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arrangement or general appearance of the words , using wooden boxes to inclose for shipment of the alleged infringer's device are such as an assembled assortment of filled cartons, dinary course of purchasing the goods, and in- the complainant used paper shaped into box duce them to suppose that they were purchasing form. The only service in this case of the the genuine article, then the similitude is such imitation of the carton package and the bunas entitles the injured party, to equitable pro- dle package is to emphasize the trend of the tection, if he takes seasonable measures to assert his rights and prevent their continued in- defendant towards copying the complainant's vasion."


[6] There will be an injunction restrainAnd Vice Chancellor Van Fleet, in the ing the defendant, including the director Wirtz Case, 50 N. J. Eq. at page 168, 24 Atl. defendants (for the sake of convenience I at page 659, puts it thus:

have heretofore referred to all of the deIf the two labels is such that it is probable, in fendants as one), from putting up and selling the sale of the goods of the parties, the one will or offering for sale: be mistaken for the other, enough is shown to (a) Any carton of bakery products having make it the duty of the court to interfere. Edel- thereon an imitation of complainant's “Insten v. Edelsten, 1 De G. J. & S. 185, 200. As er-Seal” trade-mark, calculated to mislead was said by Mr. Justice Clifford in McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245 [24 L. Ed. 828]-a case or deceive, like the defendant's "Swastika” in which all the principles pertinent to the case trade-mark. This shall not be construed to in hand were stated with great clearness and restrain the defendants from selling such fullness-no rule, as to what degree of similarity must exist in order to constitute an in cartons with their asserted trade-mark therefringement, can be laid down which may be ap- on, provided the trade-mark is so differenplied to all cases. All that can be done in that tiated in general appearance and application regard is to say that where the similarity is from the complainant's trade-mark that it sufficient to convey a false impression to the public mind, and is of a character to deceive is not calculated to deceive the ultimate orthe ordinary purchaser, buying with the cau- dinary purchaser. tion usually exercised in such transactions, (b) Any carton of bakery products having there sufficient ground exists to entitle the in- thereon an imitation of complainant's “Uneejured person to redress. There are cases which lay down a more liberal rule in favor of per- da Biscuit” trade-name, calculated to missons claiming protection, and declare that if lead or deceive, like those on defendant's the resemblance is only such as is calculated to carton "Abetta Biscuit." deceive the careless and unwary, a sufficient degree of similarity will exist to justify the court

(c) Any carton of bakery products having in interdicting the use of the counterfeit." thereon an imitation of complainant's trade

names "Uneeda Milk Biscuit," "Oysteret-es," The facts in the case sub judice, in my “Marshmallow Dainties,” “Cocoanut Dainjudgment, abundantly establish that the de- ties,” and “Oatmeal Crackers,” calculated to fendant's cartons and carton wrappers, its mislead or deceive, like those on defendant's seal trade-mark and trade-name, associated cartons respectively, “Abetta Milk Biscuit,” as they are, tend towards deceiving, and are “Toke Point Oysterettes,” “Marshmallow likely to deceive, the purchasing public into Dainties," "Cocoanut Dainties,” and “Abetta the belief that the defendant's crackers and Oatmeal Crackers." biscuits are those of the complainant.

(d) The particular forms of cartons or [5] The carton formation and the bundle packages referred to in the bill of complaint packages are not the subject of exclusive ap- and identified therein as “Complainant's Expropriation by the complainant, as devices hibit Defendant's Abetta Biscuit and Redto mark and indicate its products. The car- End Seal Carton No. 2" and "Complainant's tons known as the "Peter's Patent” were de- Exhibit Defendant's Infringing Packages clared in Union Biscuit Co. et al. v. Peters, Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 125 Fed. 601, 60 C. C. A. 337, as not a pat- and 16, respectively," which shall, by reaentable invention. There can, of course, be son of the collocation of size, shape, colors, no monopoly of the shape, size, or capacity lettering, spacing, and ornamentation, preof a box. The lining of such boxes, with sent a general appearance as closely resemwax or paraffin paper superimposed there- bling complainant's exhibits, respectively, reon, and forming a unitary structure capable ferred to in the bill of complaint and marked of interfolding at the ends, for the inclosing as "Complainant's Exhibit Complainant's of perishable goods, is a system or method Cartons Trade-Name Uneeda Biscuit Wrapwhich, it seems to me, must necessarily be per No. 2” and “Complainant's Exhibit Comcommon to all bakers. I have not a doubt plainant's Cartons Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, but that the complainant used this form of 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16," as do the said package before the defendant, and that the defendant's respective infringing packages secondary purpose of the defendant in adopt- above-mentioned, but this shall not be coning it was a part of its general plan of imi- strued as restraining the defendants from tating the complainant's line of operation. selling packages or cartons of

