1. A7 agrement, entered into by all the stockholders of a corporation, that they will in- demnify such of the stockholders then liable on the company's paper, or who shall "thereafter become so, by indorsement or otherwise," does not limit the indemnity to stockholders who have become "indorsers" of the company's paper, but gives indemnity to any stockholder who has be- come liable, in any of the modes known to the law, to pay such corporate obligations, and who has paid the same.-Taylor v. North,' (Wis.) 48
2. A contract between several persons, stock- holders of the same company, providing that each would indemnify, protect, and save harmless such stockholders who are or become indorsers on the company's paper in proportion of each stock- holder's ownership of stock, and would, on de- mand of any stockholder called upon to pay such paper, contribute to the payment such sum as he ought to contribute in proportion to his stock, is not a contract of indemnity against liability as indorser, but one of indemnity against loss or damage by reason of such liability; and, in an ac- tion on the contract, a failure to allege that plain- tiff paid the obligation on which he was indorser is fatal on demurrer.-Taylor v. Coon, (Wis.) 48
lands, and had threatened to continue to do so, the plaintiff was entitled to relief in equity by injunction, in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits.-Shafer v. Stull, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 882. Wrongs prevented.
8. In an action to cancel the subscription of complainants to the stock of a corporation on the ground that it was procured by false representa- tions, and to obtain a return of the money paid for the stock, it is proper to restrain by injunc- tion any disposition of the corporate property and the money paid for the stock pending such suit.-Sherman v. American Stove Co., (Mich.)
4. The owner of property on the shores of a lake, which is valuable as a pleasure resort on account of its nearness to the lake and easy ac- cess to the water for boating and fishing, may maintain a suit to restrain a corporation from drawing water out of the lake so as to lower its level and leave a wide margin of bog exposed around its banks, which is repulsive in appear- ance, and unhealthy, and so injurious to plain- tiff's property.-Cedar Lake Hotel Co. v. Cedar Lake Hydraulic Co., (Wis.) 48 N. W. 371.
5. A party who has been in the open, notorious, exclusive, adverse possession of a portion of a town-site for a period of time sufficient to bar an thereby acquires an absolute title to said land, and action against him to recover possession thereof, may protect his possession by injunction against unlawful acts of the city authorities in attempting
INDICTMENT AND INFORMA- to open streets through his land on the strength of
a plat made by a former owner.-Schock v. City of Falls City, (Neb.) 45 N. W. 468.
See, also, Abortion, 1; Arson, 1; Burglary; Se- for lighting by electricity, a statement in the
6. In an action to enjoin a city from paying petition that plaintiff is a tax-payer on property subject to assessment, under an ordinance pro- viding for such expenditure out of the general fund, instead of by special taxation on property benefited, is a sufficient averment of injury to en- title plaintiff to maintain his action, if the grounds thereof are well founded. -Hanson v. Wm. A. Hunter Electric Light Co., (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 1005. Dissolution.
An information for embezzling mortgaged chattels, containing in the caption the name of the state and county or city, gives the court ju- risdiction, though it does not allege where the embezzlement was committed. How. St. Mich. 9533, provides that it shall not be necessary to state any venue in the body of the indictment, but the jurisdiction named in the margin shall be taken to be the venue of all the facts alleged, does not rest in the discretion of the nisi prius 7. The dissolution of a temporary injunction except where a local description is required.-court when it appears on the face of the plead- People v. Schultz, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 293.
Indorsement.
See Negotiable Instruments, 9-15.
Information.
See Indictment and Information.
Infringement.
ings that, as a matter of law, the injunction should be dissolved; the question involved being the validity of a statute. -Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co. v. Dey, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 98.
INSANITY.
Hearing on habeas corpus.
1. Under Code Iowa, § 1444, giving to a per- son confined as insane the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, and providing that at the hear- ing "the question of insanity shall be decided, the district judge in chambers, on petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pending appeal to the district court by one adjudged insane by the com- missioners of insanity, and ordered to be com- mitted to the asylum, has the right to hear evi- dence as to petitioner's sanity, and, on finding her insane, to order her to be committed to the asylum; and his decision is res adjudicata on
To restrain nuisance, see Intoxicating Liquors, the question of insanity in the proceedings on the 17-19; Nuisance, 3.
