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in the Passaic, after these streams join it. All  The second reason urged in support of the proof we have relates to the flow of the this rule is, as stated in the brief of the dePassaic at Little Falls, which appears to be fendant: based upon the entire abstraction of the “The item of $4,120.60, for depreciation and stream, and that is said to be 25,000,000 gal- use of these filters, should not have been conlons; but, assuming this to be true, there is sidered by the jury in estimating the plaintiff's
total damages, and the court should have so diverted for the city of Paterson, as we un-charged as requested by the defendant." derstand it, about 10,000,000 gallons, SO
The request to charge was: that the best result we can arrive at is that
"They should not allow for use or depreciathe average current flow, if there was notion of the filters, as the evidence of the plaindiversion by these parties, would be, in the tiff shows that they were in addition to, and an Pequannock, 5,000,000 gallons, in the Rock- the refusal to charge this request was not er
. We think away, 10,000,000 gallons, and in the Passaic, ror, for this court said, in making the former at Little Falls, 15,000,000 gallons.
rule to show cause in this case absolute, that The proportion of damage therefore, based the true rule is to allow for the value of the upon the current flow in front of plaintiff's time of beginning suit. This may properly in
use of the permanent improvement up to the property, if none of the water was diverted, clude an allowance for loss due to wear and tear chargeable to this defendant, would be one- and depreciation." sixth. The total damages which the plaintiff That, being the rule laid down by this claims to have sustained, and which are not court upon the precise question at issue, was seriously disputed, except in certain partic- properly adopted by the trial court, and must ulars hereinafter to be mentioned, amount be followed by us. to $57,541.02, one-sixth of which is so much  The third reason challenges the correctbelow the verdict in this case that it is mani-ness of the charge concerning the pipe which festly based upon some erroneous principle. the defendant installed for the purpose of We are therefore of opinion that the present connecting its works with the Passaic Water verdict is excessive, if it is to be justified Company's main, from which company plainupon the ground that the damage must be ap- tiff claims it was required to procure water portioned upon the basis of the ordinary flow because of the several diversions of water of the river, because the plaintiff does not, in from the Passaic river by the respective parits brief, undertake to justify the verdict up-ties hereinbefore mentioned. The part of the on any such theory. Its argument upon this charge complained of was in response to the point is based largely upon the case of Jen- tenth request, which was: kins v. Penn. R. R. Co., 67 N. J. Law, 331, "That in estimating the damages, if they find 51 Atl. 704, 57 L. R. A. 309; but in that case should not allow for use or depreciation of the
plaintiff entitled to substantial damages, they there was no proof upon which a calculation pipe laid for Passaic Water Company's main, or estimation of the proportion which each because there is no evidence from which they wrongdoer contributed to the injury could be could find the value for the use of the pipe based, whereas, in this case this court has value during that period, or any part thereof."
for the period sued for, or the depreciation in laid down a rule under which an apportion
To this the court responded : ment is to be made, and that is that it shall
"If you find that it was an improvement to the be according to the natural flow of the plant, why then of course you will not allow it. stream at ordinary times, and as the natural if you find, however, that it was reasonably necflow is ascertainable, or approximately so, if essary, then of course you may allow it, if you this verdict was substantially consistent with find for the plaintiff. If you find that it was an this verdict was substantially consistent with addition to the plaintiff's plant, then you will such an apportionment, we would not require apply the rule of the Supreme Court which I that it be absolutely accurate, because in the have twice read to you, and which I will read nature of things that would not be possible. once more: The true rule is to allow for the
value of its use to the time of beginning of the In all of the other cases cited by the plaintiff suit, which may properly include the allowon this point, it appears that there was no ance due to the wear and tear and depreciamethod of ascertaining the relative proportion, provided you find that it was a permanent tion of the injury attributable to joint wrong improvement. If you find that it was neces
. of doers, and in such cases the jury were not course the plaintiff is entitled to have it alheld to absolute accuracy, but were sustained lowed." in a reasonable result not inconsistent with This, we think, was a proper instruction, the evidence.