cartons of the size, Nor do I think it can be disputed that, in weight, and shape of complainant's packages, connection with the other simulations which nor from using the respective colors as wraphave already been pointed out, this particu- pers for such packages, provided such pack lar one failed of its mission. This may also ages are so differentiated in general appearbe said of the bundle package. Instead of ance from said complainant's respective pack

ages that they are not calculated to deceive erwise, permitting the designation of the benethe ultimate ordinary purchaser.

ficiary by reference to a will, and further proThe complainant's prayer for an accounting trol the appointment

of the beneficiary, has no

viding that no will shall be permitted to conwill be denied, upon the grounds and for the retrospective operation, so as to affect the reason stated by Vice Chancellor Stevenson validity of a prior contract not in harmony in International Silver Co. V. William H. therewith. Rogers Corporation et al., 66 N. J. Eq. 140, Cent. Dig. § 1855; Dec. Dig. § 719.*]

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, 57 Atl. 725. The complainant is entitled to costs.



So far as fair construction of the language (86 N. J. L. 41)

used will permit, the provisions and conditions COGHLAN v. SUPREME CONCLAVE IM of a contract of insurance with reference to

PROVED ORDER HEPTASOPHS. forfeiture should be strictly construed in fa(Supreme Court of New Jersey. July 1, 1914.) vor of the insured and against the company.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insurance, (Syllabus by the Court.)

Cent. Dig. 88 1870-1872; Dec. Dig. 8 726.*] 1. INSURANCE ($ 793*) - CONSTRUCTION OF 8. INSURANCE (8 719*)–CONTRACT-CONSTRUCCONTRACT BENEFICIARY.

TION. Where a contract between a fraternal ben An agreement by an applicant for a benefit eficial association and a member provides that certificate of a fraternal benevolent association, a benefit fund shall be paid on the death of the to be bound by after-enacted by-laws, refers member to his "estate,” it is payable to his only to such by-laws as tend to further the executor or administrator.

subsistence of the contract between the associa[Ed: Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, tion and the member, and not to such by-laws Cent. Dig. § 1973; Dec. Dig. § 795.*]

as defeat or impair the contract.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insurance, 2. STATUTES ($ 263*)-CONSTRUCTION-RETRO- Cent. Dig. § 1855; Dec. Dig. § 719.*] SPECTIVE EFFECT.

Statutes are not to be given a retrospec- 9. INSURANCE ($$ 719, 780*)—IMPAIRMENT OF tive effect or operation if their language rea CONTRACTS-RIGHT TO DESIGNATE BENEFIsonably admits of another construction.

CIARY. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, for a valuable consideration, has issued to one

Where a fraternal beneficial association, Cent. Dig. $$ 344, 349; Dec. Dig. § 263.*]

of its members a benefit certificate payable on 3. INSURANCE ($ 719*)-BY-LAWS OF BENEFI- his death to a stated beneficiary, it is incom

CIAL ORGANIZATION-RETROSPECTIVE OPER- petent for the association by by-laws, or for ATION.

the Legislature by statute, thereafter, without The established rule "that words in a stat- such member's consent, to impair the obligaute ought not to have a retrospective operation of such contract by depriving the member tion, unless they are so clear, strong, and im- of the valuable property right of such designaperative that no other meaning can be annexed tion of the beneficiary of the certificate. to them,” should be applied to the interpreta [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, tion of by-laws of social and beneficial organ- Cent. Dig. ss 1855, 1946; Déc. Dig. $8 719, izations in controversies with members in the 780.*] civil courts.