1. An injunction to restrain a town from lay- ing out and constructing a highway, without any funds in the treasury, and without authority to contract an indebtedness for that purpose, is not "an injunction to suspend the general and or- dinary business of a corporation," which Rev. St. Wis. § 2780, declares "shall not be granted except by the court or presiding judge thereof;" and hence such injunction may be granted by a cir- cuit court commissioner.-Bay Land & Imp. Co. v. Town of Washburn, (Wis.) 48 N. W. 492.
2. Where defendants had repeatedly torn down plaintiff's fence in order to pass over his
appeal to the district court.-In re Bresee, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 991.
2. The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding of the district judge, on hearing of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, cannot be con- sidered on appeal, unless the evidence is brought up in the abstract, though, by reason of the ab- sence of a reporter, petitioner could not preserve the evidence.-In re Bresee, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 991.
See, also, Assignment for Benefit of Creditors; Bankruptcy.
Of corporations, see Corporations, 21.
1. An insolvent debtor being indebted to a bank of which he was a customer and depositcr, made a general deposit to the credit of his own account, and the next day, at his direction, the bank applied the deposit to the payment of a note due from him to the bank. Held that, as respects the provisions of the Minnesota insolvent law against preferential payments, the case stood the same as if the money had been paid by the in- solvent directly in payment of the note; and, if the bank had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent, the money can be recovered by the assignee.-Tripp v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 4.
The assignee and receiver-Actions.
2. Under Gen. St. Minn. c. 41, § 27, a receiver or assignee in insolvency may maintain an action to reach assets of an insolvent debtor fraudulently concealed or disposed of by him, whether such ac- tion be to set aside fraudulent conveyances, or to enforce a trust in favor of creditors under the statute.-Chamberlain v. O'Brien, (Minn.) 48 N.
3. Where the insolvent caused property for which he paid the consideration to be conveyed di- rectly to his wife, and she is found to have been cognizant of the fraud, she will be treated as an involuntary trustee for existing creditors, and, if she conveys the same away to innocent purchas: ers, the receiver may, at his election, proceed against her personally for the value thereof.- Chamberlain v. O'Brien, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 447.
4. It is not essential to the maintenance of such
an action that the claims of creditors represented by him should have been previously reduced to judgment, for the statute dispenses with the neces- sity of any lien in behalf of individual creditors in such cases.-Chamberlain v. O'Brien, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 447.
5. On the trial of a wife's claim against the estate of her insolvent husband for moneys loaned, it was shown that the husband, in making a state- ment for the purpose of obtaining credit, omitted to state any debt to his wife, and on the trial the husband admitted that the statement was false, and said that it was so made on advice of a friend. Held, that the question asked the hus- band as to when his wife first knew of such state- ment was not improper as calling for a mere opinion, but was competent to disprove the wife's participation in the fraud.-Rea v. Jaffray & Co., (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 78.
10, so that it reads: "When any creditor shall petition to the court or judge, ting forth that such debtor has, " etc. The amend- ing statute added several grounds for denying an insolvent his release, and provided that, if the in- solvent was charged with false swearing, the facts in relation thereto should be set out, but it did not require the details to be specified in relation to other charges. Held, that the charges in such a petition, except the charge of false swearing, may be made in the general terms of the statute.-Har- rison v. Kellogg, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 1132. Instructions.
1. A fire insurance policy provided that the company should not be liable by virtue of the policy, or any renewal thereof, until the premi- um had been actually paid. It had been the cus- tom of the agent to make out renewals, deliver them, and collect the premium. Ten days before the policy expired the insured asked the agent to attend to its renewal, and he promised to do so. Nothing more was done until the property was burned, six months afterwards. Held, that the agent had not waived prepayment of the pre- mium, and the insurance company could not be compelled to issue the renewal.-Zigler v. Phoenix Ins. Co., (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 987. Application.
2. A fire insurance policy, conditioned to be void for misrepresentations in the application, is avoided by a gross under-statement of the amount of incumbrances.-O'Brien v. Home Ins. Co., (Wis.) 48 N. W. 714.
