sense criminal but one undertaken "for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them." Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 288, 2 Sup. Ct. 569, 27. Ed. 552; Sanborn v. Kimball, 64 Me. 140, 147; Boston Bar Ass'n v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169, 183, 46 N. E. 568; In re Bowman, 7 Mo. App. 567. as it is that an attorney be competent to and technicalities prevailing in such proceddeal with the oftentimes intricate matters are. This contention, however, has not met which may be intrusted to him, it is infinite- with other than occasional approval by the ly more so that he be upright and trust-courts. The most have made emphatic and worthy. Unfortunately it is not easy to sound reply that the proceeding was in no limit membership in the profession to those who satisfy the standard test of fitness. But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for if, in the determination of the qualification of professional fitness, nonprofessional dishonor and dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be ignored. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. So it is that we, in common with other courts, hold, as did Lord Mansfield more than a century ago, that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or nonprofessional, justifies dismission as well as exclusion from the bar. In re Durant, 80 Conn. 146, 147, 67 Atl. 497, 10 Ann. Cas. 539; Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11, 17, 22 Atl. 441, 13 L. R. A. 767; Ex parte Brounsall, Cowp. 829; Boston Bar Ass'n v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169, 183, 46 N. E. 568; Sanborn v. Kimball, 64 Me. 140, 148; Delano's Case, 58 N. H. 5, 42 Am. Rep. 555; In re Percy, 36 N. Y. 651, 654. [2] The demurrer suggests in this connection that disbarment proceedings so far partake of the character of official impeachment that they are not to be permitted in the case of a judicial officer. This objection is not well taken. Since a judge of probate need not be an attorney, his disbarment can have no effect upon his official status. The courts cannot be held responsible for the character of elective officers, but they can and ought to be for the fitness of those who enjoy the privileges of the legal profession under their authority and sanction. [3] The demurrer asserts further that the complaint addressed to the court fails to set out misconduct, either professional or judicial, on the part of the accused. This general charge is elaborated by reference to specified disassociated allegations, of each of which it is said that it does not charge misconduct. The complaint, however, is to be looked at as a whole, and the question of sufficiency attempted to be presented by the demurrer must be determined upon the result of such an examination. The demurrer and counsel's argument in support of it proceed upon the assumption, or rather assertion, that the same tests are to be applied to a charge of misconduct on the part of an attorney addressed to a court for investigation and appropriate action as to a complaint in a civil suit between parties. This assumption mistakes the true character of a complaint of the former sort. Neither are they civil actions. A "civil action" is one between parties. Here an attorney is called to answer to the court of his appointment for his conduct as an officer of that court. The inquiry is directed solely to his continued fitness. There is no plaintiff. The state is not a party, as would appear by the title mistakingly given upon the record to these proceedings. No person is a plaintiff. There may be, indeed, as in this case there is, one who has called the court's attention to alleged misconduct; but he is in no sense a party, and has no interest in the outcome save as all good citizens or worthy members of the bar may have. The complaint made, the court controls the situation and procedure in its discretion as the interest of justice may seem to it to require. It may even act upon its own motion without complaint, and thus be the initiator of proceedings: "It (the hearing) was an investigation by the court into the conduct of one of its own officers, not the trial of an action or suit." Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11, 15, 22 Atl. 441, 442 (13 L. R. A. 767). "The proceeding to disbar an attorney is neither a civil action nor a criminal proceeding, but is a proceeding sui generis, the object of which is, not the punishment of the offender, but the protection of the court." In re Bowman, 7 Mo. App. 567. Section 11 of our rules regulating the admission, suspension, and displacement of attorneys, indeed, provides that complaints for misconduct shall be proceeded with as civil actions, but this does not either make the proceeding a civil action, or necessitate that the complaint be marked by the same precision of statement or conformity to the recognized formalities or technicalities of pleading which are expected in complaints in civil actions. The one supreme requisite is that it be sufficiently intelligible and informing to advise the court of the matter complained of and the attorney of the accusation or accusations made against him to the end that the former may determine whether or not it shall institute an inquiry, and, if one is ordered, properly conduct it, and that the latter may prepare to meet the charges against him, if inquiry shall be made. [4] It has been contended in other jurisdic- this condition is satisfied so that the accused tions that disbarment proceedings partake of is fully and fairly apprised of the charge the nature of criminal prosecutions, and or charges made, the complaint is sufficient accordingly require an observance in the to give him