under the rule laid down by this court. The So in the case of Harper et al. v. Moun- jury were instructed that if it was a permatain Water Co., 43 Atl. 984, cited by the nent improvement, and necessary, then they plaintiff, there was proof of an injurious dim- should allow for the depreciation according inution in flow by abstractions of water to the rule laid down by this court. from a stream, the amount of which could no error in this. not be ascertained with mathematical preci  The fourth reason urged is that it was sion, but the defendant was held liable, al- undisputed that the defendant restored to the though the amount abstracted was difficult to Pequannock river, in times of low water, a prove; but in that case no question of appor-quantity equal to the normal flow at such tionment between several wrongdoers was times, and therefore that the plaintiff's daminvolved.
ages were nominal. This we do not consider
sound, for, as was said by the Supreme Court of water required, was a proper element of in determining the former rule to show cause,
damages. the plaintiff was bound to contract for a con. Water Courses, Cent. Dig. § 82; Dec. Dig.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Waters and tinuous supply, and therefore it was not re
§ 86.*] quired to depend upon the good will of the 4. WATERS AND WATER COURSES ($ 79*)–Ridefendant in supplying water which it had
PARIAN RIGHTS-EXTENT OF USE. abstracted.
An upper riparian owner has no right to The fifth reason is rested upon a question divert from the stream water to such an ex
tent that the lower riparian owner is deprived of fact; that is, that the plaintiff could ob- of its use, since it is not a reasonable use of tain an ample supply from the river even water running through one's land to permaduring low flow. We think the preponder- nently divert it and use it for commercial purance of the evidence is against this conten- poses.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Waters and tion.
Water Courses, Cent. Dig. $$ 70, 71; Dec. Dig. The sixth reason presents the same ques- $ 79.*] tion in a different form, and is subject to the
Action by the Weidman Silk Dyeing Comsame criticism. The seventh reason is that the injuries suf- Company. On rule to show cause why a ver
pany against the Jersey City Water Supply fered were incidental; but this is based upon dict for the plaintiff should not be set aside, a question of fact which we do not think so and a new trial ordered. Rule discharged. preponderates as to justify the defendant's
Argued February term, 1913, before claim.
GUMMERE, C. J., and BERGEN and KAIn a case of this kind, certainty to a mathe
LISCH, JJ. matical demonstration is not possible, and we are of opinion that the evidence fairly demon
Griggs & Harding, of Paterson, for plain. strates that the total loss or damage which tiff. Michael Dunn, of Paterson, and Gilbert the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the re- Collins, of Jersey City, for defendant. spective abstractions of water from the stream flowing in front of plaintiff's property ilar in character to that dealt with and dis
PER CURIAM.  This litigation is simamounts to the sum shown by the plaintiff', ilar in character to that dealt with and diswhich is $57,541.02, of which the defendant posed of at this term in the case of this should pay one-sixth, $9,590.17, and, if the plaintiff against the mayor and common counplaintiff will consent to a reduction of the cil of the city of Newark, 91 Atl. 335. In
this case the plaintiff's total damage, with verdict to that amount, judgment may be entered therefor. If not, then the rule will amount of the verdict was $21,503.36. Upon
If not, then the rule will interest, amounted to $65,153.32, and the be made absolute.
the basis arrived at in the other case, that is, assuming that the flow of the Pequannock
was 5,000,000 gallons per day, and that of WEIDMAN SILK DYEING CO. V. JERSEY | the Rockaway 10,000,000 gallons per day, and CITY WATER SUPPLY CO.
that of the Passaic 15,000,000 gallons per (Supreme Court of New Jersey. June 3, 1913.) day, making a total flow, in times of low
water, of 30,000,000 gallons per day, this de1. WATERS AND WATER COURSES ($ 86*)-DI- fendant would be chargeable with two-fifths
VERSION OF WATER COURSE EXCESSIVE
of the total amount of damage shown; and, In an action for diversion of water from as this amounts to more than the verdict, we streams above plaintiff's dyeworks, a verdict for do not think that it is excessive. plaintiff was not excessive, where the total
 It is further argued in support of this amount with which defendant would be chargeable, measured by the total flow of water in rule that the user made by the plaintiff was times of low water, exceeded the verdict.
not within the right of a riparian owner. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Waters and So far as we can ascertain from an examWater Courses, Cent. Dig. 8 82; Dec. Dig. 8 ination of the record, this question was not 86.*]
raised in the court below; but, assuming that 2. WATERS AND WATER COURSES ($ 78*)-RI- it was, we do not consider the argument PARIAN RIGHTS-USE.