DEFENSE [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance,

10. PLEADING (8 5*)-ANSWER Cent. Dig. § 1855; Dec. Dig. $ 719.*]


The opinion of another court in another 4. INSURANCE ($ 719*)-BY-LAWS OF BENEFI- case is not a defense to be pleaded in answer


[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Pleading, A by-law of a fraternal beneficial associa- Cent. Dig. 8 7; Dec. Dig. $ 5.*] tion, limiting the designation of beneficiaries in its endowment certificates to a certain class, and providing that "any designation of bene

Action by Jasper Coghlan, executor of the ficiaries, except by their individual names, shall will of A. Judson Clark, deceased, against render the endowment certificate absolutely the Supreme Conclave Improved Order Hepvoid," has no retrospective operation, so as to tasophs. Motion to strike out defenses. affect the validity of a prior contract not in

Certain defenses ordered stricken. harmony therewith.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insurance, Argued February term, 1914, before GARCent. Dig. § 1855; Dec. Dig. $ 719.*]


Young & Bigelow, of Newark, for plaintiff. ROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF STATUTE.

The provision of section 210 of the Mary- W. Holt Apgar, of Trenton, and Olin Bryan, land statute Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant. 23 (Laws 1894, c. 295, § 143e) that "payments of death benefits may be made only to the widow," and certain others of a class in which the TRENCHARD, J. This is a motion to plaintiff is not included, has no retrospective operation, so as to affect the validity of a prior strike out five separate defenses contained contract not in harmony therewith.

in the defendant's answer on the ground that [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, they disclose no defense to the action. The Cent. Dig. § 1855; Dec. Dig. $ 719.*]

action is brought by the executor of the 6. INSURANCE (8 719*) - BY-LAW OF FRATER- will of A. Judson Clark, deceased, against


A by-law of a fraternal beneficial associa- tasophs, a fraternal beneficial association of tion, providing that no entry shall be made in Maryland, operating by the usual subordinate any application or benefit certificate, or oth- lodge method. Plaintiff claims $2,000, the

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexar

amount due on a contributor's endowment, by-laws, as they were at the time of the iscertificate made by the defendant as follows: suance of the certificate, do not appear in

"This certifies that A. J. Clark has been the record, they throw no light on the meaninitiated, and is a contributing member of Unity ing of this contract. Conclave No. 189 in good standing. In accord

The complaint alleged and the answer does ance with and under the provisions of the laws governing the order, the sum of two thousand not deny, that the contract was made in dollars will be paid by the Supreme Conclave Newark in this state. Improved Order Heptasophs as a benefit, upon

[1] By the contract the defendant agreed due notice of his death and the surrender of this certificate, to such person or persons as he with Mr. Clark to pay $2,000, at his death, may, by will or entry on record book of this to his “estate.” While the word "estate" Conclave, or on the face of this certificate, is not very apt, its meaning is clear. The direct the same to be paid, provided he is in parties undoubtedly meant that the money good standing when he dies." On the face of the certificate is the fol- administrator, to be administered as a part

should be paid to the insured's executor or lowing direction:

of the property which the insured might "To the Officers and Members of Supreme leave at his death. Sulz v. Mutual Reserve, Conclave Improved Order Heptasophs: 'It is leave at his death. my will that the benefits named in this certifi- 145 N. Y. 563, 40 N. E. 242, 28 L. R. A. 379 ; cate be paid to estate [Signed] A. J. Clark.” Daniels v. Pratt, 143 Mass. 216, 10 N. E.

The application for membership also di- 166. As there is no suggestion in the record rects that:

that this designation of a beneficiary was "In case of my decease all benefits to which I improper when made, it only remains to be may be entitled from the Improved Order considered whether any subsequent matter Heptasophs be paid to my estate."

alleged in defense avoids this contract. The certificate is dated April 2, 1889.

[2] It is a familiar and important princiThe first defense alleges that defendant ple, always to be kept in mind in the conadopted a by-law in June, 1889, restricting struction of statutes, that they are not to be the class to whom endowments might be given a retrospective effect or operation if made payable to certain relatives and de- their language reasonably admits of another pendents; that the plaintiff's testator was construction. Frelinghuysen v. Morristown, notified to surrender his certificate and fail- 77 N. J. Law, 493, 72 Atl. 2. ed to do so. The second defense sets forth