an opportunity to be fully and preparation of complaints of the formalities fairly heard, and therefore to entitle the If court to entertain it, and thereon proceed | functions of an attorney, and they are all to an investigation. In Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 539 (19 L. Ed. 285), where the foundation of the proceeding was nothing more formal than a letter, the court used this language: "The information imparted by the letter was sufficient to put in motion the authority of the court, and the notice to the plaintiff was sufficient to bring him before it to explain the transaction to which the letter referred. The informality of the notice, or of the complaint by the letter, did not touch the question of juris diction." apparent upon the face of the complaint. The court did not err in accepting it as embodying charges deserving of investigation, or in calling upon the accused to answer to them. Inartificial as the complaint may be, it is no pointless story that it tells. The following language used by the court in Re Lowenthal, 78 Cal. 427, 429, 21 Pac. 7, 8, under somewhat similar conditions, is quite appropriate to it, and for the most part might well be borrowed by us in comment "No formal or technical description of the acting upon it: complained of is deemed requisite to the validi- "We must say that the accusation is not a ty of such a proceeding." In re Randall, Peti- model pleading in this respect. The facts stattioner, 11 Allen (Mass.) 473, 479; In re Bow-ed, as we have said, are set out in narrative man, 7 Mo. App. 569; Sanborn v. Kimball, 64 Me. 140, 147. "We entertain no doubt that a court has jurisdiction without any formal complaint or petition, upon its own motion, to strike the name of an attorney from the roll in a proper case, provided he has had reasonable notice, and been afforded an opportunity to be heard in his defense." Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 272, 2 Sup. Ct. 569, 575 (27 L. Ed. 552). Turning now to the complaint, we find that it is confined to a simple narrative of alleged facts and occurrences touching the accused's conduct in the course of the settlement in his court of the estate of a deceased person. There is no such distinct and precise specification and characterization of acts of misconduct as would be incorporated into a criminal indictment or even a welldrafted civil complaint. But the charges of misconduct are there. They are unmistakably involved in the narrative, and could scarcely be made more apparent by a more scientific pleading. The accused could not have failed to appreciate the charges involved, and be thereby supplied with all the information requisite for the adequate preparation for the court's inquiry. That he was not misled or inadequately informed is apparent from an examination of the transcript of the quite voluminous evidence presented upon the hearing which is before us in the record. [5] The story told in the complaint embodies the charge that the accused was guilty of misconduct, in that he obtained from the assets of the estate the payment to himself of $750 as compensation for pretended services rendered by him as an attorney on behalf of the estate, but never in fact rendered, that he exerted his influence and authority, as the presiding judge of the court having jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate, to secure such payment, that in his efforts to secure it he resorted to deception, misrepresentation, and concealment, and that in those efforts he made use in his official position of threats calculated to produce the end desired for the purpose of coercing and compelling the payment and consent thereto on the part of the persons in interest. These charges certainly are of misconduct unfitting one to continue to exercise the form, without any allegations connecting them with one or the other of the general charges of misconduct, and are unnecessarily long; but we think they are such as to show misconduct on the part of the respondent, as an attorney of this court, sufficient to put him upon his trial." Before filing his demurrer to the complaint, counsel for the accused pleaded in abatement for two reasons, to wit: (1) That the proceedings were improperly begun by a presentment by a state's attorney; and (2) that the state's attorney who began them by the presentation of the complaint acted in the premises without legal right or authority by reason of his bitter enmity to the accused and his bias and prejudice against him, rendering him incapable of fair and impartial action as an inquiring and complaining officer. [6] The first of these reasons rests upon the provisions of chapter 120, P. A. 1907, wherein the appointment of a grievance committee in each county is provided for, their duties defined, and certain powers conferred upon them. Among the duties enumerated in the first section is that of presentment to the court for offenses by attorneys not occurring in its presence. Section 10, of the rules of court, subsequently passed under authority of section 458 of the General Statutes and chapter 256 of the Special Laws of 1907, provides that presentment may be made by the grievance committee or the state's attorney or any member of the bar by direction of the court. The respondent's contention is that the provisions of the General Statutes are controlling and exclusive so that complaint can now be made by grievance committees only. The effect of the adoption of the rule after the enactment of the statute aside, it is apparent that the statute did not intend to provide an exclusive mode of instituting inquiries into the conduct of attorneys. The manifest purpose of the statute was to equip grievance committees with powers