A riparian owner has a right to use the sound, for a riparian owner manifestly has stream as it comes to his land, without unrea
a right to use the stream as it comes to his sonable diminution by upper riparian owners, land, without unreasonable diminution by and subject to the rights of lower riparian own- riparian owners on the stream above his ers.
[Ed. Note.— For other cases, see Waters and property, subject, of course, to any proper Water Courses, Cent. Dig. 88 67–69;" Dec. Digo complaint by a lower riparian owner, if his § 78.*]
rights are being interfered with. 3. WATERS AND WATER COURSES (8 86*)-Di- contrary to the charge of the court, which
 It is further urged that the verdict is VERSION-ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE.
In an action for diversion of water from was, in substance, that if the jury should streams above plaintiff's dyeworks, in conse- find that the plaintiff could have obtained quence of which plaintiff was obliged to contract water from the river, necessary for its use, for water, the cost of such contract incidentally covering portions when the stream did not by a change or alteration in its pipe, the depermit plaintiff to have at all times the supply fendant would only be liable for such portion
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. '& Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Kep'r Indexes
of the expense of making the alteration as , 3. WATERS AND WATER COURSES ($ 86*)-DIwas caused by its diversion; and it is argued VERSION-MEASURE OF DAMAGES-INTEREST. that the evidence establishes, first, that there in making good the damage, and recoverable in
Interest on the amount actually expended was a sufficient quantity of water, second, the suit, was a fair element of compensation. that a slight or inexpensive alteration in [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Waters and its pipes would have made it available to Water Courses, Cent. Dig. § 82; Dec. Dig. $
86.*] the plaintiff. On this branch of the case we think it sufficient to say that, while the evi. 4. WATERS AND WATER COURSES ($ 87*)— dence was contradictory, its preponderance is
QUESTION FOR JURY-PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT.
The question whether defendant, in an acin favor of the fact that the plaintiff could tion for excessive diversion of water, had acnot at all times secure from the river the quired a prescriptive right to take water by quantity of water required, and therefore was over 20 years' user of the stream for purposes
of water supply was for the court. justified in seeking it elsewhere, and in so doing it had to make a contract which in Water Courses, Cent. Dig. $$ 77–81, 83, 89, 90;
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Waters and cidentally covered periods when the river Dec. Dig. § 87.*] did not permit the plaintiff to have at all
5. APPEAL AND ERROR ($ 1062*)-HARMLESS times the supply required.
ERROR-QUESTION FOR JURY.  The next point is that the verdict is In an action for damages for excessive dicontrary to law, and is not supported by version of water by an upper riparian owner, the evidence, in that the defendant had the issue of its prescriptive right, error in submit
where the jury found against defendant on the right to appropriate and make a just and ting the question of such right to the jury was reasonable use of water passing through its harmless. land. We do not think that this principle [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and permits the upper riparian owner to divert Error, Cent. Dig. $8 4212–4218; Dec. Dig. 8 and abstract from the stream water to such 1062.*] an extent that the lower riparian owner is 6. WATERS AND WATER COURSES ($ 78*)-PREdeprived of its use. It is not a reasonable
SCRIPTION-PERSONS ENTITLED. use of water running through one's land to general corporation act to supply water, and
A water company incorporated under the permanently abstract the water and use it with whom, under P. L. 1888, p. 366 (3 Comp. for commercial purposes.
St. 1910, p. 3647, $ 669), municipalities were auAfter carefully considering this record, we thorized to contract for a water supply, was are inclined to the opinion that the rule to interest, since the permission to buy water beshow cause should be discharged.
stowed no franchise upon it, and hence had no private right to divert water incidental to any franchise.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Waters and WEIDMAN SILK DYEING CO. V. EAST Water Courses, Cent. Dig. $8 67–69; Dec. Dig. JERSEY WATER CO.