[3] The established rule "that words in a à statute of Maryland enacted in 1894 of statute ought not to have a retrospective similar import to the by-law mentioned in operation, unless they are so clear, strong, the first defense. The third defense recites and imperative that no other meaning can be a decision of the Maryland Court of Ap-annexed to them” should be applied in the peals construing a by-law of the Knights of interpretation of by-laws of social and benColumbus. The fourth defense states that eficial organizations in controversies with defendant, in June, 1893, amended its by- members in the civil courts. Roxbury Lodge laws so as to prohibit designation of ben- v. Hocking, 60 N. J. Law, 439, 38 Atl. 693, eficiaries by will. The fifth defense is that, 64 Am. St. Rep. 596, by reason of defendant's constitution and

[4, 6] The by-law adopted by the defendant by-laws revised in 1911 and in force at the in June, 1889, and recited in the first dedeath of A. Judson Clark, defendant is in- fense, with unimportant omissions, reads: debted, not to plaintiff, but to Mr. Clark's

“Sec. 3. The endowment may be made paynext of kin. All of these by-laws and the able to the following classes of persons only, statute were adopted after the endowment viz.: (a) To a member's father, mother, wife, certificate had been issued. We shall here- children, grandchildren, grandparents, brothers

or sisters, or any, or as many of them as the after state more fully their provisions.

member shall desire and specify; in any of We are of opinion that the matters above which cases no proof of dependency shall be mentioned constitute no defense to this ac required by the Supreme Secretary before is

(b) To any tion; that the statute and by-laws are not suing the endowment certificate.

person or persons * * * who may be deretrospective or intended to affect the cer- pendent altogether or in part upon the memtificate in question; that even if so intended, ber * in which latter cases neither plaintiff nor his testator consented written evidence of the dependency

must be furnished to the satisfaction of the Suthereto or was bound thereby.

preme Secretary before the endowment certifiThe endowment certificate created a con-cate shall be issued * tract between the defendant and Mr. Clark.

“Sec. 4. All beneficiaries shall be designated In essence it is a contract of a life insur- in accordance with the foregoing regulations;

* * * and any designation of beneficiaries, , ance. Holland v. Chosen Friends, 54 N. J. except by their individual names, shall render Law, 490, 25 Atl. 367; O'Neill v. Supreme the endowment certificate absolutely void and Council, 70 N. J. Law, 410, 57 Atl. 463, 1 of no effect.” Ann. Cas. 422; Sautter V. Supreme Con Clearly this by-law is not retrospective. clave, 76 N. J. Law, 763, 71 Atl. 232. It dif- It limits the class to whom benefits may be fers from the ordinary insurance contract made payable, but does not attempt to avoid only in that its terms are interpreted in the or alter certificates theretofore issued. light of the application for membership, and The use of the word "shall" in the last of the constitution and by-laws of the asso- clause indicates that a prospective operation ciation. Inasmuch as the constitution and only was intended. No doubt if this clause


* *


had been intended to affect outstanding cer- tificate, and failed to do so. The defendant, tificates, it would have so declared. The however, contends that Mr. Clark's consent fact that the improper designation is made was given in advance, and is set forth in the to render the certificate absolutely void application and in the certificate itself. The makes it clear that outstanding certificates application contains the statement: are not intended to be affected, for the de

“I agree to make punctual payments of all fendant cannot be supposed to have had the dues and assessments for which I may beextraordinary intention to make absolutely come liable, and to conform in all respects to void certificates which were valid when is in force, or which may hereafter be adopted

the laws, rules and usages of the order now sued, and which were accepted and paid for by the same." in good faith.

The certificate states that the sum of $2,land statute (Laws 1894, c. 295, § 143e) cited 000 will be paid to the estate “in accordance land statute (Laws 1894, c. 295, § 143e) cited with and under the provisions of the laws ments of death benefits may be made only in the certificate presumably was the law ex

governing the order." The law mentioned the widow" and certain others of a class in which the plaintiff is not included. This isting at the time the certificate was issued.