adequate for the effective performance of their duties. These committees, already existing under judicial authority, were given statutory recognition and powers adequate to the performance of the duties assigned them were conferred upon them. But there the act stopped. Neither by expression or by implication does it contain a restriction of the right of complaint to these committees, or a prohibition to the courts of the right to entertain complaints not thus presented. Such an apparent invasion of the power inherent in courts to supervise the conduct of their own officers is not to be presumed, and the provisions of the statute give no countenance to the existence of a legislative intention to that end. See Grievance Committee v. Ennis, 84 Conn. 594, 603, 80 Atl. 767. But that particular consideration aside, it is quite apparent that neither the statute nor the rule, save as the latter comprehends most, if not all, practicable methods of procedure, undertakes to frame exclusive provisions. Each provides methods of procedure, but neither exclusive methods. The courts are, as they should be, left free to act as may in each case seem best in this matter of most important concern to them and to the administration of justice. They may of their own initiative, and without complaint, set on foot inquiries as to professional conduct and fitness, or they may in their discretion entertain a complaint received from any source within or without the profession. Statute and rule provide orderly methods of procedure possessing the advantage of uniformity, thoroughness, and the promise of efficiency. But the power of the courts is left unfettered to act as situations, as they may arise, may seem to require for efficient discipline of misconduct, and the purging of the bar from the taint of unfit membership. Such statutes as ours are not restrictive of the inherent powers which reside in courts to inquire into the conduct of their own officers, and to discipline them for misconduct. Boston Bar Ass'n v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169, 183, 46 N. E. 568. [7] The second ground of abatement finds its justification in the qualification of impartiality required of grand jurors in the performance of their duties in presenting for criminal prosecution. The argument is that the same qualification is, under our system, required of a state's attorney in the filing of informations by him, and further by assumption rather than assertion that it attaches to a state's attorney's action when he undertakes to act under the provision in our rules which names him as one who may present to the court complaint of misconduct on the part of an attorney. It is unnecessary to follow the course of this argument, or to examine its premises. It is enough for present purposes to observe that proceedings looking to inquiry into the conduct of an attorney are in no sense, as we have already had occasion to notice, criminal prosecutions; that the state's attorney, if he acts, does not appear as a prosecuting officer; and that his only duty in such case is to do what others might in calling the attention of the court to alleged misconduct on the part of one of its officers, and thereafter to conform to the behests of the court in whose hands the proceeding rests. The duty which he performs from first to last is one which he owes as a member of the bar and an officer of the court to whose orders in the premises he is subject, and, not as a criminal prosecutor. He has no power to direct or control the proceeding. The complaint being made, the duty rests upon the court to see that the interests of justice are preserved and the rights of an accused attorney protected, and when that duty is performed, as it was in this case, by the transfer of the management of the proceeding and the conduct of the hearing to confessedly impartial hands, the accused can have no just cause for complaint. [8] Beyond question the facts found, as a result of the court's inquiry, furnish ample justification for the order of disbarment. It is, however, asserted on behalf of the respondent that some of these facts lie outside of the charges contained in the complaint. It is true that two features of the finding involving serious matters of misconduct and possibly others of less importance are not touched upon in the complaint. One of these, the most serious of all, could not be, since it related to the presentation upon the hearing of written testimony falsified by the accused. But no one of these matters is made the basis of the judgment. Whether the one referred to as the most serious might not have been made a cause of disbarment, as having occurred in the presence of the court, we need not inquire. It is enough that it was not. The matters which in a sense lay outside of the field of the charges of the complaint are related in the finding as incidental to its story and as having a bearing upon the charges made and the conclusions reached with respect to them; but the misconduct, for which judgment of disbarment was entered as appears by the memorandum of decision, the judgment file, and the finding, is limited to matters clearly within the complaint. The judgment file, following the memorandum of decision, beyond finding the allegations of the complaint true, confines its finding of misconduct to three particulars: (1) That the respondent "as an attorney deliberately planned to obtain possession of, from an estate before him as judge of probate, a fee dered, and to which he was in no manner enfor services as attorney which he had not rentitled." (2) That "he did collect and receive from said estate such fee as attorney, knowing that he was obtaining and receiving it without right and with intent to deprive