$ 78.*] (Supreme Court of New Jersey. March 4,
Action by the Weidman Silk Dyeing Com1914.) 1. WATERS AND WATER COURSES ($ 79*)-DI- pany. On rule to show cause why a verdict
pany against the East Jersey Water ComVERSION-PROXIMATE CAUSE.
Where the injury to plaintiff company re- for the plaintiff should not be set aside, and sulted from the contributing negligence, not only a new trial ordered. Rule discharged. of defendant in taking the water, but of other
Argued June term, 1913, before GUMparties in polluting what was left so as to make it unfit for use, but plaintiff, notwithstanding MERE, C. J., and
J., and PARKER and KAthe pollution, could still have used it but for LISCH, JJ. defendant's diversion, such diversion was a direct and proximate cause of the injury, though Griggs & Harding, of Paterson, N. J., for alone it would not have caused it, so as to ren- plaintiff. Michael Dunn, of Paterson, and der defendant liable for the whole resulting in- Gilbert Collins, of Jersey City, for defendant. jury.
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Waters and Water Courses, Cent. Dig. $$ 70, 71; Dec. Dig. PER CURIAM.  This case is similar § 79.*]
in theory and in its main aspects to the case 2. WATERS AND WATER COURSES (8 86*)-DI- of Weidman Silk Dyeing Co. v. Newark, 83 VERSION-DAMAGES.
Where plaintiff dyeing company, because N. J. Law, 50, 84 Atl. 273, and two other of excessive diversion of water by defendant, suits by the same plaintiff argued at Februan upper riparian cwner, was obliged to con- ary term 1913, 91 Atl. 335, 337, but not yet tract for a minimum consumption of water throughout the year, all of which at times it did officially reported. Damages are claimed for not need, and to pay extra for more than the excessive abstraction of water from the minimum, the agreement was only another form Passaic river or its watershed, above plainof paying for the privilege of taking such water tiff's works, which as alleged, and as the as plaintiff needed up to the minimum, and was entirely distinct from the charges in excess of jury evidently found, was a contributing that minimum, so that the minimum cost, plus cause of plaintiff's being obliged to make the extra charge, was a legitimate element of new arrangements for the supply that it damage.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Waters and formerly obtained directly from the river. Water Courses, Cent. Dig. 8 82; Dec. Dig. Suits were brought against several abstract§ 86.*]
ers of water, and the damages apportioned
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
according to plaintiff's theory that the sev We are unable to see that the amount of eral defendants should be held responsible the verdict is inconsistent with the theory for the same proportion of the total damage that allowance was made for the more valuas their respective takings of water bore to able rights acquired under the new contract. the total taking.
[4-6] A new point is made, viz.: That de. It is now argued that the verdict was ex- fendant had acquired a prescriptive right to cessive, because it appeared that the injury take water by over 20 years' user of the river resulted from the contributing negligence, not for purposes of water supply. The trial only of defendant in taking the water, but of judge left this question to the jury. We other parties in polluting what was left with think he went too far and should have decidsewage, waste, etc., in such quantities as to ed against such prescriptive right as a court make it unfit for the plaintiff's use. It question; but, as the jury evidently found was open to the jury to find that, notwith-against the defendant on this score, no harm standing the pollution, plaintiff could have is done, and the verdict is justified. Counsel still used the water but for the abstraction practically concede that such a right cannot by the defendant and the defendants in the be acquired in gross, but rely on the remark other suits, which collectively absorbed a of Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking for the Court large proportion of the entire flow for munic- of Errors and Appeals in Mitchell v. D'Olier, ipal water supply. Consequently the ab- 68 N. J. Law, 380, 53 Atl. 468, 59 L. R. A. straction was a direct and proximate cause 919, as follows: of the injury, though alone it would not "The English rule seems to be well founded have caused it. The argument is that the both in reason and authority. It forbids, in defendant should be held for only a portion ordinary circumstances, the existence of a 'pri
vate easement in gross. The ‘rights of way of of the verdict as rendered, and the remain a railroad company and the right to divert wader left to be recovered if possible against ter, as held by an aqueduct company, stand the various polluters. But this is not the upon a footing of their own; such rights belaw. The rule as stated in 38 Cyc. 488, is ing, by express legislative sanction, annexed to as follows:
The answer to this is that the East Jer, “Where, although concert is lacking, the separate and independent acts or negligence of sey Water Company is not an “aqueduct comseveral combine to produce directly a single in- pany” affected by a public interest, but a corjury, each is responsible for its entire result, poration organized under the general corpoeven though his act or neglect alone might not ration act, and which trades in water, so it have caused it."