3. Where one defense relied on is the falsity of the statements in the application for the pol- icy, the plaintiff may show that the questions were truthfully answered by him; that the com- pany's agent who wrote out the application mis- stated his answers; and that he signed the ap- plication without reading it, or knowing of the misstatements.-McComb v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 1038.
4. Where the assured was not questioned as to incumbrances on his property, and did not in- tentionally conceal the facts, the existence of a mortgage thereon does not invalidate the policy. -Vankirk v. Citizens' Ins. Co., (Wis.) 48′N. Ŵ. 798.
6. A wife, who was a former partner of her 5. An application for insurance provided that husband, against whom are outstanding unpaid the representations therein contained should be joint notes for moneys which went into the firm warranties, and that the company should not be business, and which were assumed by the hus- bound by any act or statement made by or to any band as debts of the firm, is a creditor of his es-agent or other person not contained in the appli- tate, within the Iowa general assignment act, cation. The policy provided that the application (Code, c. 7, tit. 14,) though the holder of one of should be a part thereof, and that the company the notes has made no demand for a distributive should not be bound by any act or statement share in the estate; and the court will order the made to or by any agent, unless inserted in the proper distributive share to be applied on such contract. The application was not attached to notes.-Rea v. Jaffray & Co., (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 78. the policy, but was retained by the company. 7. Antedated notes given, just before making Held, that assured having told the agent that a general assignment, by a husband to his wife, there was an incumbrance of $3,000 on the prop- who was a former partner, to an amount equal to erty, and he having by mistake and without the debts of the firm, which had been assumed assured's knowledge written it as $2,000 in the ap- by him, but were not paid at that time, do not plication, the policy was not thereby avoided.- change the relations of the parties.-Rea v. Jaff- Tubbs v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., (Mich.) 48 N. ray & Co., (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 78.
8. Under the Minnesota insolvent law, requir- 6. A policy provided for arbitration as to the ing a debtor to make an assignment of "all his un- amount of loss, and gave the insurer the right to exempt property for the equal benefit" of his cred- take the property insured at the value fixed by itors, who shall file releases, the insolvent's right the arbitrators. The assured, after agreeing to to a discharge depends upon his having in good arbitration, revoked the submission, and declined faith subjected all his unexempt property, whether to be bound. He then had the goods appraised, in or out of the state, to the insolvency proceed- and sold them. Held a forfeiture of the policy. ings.-Harrison v. Kellogg, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 1132.-Morley v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. 9. Laws Minn. 1881, c. 145, § 10, provided for Co., (Mich.) 48 N. W. 502. citing insolvents "when any creditor alleges by complaint * that such insolvent has." etc. Laws 1889, c. 30, § 7, amended section
7. An insurance policy was conditioned to be void in case the assured died by his own hand, unless he was insane at the time of taking his
life, in which event the insurer reserved to itself | the right to pay the amount insured or only to refund the premiums paid, "according to the equities of the case. "" Held that, though the policy stipulates that the amount of insurance shall be paid within 60 days after due notice and satisfactory proof of the death of the assured, where he takes his own life while insane the in- surer is entitled to a sufficient time to learn all the facts controlling the equities of the case, and three months and a few days, before notify- ing the beneficiary of the exercise of its option, is not an unreasonable time.-Salentine v. Mut- ual Ben. Life Ins. Co., (Wis.) 48 N. W. 855.
8. A policy provided for arbitration as to the amount of loss, and gave the insurer the right to take the property insured at the value fixed by the arbitrators. The assured, after agreeing to arbitration, revoked the submission, and declined to be bound. Held, that where the insurance com- pany, two months after the submission was re- voked, procured the examination of the assured according to the terms of the policy, this was a waiver of the forfeiture -Morley v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., (Mich.) 48 N. W. 502. Proof of loss.
9. The fact that assured in her proofs of loss included some articles that were not her property did not invalidate the policy, where no fraud was intended, and she supposed the articles were in- cluded in a clause of the policy.-Tubbs v. Dwell- ing-House Ins. Co., (Mich.) 48 N. W. 296.
Actions on policies-Evidence.
