Proximate and remote cause. 2. In an action for the price of goods manufactured for defendants, where defendants plead a set-off on account of defects in such goods, evidence that after defendants had sold such defective goods they were unable to sell any more goods to the same parties is not admissible, as the damages shown are too remote.-Loudy v. Clarke, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 25. Measure for breach of contract. sician that she was then too ill to be moved is inadmissible, where such advice was not in her hearing, and there was no evidence that it was communicated to her.-Thrasher v. Postel, (Wis.) 48 N. W 600. 10. Where plaintiff's land was overflowed because of the construction by defendant city of a levee along the banks of a river, and an extension of the levee would have prevented such overflow, evidence of the cost of extending the levee is admissible in determining the amount of plaintiff's damages. -Barden v. City of Portage, (Wis.) 48 N. W. 210. 11. In an action to recover for the destruction of a grove of trees standing upon a farm, the measure of damages is the value which the trees added to the farm, and such value may be proved by showing the value of the farm with the trees standing on it, and then its value with the trees destroyed. Following Carner v. Railway Co., 43 Minn. 375, 45 N. W. 713.-Hoy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (Minn.) 48 N. W. 1117. Excessive damages. 3. In a suit against a school-district for the 12. Where the evidence shows that plaintiff breach of a contract to employ the plaintiff as before the accident was a boiler-maker, earning principal for a year, at a salary of $1,000, the an- from $3.25 to $3.50 per day; that he was then 29 swer was a general denial. The plaintiff testi-years old; that the accident disabled him from fied that he had tried unsuccessfully to obtain following his trade: and that since then he had another situation as principal, but there was no only earned about $300 in 18 months,-a verdict evidence that he had not, during the year, de- for $5,000 is not excessive.-Kinney v. Folkerts, rived an income from some other employment. (Mich.) 48 N. W. 283. The court charged that, if the plaintiff could recover at all, he was entitled to the agreed salary of $1,000. Held that, though the verdict was for $600 only, the error was not cured by another instruction which stated the proper measure of damages. -School-Dist. of Chadron v. Foster, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 267. 4. Where plaintiff intrusted to defendant, as his agent, a deed to be delivered to a third party on the fulfillment of certain conditions, and defendant delivered it contrary to the instructions, and the land passed into the hands of innocent purchasers, the measure of damages against defendant was the value of the land at the date of the delivery of the deed, with interest from that time to the time of trial.-Triggs v. Jones, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 1113. 5. On a breach of contract to furnish a dealer with coal during the season, the profit at which he could have sold at retail is speculation, and cannot be recovered.-Denver, T. & G. R. Co. v. Hutchins, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 398. 13. The sum of $1,250 is not excessive as damages to plaintiff, a young lady, for an injury sustained by a fall on a defective sidewalk, whereby plaintiff's knee became inflamed until suppuration took place, the injury being likely to result is a permanent stiffening of the joint.-City of Lincoln v. Staley, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 887. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT. Pleading and evidence of damages. In an action for death by wrongful act under How. St. Mich. § 8314, which provides that the jury may give "such damages as they may deem fair and just with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death" to the persons entitled to them, pecuniary injury must be alleged and proven.-Hurst v. Detroit City Ry., (Mich.) 48 N. W. 44. Decedents. 6. Where defendant contracted to purchase a lot of posts from plaintiffs, to be received on the See Executors and Administrators. cars where they were then lying, on failure so to do, she was liable to plaintiffs for the difference between the contract price and the price for which they afterwards sold them to others.-Madden v. Lemke, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 785. Measure for tort. 7. Where plaintiff, previous to the injury complained of, was afflicted with hernia, which had been aggravated thereby, and was also suffering from internal injuries, an instruction that he was entitled to recover as damages for future disability the amount he would be prevented from earning each year during the continuance of such disability, "not exceeding, however, the time of his expectancy in life, which by the approved mortuary tables recognized by our state is 17 years for a person of the age of 52," is erroneous, since those tables indicate only the expectancy for perfectly sound and healthy lives.Denman v. Johnston, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 565. 