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which being refused he immediately proceed-, portant facts surrounding this unfortunate ed to break down the doors of the house, all affair. the while threatening to kill the accused.  The evidence and claims of the parties After he had broken down the storm porch were such as to require a charge upon the door, the accused warned him that she had theory that Mrs. Perkins' motive in shooting two revolvers, and that if he broke through the deceased was to save her own life or to the double house doors and attempted to protect herself from any bodily harm. An come in she would shoot him. Notwithstand assault on one's house can be regarded as an ing this warning Coatchaly continued his vio- l'assault on the person, within the meaning lent assault upon the double doors, and, as of the law with reference to self-defense, the right-hand door was giving way, he said where the purpose of the assault is an injuto the accused, with an oath, "Now I've got ry to the person of the occupant or members you, and I'll cut your guts out.” That the of his family, to accomplish which the asaccused at the time of his breaking into her sailant attacks the house in order to reach house believed that the deceased intended to the inmate. In this connection it is said and carry out his threats to kill her, and believed settled that in such case the inmate need not that her life was in imminent danger from flee from his house in order to escape injury Coatchaly, who was a strong, robust man, by the assailant, but he may meet him at 28 or 29 years of age, weighing about 180 the threshold and prevent him from breaking pounds. After the accused had warned the in by any means rendered necessary by exdeceased that she would shoot if he broke in, igency, and upon the same ground and reaand after he had broken down the right half son that one may defend himself from peril of the house doors, and was attempting to of life or great bodily harm by means fatal enter, the accused attempted to fire a revolv- to the assailant, if rendered necessary by the er at him, but it would not work. She then exigency of the assault. State v. Patterson, thought of the shotgun, which was kept near 45 Vt. 308, 12 Am. Rep. 200. This proposiby, and fired at Coatchaly. The accused shot tion was cited with approval by this court the deceased as he was breaking into the in the case of State v. Scheele, 57 Conn. 328, house to prevent his entering and taking her 18 Atl. 256, 14 Am. St. Rep. 106. life. While living with the accused he had Upon this branch of the case the trial beaten her and threatened to take her life. court, among other things, stated to the jury At the time when the deceased attempted to that: break into the house the accused was alone "A man may thus do what seems reasonably in the house, except that she had in her necessary under the circumstances in which an
assault is made upon him to preserve himself charge two infants, one her son's child, 11 from personal danger, with this limitation: months old, the other her daughter's child, That he must not take the life of a fellow being between 3 and 4 months old.
who is assaulting him when such fellow being is Many of the claims of the defendant as to assault and battery upon him, but only in case
doing no more than committing an ordinary the facts surrounding the shooting were con- of extreme necessity as the only practicable troverted by the state. The state claimed method of saving his own life or protecting that it might fairly be inferred from the evi- himself from great bodily harm, and even then dence that when Coatchaly was breaking in necessity which he set up in his defense by be
the the doors and attempting to make a violent ginning or continuing the fight. A man who is entry into the house, the accused had no rea. attacked by another under circumstances which son to believe that he intended to do or would him great bodily harm may lawfully kill the
denote an intention to take his life or to do do her, or either of the children, any harm assailant, provided he uses such means as he or violence, or that he intended to do or reasonably can to avoid the necessity. It is would do anything but to gain access to his thorize a reasonable belief that the assault is
only when the circumstances are such as to
auchild. The state claimed to have proven that made by the first aggressor with a design to Coatchaly's only motive in breaking and en- take life or inflict extreme bodily harm that a tering was to obtain access to his child. It man would be justified in attempting to kill
the assailant or using violence upon him likely was conceded by the state that Coatchaly was to kill him. What it is reasonably necessary a trespasser in so breaking and entering. to do in making a defense against the first agYet it is claimed that no necessity existed for gressor depends upon all the circumstances of
the particular case, the nature of the attack, killing him for the simple purpose of pre- and the degree of danger in which an accused venting him from breaking into the house to person was at the time, or reasonably believed see his child. It was said in substance that, he was in. If the circumstances at the time admitting that all that all the conditions existed reasonably appear to him to indicate great dan
ger, and he acts upon such belief, he will not be substantially as the defendant contends, she deprived of the benefit of the law of self-defense was guilty of manslaughter, unless it appear- because in fact the danger was less than he ed that she had reasonable grounds to believe be a question for the jury whether the circum
reasonably believed it to be. It will, of course, that Coatchaly intended to kill or seriously stances were such as could reasonably give him injure her, or that she was in imminent dan- the belief of the existence of such great danger.” ger of death or of great bodily harm.