the owners of the sum so received." And (3) that he, "in order to retain to himself as attorney the sum so obtained, did, by threats to make use of his power as judge of probate to deprive the heirs of the testatrix of the immediate possession of the estate, extort from them against their will a waiver of objection to the allowance by him as judge of the fee received by him as attorney." These matters were all within the complaint, and it cannot reasonably be contended that they do not amount to misconduct justifying the judgment. An examination of this statement of misconduct furnishing the basis for the judgment clearly shows that the, by reason of his operation of an automobile, court understood its duty, and was careful to recognize the limitations which the complaint imposed upon it. This is further shown by its distinct ruling in favor of the respondent's claim of law that it "could not legally find, consider, or regard as a basis of judgment against the defendant in this case any operative fact not directly and positively alleged in the information." The story told in the finding furnishes more incidental details than does that in the complaint, and it is more precise in its statement of ultimate conclusions, and more direct in its characterization of wrongdoing; but it is, after all, the same story in essence, and leads to the establishment of the same operative facts in so far as they influenced the judgment. It is further contended that the finding of the court, in its significant details and ultimate conclusions of misconduct, is not supported by the evidence, and should be corrected; and the evidence is before us to secure such correction. If it be assumed that our jurisdiction in proceedings of this character extends to the point of reviewing the conclusions of the investigating court upon matters of fact, as in civil actions, it nevertheless appears to us upon an examination of the transcript of testimony that the evidence is such that the court could not have arrived at other conclusions than those upon which its judgment was based. See In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 149, 67 Atl. 497, 10 Ann. Cas. 539. provided the policy shall not apply while any [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. & 1298; Dec. Dig. § 514.*] Case Reserved from Superior Court, New Haven County; William L. Bennett, Judge. Amicable suit under Gen. St. § 955, by Charles W. Brock against the Travelers' Insurance Company, on an agreed statement of facts. Cause reserved by the superior court for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors. Judgment for plaintiff advised. Charles F. Clarke, of New Haven, for plaintiff. William Brosmith and Robert C. Dickenson, both of Hartford, for defendant. THAYER, J. The plaintiff holds a policy or agreement of indemnity of the defendant whereby the latter agrees to indemnify him against loss suffered by him on account of bodily injuries accidentally sustained by others by reason of his ownership and maintenance of an automobile, which is described in his declaration attached to the policy. The policy or agreement contains the following provision: "This agreement shall not apply while any such automobile is driven or' manipulated in any race or competitive speed test, or by any person under the age fixed by law or under the age of sixteen in any event." [9, 10] The question for the court's determination was whether the respondent, by reason of his past conduct evidencing his qualities of character and uprightness, was a fit person to be longer allowed to exercise the functions of an attorney and to act as an officer of the court in the administration of justice. Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11, 16, 22 Atl. 441, 13 L. R. A. 767. Into the determination of this question there entered a large measure of judicial discretion to be exercised not arbitrarily, impulsively, or under the influence of hatred or prejudice, While the automobile was being driven by but reasonably, fairly, and dispassionately. The accused attorney was entitled to notice the plaintiff's son in the plaintiff's business of the charge against him and opportunity to an accident occurred, resulting in bodily inbe heard, a fair and dispassionate investiga- juries to another boy, causing his death. The tion, and a reasonable exercise of the judi- plaintiff's son at the time was between 16 cial discretion. In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, and 17 years of age, was not licensed to 148, 150, 67 Atl, 497, 10 Ann. Cas. 539. We operate an automobile, and was not accomfail to discover wherein he has not been ac-panied by a licensed operator. The plaintiff corded all these rights. There is no error. (88 Conn. 308) BROCK v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. July 13, 1914.) INSURANCE (§ 514*)-CONTRACTS-CONSTRUC TION. was compelled to pay damages for the abovenamed injuries, and asked indemnity therefor from the defendant. The defendant refuses to indemnify him upon the ground that at the time of the accident the automobile was being driven by a person under the age fixed by law. Most, if not all, of the states regulate by statute the operation and maintenance of au A policy, indemnifying insured against tomobiles, and fix the age and qualifications bodily injuries accidentally sustained by others to be required in the persons operating them. *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes These requirements are not uniform; younger, ordinary, popular sense, and that, so taken, persons being permitted to operate them in they show that the parties to the policy “insome states than in others. A blank form, tended that the insurer should not cover the which is in