Also it was a law authorizing payment to sentence is part of a lengthy statute regu- the estate, for otherwise the payment would lating fraternal organizations, prescribing not be “in accordance with and under” the the method of their incorporation, the priv- not be “in accordance with and under” the

law. ileges they shall enjoy, the reports they shall

[7] The agreement to "conform" contained make to the insurance commissioner, etc. in the application requires more consideraThere is nothing in this statute as a whole tion. This application was for membership to indicate that the Assembly of Maryland in a fraternal organization. The natural intended to vitiate any past transaction, or meaning of the agreement by the applicant to alter the effect of any outstanding cer- to conform to the by-laws, is that he shall tificate. The obvious purpose of the provi- conduct himself as a Heptasoph, in his resion quoted is to limit and regulate the fu-lations with the society and his fellow memture activities of fraternal organizations, bers, in conformity with its rules in force and it should be so interpreted.

at the time of his election, or thereafter The superior court of Delaware, in a well- | adopted. That Mr. Clark conformed to the considered opinion by Chief Justice Lore, rules of the society is indicated by the addiscussed the act now before the court, and mitted fact that he was a member in good also the by-law pleaded in the first defense, standing at his death. It would certainly be and held that they were not retrospective, a strained construction of the agreement to and did not affect certificates issued before conform in all respects to the laws to contheir enactment. Emmons v. Supreme Con- strue it to mean that the applicant's insurclave, 6 Pennewill (Del.) 115, 63 Atl..871.

ance policy may be altered by the insurer The fourth defense sets up an amendment at its pleasure. So far as fair construction to the defendant's by-laws, made in 1893, of the language used will permit, the proviproviding that no entry shall be made in any sions and conditions of a contract of insurapplication or benefit certificate, or other-ance with reference to forfeiture should be wise, permitting the designation of the ben- strictly construed in favor of the insured eficiary by reference to a will, and further and against the company. Harris v. Ameriproviding that no will shall be permitted to can Gas Co., 83 N. J. Law, 641, 85 Atl. 191, control the appointment of the beneficiary. 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 70; Bohles v. Prudential The two clauses of this amendment have one Ins. Co., 84 N. J. Law, 315, 86 Atl. 438. purpose, to prevent appointments by will,

[8] The rule is established in this state and the first clause indicates that this pur- that an agreement by an applicant to be pose is prospective only, and does not relate bound by after-enacted by-laws refers only to prior outstanding certificates.

to such by-laws as tend to further the subThe foregoing observations apply with full sistence of the contract between the associaforce to the matter set up in the fifth de- tion and the member, and not such by-laws fense, and dispose of it.

as defeat or impair the contract. O'Neill v. But even if the by-laws and statute before Supreme Council, 70 N. J. Law, 410, 57 Atl. mentioned were intended to have a retroac- 463, 1 Ann. Cas. 422; Sautter v. Supreme tive operation, they would still be ineffectual Conclave, 76 N. J. Law, 763, 71 Atl. 232; to defeat the plaintiff's claim. The endow- Poole v. Supreme Circle, 85 Atl. 821, affirmed ment certificate evidenced a contract. That 80 N. J. Eq. 259, 87 Atl. 1118. Moreover it contract, like all other contracts, could only has also been decided in those cases that be altered by the consent of both parties, by such contract conferred upon the member a a new meeting of minds. There is no sug- property right; "that even the power of apgestion in the answer that Mr. Clark, or pointment (of a beneficiary) incidental to the plaintiff, ever consented, after the mak-the status of membership in a fraternal asing of the contract, to a change in it. On sociation is a valuable property right.” the contrary, the first defense states that O'Neill v. Supreme Council, 70 N. J. Law, 410, Mr. Clark was notified to surrender his cer- | 417, 57 Atl. 463, 1 Ann. Cas. 422.

[9] Mr. Clark had by his original contract, the City of Newark to execute to them a the right to have the amount of his policy deed. From an order directing the execution paid on his death to his executor, to be dis- of the deed, Charles L. Jacobus and others tributed according to his will to such of his bring certiorari. Affirmed. kindred and friends or to such charities as Argued before GUMMERE, C. J., sitting he preferred. This was the motive which alone, by consent of parties. induced Mr. Clark to make the contract, and when the defendant sought to take away Mr.

