as that, by reason of his remaining corruption, he doth not perfectly nor only will that which is good, but doth also will that which is evil.

SECTION V.-The will of man is made perfectly and immutably free to do good alone in the state of glory only.

EXPOSITION.

The human will is not a distinct agent, but only a power of the rational soul. It is essential to a soul to have a moral disposition, good or bad, or a mixture of both; and according to what is the prevailing moral disposition of the soul, must be the moral actings of the will. Hence there is a great difference in regard to the freedom of the will in the different states of man, In the state of innocence the natural inclination of man's will was only to good; but it was liable to change through the power of temptation, and therefore free to choose evil. In his natural corrupt state man freely chooses evil without any compulsion or constraint on his will; and he cannot do otherwise, being under the bondage of sin. In the state of grace, he has a free will partly to good and partly to evil. In this state there is a mixture of two opposite moral dispositions, and as sometimes the one, and sometimes the other, prevails, so the will sometimes chooses that which is good, and sometimes that which is evil, In the state of glory, the blessed freely choose what is good; and, being confirmed in a state of perfect holiness, they can only will what is good."

The doctrine of Free Will as set forth in the Confession of Faith, as clearly shown in the above exposition, is this. The action of the will always is and must be as the antecedent 'disposition or propensities; in other words, "according to inward principles of rational apprehension and natural disposition." Yet the will is free. "It is endued with a natural liberty" by which from no force from without, nor from any necessity of internal disposition is it detetermined, contrary to its own choices, in the direction of either good or evil. As water when placed upon an inclined plane flows freely down by virtue of its own internal antecedent tendencies, and from no force out of itself, so the action of the will is always in the direction of the predominant state of the propensities, and can be in no other direction. When the propensities are in a sanctified state, then the will is on the inclined plane to life eternal, and its determinations, though free, can by no possibility be in any other direction. If the propensities, on the other hand, are unsanctified and impure, the will is on the inclination towards perdition, and though its acts are all free, the force of its free determinations cannot but be in the direction of death, and must land the soul there, unless by a direct and supernatural interposition of almighty power the direction of the propensities be changed, a change in which man must be wholly passive. To a complete elucidation of this whole doctrine as here presented, the following observations are deemed requisite.

1. The only real liberty according to the true idea of it, the idea above defined, ever possessed by man, was that exercised by our first parents before the Fall. Then the will was mutable. Good and evil were equally within its power. It could choose the one or the other. Now in all the unregenerate, the will, according to its teachings, is free only to evil. In the regenerate, whose propensities are partly pure and partly impure, its action cannot but be sometimes in the direction of of the right, and sometimes in, that of the wrong, according as the balance of the "inward principles of rational apprehension and natural disposition" happen at any time to be in the direction of the one or the other. In a state of glory, the propensities being in a changelessly pure state, the will is immutably free to to good alone." Its action though free, will and can be in no other direction.

2. The doctrine that the will of man prior to the Fall was free according to the true idea of liberty, is asserted in this Confession in undeniable contradiction to its own fundamental principle in respect to the will, to wit: that its action is and must be in the direction of its "internal principles of rational apprehension and natural disposition." According to the Confession of Faith itself, Chapter IV, Section 3d, our first parents, as created, were "endued with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, after his [God's] image, having the law of God written upon their hearts, and power to fulfill it." In the exposition of this section, it is asserted that the "image of God in man principally consisted in his conformity to the moral perfections of God, or in the complete rectitude of his [man's] nature." Further on, we have the following remarks:

"Man had knowledge in his understanding, righteousness in his will, and holiness in his affections. His understanding was illuminated with all necessary knowledge. He knew God and his will; he knew himself, his relations to God, his duty to him, and his dependence upon him. That he had also an extensive and accurate knowledge of natural objects, may be inferred from his giving distinctive names to the inferior creatures when they passed in review before him. His will was in conformity to the will of God. As he knew his duty, so he was fully disposed to the performance of it. And his affections were holy and pure; they were placed upon proper objects, and exercised in a regular manner. There was then no need that the moral law should be written on tables of stone, for it was engraven on the heart of man in fair and legible characters."

Yet, in the section above referred to, it is asserted that man, notwithstanding his actual "knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, and the "complete rectitude of his nature," was "yet under the possibility of transgressing, being left to

the liberty of his own will, which was subject to change." So in the exposition of the above statement, it is affirmed that man's "will was entirely free to act according to his original light and holy inclinations, or to turn aside to evil." Now how is such liberty or liability to sin consistent with the fundamental doctrine of this Confession of Faith, and of the entire Necessitarian school, in respect to the will, to wit, that its action always is and cannot but be "according to inward principles of rational apprehension and natural disposition." All such principles, as we are here taught, were exclusively in the direction of holiness, and could impel the will in no other direction. Now, if the action of the will, as is here asserted, can be only in the direction of its antecedent "inward principles," how, in connection with "complete rectitude of nature,” which is asserted of man prior to the Fall, could action in him in the direction of evil have been possible? Such a change of action could occur on one condition only, an antecedent change of the nature of man from a state of "complete rectitude," to one of corresponding corruption. But this would make God the direct author of sin; for no other being could produce this change of nature. The subject himself could not do it. This would suppose one sin in man before the first. It would also involve the absurdity that the action of a power or substance may change its nature, when such action cannot but result from such nature. Equally manifest is it that no being but God could produce the change. God then is the author of sin by his own direct agency, or the doctrine of the Confession of Faith, and of the Necessitarian school in respect to the human will is fundamentally false. Whichever position we take however, the teachings of the instrument in respect to the will are most palpable selfcontradictions.

