Constructi

INDEMNITY.

1. A7 agrement, entered into by all the
stockholders of a corporation, that they will in-
demnify such of the stockholders then liable on
the company's paper, or who shall "thereafter
become so, by indorsement or otherwise," does
not limit the indemnity to stockholders who have
become "indorsers" of the company's paper, but
gives indemnity to any stockholder who has be-
come liable, in any of the modes known to the
law, to pay such corporate obligations, and who
has paid the same.-Taylor v. North,' (Wis.) 48

N. W. 126.

2. A contract between several persons, stock-
holders of the same company, providing that each
would indemnify, protect, and save harmless
such stockholders who are or become indorsers on
the company's paper in proportion of each stock-
holder's ownership of stock, and would, on de-
mand of any stockholder called upon to pay such
paper, contribute to the payment such sum as he
ought to contribute in proportion to his stock, is
not a contract of indemnity against liability as
indorser, but one of indemnity against loss or
damage by reason of such liability; and, in an ac-
tion on the contract, a failure to allege that plain-
tiff paid the obligation on which he was indorser
is fatal on demurrer.-Taylor v. Coon, (Wis.) 48

N. W. 123.

lands, and had threatened to continue to do so,
the plaintiff was entitled to relief in equity by
injunction, in order to prevent a multiplicity of
suits.-Shafer v. Stull, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 882.
Wrongs prevented.

8. In an action to cancel the subscription of
complainants to the stock of a corporation on the
ground that it was procured by false representa-
tions, and to obtain a return of the money paid
for the stock, it is proper to restrain by injunc-
tion any disposition of the corporate property
and the money paid for the stock pending such
suit.-Sherman v. American Stove Co., (Mich.)

48 N. W. 537.

4. The owner of property on the shores of a
lake, which is valuable as a pleasure resort on
account of its nearness to the lake and easy ac-
cess to the water for boating and fishing, may
maintain a suit to restrain a corporation from
drawing water out of the lake so as to lower its
level and leave a wide margin of bog exposed
around its banks, which is repulsive in appear-
ance, and unhealthy, and so injurious to plain-
tiff's property.-Cedar Lake Hotel Co. v. Cedar
Lake Hydraulic Co., (Wis.) 48 N. W. 371.

5. A party who has been in the open, notorious,
exclusive, adverse possession of a portion of a
town-site for a period of time sufficient to bar an
thereby acquires an absolute title to said land, and
action against him to recover possession thereof,
may protect his possession by injunction against
unlawful acts of the city authorities in attempting

INDICTMENT AND INFORMA- to open streets through his land on the strength of

TION.

a plat made by a former owner.-Schock v. City of
Falls City, (Neb.) 45 N. W. 468.

See, also, Abortion, 1; Arson, 1; Burglary; Se- for lighting by electricity, a statement in the

duction, 2.

Venue.

6. In an action to enjoin a city from paying
petition that plaintiff is a tax-payer on property
subject to assessment, under an ordinance pro-
viding for such expenditure out of the general
fund, instead of by special taxation on property
benefited, is a sufficient averment of injury to en-
title plaintiff to maintain his action, if the grounds
thereof are well founded. -Hanson v. Wm. A.
Hunter Electric Light Co., (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 1005.
Dissolution.

An information for embezzling mortgaged
chattels, containing in the caption the name of
the state and county or city, gives the court ju-
risdiction, though it does not allege where the
embezzlement was committed. How. St. Mich.
9533, provides that it shall not be necessary to
state any venue in the body of the indictment,
but the jurisdiction named in the margin shall
be taken to be the venue of all the facts alleged, does not rest in the discretion of the nisi prius
7. The dissolution of a temporary injunction
except where a local description is required.-court when it appears on the face of the plead-
People v. Schultz, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 293.

Indorsement.

See Negotiable Instruments, 9-15.

Infancy.

See Guardian and Ward.

Information.

See Indictment and Information.

Infringement.

See Trade-Marks.

INJUNCTION.

ings that, as a matter of law, the injunction
should be dissolved; the question involved being
the validity of a statute. -Burlington, C. R. & N.
Ry. Co. v. Dey, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 98.

INSANITY.

Hearing on habeas corpus.