These instructions were well adapted to Although the evidence was conflicting, the this issue. jury had the right to believe the version of  The jury were warranted from the evithe defendant and her witnesses as to the im- dence before them in finding the accused not
guilty upon this theory and claim. But the gratify his hatred, malice, or ill will, when state con.ends that the court erred in stat- the killing will be at least manslaughter. ing to the jury that:
While these instructions are not in accord "A man is not obliged to retreat if assaulted with the law of those jurisdictions where in his dwelling, but may use such means as are the right to take life in the defense of one's absolutely necessary to prevent the assailant's dwelling is limited to occasions where it is
to man is making an unlawful entry by force into reasonably apparent that the in ruder is the house of another, the owner may, for the actuated by a felonious purpose, they well sole purpose of preventing the execution of such state what we regard as the better and soundunlawful act, make resistance sufficient in degree and in time to prevent it. He is under no
er rule. Wharton, Criminal Law (11th Ed.) obligation to admit the unlawful intruder, or to $ 634; Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, & flee from the house and permit him to effect an 196. unlawful entrance. If the resistance is neither greater in degree nor earlier in time than is nec
The court did not err in instructing the essary, and it results in the death of the assail- jury that: ant, it is justifiable homicide; and the slayer "Assuming that the deceased had a right to is to be judged as the circumstances really ap- see the child, and had an equal right to its cuspeared to him at the moment. If the resistance tody with the mother, he had no right to enforce is unnecessarily great in degree, or early in his prerogatives with regard to the child by a time, and therefore unreasonable, and therefore violent intrusion into the house of another perunlawful, and results in the death of the as- son. The law was open to him, and it would be sailant, it is manslaughter. But even if the cir- very easy for him to have tested the right of cumstances are such as would justify the house- | possession, either by an attempt to remove his holder in taking the life of the assailant who is coguardian, if she were an improper person, or violently and unlawfully breaking into the house to let the court decide who, in regard to the for the purpose of preventing such breaking in, best interests of the child, was the best person still, if the houseowner take the opportunity of to have the custody of it.” the breaking in to kill the intruder, not for the sake of preventing the unlawful intrusion, but
The right of self-defense and the right of to gratify his hatred, malice, or ill will against redress are two different things. You may the intrider, then the killing will be at least prevent an injury from being done by all manslaughter, if not murder. You should apply these principles to the facts in this case as you proper means, but, when done, you cannot find them from the evidence. First, was the ac- take redress into your own hands. The right cused, as the defense claims, making a reason of redress is provided for in no uncertain able and necessary defense against the deceased in an attempt, either real or apparently real, to terms. Our Constitution provides that: take the life or do serious bodily harm to her “All courts shall be open, and every person, self or the children who were under her charge for an injury done to him in his person, properand part of her family? Second, was the de- ty or reputation, shall have remedy by due ceased, as the defense claims, violently and course of law, and right and justice administerunlawfully breaking into the house of the accused without sale denial or delay.” Constitution ed against her will, and was her resistance, as of the State of Connecticut, art. 1, $ 12. the defense also claims, no greater or earlier
This declaration asserts the broad doctrine than necessary to prevent such breaking in? Third, if the defense made by the accused was that for every injury to the person or propno greater or earlier than necessary to prevent erty the redress is to be administered by such breaking in, was it made in good faith, the sole purpose of preventing such breaking in, the “courts” and “in due course of law.” or did the accused merely take advantage of the There is no error. The other Judges conopportunity afforded by the breaking in to curred. gratify ill will against the deceased by killing
(88 Conn. 423) The state claims that by these instructions
Appeal of KING. the jury were told that:
In re GEDNEY'S ESTATE. “No matter what the object of an intruder might be when the doors are shut the householder (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. may kill the intruder to prevent his entry into
July 13, 1914.) the house. As it was admitted that the deceased was breaking into the house under the 1. ABSENTEES ($ 5*)-ADMINISTRATION OF Escharge, the jury had no alternative."