14. In an action on a life insurance policy, plaintiff, beneficiary, alleged that he was the owner and holder and entitled to the proceeds thereof. The company paid the money into court, averring that the widow claimed it; and the lat- ter, being made a party, answered, alleging that band; that it had been written in plaintiff's fa- the policy was bequeathed to her by her hus- made to him by her husband, which had been vor solely to secure payment of certain notes fully paid. Plaintiff replied that the policy was also collateral security for other debts due him by decedent, and that in consideration of the sur- render of the notes decedent had relinquished to bim all rights in the policy. Held, that it was error to exclude evidence of the excess of the in- debtedness over the amount of the notes, on the ground that it tended to show conditional ownership of the policy, and hence was inconsist tional ownership.-Shove v. Shove, (Wis.) 48 N. ent with plaintiff's original claim of uncondi- W. 647.
15. The existence of a mortgage on insured property is a fact material to the risk, proof of which materiality is not necessary, so that it is not error to exclude it.-Vankirk v. Citizens' Ins. Co., (Wis.) 48 N. W. 798.
16. The assured is competent to testify whether or not he intentionally concealed the existence of a mortgage on the insured property from the agent of the insurer.-Vankirk v. Citizens' Ins. Co., (Wis.) 48 N. W. 798.
17. Where the only evidence as to the amount 10. Where the assured, in his final proofs of of the loss consisted of the two appraisals, one loss, adopted, item for item, the valuation of the by the arbitrators, and one ordered by plaintiff, arbitrators, he was bound thereby, in the ab-the jury were bound to adopt one or the other, sence of fraud.-Morley v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., (Mich.) 48 N. W. 502.
11. Under the provision of the policy that all persons having a claim thereunder should forth- with give written notice of any loss, and within 30 days furnish proofs thereof, and that until such proofs should be furnished the claim should not be due or payable, failure to make proof within the 30 days did not work a forfeiture, but only postponed the right of action till they were supplied.-Tubbs v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., (Mich.) 48 N. W. 296.
13. The plaintiff applied for fire insurance to a local agent, who wrote to R. & Co., general in- surance agents, to send him a policy. R. & Co. wrote an application, signed it in their own names, and sent it to the defendant's general agent. The latter issued the policy, and it was sent through R. & Co. to the local agent, who collected the premium and sent it to R. & Co., and it was by them credited to the defendant's gen- eral agent. The policy provided: "This company shall not be liable until the actual payment of the premium. * *The application re- ferred to in this policy shall be considered as a part of this policy, and a warranty by the insured.
Any person other than the insured, or the duly authorized agent of this company, who may have procured this insurance to be taken by this company, shall be deemed to be the agent of the insured named in this policy, and not of this company. This policy is made and accepted in reference to the foregoing terms and conditions which are hereby declared a part of this contract." Held, that R. & Co. were not the agents of the insured, and the insurance com- pany could not avoid liability for a loss because of misrepresentations in the application signed by R. & Co., nor on the ground that the premium had not been paid to the company.-South Bend Toy Manuf'g Co. v. Dakota Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (S. D.) 48 N. W. 310.
and a verdict inconsistent with either should have been set aside.-Morley v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., (Mich.) 48 N. W. 502.
18. Under Circuit Court Rule Mich. 104, re- quiring declarations on policies to set forth only the dates and amounts thereof, premiums paid, risk insured, and loss, and allowing proof to be made in the same way as if the policy were set forth in full, a failure to submit to arbitration, defense under the general issue without notice, as required by the policy, may be proved as a although such provision was not declared on either verbatim or in legal effect.-Morley v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., (Mich.) 48 N. W. 502.
19. Acts 18th Gen. Assom. Iowa, c. 211, § 8, provides that in a suit on any policy of insur- ance, "in case of the loss of any building so in- sured," the sum stated in the policy shall be prima facie evidence of the value of the property, and it shall only be necessary for the assured to prove "the loss of the building insured," and due notice of the loss. Held, that the amount stated in a policy was not prima facie evidence of the value of personal property insured.-Joy v. Secu- rity Fire Ins. Co., (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 1049.
second-hand furniture, which cannot be said to 20. The property insured consisting of old or have a fixed market value, it is competent for the insurance company to prove the price at which the insured had offered to sell the property, to show value. Joy v. Security Fire Ins. Co., (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 1049.