1. Under Code Iowa, § 1444, giving to a per-
son confined as insane the benefits of the writ
of habeas corpus, and providing that at the hear-
ing "the question of insanity shall be decided,
the district judge in chambers, on petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, pending appeal to the
district court by one adjudged insane by the com-
missioners of insanity, and ordered to be com-
mitted to the asylum, has the right to hear evi-
dence as to petitioner's sanity, and, on finding
her insane, to order her to be committed to the
asylum; and his decision is res adjudicata on

To restrain nuisance, see Intoxicating Liquors, the question of insanity in the proceedings on the
17-19; Nuisance, 3.

Jurisdiction.

1. An injunction to restrain a town from lay-
ing out and constructing a highway, without any
funds in the treasury, and without authority to
contract an indebtedness for that purpose, is not
"an injunction to suspend the general and or-
dinary business of a corporation," which Rev. St.
Wis. § 2780, declares "shall not be granted except
by the court or presiding judge thereof;" and
hence such injunction may be granted by a cir-
cuit court commissioner.-Bay Land & Imp. Co.
v. Town of Washburn, (Wis.) 48 N. W. 492.

2. Where defendants had repeatedly torn
down plaintiff's fence in order to pass over his

appeal to the district court.-In re Bresee, (Iowa,)
48 N. W. 991.

2. The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the finding of the district judge, on hearing of the
petition for writ of habeas corpus, cannot be con-
sidered on appeal, unless the evidence is brought
up in the abstract, though, by reason of the ab-
sence of a reporter, petitioner could not preserve
the evidence.-In re Bresee, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 991.

INSOLVENCY.

See, also, Assignment for Benefit of Creditors;
Bankruptcy.

Of corporations, see Corporations, 21.

Preferences.

1. An insolvent debtor being indebted to a
bank of which he was a customer and depositcr,
made a general deposit to the credit of his own
account, and the next day, at his direction, the
bank applied the deposit to the payment of a note
due from him to the bank. Held that, as respects
the provisions of the Minnesota insolvent law
against preferential payments, the case stood the
same as if the money had been paid by the in-
solvent directly in payment of the note; and, if
the bank had reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor was insolvent, the money can be recovered
by the assignee.-Tripp v. Northwestern Nat.
Bank, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 4.

The assignee and receiver-Actions.

2. Under Gen. St. Minn. c. 41, § 27, a receiver
or assignee in insolvency may maintain an action
to reach assets of an insolvent debtor fraudulently
concealed or disposed of by him, whether such ac-
tion be to set aside fraudulent conveyances, or to
enforce a trust in favor of creditors under the
statute.-Chamberlain v. O'Brien, (Minn.) 48 N.

W. 447.

3. Where the insolvent caused property for
which he paid the consideration to be conveyed di-
rectly to his wife, and she is found to have been
cognizant of the fraud, she will be treated as an
involuntary trustee for existing creditors, and, if
she conveys the same away to innocent purchas:
ers, the receiver may, at his election, proceed
against her personally for the value thereof.-
Chamberlain v. O'Brien, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 447.

4. It is not essential to the maintenance of such

an action that the claims of creditors represented
by him should have been previously reduced to
judgment, for the statute dispenses with the neces-
sity of any lien in behalf of individual creditors in
such cases.-Chamberlain v. O'Brien, (Minn.) 48
N. W. 447.

Proof of claims.

5. On the trial of a wife's claim against the
estate of her insolvent husband for moneys loaned,
it was shown that the husband, in making a state-
ment for the purpose of obtaining credit, omitted
to state any debt to his wife, and on the trial the
husband admitted that the statement was false,
and said that it was so made on advice of a
friend. Held, that the question asked the hus-
band as to when his wife first knew of such state-
ment was not improper as calling for a mere
opinion, but was competent to disprove the wife's
participation in the fraud.-Rea v. Jaffray & Co.,
(Iowa,) 48 N. W. 78.

*

set-

10, so that it reads: "When any creditor
shall petition to the court or judge,
ting forth that such debtor has, " etc. The amend-
ing statute added several grounds for denying an
insolvent his release, and provided that, if the in-
solvent was charged with false swearing, the facts
in relation thereto should be set out, but it did not
require the details to be specified in relation to
other charges. Held, that the charges in such a
petition, except the charge of false swearing, may
be made in the general terms of the statute.-Har-
rison v. Kellogg, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 1132.
Instructions.