8. The elements of damage for personal injuries of an employe are the amount paid out by plaintiff for doctor's bills, medicine, and nursing, compensation for his pain and suffering, and for his loss of time from the accident until his wound was healed, and the present worth of his loss from inability to earn future wages.-Kinney v. Folkerts, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 283. DECEIT. When action lies. 1. Where a merchant makes a report to a com mercial agency of material facts as to his financial condition, knowing them to be false, for the purpose of obtaining a standing thereby, one to whom the agency communicates the report, and who by reason thereof, believing it to be true, sells goods to the merchant on credit, may recover in an action against him for fraudulent representations.-Hinchman v. Weeks, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 790. 2. A creditor who files his claim for goods sold with the assignee of an insolvent debtor, and receives a dividend thereon, does not thereby waive his right of action against the debtor for fraudulent representations in procuring the goods, if he states in the claim that the goods were obtained by fraudulent representations, and that an action has been brought therefor.-Hinchman v. Weeks, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 790. Pleading. 3. In an action for fraudulent representations as to his financial condition, by which it is alleged defendant secured merchandise from plain9. Where it is claimed that plaintiff's illness tiffs on credit, a declaration alleging that defendwas in part due to her own imprudence in being ant made certain specified false statements of his moved too soon after the accident, testimony that financial condition to a mercantile agency, of her husband was advised by the attending phy-which plaintiffs were members, that the sale was made in reliance on this report, and that it was 4. In an action for fraudulent representations as to his financial condition, by which it is alleged defendant secured merchandise from plaintiffs on credit, the agent of the mercantile agency who took defendant's statement may testify as to the agency's method of doing business in collecting reports.-Hinchman v. Weeks, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 790. iting a conveyance of the land during the lifetime of the tenant for life, is a condition subsequent, and can be enforced only by the grantor and his heirs; and hence strangers in possession of the land cannot resist the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the life-tenant on the ground that it violated the condition in the deed. -Hayward v. Kinney, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 170. Description. * "except one acre from the south-east corner, 3. Defendant conveyed to M. certain land, 5. Plaintiffs may show that they sent their and M. mortgaged the land to plaintiff. Defendtogether with the buildings thereon, salesman to call on defendant, and that they re-ant remained in possession of all the buildings fused to sell him goods, prior to receiving the situated in the south-east corner of the land, ocreport.-Hinchman v. Weeks, (Mich.) 48 N. W.cupying them as her home. Held that, in a suit 790. 6. Plaintiff alleged that he had contracted with defendant to sell type-writers for him as agent for the state of Nebraska, and that, after he had incurred certain expenses in establishing the agency, defendant had violated the contract by selling type-writers to other parties in that state. Plaintiff claimed damages on the ground that defendant had fraudulently and deceitfully employed him in the premises. It appeared that defendant had not parted with his right to sell type-writers in that state, and that plaintiff was a mere figure-head in respect of such agency, which was really to have been conducted by plaintiff's son-in-law. Held, that plaintiff was not entitled to recover on this evidence.-Earl v. Reid, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 894. Declaration. Evidence 01, see Evidence, 7-12. Effect. DEDICATION. 1. A railroad company cannot acquire title to land through a common-law dedication of it to public use for railroad purposes.-Watson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (Minn.) 48 N. W. 1129; Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 1d. 1132. to foreclose the mortgage, defendant could show that one square acre in the south-east corner of the land would not include all the buildings reserved by her, and that it was intended in the deed to M. to reserve an acre of such shape as would include them.-Lego v. Medley, (Wis.) 48 N. W. 375. tion of premises conveyed than that they are all 4. A deed which contains no other descripof a designated tract not theretofore conveyed by the grantors to a third party named, is insufficient, without proof of what part of the tract had not to any of such lands in the grantee.-Maier v. been conveyed to the third person, to show title Joslin, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 909. Acknowledgment. 