21. In an action on an insurance policy the only allegation in the answer in regard to the time of bringing suit was the statement, in con- nection with allegations tending to show the proof of loss to be defective, that "this action is premature." After testimony had been offered by both sides, the defendant's counsel stated in his argument that the sheriff's return showed that the action had been begun within 90 days after proof of loss, contrary to Acts 18th Gen. Assem. Iowa, c. 211, § 3. Held, that the court might, in its discretion, allow the plaintiff to show that the defense was not well founded, since the answer did not properly apprise him of the defense relied on. -McComb v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 1038.
Actions on policies-Instructions.
22. An instruction that "proof of fraud should be of such a character as to be inconsistent with any other view than that the assured was guilty of fraud," is erroneous, as requiring fraud to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and the error is not cured by a further charge that they "should deal with that question precisely as with any other question of fact, viewing it rea- sonably, weighing it and acting upon it upon the same testimony, and using the same reason in arriving at results as upon any other branch of the case."-Morley v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., (Mich.) 48 N. W. 502.
dues, the association being authorized to "other- wise direct," a declared suspension, ex parte, and without notice, is ineffectual to terminate the ob- ligation of the association on its contract of insur- ance.-Backdahl v. Grand Lodge Ancient Order of United Workmen, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 454. 31. In an action on a mutual benefit certificate, allegations in the answer of the association that deceased was suspended for non-payment of assess- ments, and that he was suspended for non-payment of dues, do not set up inconsistent defenses be- tween which defendant must be compelled to elect. Backdahl v. Grand Lodge Ancient Order of United Workmen, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 454.
23. Defendant could not be prejudiced by the the decree of the probate court distributing the 32. In an action on a mutual benefit certificate, court's instructions that plaintiff could recover for certain articles of wearing apparel amount-ble as against the association to prove that they estate of the deceased to plaintiffs is not admissi- ing in value to $25, where, if insured at all, they are his heirs.-Backdahl v. Grand Lodge Ancient were insured under a $700 clause in the policy, Order of United Workmen, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 454. and the loss under that clause was over $1,000. -Tubbs v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., (Mich.) 48 N. W. 296.
33 The defendant association, as well as its subordinate lodges, were unincorporated voluntary 24. In an action by the mortgagor on a policy in associations for the mutual benefit and insurance which the loss is payable to the mortgagee, it is of their members. The subordinate lodges were error to instruct the jury to find for plaintiff, wher answerable to defendant in many things as in the the evidence is conflicting as to whether the mort-matter of assessments, and had representation at gage has been paid.-Graves v. American Live the meetings of defendant, but in other matters Stock Ins. Co., (Minn.) 48 N. W. 684. they acted without reference to defendant. Held, that plaintiff's son, who became a member of one of the subordinate lodges, and thereby became en- titled to, and received from defendant, a policy of insurance, could designate his lodge as beneficiary, and that plaintiff could not question the capacity of such lodge to take as such beneficiary.-Bacon v. Brotherhood of Railroad Brakemen, (Minn.) 48 N.
25. In an action on a policy of insurance in which a mortgagee secured by the policy is joined as a party, the court may, in case of a recovery in the action, adjust the rights of the plaintiff and mortgagee in the final judgment, though the ac- tion is properly triable by jury.-Crich v. Will- iamsburg City Fire Ins. Co., (Minn.) 48 N. W. 198.
Mutual fire companies.
26. Defendant, a mutual insurance company, had no authority to issue policies as a stock com- pany for a fixed cash premium, but the statute (Sanb. & B. St. Wis. 1941e) provided that, in case of a loss, an assessment sufficient to pay the loss should be made "upon all property insured." Held, that a policy issued for a cash premium is binding on the company and not ultra vires, since the holder, notwithstanding such payment, is under the statute still liable to assessments.- Rundle v. Kennan, (Wis.) 48 N. W. 516.
27. In a mutual fire insurance company, or ganized under Laws Minn. 1881, c. 91, all the pol- icy-holders are members during the term of in- surance. The capital is made up of cash pre- miums and premium notes, and the latter are as- sessable in proportion to the amount of losses sustained. An adjudication of the insolvency of such an insurance company, and the judicial seq- uestration of all its property, fixes the date for ascertaining debts and claims against the com- pany, and the effect is to cancel the outstanding policies. -Taylor v. North Star Mut. Jas. Co., (Minn.) 48 N. W. 772.