Laws conferring on the probate court powThis is not a fair interpretation of these er to administer the estates of persons unheard remarks. In effect the jury was instructed of for seven years are valid, if provision is that if one is attacked unlawfully in his own made for giving proper notice of the proceeddwelling house by one who is attempting to ings and adequate safeguards are provided.
(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Absentees, make a forcible and unlawful entry therein, Cent. Dig. $$ 3-11; Dec. Dig.' $ 5.*] he is not obliged to retreat, but he may use 2. ABSENTEES ($ 5*)—ADMINISTRATION OF Essuch means as are absolutely necessary to TATE-NOTICE-SUFFICIENCY. prevent the assailant's forcible entry, even Under Gen. St. 1902, § 319, giving to to taking life. It is justifiable homicide if courts of probate jurisdiction to administer es
tates of nonresidents who are presumptively it appears that the resistance is neither great dead, and providing that a sufficient notice shall er in degree nor earlier in time than is nec- be given, notice by one publication in a newsessary, and it results in the death of the as- paper is sufficient, where the absentee had been sailant, unless the householder under such his age at the time of leaving was not shown.
away and not heard from for over 27 years, and circumstances should take the opportunity [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Absentees, of the unlawful entry to kill the intruder to Cent. Dig. 88 3-11; Dec. Dig. § 5.*] *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
3. ABSENTEES ($ 5*)-ADMINISTRATION OF Es-, purports to give to probate courts jurisdicTATE-PERSONS ENTITLED TO APPEAL.
tion over absentee's estates does not provide An administrator not personally interested in the estate of an absentee, whose property for adequate notice to the absentee, and was being distributed under administration had therefore is unconstitutional; and (2) that, on the presumption of his death, cannot attack if the statute provides for a sufficient notice, a decree of distribution on the theory that such notice was not, in fact, given. the notice was insufficient; for, if the notice was insufficient, the administrator's appoint
 That a court of probate, under its statment was invalid, and he was without standing utory power to grant administration on the in court on any theory.
estates of deceased persons, has no jurisdic(Ed. Note. For other cases, see Absentees, tion to grant administration binding upon Cent. Dig. 88 3-11; Dec. Dig. $ 5.*]
him, on the estate of an absentee unheard of Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield for seven years, and so at common law preCounty ; Joseph P. Tuttle, Judge.
sumptively dead, is well established. Scott In the matter of the distribution of the v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 43, 14 Sup. Ct. 1108, estate of William E. Gedney. From a de- 38 L. Ed. 896, and cases cited. It is equally cree of distribution, Clitus H. King, adminis-well settled that the state may give to these trator, appeals. Affirmed.
courts the power to regulate and administer Edward P. Nobbs and John P. Gray, both the estates of absentees, so presumptively of Bridgeport, for appellant. Paul L. Miller, dead, if provision is made for giving proper of Bridgeport, for appellees.