5. Laws Wis. 1883, c. 348, provides that every instrument in writing heretofore made purporting to convey real estate, duly signed, witnessed, and acknowledged, but which shall not have been sealed, shall be entitled of record as if such seal shall have been affixed. In October, 1835, one K. made and recorded a plat of land in the territory of Michigan, now in the state of Wisconsin, laying the same out in blocks, streets, and alleys, as and for the town of Milwaukee. On the plat certain blocks were designated and dedicated for certain public uses. The plat was executed under the Territorial Laws of Michigan of 1827, p. 278, providing that acknowledgments 2. K. and M. entered into a contract with trus- should be under the hand and seal of the acknowltees to furnish a fund which the trustees agreed edging officers, and, when recorded, operated as to expend in improving certain land of M. for a a conveyance; but the plat omitted to bave the city park, and to have the improvements com- statutory seal of the acknowledging justice. pleted by January 1, 1885; K. and M. agreeing that Held, that the omission of the seal in the execuupon the completion of the improvements, or at tion of the plat was cured by the Laws of 1883.any time prior to January 1, 1886, when the city of Williams v. Milwaukee Industrial Exposition J. would accept the same, they would dedicate cer- Ass'n, (Wis.) 48 N. W. 665. tain land, including the land on which the improvements were made, to the city for a public park forever, on certain conditions. The city, by resolution, agreed to accept the land when improved as stated in the contract. The funds were raised, improvements made, and deeds of dedication placed in the hands of the trustees. The city refused to accept. After January 1, 1886, M. withdrew his deed, and conveyed to a third party. Held, that he violated no contractual relations with K. in so doing.-Kidd v. McGinniss, (N. L.) 48 N. W. 221. DEED. Delivery. 6. The recording, by a father, of a deed in which he grants land to his two infant children in fee, subject to a life-estate in himself, is a sufficient delivery of the deed to pass the title to the infants, without any actual manual delivery, or formal acceptance by the children.-Compton v. White, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 635. Recording. 7. An unrecorded deed is good against everybody except creditors of the grantor, and subsequent purchasers without notice of the first con See, also, Covenants; Fraudulent Conveyances; veyance.-Keeling v. Hoyt, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 66. Vendor and Vendee. Proof of, see Evidence, 4. Sufficiency. Defective Sidewalks. Delivery. 1. In trover for timber, a certain deed in See Municipal Corporations, 8-19. plaintiff's chain of title was made to one "Harriet N. Andrews," and the next one was executed by "Harriet Andrews" and her husband. In the body of the latter deed she was described as Harriet N. Andrews, and in each as a resident of the same town. Held, that the identity was sufficiently established.-Clow v. Plummer, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 795. Conditions. Of chattel mortgage, see Chattel Mortgages, 5. 2. A condition in a deed conveying land to one for life, with remainder to his heirs, prohib-See Pleading, 3–5. Demurrer. DEPOSITION. Notice of taking. 1. Where depositions are taken upon commission, five days' notice thereof served upon the opposite party in the county where the action is pending is sufficient, under Code Iowa, § 3730, though the depositions are to be taken in another state. Distinguishing Kennedy v. Rosier, 71 Iowa, 673, 33 N. W. 226.-Cook v. Shorthill, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 84. Suppression. 2. Under Code Iowa, § 3738, providing that, where depositions are taken on interrogatories, neither of the parties, their agents or attorneys, shall be present, unless both are present, and that the certificate shall state the fact, if the party is present, a deposition will not be suppressed because the notary's certificate recites that it was reduced to writing by another person in his presence, unless it is shown that such person was a party, or the agent or attorney of a party. Cook v. Shorthill, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 84. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION. See, also, Executors and Administrators; Wills. Remedies of distributees. On the face of a petition for the final distribution of the assets of an estate, it appeared that the executor had been admitted to defend an action brought against the deceased in a federal court sitting within the state, and that the action was pending on appeal from a judgment of dismissal. The plaintiff in that suit was cited to show cause against the distribution. Gen. St. Minn. 1878, c. 53, § 16, provides that, when an executor is made a party to a suit pending against his testator, the judgment therein may be certified to the probate court, and shall be paid as other claims. Held, that the probate court was justified in refusing to order distribution, though the plaintiff in the pending suit did not appear to oppose the same. In re Kittson's Estate, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 419; St. Paul Trust Co. v. Hill, Id. 2. In an action to enjoin a liquor nuisance under Laws Iowa 1886, c. 66, brought by the county attorney in the name of the state, he is entitled to the attorney's fees taxed as costs in the case. Farr v. Seaward, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 67. 