28. Policies on which losses have not occurred are not debts or fixed liabilities of the company; and losses occurring after the appointment of a receiver to wind up the affairs of an insolvent mutual insurance company cannot be proved and allowed as claims against the company by the re- ceiver. Taylor v. North Star Mut. Ins. Co., (Minn.) 48 N. W. 772.
Mutual benefit insurance.
29. In an action on a mutual benefit certificate, where the association pleads suspension of deceased for non-payment of dues, testimony by the proper officer that he recollects sending notices to mem- bers of a particular assessment, as was his duty and custom to do, and that he believes he sent no- tice to all on this particular occasion, is evidence of sending notice to a particular member, although the officer cannot swear, positively and specifically, as to such member.-Backdahl v. Grand Lodge Ancient Order of United Workmen, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 454.
30. Where it is contemplated by the constitution of a mutual benefit association that suspension shall not necessarily result from non-payment of
See, also, Usury. When allowed.
1. In actions for damages for negligence, in- terest may be awarded or withheld in the discre- tion of the jury, as provided by Comp. Laws N. D. § 4578.-Eli v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (N. D.) 48 N. W. 222.
for $5,000 damages and costs, and having paid but 2. The plaintiff having recovered judgment $3.35 for the original costs, and the whole of the judgment and costs having been settled by the judgment debtor at the end of litigation, after two years, the judgment creditor was not entitled to interest on the taxable bill of costs. -O'Don- nell v. Omaha, N. & B. H. R. Co., (Neb.) 48 N.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
Constitutionality of acts.
1. The provision of section 8, Act 313, Pub. Acts Mich. 1887, that the principal in the bond required by that section shall not sell intoxicat- ing liquors in any other place than that specified in the bond, without giving notice and executing another bond, is not unconstitutional.-People v. Brown, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 158.
2. The Wilson law is not a delegation but an exercise of the power of congress to regulate com- merce between the states, and it subjects intoxi- cating liquors from other states in the original packages to the laws of the state enacted before its passage.-State v. Fraser, (N. D.) 48 N. W.
3. Ten days after an application to the trustees of a village for a license to sell intoxicating liquors, the relator and others filed a remonstrance based on defects in the petition, the published notice thereof, and the bond given by the applicant. A few hours before the time set for a hearing, the relator and others filed a second remonstrance, on
the ground that the applicant was not a man of good character. No evidence was offered in sup- port of the first remonstrance. Held, that it was not clear that the second was filed in good faith, and the writ of mandamus would not issue to com- pel the trustees to revoke the license, and grant a hearing on the second remonstrance.-State v. Pearse, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 391.
4. A remonstrance against the issue of a li- cense to sell intoxicating drinks having been overruled, and an appeal taken to the district court, the revocation of a license issued before the appeal is disposed of will be compelled by mandamus, though there may have been some
delay in perfecting the appeal.-State v. Bays,
(Neb.) 48 N. W. 270; Id. 271.
Illegal sales-Construction of statutes. 5. Under Code Iowa, $$ 1523, 1543, making it an offense to keep intoxicating liquors with intent "to sell the same within the state, con- trary to law," the intent need not be to sell in or from the building in which the liquors are kept.-State v. Viers, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 732.
6. Under Code Iowa, §§ 1523, 1543, making it an offense to maintain a building in which liquors are sold or kept for sale, contrary to law, it is an offense to maintain a building in which liq- uors are illegally sold, though no liquors are kept in that building.-State v. Viers, (Iowa,) 48 N.
7. A saloon-keeper who, without protest, al- lows an adult to buy intoxicating liquor, and give it to a minor to drink in his saloon, violates Acts Mich. 1887, No. 313, prohibiting the "fur- nishing" of intoxicating liquors to minors.-Peo- ple v. Neumann, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 290.
Criminal prosecution.