notice of the proceeding and adequate safe
guards are provided to protect the absentee's THAYER, J. The appellant appeals in his interest in case of his reappearance. Cunnius capacity as administrator of the estate of v. Reading School District, 198 U. S. 458, William E. Gedney, who, as the agreed state- 471, 477, 25 Sup. Ct. 721, 49 L. Ed. 1125, 3 ment of facts shows, left his home in Trum- Ann. Cas. 1121, and cases cited. bull about 27 years ago for parts unknown,
 General Statutes, $ 319, gives to courts and has not been heard of since. At the time of probate this jurisdiction, requires notice of his departure he was unmarried, and' was of the proceeding to be given, and safeguards then the owner of an undivided interest in the property of the absentee against his recertain land in Trumbull and of a deposit in turn. The notice to be given is left to the a savings bank. On June 27, 1913, his two discretion of the court, except that it requires brothers and the widow and children of a de- that proper notice shall be given. Different ceased brother made application for the ap- cases might call for different notices in order pointment of an administrator upon his es- that the latter should be proper notice. If tate, representing to the court in their peti- an absentee when last heard from had been tion the facts as to his absence unheard living for some years in a designated locality, of for more than 7 years. The probate court, and could, if living, probably be reached by after notice by publication as ordered by it a notice personally directed to him there, one time in a Bridgeport newspaper, heard such notice or a public notice published in the application on July 1, 1913, the day ap- that locality might be required to satisfy pointed for the hearing in the notice, granted the call for a proper notice. When the abthe petition, and appointed the appellant ad- sentee has gone to parts unknown and been ministrator of Gedney's estate. He qualified absent for a great many years under circumby giving bonds, and proceeded with the set-stances which make the presumption of death tlement of the estate, procuring as part of conclusive, a different notice might satisfy the administration an order to sell the real the call of the statute for a proper notice. estate, and on January 30, 1914, after notice In the present case the notice given was and hearing, the probate court approved his very short, and the finding gives no facts, exadministration account. On the same day cept that the absence had been long-27 years it ascertained the heirs at law and distribu- —with no notice of his whereabouts and an tees of said Gedney, and made the order apparent abandonment of his property in which is now appealed from, which, in sub- this state. It is not claimed that he is now stance, ordered and directed the appellant as alive. What his age was when he absented administrator to pay and deliver to each dis- himself does not appear. If he was then tributee his share of the estate upon his giv- above 70 years of age, there is little probaing bond with surety conditioned for the re- bility that any notice would have been better turn of the amount thereof, with interest than the one given. The presumption of thereon, to the presumed decedent, if he re- death in that case would be so conclusive appear, and, upon failure of either distributee that any notice would be a practical complito give such bond, to hold such distributee's ance with the statute. We cannot say, thereshare of the property for 5 years, and until fore, from the facts before us that the nofurther order of the court.
tice which was given was not a proper notice. No exception is taken in the reasons of ap  But we have no occasion to inquire peal to the form or substance of this order, whether it was or not; for we have before us the only reasons of appeal being: (1) That no one who in this proceeding is entitled to the court of probate had no jurisdiction over question it. If, as the appellant claims, the Gedney's estate, because the statute which I notice was not a proper one, and the order
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
taking jurisdiction of the estate and appoint The reservation presents two questions. ing him administrator was void, then he is not the testatrix executed a will in December, administrator, and has no standing in court. 1897, by the third clause of which she gave As his appeal is taken solely as he is admin- to her sister Sarah R. Guinn $10,000, and to istrator, he is not as such aggrieved by the her sister Jerusha A. Winsolow $5,000. Both order. If the notice was proper, the probate of these legatees having died, the testatrix, in court is rightfully exercising jurisdiction over January, 1908, executed a codicil reaffirming the estate, and, as no complaint is made by all the provisions of her will, except as alterthe appellant as to the form or substance of ed by the codicil, and giving to four nieces the order, he is not aggrieved thereby.
$5,000 each. Of these nieces one was the The superior court is advised to erase the surviving issue of the testatrix's deceased case from its docket.
sister Sarah, and one the sole surviving issue The other Judges concur.
of the testatrix's deceased sister Jerusha.
The first question presented by the reser
vation is whether the legacies to the deceas(88 Conn. 404) LEE v. LEE et al.
ed sisters lapsed, or whether their issue are
entitled to take the estate so bequeathed, un(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
der our statute for the prevention of lapses July 13, 1914.)
(section 296, G. S. of 1902). 1. WILLS (§ 439*) — CONSTRUCTION — INTEN
The second question arises under the sixth TION OF TESTATOR.
No rule for the construction of wills is clause of the will, directing the executors to permitted to defeat the intention of the testa- divide the residuary estate into six equal tor expressed in the will itself.
shares, and to pay over one of such shares (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. to each of three children, and to hold one Dig. $$ 952, 955, 957; Dec. Dig. § 439.*]
share as trustee for the benefit of each of 2. WILLS (8 536*) - CODICIL - REAFFIRMING the three others. Frederick H. Lee, a son, WILL-LAPSE OF LEGACIES-STATUTE.