3. In an action against a county by the coun ty attorney to recover attorney fees taxed as costs in a liquor injunction case, it is not necessary to first present such claim to the board of supervisors, as Code Iowa, § 2610, requiring such presentment and demand, applies only to unliquidated claims.-Farr v. Seaward, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 67. DIVORCE. Annulment of marriage, see Marriage. 1. A divorce will not be granted the wife on the ground of inhuman treatment endangering life, where the treatment complained of consisted in the use of profane and indecent language, false accusations of unchastity, and threats against her life, in the presence of their child, no physical violence being shown, when such language was provoked by the undignified and improper conduct of the wife with other men.-Evans v. Evans, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 809. Repeal of statutes. 2. Acts Wis. 1881, c. 297, § 8, provides that "in every action for divorce for incurable insanity, in pursuance of the provisions of this act, the court may, at any time after rendering judgment therein, revise and alter such judgment" in certain named particulars. Acts 1882, c. 230, declares that such chapter 297 "is hereby repealed; this act shall not affect any actions pending March 25, 1882." Held, that an action in which the decree of divorce was rendered prior to March 25, 1882, is an “action pending," within the meaning of the repealing act, and is unaffected thereby.-Hicks v. Hicks, (Wis.) 48 N. W. 495. Wife's attorney's fees. 3. Comp. St. Neb. c. 25, § 12, authorizes the court in a divorce suit "to require the husband to pay any sum necessary to enable the wife to carry on or defend the suit during its pendency." Held, that the remedy here given for attorney's fees for the wife is exclusive, and that the attorney cannot afterwards maintain an action against the husband for fees in addition to those allowed by the court and paid.-Burnham v. Tizard, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 823. Rights of divorced persons. 4. The grantees in a deed were described therein as husband and wife, to whom the lands were conveyed in entirety, and to the heirs and assigns of the survivor. Thereafter a decree of divorce was granted to the wife, subsequent to which the husband died, leaving children, the issue of their marriage. The probate court granted an order to sell the undivided half of the lands as belonging to decedent's estate, to pay debts and expenses of administration, and from this order the wife appeals. Held, that the divorce did not destroy the right of survivorship, and the wife became seised of the fee. Modifying Dowling v. Salliotte, (Mich.) 47 N. W. 225.-Appeal of Lewis, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 580. dower, but afterwards filed a notice accepting A widow elected by petition to take the provisions of the will. The clerk noted the filing of the notice, but did not make it a part of the record, and subsequently the widow asked leave to withdraw it, alleging that she had signed it under a misapprehension of her rights. The proponent of the will answered her petition for dower, setting up the acceptance, and on his motion the notice was ordered to be made part of the record. Held, that an appeal by the widow from this order pending the suit should be dismissed, since making the acceptance a part of the record gave it no additional force, and she was still free, in the dower proceeding, to contest its sufficiency to bind her. Slauson v. Slauson, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 87. DRAINAGE. See, also, Surface Water. A person who sees a system of drainage be ing constructed, calculated to benefit his property, cannot wait until it is completed, and the expenditure has been made, and his property received the benefit, before proceeding to avoid the tax, but must, as a condition of relief by injunction, do equity by paying the amount thereof just ly chargeable against such property. Following Barker v. Omaha. 16 Neb. 269, 20 N. W. 382.Darst v. Griffin, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 819. Due Process of Law. See Constitutional Law, 15–19. DURESS. What constitutes. After plaintiff had obtained divorce from defendant, the latter, accompanied by some friends, went to plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining a settlement with regard to the division of the property. The friends told plaint ff that she had better settle, or defendant would make trouble. During the negotiations, defendant used some profane and indecent language, and, on plaintiff's objecting to his proposition of settlement, told her that if she didn't want to settle it that way she could settle it in court. Their son, who was pres ent and threatened to whip his father, was told that order must be preserved, or he would be placed under arrest. Held, that such facts did not show duress entitling plaintiff to the cancellation of a deed executed by her on such occasion.-Prior v. Hunter, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 736. EASEMENTS. Right of way. 1. A contract giving to the lessees of plaintiffs quarries a right to lay a railroad track or switch across plaintiffs' land to reach the quarries in order to transport their products to market does not authorize laying across plaintiffs' land a railroad track, part of a long line of an ordinary commercial railroad for general business, not going to the quarries, but passing at a distance.