8. Act 313, Mich. 8, (Pub. Acts 1887,) pro- vides that the principal in the bond required by the section shall not sell liquor in any other place than that specified in the bond witnout giv- ing notice and executing another bond, and that any violation thereof shall be a misdemeanor, punishable "as provided in section 6 of this act." Section 6 provides no punishment or penalty, but section 7 provides punishment for violation of any of the provisions of the act. Held, that a violation of section 8, by selling liquor in two different places without giving the required no- tice or executing the required bond, was punish- able under section 7.-People v. Brown, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 158.
intoxicating drinks, without having first * obtained a license," etc., shall be fined, etc. Held, that each act of selling any of the liquors named in the section, as well as the act for giv- ing away any of them, without a license to do so, is a crime; and an information charging, in one count, that defendant sold and gave away spirituous, vinous, and intoxicating liquors, is too indefinite and uncertain, and should be quashed, on motion. Following State v. Pischel, 16 Neb. 490, 20 N. W. 848.-Smith v. State, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 823.
15. A car-load of beer shipped into Iowa by a non-resident, and there seized in the original packages by virtue of a search-warrant issued by a justice of the peace under Code Iowa, § 1544, and charging that it belonged to certain residents, was rightfully in the sheriff's possession pending the justice's determination as to a forfeiture, and could not be replevied from him.-Lemp v. Ful- lerton, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 1034.
16. An original package of intoxicating liquors was transported by rail from another state, and upon being unloaded on the depot platform, and before delivery to the consignee, was seized un- der a search-warrant. The condemnation pro- ceedings were begun before the enactment by con- gress of the "Wilson Bill." Held, that the ship- ment was a lawful act of interstate commerce, and the liquors were not liable to seizure under the law of Iowa relating to intoxicating liquors. Following Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 S. Ct. 681.-State v. Corrick, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 808. Injunction-Liquor nuisance.
9. Act Mich. June 28, 1887, which minutely covers the entire subject of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, and which empowers city councils to authorize their sale only on week- 17. An injunction will not be granted to re- days, and which repeals all inconsistent acts, strain a defendant from maintaining a liquor nui- by implication repeals a city ordinance regulat-sance when it appears that he is the agent of cer- ing the sale of intoxicating liquors on the Sabbath tain parties in Milwaukee, who are the lessees of day; and hence a conviction for a sale on that the house in which the liquor is kept for sale; day, in violation of the ordinance, is no bar to a that the beer and whisky are put up in sealed prosecution for the same sale under Act June 28, bottles in Milwaukee, and for convenience of ship- 1887.-People v. Furman, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 169. ping are packed in boxes and barrels; that they are consigned to the Milwaukee owners, and are received by defendant as their agent; that he re- moves the bottles from the boxes and barrels, but sells them sealed to persons, who are not allowed to open them and drink the contents on the prem- ises. Such a sale is a sale in the original pack- ages, within Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 S. Ct. 681.-State v. Coonan, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 921. 18. Laws N. D. 1890, c. 110, § 13, provides that "all places where intoxicating liquors are sold in violation of the provisions of this act, or where any persons are permitted to resort for the purpose of drinking intoxicating liquors as a beverage, or where intoxicating liquors are kept for sale * * in violation of this act, are hereby declared to be common nuisances." Held, that a place where liquors were sold in violation of the statute was a common nuisance, whether drinking on the premises was or was not permit- ted.-State v. Fraser, (N. D.) 48 N. W. 343.
10. Under a criminal prosecution for violating Pub. Acts Mich. 1887, No. 313, § 15, which pro- vides that it shall be unlawful for any person to allow a minor to visit or remain in any room where liquors are sold, unless accompanied by his father or guardian, it appearing that defend- ants were absent at the time of the offense, and their saloon was in charge of their clerk, and they had no knowledge of the minor's presence, they cannot be convicted of the offense charged. -People v. Hughes, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 945.
11. The provision in section 14 of said act, making a saloon-keeper liable when his clerk or servant permits minors to play cards in tne sa- loon, does not extend the liability of the saloon- keeper, under section 15, to acts of his clerk.- People v. Hughes, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 945.
12. Comp. St. Neb. c. 50, 11, provides that "all persons who shall sell or give away upon any pretext malt, spirituous, or vinous liquors, or anv
19. Where, under an injunction to restrain the maintenance of a liquor nuisance, it appeared
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