Testatrix by will executed in 1897, gave died, without issue, before the testatrix, and certain amounts of money to each of two sis- the question is whether the legacy to him ters, and, after they had both died, executed a lapsed, and, if so, whether the residuary escodicil reaffirming all the provisions of her will, tate should be divided into five equal shares, except as altered by the codicil. Gen. St. 1902, § 296, on the death of the legatees, converted and distributed among the surviving chiltheir legacies into valid gifts to their issue. dren. Held that, as testatrix is presumed to have known the law, the codicil did not convert the Reuben Taylor, of Hartford, for plaintiff. legacies contained in the will into void legacies, Lewis Sperry, of Hartford, and William A. but that under the statute they were operative Morse, of Boston, Mass., for Louisa L. Dagas gifts to the issue of the deceased legatees.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. gett and others. Lewis Sperry, of Hartford, Dig. § 1161; Dec. Dig. § 536.*]
for Campbell Smidt and others. E. Henry 3. WILLS ($ 486*)-CONSTRUCTION-CIRCUM
Hyde, of Hartford, for Thomas G. Lee and STANCES SURROUNDING EXECUTION OF WILL.
others. In the construction of a will leaving pecuniary bequests to each of two sisters of testatrix, and of a codicil reaffirming the will, exe
BEACH, J. (after stating the facts as cuted after the deaths of the sisters, and after above).  The question whether the legaa statute had converted their legacies into valid cies to the sisters who died before the tesgifts to their issue, held, that evidence of the tatrix are saved for the benefit of their isknowledge of testatrix of her sisters' death was admissible as one of the circumstances sur- sue by section 296 of the General Statutes rounding the execution of the codicil, but not depends primarily on the effect to be given to that she believed that because thereof the lega- the execution of the codicil of 1908, as a recies were void.
publication of the will of 1897. The defend[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Wills, Cent. ants who are residuary legatees rely upon Dig. 88 1016-1022; Dec. Dig. § 486.*]
the rule that the execution of a codicil which 4. WILLS (8 627*) — CONSTRUCTION — INTES- in terms ratifies and confirms a previous will TACY.
Under a will directing the executors to di- gives to the original will the same force and vide all the residue into six equal shares, and effect in law as if it had been rewritten, reto pay over one of such shares to each of six executed and republished at the date of the separately named children, no joint tenancy or codicil. Giddings, Ex'r, v. Giddings, 65 Conn. ated; but the share of a son dying, without is- 149, 160, 32 Atl. 334, 48 Am. St. Rep. 192; sue, before the testatrix was intestate estate. Whiting's Appeal, 67 Conn. 379, 388, 35 Atl.
[Éd. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. 268; Carpenter v. Perkins, 83 Conn. 11, 18, Dig. $8 1452-1459; Dec. Dig. $ 627.*]
74 Atl. 1062. Then it is said that, as both Case Reserved from Superior Court, Hart- of the sisters named in the third clause of ford County; Marcus H. Holcomb, Judge. the will were dead when the codicil was ex
Action by Charles N. Lee, executor, against ecuted, the bequests contained in the third Thomas G. Lee and others, to obtain a judi- clause are in legal effect gifts to persons alcial construction of the will of Louise M. ready dead at the date of the execution of Lee. Case reserved. Will construed, and su- the will, and therefore legacies which were perior court advised.
void when made. The legal conclusion of the
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER ID Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
argument is that our statute for preventing | The determination of the second question lapses in certain cases is confined to legacies presented by the reservation depends upon which lapse by reason of the death of the whether the sixth clause of the will creates beneficiary after the execution of the will, a gift to a class with a right of survivorand that it does not operate to save a bequest ship or a gift to each of the six children of which was void when made, because the ben- the testatrix. The decisive words are as eficiary was already dead when the will was follows: executed. In the view we take of the case "Sixth. I direct my executors hereinafter it is unnecessary to determine whether our named to divide all the rest, residue and restatute is so limited or not, because this case mainder of my property into six equal shares must be controlled by the universally accept- or parts to my son Charles N. Lee. 2. To pay
or parts and 1. To pay over one of such shares ed principle that no rule for the construction over one other of such shares or parts to my of wills shall be permitted to defeat the in- son Frederick H. Lee." tention of the testator expressed in the will And so each share is to be paid over or itself.