-Shoemaker v. Cedar Rapids, I. F. & N. W. Ry. Co., (Minn.) 48 N. W. 191; McDermott v. Same, Id. 2. In trespass for tearing down a fence on the line of a private road, it appeared that plaintiff had acquired a statutory right of way 24 feet wide across one end of defendant's lands, and erected a fence along and within the boundary line, and had been accustomed daily to drive cattle and horses through the private road. Held, that the fence along the boundary dividing the road from defendant's land is an incident necessary to plaintiff's reasonable enjoyment thereof, and defendant was liable for destroying it.-Harvey v. Crane, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 582. By necessity. 3. Where a building was unfinished at the time the lessee sublet the first floor to defendant, and it was apparent that there was one stairway and elevator to reach the upper stories, defendant takes the first floor subject to a way by necessity for the lessee and his customers and goods to reach the upper floors, and he cannot claim any abatement of rent on account of defendant's use of the first floor for that purpose.-Benedict v. Barling, (Wis.) 48 N. W. 670. Inference with. 4. Where complainants, by deed, have granted defendant the right to maintain a stairway on complainant's side of the partition wall between their respective buildings, and the same is constructed, and its use acquiesced in by complainants for 20 years, they have no right, in changing their building, to alter the stairway, against Title to support. 2. Land was sold, under a contract for a deed, jointly to plaintiff and defendant's assignor, who paid part of the purchase money and agreed to pay the balance in five years. Plaintiff afterwards, without the knowledge of defendant, who was lawfully in possession, paid the balance of the purchase money, and received a deed. Held, fendant.-Greenop v. Wilcox, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 47. that he could not maintain ejectment against deDefenses. 3. A father told his daughter and her husband that, if they would move on certain land and erect a house and break and cultivate the land and pay the taxes, they could have the land. Held, brought against them by the father.-Ford v. a good equitable defense to ejectment Steele, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 271. 5. Where, upon the foreclosure of a mortgage, ejectment is brought against the mortgagor, who is married, and has been in possession of the land, consisting of 40 acres, occupying and claiming it as a homestead, the wife is a necessary party defendant to the suit in ejectment, notwithstanding the mortgage was for the purchase money.-Gibbs v. O'Neil, (Mich.) 48 N. Ŵ. 696. Evidence. 6. A deed in plaintiffs' chain of title purporting to convey more land than was shown in the grantor was admissible to show the conveyance of 40 acres, which it was admitted she did own.-Atwood v. Canrike, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 950. 7. In ejectment, where defendant testifies that he was put into possession of the land under an oral agreement of sale, with whose terms he has complied, and plaintiff denies that such an agreement ever existed, and testifies that defendant is his tenant, a judgment for plaintiff will not be set aside, though defendant has been in possession for 19 years, without paying rent, but paying all taxes and making improvements.-Cutler v. Babcock, (Wis.) 48 Ň. W. 494. 8. The grantor in a quitclaim deed to his brother testified that he could not read or write, and that when he executed the instrument he thought he was executing a lease. Another witness, who was not on good terms with the grantee, testified that, in a casual conversation with the grantee, 20 years before, and after execution of the deed, the grantee told him he had the grantor tight, and asked him not to say anything. that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant submission to the jury of the question whether the deed was intended as a lease, in the face of the testimony of the person who drew it up and took the acknowledgments, and other evidence tending strongly to show that the grantee intended to make a deed. -Nau v. Brunette, (Wis.) 48 N. W. 649. Held, 9. Where defendant in his answer claims the | right to the possession as a purchaser from plaintiff, he is thereby estopped to deny plaintiff's title, and it is not necessary for plaintiff to prove title in order to recover.-Cutler v. Babcock, (Wis.) 48 N. W. 494. 10. In an action to recover possession of a strip of land, which plaintiff contends is a part of section 15 and defendant of section 14, and to which defendant also claims title by prescription where by undisputed evidence it appears that in proceedings under the statute between the same parties to fix the boundary lines between the two sections the fact had been adjudicated that the strip in question was a part of section 15, it was not error for the court to submit to the jury only the issue as to whether defendant's possession of the land had been such that the action was barred by limitation.-Fisher v. Muecke, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 936. 11. The plaintiff's title being established by undisputed evidence, it was not error for the court to refuse to submit the question as to that issue to the jury.