3. The doctrine of the Confession of Faith in respect to the power of the will prior to the Fall to act in the direction of evil, is perfectly fatal to the doctrine of Inability, as set forth in the same work. As the nature of unregenerate man is now corrupt, and wholly so, and as the action of the human will can be only in the direction of antecedent disposition, action in man in the direction of good is possible, it is asserted, only on the condition of a prior purification of his nature, a change in which man is and must be wholly passive. Now if the will when existing in connection with a nature of "complete rectitude," had the power to act in the direction of evil, why, when existing in connection with a nature of cor

responding corruption, may it not have the power to act in the direction of goodness? We leave it with our brethren of the Old and New School both, to answer such questions.

4. The doctrine of the will as here set forth, presents little else than a most condensed mass of the most palpable contradictions. When the will, for example, was, as above remarked, placed in connection with a nature in all respects "completely perfect," it had then full power to "act according to original light and holy inclinations, or to turn aside to evil," in other words, it was then equally capable of actions wholly good or wholly bad. But when connected with a nature completely imperfect, imperfect in the sense in which complete perfection was previously asserted of it, this same will is now wholly incapable of any actions but those wholly bad. Again, when placed in connection with propensities partly pure and partly impure, it is then incapable of any actions but those which are "partly good and partly evil." Finally; when placed, at last in connection with a nature perfectly pure, the very state in which it originally was, it is forever after wholly incapable of any actions but what are good. || Was ever such a mass of contradictions condensed into so small a compass before?

5. The teachings of the Confession of Faith in respect to the power of the human will prior to the fall, present the only instance that we know of in which the instrument is palpably inconsistent with itself. In all other respects, it has the high merit of perfect self-consistency. But here is a sentiment admitted most palpably and fundamentally contradictory to its entire principles in respect to the changeless laws of universal mind, human and divine, to wit, that the action of the will cannot but be "according to inward principles of rational apprehension, and natural disposition." Now why was this alien and foreigner permitted and even required to occupy this small niche in the system herein devel oped, while in all other departments, its very image is held in absolute detestation? For this reason only, to save that entire system from splitting and falling to pieces upon one fatal rock, from which it could not otherwise by any possibility be saved, namely, the fearful dogma, that God is the author of sin. The fall of man can be accounted for, only on one of three suppositions-that the nature of man was originally corrupt-that prior to that event, God, by a supernatural interposition, changed that nature from a state of perfect purity, to one of corresponding corruption-or that the

human will was then, at least, truly and properly free, free in the sense that it had the power to act in harmony with, or in opposition to antecedent inclinations. Either of the first two suppositions would make God the direct author of sin, it being a fundamental article of the Confession, that a "corrupt nature is both itself, with all the motions thereof, truly and properly sin." To avoid such a rock, a thing which must be done at any rate, the doctrine is admitted, a doctrine in all other circumstances actual and conceivable, rejected, as impossible and absurd, that the will of man was then truly and properly free, that is, endued with the power, to "act according to original light and holy inclinations, or to turn aside to evil." Thus the system was saved from total shipwreck by a most palpable contradiction of its own fundamental principles.

6. It should be borne in mind, that the assumption of this doctrine of Liberty, which is thus admitted to be indispensable to a vindication of the character of God, as far as the first sin of the first man is concerned, is equally necessary to a vindication of the justice and equity of his eternal government, in all other departments. If we postulate of all moral agents the power, at the same time, to "choose the good, and refuse the evil," then we can, and must affirm, that they ought to be required to choose the one and refuse the other. If on the other hand, we deny of them all power to choose the good, and affirm that they cannot but choose the wrong, what conceivable meaning attaches to the term ought, when it is asserted, that they ought to choose the former, and refuse the latter? No man can attach any meaning to the term under such circumstances. It represents no idea whatever. The idea of righteous moral legislation, has no place in the universe of God, when the doctrine of liberty is not assumed as the basis of such legislation.

7. In this contradiction, we have an answer full and complete to all the objections urged by Necessitarians of the Old School and New against the doctrine of liberty-liberty as opposed to necessity. If, as the Confession of Faith affirms, man then had the power "to act according to original light. and holy inclinations, or to turn aside to evil," and was "left to the liberty of his own will," then his acts were and must have been free and contingent in the only sense in which freedom and contingency are ever asserted of the will, by the advocates of the doctrine of liberty. But what are the main objections urged by Necessitarians against the doctrine