1. A fire insurance policy provided that the
company should not be liable by virtue of the
policy, or any renewal thereof, until the premi-
um had been actually paid. It had been the cus-
tom of the agent to make out renewals, deliver
them, and collect the premium. Ten days before
the policy expired the insured asked the agent
to attend to its renewal, and he promised to do
so. Nothing more was done until the property
was burned, six months afterwards. Held, that
the agent had not waived prepayment of the pre-
mium, and the insurance company could not be
compelled to issue the renewal.-Zigler v. Phoenix
Ins. Co., (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 987.
Application.

2. A fire insurance policy, conditioned to be
void for misrepresentations in the application,
is avoided by a gross under-statement of the
amount of incumbrances.-O'Brien v. Home Ins.
Co., (Wis.) 48 N. W. 714.

3. Where one defense relied on is the falsity
of the statements in the application for the pol-
icy, the plaintiff may show that the questions
were truthfully answered by him; that the com-
pany's agent who wrote out the application mis-
stated his answers; and that he signed the ap-
plication without reading it, or knowing of the
misstatements.-McComb v. Council Bluffs Ins.
Co., (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 1038.

4. Where the assured was not questioned as
to incumbrances on his property, and did not in-
tentionally conceal the facts, the existence of a
mortgage thereon does not invalidate the policy.
-Vankirk v. Citizens' Ins. Co., (Wis.) 48′N. Ŵ.
798.

6. A wife, who was a former partner of her
5. An application for insurance provided that
husband, against whom are outstanding unpaid the representations therein contained should be
joint notes for moneys which went into the firm warranties, and that the company should not be
business, and which were assumed by the hus- bound by any act or statement made by or to any
band as debts of the firm, is a creditor of his es-agent or other person not contained in the appli-
tate, within the Iowa general assignment act, cation. The policy provided that the application
(Code, c. 7, tit. 14,) though the holder of one of should be a part thereof, and that the company
the notes has made no demand for a distributive should not be bound by any act or statement
share in the estate; and the court will order the made to or by any agent, unless inserted in the
proper distributive share to be applied on such contract. The application was not attached to
notes.-Rea v. Jaffray & Co., (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 78. the policy, but was retained by the company.
7. Antedated notes given, just before making Held, that assured having told the agent that
a general assignment, by a husband to his wife, there was an incumbrance of $3,000 on the prop-
who was a former partner, to an amount equal to erty, and he having by mistake and without
the debts of the firm, which had been assumed assured's knowledge written it as $2,000 in the ap-
by him, but were not paid at that time, do not plication, the policy was not thereby avoided.-
change the relations of the parties.-Rea v. Jaff- Tubbs v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., (Mich.) 48 N.
ray & Co., (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 78.

Discharge.

W. 296.

Conditions of policy.

8. Under the Minnesota insolvent law, requir- 6. A policy provided for arbitration as to the
ing a debtor to make an assignment of "all his un- amount of loss, and gave the insurer the right to
exempt property for the equal benefit" of his cred- take the property insured at the value fixed by
itors, who shall file releases, the insolvent's right the arbitrators. The assured, after agreeing to
to a discharge depends upon his having in good arbitration, revoked the submission, and declined
faith subjected all his unexempt property, whether to be bound. He then had the goods appraised,
in or out of the state, to the insolvency proceed- and sold them. Held a forfeiture of the policy.
ings.-Harrison v. Kellogg, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 1132.-Morley v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins.
9. Laws Minn. 1881, c. 145, § 10, provided for Co., (Mich.) 48 N. W. 502.
citing insolvents "when any creditor
alleges by complaint *
that such insolvent
has." etc. Laws 1889, c. 30, § 7, amended section

*

*

* *

7. An insurance policy was conditioned to be
void in case the assured died by his own hand,
unless he was insane at the time of taking his

17. Where the only evidence as to the amount
10. Where the assured, in his final proofs of of the loss consisted of the two appraisals, one
loss, adopted, item for item, the valuation of the by the arbitrators, and one ordered by plaintiff,
arbitrators, he was bound thereby, in the ab-the jury were bound to adopt one or the other,
sence of fraud.-Morley v. Liverpool & London &
Globe Ins. Co., (Mich.) 48 N. W. 502.

Actions on policies-Instructions.