-Fisher v. Muecke, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 936. Keeping polls open. 2. The fact that the polls were kept open after the hour for closing is not ground for rejecting the votes of a precinct, in the absence of any evidence that any votes were cast after that hour.Soper v. Board County Com'rs Sibley County, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 1112. Refusal to allow challenges. 3. The refusal of the judges to allow an elector to be present in the room as a challenger of votes is not ground for throwing out the votes of a precinct, in the absence of evidence that any injustice resulted.-Soper v. Board County Com'rs Sibley County, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 1112. Contests. 4. Comp. Laws 8. D. § 1489, provides that "any candidate or person claiming the right to hold an office contested, or any elector of the proper county desiring to contest the validity of an election or the right of any person declared duly elected to any office in said county, shall give notice thereof in writing to the person whose election he intends to contest, within twenty days after the canvass of the votes for such election, which notice shall be served in the same manner as a summons in a civil action." Held that, where two candidates have received an equal and the highest number of votes for the same county office, the 20 days does not begin to run until one of them has been declared elected by the clerk after deciding the tie by lot, as provided by Laws S. D. 1890, c. 84, § 26. KELLAM, J., dissenting.-Bowler v. Eisenhood, (S. D.) 48 N. W. 136. 5. A notice that an election will be contested, on the ground that "a large number of legal voters desired and attempted to cast their votes, but, with the knowledge, consent, and connivance of the judges of election, were, by violence and threats, prevented from so doing," is too general and indefinite, as a specification of a ground of contest.-Soper v. Board County Com'rs Sibley County, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 1112. 6. It is not error to dismiss the proceedings on the ground of the insufficiency of the specifications of points upon which an election will be contested, at least in the absence of any offer, or application for leave, to amend the specifications.-Soper v. Board County Com'rs Sibley County, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 1112. EMBEZZLEMENT. What constitutes. * * * Comp. Laws Dak. § 6799, provides: "If any person, being a trustee, or being otherwise interested with or having in his control property for the use of any other person, fraudulently appropriates it to any purpose not in the due and lawful execution of his trust," shall be guilty of embezzlement. Section 4036 declares "the relations of partners are confidential. They are trustees for each other, within the meaning of chapter 1 of the title on Trusts." Said chapter 1, 3915, provides that "every person who voluntarily assumes a relation of personal confidence with another is deemed a trustee within the meaning of this chapter, not only as to the person who reposes such confidence, but also as to all persons of whose affairs he thus acquires information * * or over whose affairs he, by such confidence, obtains control." Held, that the misappropriation of partnership funds by a general partner, with felonious intent, was not embezzlement, within the meaning of said statutes, to constitute which the property embezzled must have been the property of another, which cannot be affirmed of partnership property with respect to the ownership of any of the partners.-State v. Reddick, (S. D.) 48 N. W. 846. * EMINENT DOMAIN. What subject to. 1. Under Rev. St. Wis. § 1828, subd. 4, giving railway companies the power, for the purpose of obtaining gravel or other materials, "to take as much land as may be necessary to the proper construction, operation, and security of the road, a company desiring to condemn land for such purpose must show the necessity for taking it; and where the findings by the court on this question are that the directors had declared it to be necessary to take the land; that it adjoins the company's main line at a spur track; that the company intends to take from it gravel to ballast the road, but that the taking would work great damage to the owner, and be injurious to the welfare of the people in the vicinity; that there are other places from which gravel may be obtained; and that the taking would be "unreasonable and oppressive, "-the petition to condemn should be denied. - Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Kneale, (Wis.) 48 N. W. 248. Compensation. 2. A railway was constructed in a highway in front of a residence. The grade was eight feet high, and access to the property was obstructed. It was shown that the value was greatly diminished, and the verdict was based on lowest estimate made by the witnesses. Held, that the verdict would not be set aside.-Nebraska & C. R. Co. v. Scott, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 390. 3. In condemnation proceedings witnesses shown to be qualified to testify on the subject may, in the discretion of the court, be permitted to give their estimate of the damages to a partic |