Clark McK. Whittemore, of Elizabeth, for Clark's freedom of disposing of the benefit, prosecutors. McCarter & English, of Newark,

for defendants. and to restrict payment to certain next of kin, for whom he may have had no affection, it attacked the very essence of the contract. GUMMERE, C. J. The writ in this case Clearly, therefore, if the by-laws and Mary- brings up proceedings had before the circuit land statute in question be regarded as in- court of Essex county instituted by Florence tended to apply to prior contracts between E. Cahill, one of the defendants, for the the defendant and its members, they are in- purpose of obtaining from that court an oreffectual for such purpose, since it was not der directing the comptroller of the city of competent for either the defendant or the Newark to execute and deliver to her a Legislature to impair the obligations of such deed of conveyance for certain lands in the contracts. Ball v. Board of Trustees, 71 N., county of Essex purchased by her at a tax J. Law, 64, 58 Atl. 111; 15 A. & E. Enc. of sale held by the city comptroller on the 28th Law (2d Ed.) 1044.

of May, 1906, including the final order made [10] The fifth defense sets up the opinion therein directing the execution and delivery of the court in Mathieu v. Mathieu, 112 Md. of such conveyance by the comptroller. 625, 77 Atl. 112.

At the hearing had before the circuit court But this opinion, while of course worthy Adams, J., delivered the following opinion: of the consideration which we have given it "The petitioner, Florence E. Cahill, bought at in the decision of this present case, does not a tax sale the property known as the Moses constitute a defense to be pleaded. The re- Roberts tract, and received certificate No. 7215, sult is that the first, second, third, fourth, athan Lyon tract, for which she received cer

and bought also premises known as the Jonand fifth defenses will be stricken out, with tificate No. 7218. In each case, after the precosts.

liminary proceedings required by law in the case of unkņown owners, the petitioner obtained orders to show cause directed to unknown own

ers and persons in interest, which were duly JACOBUS et al. v. CAHILL et al. published, and upon the return of the order in (Supreme Court of New Jersey. May 27,

each case a final order was made in each case 1914.)

on December 19, 1908, for the execution of a

deed. 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ($ 981*)-TAXA "The comptroller of the city of Newark, actTION-REDEMPTION FROM SALE.

ing under legal advice, has refused to execute The tax adjustment act, commonly known the deeds, upon the ground that the premises as the Martin act (Act March 30, 1886 [P. L. had been already redeemed from the sales upp. 149], as amended by Act April 18, 18SI, § 3, on which the proceedings were based. Accord[P. L. p. 309]), prescribing the procedure for ingly, in order to test the question, petitions redemption of land from municipal tax sales, is have been filed in this court, and the comptrolapplicable where the owners are unknown. ler has been called on to show cause why he

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal should not give a deed pursuant to the direction Corporations, Cent. Dig. $$ 2134-2139; Dec. of the previous order. Dig. $ 981.*]

It appears that on December 19, 1908, the 2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ($ 981*)— TAXA- granted, one H. A. De Raismes deposited with

the TION-REDEMPTION FROM SALE. known as the Martin act (Act March 30, 1886, tioner and the city is, therefore, whether the

Under the tax adjustment act, commonly the comptroller the moneys to redeem his prop[P. L. p. 149], as amended by Act April 18, redemption was, in each case, effectual. The 1889, § 3 [P. L. p. 309]), prescribing the pro; position of the comptroller is that the time for cedure for redemption

of land from municipal redemption from a tax sale does not expire until tax sales in case of unknown owners, and pro- he has actually delivered a deed to the purchasviding that if such owner, or any person interested, fails to redeem within the time limited. Jer, and that, as these moneys were deposited the circuit court shall make an order directing in the comptroller's office before the execution the comptroller to make a deed to the purchas- and delivery of the deeds which the court has er which shall convey the lands free from all directed the comptroller to give, the redemption interest of such unknown owners, the order is was effective. final, and hence the land cannot be redeemed

"The answer to this question must depend upsubsequent thereto, even though the deed has on the language of the statute which regulates not been executed and delivered by the comp-|I

will refer, for convenience, to Griffith's edition

the procedure in the case of unknown owners. troller. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Martin act, with its supplements.

of the tax adjustment act, commonly called Corporations, Cent. Dig. $8 2134-2139; Dec.

“In 1905 an act was passed, approved June Dig. $ 981.*]

2, 1905, which is to be found on pages 490 to

It Certiorari to Circuit Court, Essex County. 492 of the Pamphlet Laws of that year. Application by Florence E. Cahill and oth- the Martin act, which in Griffith's edition is

amends section 6 of the act commonly known as ers for an order requiring the Comptroller of designated by the Roman

numeral VI, and con

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexés

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