22. An instruction that "proof of fraud should
be of such a character as to be inconsistent with
any other view than that the assured was guilty
of fraud," is erroneous, as requiring fraud to be
established beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
error is not cured by a further charge that they
"should deal with that question precisely as
with any other question of fact, viewing it rea-
sonably, weighing it and acting upon it upon the
same testimony, and using the same reason in
arriving at results as upon any other branch of
the case."-Morley v. Liverpool & London &
Globe Ins. Co., (Mich.) 48 N. W. 502.

dues, the association being authorized to "other-
wise direct," a declared suspension, ex parte, and
without notice, is ineffectual to terminate the ob-
ligation of the association on its contract of insur-
ance.-Backdahl v. Grand Lodge Ancient Order of
United Workmen, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 454.
31. In an action on a mutual benefit certificate,
allegations in the answer of the association that
deceased was suspended for non-payment of assess-
ments, and that he was suspended for non-payment
of dues, do not set up inconsistent defenses be-
tween which defendant must be compelled to elect.
Backdahl v. Grand Lodge Ancient Order of
United Workmen, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 454.

23. Defendant could not be prejudiced by the the decree of the probate court distributing the
32. In an action on a mutual benefit certificate,
court's instructions that plaintiff could recover
for certain articles of wearing apparel amount-ble as against the association to prove that they
estate of the deceased to plaintiffs is not admissi-
ing in value to $25, where, if insured at all, they are his heirs.-Backdahl v. Grand Lodge Ancient
were insured under a $700 clause in the policy, Order of United Workmen, (Minn.) 48 N. W. 454.
and the loss under that clause was over $1,000.
-Tubbs v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., (Mich.) 48
N. W. 296.

33 The defendant association, as well as its
subordinate lodges, were unincorporated voluntary
24. In an action by the mortgagor on a policy in associations for the mutual benefit and insurance
which the loss is payable to the mortgagee, it is of their members. The subordinate lodges were
error to instruct the jury to find for plaintiff, wher answerable to defendant in many things as in the
the evidence is conflicting as to whether the mort-matter of assessments, and had representation at
gage has been paid.-Graves v. American Live the meetings of defendant, but in other matters
Stock Ins. Co., (Minn.) 48 N. W. 684.
they acted without reference to defendant. Held,
that plaintiff's son, who became a member of one
of the subordinate lodges, and thereby became en-
titled to, and received from defendant, a policy of
insurance, could designate his lodge as beneficiary,
and that plaintiff could not question the capacity
of such lodge to take as such beneficiary.-Bacon v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Brakemen, (Minn.) 48 N.

Judgment.

25. In an action on a policy of insurance in
which a mortgagee secured by the policy is joined
as a party, the court may, in case of a recovery in
the action, adjust the rights of the plaintiff and
mortgagee in the final judgment, though the ac-
tion is properly triable by jury.-Crich v. Will-
iamsburg City Fire Ins. Co., (Minn.) 48 N. W. 198.

Mutual fire companies.

26. Defendant, a mutual insurance company,
had no authority to issue policies as a stock com-
pany for a fixed cash premium, but the statute
(Sanb. & B. St. Wis. 1941e) provided that, in
case of a loss, an assessment sufficient to pay the
loss should be made "upon all property insured."
Held, that a policy issued for a cash premium is
binding on the company and not ultra vires, since
the holder, notwithstanding such payment, is
under the statute still liable to assessments.-
Rundle v. Kennan, (Wis.) 48 N. W. 516.

27. In a mutual fire insurance company, or
ganized under Laws Minn. 1881, c. 91, all the pol-
icy-holders are members during the term of in-
surance. The capital is made up of cash pre-
miums and premium notes, and the latter are as-
sessable in proportion to the amount of losses
sustained. An adjudication of the insolvency of
such an insurance company, and the judicial seq-
uestration of all its property, fixes the date for
ascertaining debts and claims against the com-
pany, and the effect is to cancel the outstanding
policies. -Taylor v. North Star Mut. Jas. Co.,
(Minn.) 48 N. W. 772.

28. Policies on which losses have not occurred
are not debts or fixed liabilities of the company;
and losses occurring after the appointment of a
receiver to wind up the affairs of an insolvent
mutual insurance company cannot be proved and
allowed as claims against the company by the re-
ceiver. Taylor v. North Star Mut. Ins. Co.,
(Minn.) 48 N. W. 772.

-

Mutual benefit insurance.

29. In an action on a mutual benefit certificate,
where the association pleads suspension of deceased
for non-payment of dues, testimony by the proper
officer that he recollects sending notices to mem-
bers of a particular assessment, as was his duty
and custom to do, and that he believes he sent no-
tice to all on this particular occasion, is evidence
of sending notice to a particular member, although
the officer cannot swear, positively and specifically,
as to such member.-Backdahl v. Grand Lodge
Ancient Order of United Workmen, (Minn.) 48 N.
W. 454.

30. Where it is contemplated by the constitution
of a mutual benefit association that suspension
shall not necessarily result from non-payment of

W. 1127.

INTEREST.

See, also, Usury.
When allowed.

1. In actions for damages for negligence, in-
terest may be awarded or withheld in the discre-
tion of the jury, as provided by Comp. Laws N. D.
§ 4578.-Eli v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (N. D.) 48 N.
W. 222.

for $5,000 damages and costs, and having paid but
2. The plaintiff having recovered judgment
$3.35 for the original costs, and the whole of the
judgment and costs having been settled by the
judgment debtor at the end of litigation, after
two years, the judgment creditor was not entitled
to interest on the taxable bill of costs. -O'Don-
nell v. Omaha, N. & B. H. R. Co., (Neb.) 48 N.

W. 880.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Constitutionality of acts.

1. The provision of section 8, Act 313, Pub.
Acts Mich. 1887, that the principal in the bond
required by that section shall not sell intoxicat-
ing liquors in any other place than that specified
in the bond, without giving notice and executing
another bond, is not unconstitutional.-People v.
Brown, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 158.

2. The Wilson law is not a delegation but an
exercise of the power of congress to regulate com-
merce between the states, and it subjects intoxi-
cating liquors from other states in the original
packages to the laws of the state enacted before
its passage.-State v. Fraser, (N. D.) 48 N. W.

343.

Licenses.

3. Ten days after an application to the trustees
of a village for a license to sell intoxicating liquors,
the relator and others filed a remonstrance based
on defects in the petition, the published notice
thereof, and the bond given by the applicant. A
few hours before the time set for a hearing, the
relator and others filed a second remonstrance, on

the ground that the applicant was not a man of
good character. No evidence was offered in sup-
port of the first remonstrance. Held, that it was
not clear that the second was filed in good faith,
and the writ of mandamus would not issue to com-
pel the trustees to revoke the license, and grant a
hearing on the second remonstrance.-State v.
Pearse, (Neb.) 48 N. W. 391.

4. A remonstrance against the issue of a li-
cense to sell intoxicating drinks having been
overruled, and an appeal taken to the district
court, the revocation of a license issued before
the appeal is disposed of will be compelled by
mandamus, though there may have been some

delay in perfecting the appeal.-State v. Bays,

(Neb.) 48 N. W. 270; Id. 271.

Illegal sales-Construction of statutes.
5. Under Code Iowa, $$ 1523, 1543, making
it an offense to keep intoxicating liquors with
intent "to sell the same within the state, con-
trary to law," the intent need not be to sell in
or from the building in which the liquors are
kept.-State v. Viers, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 732.

6. Under Code Iowa, §§ 1523, 1543, making it
an offense to maintain a building in which liquors
are sold or kept for sale, contrary to law, it is
an offense to maintain a building in which liq-
uors are illegally sold, though no liquors are kept
in that building.-State v. Viers, (Iowa,) 48 N.

W. 732.

Sales to minors.

7. A saloon-keeper who, without protest, al-
lows an adult to buy intoxicating liquor, and
give it to a minor to drink in his saloon, violates
Acts Mich. 1887, No. 313, prohibiting the "fur-
nishing" of intoxicating liquors to minors.-Peo-
ple v. Neumann, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 290.

Criminal prosecution.