held in trust for one separately named child. [2, 3] The first enacting clause of the codi- It seems too clear for discussion that no cil here in question is as follows:
joint tenancy or class gift with right of sur“First. I hereby reiterate and reaffirm all the vivorship can be constructed from such lanprovisions of my said last will and testament, guage. The question has been so recently except in so far as the same are altered hereby." before us that it is only necessary to refer
That is to say, the testatrix reiterates and to Allen v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 89 Atl. 205, reaffirms, as of January 20, 1908, the third and White v. Smith, 87 Conn. 663, 89 Atl. clause of her will making certain bequests to 272. It follows that the share of Frederick sisters already dead, obviously intending, so H. Lee, who died, without issue, before the far as her written word is concerned, that testatrix, is intestate estate. such legacies, in common with all other un The superior court is advised, first, That altered provisions of her will, should con- the issue of Sarah R. Guinn and Jerusha A. tinue in the same legal force and effect as Winsolow, respectively, take the legacies givbefore the codicil was executed.
en to the testatrix's sisters under the third The statute, which the testatrix is presum- clause of the will; second, that the portion ed to know, had, at the dates of the sisters' of the rest, residue, and remainder of the deaths, converted their legacies into valid estate given to the testatrix's son Frederick gifts to the issue of such sisters; and it H. Lee is intestate estate. The other Judgwould be a misapplication of the rule con- es concurred. tended for to hold that the testatrix, by the very act of reaffirming these gifts, had inad
(38 Conn. 353) vertently made them utterly ineffectual in
STATE v. McGEE. law. Blakeslee v. Pardee, 76 Conn. 263, 267, (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. July 56 Atl. 503.
13, 1914.) The codicil of 1908 did not convert the 1. Food ($ 15*)-SALES-REGULATIONSSTATbequests contained in the third clause of the UTORY PROVISIONS—CONSTRUCTION. will into void legacies. They still remained Acts 1911, c. 134, penalizing any person of the same effect, and therefore still remain selling or offering for sale food in package form,
unless the net quantity of the contents be marked operative under the statute as gifts to the ed on the outside of the package, and declaring issue of the original legatees.
that the act shall take effect from its passage,  In this connection we are asked to de- but no penalty shall be enforced for any viotermine whether extrinsic evidence is admis- lation arising from the sale of food "prepared
and inclosed in package form" prior to 18 sible to prove that the testatrix, when she months after passage of the act, does not have executed the codicil, knew that her sisters any effect as to sales of unbranded packages prewere dead, and also that she then believed pared and inclosed at the time of the taking efthe legacies had lapsed and become void by 18 months thereafter, but a sale of food pre
fect of the act, provided the sale is made within reason of their deaths. We answer that evi-pared and inclosed in unmarked packages after dence of her knowledge of the sisters' deaths the passage of the act subjects the seller to the is admissible as one of the circumstances sur- penalties imposed, and a sale after 18 months rounding the execution of the codicil, but ages, whenever inclosed, renders the seller liable.
after the passage of the act in unmarked packthat evidence of her belief that the legacies
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Food, Cent. to her sisters had become void is not admissi- Dig. § 14; Dec, Dig. $ 15.*] ble. Its only importance would be as tend- 2. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION (8 111*)-ing to prove that the testatrix, in executing STATUTORY OFFENSES-REQUISITES. the codicil, did not intend to make cumula An information, charging a sale of a can of tive gifts to the issue of her deceased sis- tomatoes without the net quantity plainly markters; extrinsic evidence of such intent is in- 1911, c. 134, penalizing any person selling food
ed on the outside, charges a violation of Acts admissible. Bishop v. Howarth, 59 Conn. in package form, unless net quantity of con455, 22 Atl. 432; Bryan v. Bigelow, 77 Conn. tents be plainly marked, and it need not nega604, 614, 60 Atl. 266, 107 Am. St. Rep. 64; forced for any violation arising from the sale
tive the proviso that no penalty shall be enSeymour v. Sanford, 86 Conn. 516, 521, 86 of food prepared and inclosed in package form Atl. 7.
prior to 18 months after the passage of the act,
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes