeding was on the theory and supposition that Bouton was the owner of the lot. He had been residing in the country, was moving into town, and, under the undisputed evidence, constructed the building for his own immediate use, and there is no pretense in the record that such use was not authorized by plaintiff. Plaintiff's deed had been kept from the record, and Bouton, being in possession, was the ostensible, and the material was furnished under a belief that he was the actual, owner. It is beyond dispute that the building was made for the immediate use of Bouton, though perhaps ultimately for the plaintiff.

Under that state of facts, Bouton was, for the purpose of a mechanic's lien thereon, the owner. By section 10, c. 100, Laws 16th Gen. Assem., it is provided: "Every person for whose immediate use or benefit any building, erection, or other improvement is made * *shall be included

in the words 'owner' thereof." Code, § 2130, gives the lien by virtue of a contract with the "owner" of the land. It will thus be seen that the "owner" is not of necessity one who has a legal or equitable title, but one for whose immediate use or benefit the improvement is made. Bouton comes clearly within this provision of the statute, and the case exemplifies the wisdom of the law; as, without it, Greenwood would have been denied his lien, for, by the transaction between the plaintiff and Bouton, the actual ownership was unknown. See Estabrook v. Riley, (Iowa,) 46 N. W. Rep. 1072. The foreclosure judgment was small, and it is to be regretted that property of much greater value should be sacrificed in payment. But this does not seem to have been the fault of the defendants. Both Knapp and Bouton, at the commencement of the foreclosure suit, were in New York, and the service was by publication, and it is said that Bouton had no actual knowledge of its pendency. That fact would not defeat the judgment. The judgment was by default, and the law fixes the time and terms of opening such a case for retrial. There is reason to believe there was not as much anxiety to investigate the merits of the foreclosure suit as there is to avoid the judgment by this kind of a proceeding. The record shows that, after the expiration of the period of redemption, defendant Frazier was willing to permit redemption, which was refused or neglected. There are no controlling equities on behalf of the plaintiff. The judgment below is affirmed.

MCELHENNEY V. HENDRICKS. (Supreme Court of Iowa. May 26, 1891.) TRANSACTIONS WITH DECEDENT-COMPETENCY OF

WITNESS.

In a suit by an administrator, the defendant pleaded payment, and offered in evidence certain checks drawn by him on a bank, and payable to the plaintiff's intestate or bearer. Held, that it was competent for the defendant to testify that he did not deliver any of the checks to any person other than the plaintiff's intestate.

Appeal from district court, Tama county; L. G. KINNE, Judge.

Action upon three promissory notes. The defendant pleaded payment. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $49.90. Plaintiff appeals.

Wm. H. Stevers and S. M. Endicott, for appellant. Struble & Stiger, for appellee.

ROTHROCK, J. The plaintiff is administrator of the estate of Tillie J. Mc Elhenney, deceased. The defendant is a brother of the deceased. The action is founded upon three promissory notes executed by the defendant, and payable to the order of Tillie J. Hendricks. This was the maiden name of the deceased. After the notes were excuted, she was married to the plaintiff herein. One of the notes was for the sum of $200, dated March 31, 1884, and due on sight, with 10 per cent, interest. Another note was for the sum of $90, dated December 4, 1885, and payable on or before the 20th day of June, 1886, with 10 per cent. interest. The last note was for $500, dated December 5, 1885, and payable on or before December 20, 1887, with interest at 8 per cent. per annum. The interest on all the notes was payable annually, and, if the interest was not paid when due, it was to draw the same rate of interest as the principal. There were credits indorsed on the $500 note, amounting in the aggregate to $310, and interest on the note to January 6, 1887. The defendant pleaded that, in addition to these amounts, he had paid the said notes in full. These alleged payments consisted of various sums claimed to have been paid for the said Tillie J. Hendricks to other persons, and for money paid to her by certain checks upon a bank. It is claimed by the plaintiff that the evidence of payment did not authorize the verdict, and that the undisputed facts show that there should have been a verdict for the plaintiff for at least $262. It is to be conceded that the evidence of payment is not clear and satisfactory, and yet we are not prepared to disturb the verdict on this ground. Some of the items claimed as payments were not established. The action is by an administrator, and, under section 3639 of the Code, the defendant was not a competent witness to personal transactions between him and the deceased. But we attach much importance to the testimony of one O. B. Feris, touching a conversation which he had with the deceased in the fall of the year 1886, in which she stated, in substance, that she held some notes on the defendant which were paid. We cannot take the time, nor is it necessary, to set out the evidence in detail, and enter upon a discussion as to its weight. It is enough to say that, upon a careful examination of the record, we are content to allow the verdict to stand.

2. All of the bank-checks claimed as pay ments were made payable to Tillie J. Hendricks or bearer. The defendant was a witness in his own behalf, and he was asked this question: "State whether or not you ever delivered any of the checks referred to by witnesses Blum and Wert

Iowa.)

CONSOLIDATED TANK-LINE CO. v. HUNT.

ing to any individual or individuals other |
and not including and not referring in any
way to your deceased sister, Tillie J.
Hendricks, and, if so, state the name of
The ques-
said other person or persons."
tion was objected to by the plaintiff, be-
cause it tended to prove personal transac-
tions between the defendant and the de-
ceased, and was incompetent and inad-
missible, under section 3639 of the Code.
The objection was overruled. It is claimed
The an-
that this ruling was erroneous.
swer to this question was: "I did not de-
We
liver them to any other person.
think the ruling of the court was correct.
The statute does not exclude the proof of
facts from which by inference other facts
may be found. The question and answer
expressly exclude any personal transaction
between the plaintiff and the deceased. It
was no more than a statement that the
drawing of the checks was in the usual
course of business, and that they were not
We
delivered to another than the payee.
discover no ground for reversing the judg.
ment. Affirmed.

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CONSOLIDATED TANK-LINE Co. v. HUNT. (Supreme Court of Iowa. May 26, 1891.)

EXEMPTIONS-TEAM AND WAGON.

A debtor was engaged in selling oil, most of the sales being made from a tank-wagon which he used in delivering oil. The wagon was driven sometimes by the debtor, but generally by his A few sales were made at a room in minor son. which the oils were kept. Held, that the wagon and team were exempt under the provision of the Code of Iowa exempting from execution "the horse or team and the wagon or other vehicle by the use of which the debtor, if a physician, public officer, farmer, teamster, or other laborer, habitually earns his living."

Appeal from district court, Page county; H. E. DEEMER, Judge.

reasons

Appellant brought an action to recover for oils sold to the defendant, and obtained an attachment, which was levied on a team, harness, and oil-wagon. The defendant moved the court to discharge the attached property, and assigned as therefor the following: "The said team and harness and oil-wagon is the only one owned by the defendant; that defendant is a married man, and the head of a family, and resides in Clarinda, Page county, Iowa; that said team, harness, and wagon is the only one owned by defendant, and the only one by which defendant habitually earns a living for his family. It is therefore exempt under the law, as is more fully shown by affidavits hereto attached, marked 'A' and 'B,' and Affidavits were made a part hereof." filed in support of and against the motion, upon a consideration of which the court below sustained the motion, from which order the plaintiff appealed.

W. W. Morgan, for appellant. Clark & Hill and J. R. Good, for appellee.

GRANGER, J. The testimony gives sup. port to the following facts: That the defendant is a resident of Pagecounty, lowa, a married man, and the head of a family; that prior to March, 1889, he was engaged in selling oils and gasoline at Clarinda. v.48N.w.no.16-67

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Iowa; that after that he was engaged in
a retail trade in those articles, having a
"Head-Quar-
place of business known as
ters," in the back room of a building on
the north side of the square in Clarinda.
From these head-quarters for a time he
delivered his sales in an ordinary wag-
The
on, and afterwards from the wagon in
suit, known as a "tank-wagon.'
wholesale trade was discontinued June 27,
1889, for which trade his oils had been
stored near the depot. After the discon-
tinuance of the wholesale trade his oils for
the retail trade were stored at and deliv-
ered from the head-quarters. A few sales
were inade, including the delivery at the
head quarters, but the general business
was carried on by orders being left at
head-quarters to be filled about the city
from the tank-wagon, and in some cases
cans would be "set out" by the custom-
ers, and these were also filled from the
At times the oils would be paid
wagon.

for at head-quarters, but generally at the
place of delivery. The team for the pur-
pose of delivering the oils was sometimes
driven by the defendant in person, and
sometimes by his minor son, 16 years of
age. At times both were with the team.
The evidence favors the view that most of
the time the son was with the team and
delivered the oils, but for his father. The
oils were received at head-quarters in
quantities of from three to five barrels at
a time. The team, harness, and wagon
were used by the defendant in this busi-
ness, and the business is defendant's means
Appellant insists
of earning a living.

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that the facts do not sustain the action
of the court. Counsel for appellant states
his view of the law in these words: "In
my judgment, the right has been clearly
defined by statute, and under the statute,
in order to maintain the exemption, the
debtor must show that he is a teamster or
other laborer, who by his personal use of
the property habitually earns his living.
The statute to be construed is as follows:
"If the debtor is a resident of this state,
and is the head of a family, he may hold
exempt from execution the following prop-
# * The horse or team
erty:
and the wagon or other vehicle, with a
proper harness or tackle, by the use of
which the debtor, if a physician, public
officer, farmer, teamster, or other laborer,
It is conced-
habitually earns his living."

ed on authority that the statute is to re-
ceive a liberal construction. It would be
a grave disregard of the concession were
we to hold to the view claimed by appel-
lant, that because the team was driven by
the son, though for the father, the debtor,
he is not within the provisions of the law
as to exemptions. Let us suppose one
who is a laborer or teamster, and earns
his living by the personal use of his team,
is disabled, we will say, totally, and a mi-
nor son, by the use of the team, supports
the family; will it be said that the owner
if a debtor loses his right of exemption?
Confining ourselves to the literal definition
of the word "laborer" or "teamster" as
quoted in argument, such a result might
follow. But looking to the law and the
purposes of its enactment there is no diffi-
culty in saying that such a case is clearly

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