broad and general language, mani-operation of the car by a person too young to festly intended for use in different states, and be licensed to operate a car alone, and yet not in this state alone, was used in writing who was so operating it." We think that the policy now in question. The proviso this reads something into the provision which quoted above undoubtedly has reference to the language taken in its ordinary sense does these statutes, and was intended to save the not import. The provision of the statute that defendant from liability for losses resulting an unlicensed person operating a car must be when the automobile should be driven by a accompanied by a licensed operator has no person under the age thus fixed by law for relation to the age of the operator. It apthe operation of these vehicles, or when driv-plies to the man of 70 as well as to the boy en by a person under the age of 16 although the age fixed by law should be less than 16. Our statutes do not in direct terms fix the age at which it shall be unlawful for a person to operate a motor vehicle in the public highways. Public Acts of 1911, c. 85, § 5, which is the statute by which the question between the parties to this action must be de-ance with the other provision of the statute. termined, provides as follows: "No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state until he shall have obtained from the secretary a license for that purpose, but no such license shall be issued until said secretary is satisfied that the applicant is over eighteen years of age and is a **Nothing proper person to receive it. * herein contained shall prevent the operating of a motor vehicle by an unlicensed person sixteen years of age or more * if accompanied by a licensed operator." The first part of this section, if taken by itself, in effect fixes the age at which a person may operate a motor vehicle at 18 years; for it provides that none but a licensed operator may operate one, and that no person under the age of 18 years may obtain a license. But the statute is to be interpreted as a whole, and the last part provides in effect that any person above the age of 16 years may operate such vehicle if accompanied by a licensed operator. The effect of the section taken as a whole is the same as it would be had it read: Any person sixteen years of age or more may operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state if accompanied by a licensed operator or if himself licensed by the secretary for that purpose but no such license shall be issued until the secretary is satisfied that the applicant is over eighteen years of age and is a proper person to receive it. The statute unquestionably fixes 16 as the age under which a person may not in this state operate a motor vehicle upon the highways. Under that age no person may operate such vehicle. Above that age any person may operate one if accompanied by a licensed operator and if licensed, as he may be, if qualified, after the age of 18, without being so accompanied. Had the plaintiff's son at the time of the accident been accompanied by a licensed operator, it could not be claimed rationally that he was under the age fixed by law for operating a motor car. The defendant does not claim that in such case he would have been under the age fixed by law. Its claim is that the words "under the age fixed by law" in its policy are to be taken in their of 17. Neither may operate the car unless so accompanied, and when so accompanied either may, although unlicensed, operate it. If the operator is not so accompanied the law in each case is violated, not because the operator is under the age fixed by law for operating the car, but because of his noncompli The provision in the policy upon which the defendant relies excepts from the coverage of the policy cases where the operator may be duly licensed and above the age fixed by law, but under the age of 16 fixed by the defendant, as well as cases where he may be above the age fixed by the defendant and under that which is fixed by the law. It raises these two questions: First. Was the operator under 16 years of age? If so, the case is not covered by the policy, although the law of the state may permit a person under that age to operate a car and receive a license to do so. Second, if above the age of 16 years fixed by the defendant, was the operator under the age fixed by law. If so, the case is not covered by the policy. The provision relates solely to the question of age, and not at all to the question whether the operator has complied with the other requirements of law. The defendant's construction makes liability depend upon the question whether a licensed operator accompanied the plaintiff's son at the time of the accident, and not upon the question of his age. But the proviso does not attempt to excuse the defendant from liability for losses incurred by the operation of the automobile contrary to the provisions of the statute. It is not claimed that the defendant would not be liable if an unlicensed person above the age of 18 years had been operating the car at the time of the accident without being accompanied by a licensed operator, or if a licensed operator had been operating it in violation of the statute when not equipped with suitable brakes, markers, or lights. The manifest purpose was to excuse from liability only in case the operator was too young, either in the opinion of the defendant or under the terms of the statute, to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways. It is said that one construction will tend to encourage violations of the statute. Such is the tendency of accident and indemnity policies generally. They all in a sense encourage neglect of duties which the law im |