8. Act 313, Mich. 8, (Pub. Acts 1887,) pro-
vides that the principal in the bond required by
the section shall not sell liquor in any other
place than that specified in the bond witnout giv-
ing notice and executing another bond, and that
any violation thereof shall be a misdemeanor,
punishable "as provided in section 6 of this act."
Section 6 provides no punishment or penalty,
but section 7 provides punishment for violation
of any of the provisions of the act. Held, that
a violation of section 8, by selling liquor in two
different places without giving the required no-
tice or executing the required bond, was punish-
able under section 7.-People v. Brown, (Mich.)
48 N. W. 158.

intoxicating drinks, without having first *
obtained a license," etc., shall be fined, etc.
Held, that each act of selling any of the liquors
named in the section, as well as the act for giv-
ing away any of them, without a license to do
so, is a crime; and an information charging, in
one count, that defendant sold and gave away
spirituous, vinous, and intoxicating liquors, is
too indefinite and uncertain, and should be
quashed, on motion. Following State v. Pischel,
16 Neb. 490, 20 N. W. 848.-Smith v. State, (Neb.)
48 N. W. 823.

15. A car-load of beer shipped into Iowa by a
non-resident, and there seized in the original
packages by virtue of a search-warrant issued by
a justice of the peace under Code Iowa, § 1544,
and charging that it belonged to certain residents,
was rightfully in the sheriff's possession pending
the justice's determination as to a forfeiture, and
could not be replevied from him.-Lemp v. Ful-
lerton, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 1034.

16. An original package of intoxicating liquors
was transported by rail from another state, and
upon being unloaded on the depot platform, and
before delivery to the consignee, was seized un-
der a search-warrant. The condemnation pro-
ceedings were begun before the enactment by con-
gress of the "Wilson Bill." Held, that the ship-
ment was a lawful act of interstate commerce,
and the liquors were not liable to seizure under
the law of Iowa relating to intoxicating liquors.
Following Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 S. Ct.
681.-State v. Corrick, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 808.
Injunction-Liquor nuisance.

9. Act Mich. June 28, 1887, which minutely
covers the entire subject of the manufacture and
sale of intoxicating liquors, and which empowers
city councils to authorize their sale only on week- 17. An injunction will not be granted to re-
days, and which repeals all inconsistent acts, strain a defendant from maintaining a liquor nui-
by implication repeals a city ordinance regulat-sance when it appears that he is the agent of cer-
ing the sale of intoxicating liquors on the Sabbath tain parties in Milwaukee, who are the lessees of
day; and hence a conviction for a sale on that the house in which the liquor is kept for sale;
day, in violation of the ordinance, is no bar to a that the beer and whisky are put up in sealed
prosecution for the same sale under Act June 28, bottles in Milwaukee, and for convenience of ship-
1887.-People v. Furman, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 169. ping are packed in boxes and barrels; that they
are consigned to the Milwaukee owners, and are
received by defendant as their agent; that he re-
moves the bottles from the boxes and barrels, but
sells them sealed to persons, who are not allowed
to open them and drink the contents on the prem-
ises. Such a sale is a sale in the original pack-
ages, within Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10
S. Ct. 681.-State v. Coonan, (Iowa,) 48 N. W. 921.
18. Laws N. D. 1890, c. 110, § 13, provides that
"all places where intoxicating liquors are sold
in violation of the provisions of this act,
or where any persons are permitted to resort for
the purpose of drinking intoxicating liquors as a
beverage, or where intoxicating liquors are kept
for sale * * in violation of this act, are
hereby declared to be common nuisances." Held,
that a place where liquors were sold in violation
of the statute was a common nuisance, whether
drinking on the premises was or was not permit-
ted.-State v. Fraser, (N. D.) 48 N. W. 343.

10. Under a criminal prosecution for violating
Pub. Acts Mich. 1887, No. 313, § 15, which pro-
vides that it shall be unlawful for any person to
allow a minor to visit or remain in any room
where liquors are sold, unless accompanied by
his father or guardian, it appearing that defend-
ants were absent at the time of the offense, and
their saloon was in charge of their clerk, and
they had no knowledge of the minor's presence,
they cannot be convicted of the offense charged.
-People v. Hughes, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 945.

11. The provision in section 14 of said act,
making a saloon-keeper liable when his clerk or
servant permits minors to play cards in tne sa-
loon, does not extend the liability of the saloon-
keeper, under section 15, to acts of his clerk.-
People v. Hughes, (Mich.) 48 N. W. 945.

Information.

12. Comp. St. Neb. c. 50, 11, provides that
"all persons who shall sell or give away upon any
pretext malt, spirituous, or vinous liquors, or anv

* *

*

*

19. Where, under an injunction to restrain the
maintenance of a liquor nuisance, it appeared