is not within the rule. Counsel, realizing This rule is adopted and applied in such this difficulty, cite the act of 1888, authorizdecisions as Newman v. Fowler, 37 N. J. ing municipalities to contract for water supLaw, 89, and Matthews v. D., L. & W. R. R. ply with any water company or other comCo., 56 N. J. Law, 34, 27 Atl. 919, 22 L. R. pany, contractor, or contractors. P. L. 1888, A. 261.
p. 366; 3 Comp. St. 1910, p. 3647, § 669.  When the plaintiff had to turn else- This is merely a legislative permission to buy where for its main supply, it was obliged water, and bestows no franchise of any kind to contract for a minimum consumption upon the seller. throughout the year. At times it did not need
Upon the whole we do not find the damthis; but it still had to pay for it. At other ages plainly excessive, nor do we see anytimes it used and paid for more than the min- thing in any of the points discussed that imum. It is now claimed that (as we under-calls for a retrial. stand the argument) no more than the mini
The rule to show cause will be discharged. mum annual charge should be made, because the excess amounts in low water should be
(123 Md. 310) offset against the unused minimum in times of MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIhigh water. We fail to see the force of this MORE et al. v. WOLLMAN et al. argument. The agreement to pay for a mini
(No. 21.) mum the year round was only another form (Court of Appeals of Maryland. May 6, 1914. of paying for the privilege of taking such
Rehearing Denied June 26, 1914.) water as plaintiff needed up to the mini- 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (8 112*)-ORDImum, and was entirely distinct from the NANCES—TITLE-SUFFICIENCY.
The title of an ordinance of the city of supercharge in excess of that minimum. So, Baltimore entitled “An ordinance to repeal secas plaintiff to get water at all had to take tions 4, 13, 16, 17, 112 and 113 of the Baltiit on those terms, the actual cost of getting more City Code of 1906, art. 23, title Markets' what water it needed (which was the mini-ciently enumerates the sections of the Code to
and reordain the same with amendments” suffimum plus supercharge) was a legitimate ele- be repealed and re-enacted. ment of damage.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal  We consider that interest on amounts Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 258-262; Dec. Dig. actually expended in making good the dain- 8 112.*] age and recoverable in the suit was under 2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (8 112*)–ORDI
NANCES-TITLE-SUFFICIENCY. the circumstances a fair element of com
It is only the subject-matter of an ordipensation
nance that need be described in its title, which
*For otter cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
need not indicate the details, agency, or means 9. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (8 63*) –ORDIby which the subject of the ordinance is to be NANCES_VALIDITY. carried into effect.
The necessity and reasonableness of an oro [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal dinance, passed in pursuance of charter powCorporations, Cent. Dig. 88 258-262; Dec. Dig. Jers, are primarily committed to the council
, § 112.*]
and, unless an ordinance is purely arbitrary,
oppressive, or capricious, the courts will not 3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ($ 62*) - DELE- prevent its enforcement. GATION OF POWER.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Legislative or discretionary powers, de- Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 155, 1378, 1879; volved by law or charter on the council or gov- Dec. Dig. § 63.*] erning body of a municipality, cannot be delegated, but ministerial or administrative func- 10. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (8 720*)-ORDItions may be delegated.
An ordinance of the city of Baltimore reg. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal ulating markets and authorizing the clerks of Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 153, 154; Dec. Dig. the several markets, with the approval of the § 62.*]
board of estimates, to fix the rent of all stalls, 4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (8 62*)-DELE- the occupants of which do not pay an annual GATION OF POWER.
license and charge, and which imposes an annual The state may expressly authorize delega- charge amounting to a little more than the ten tion of powers by a municipal corporation, but, cents per day formerly charged, and fixing an in the absence of such express authority, the annual license of $10, is not invalid as excescouncil of a municipality must itself exercise sive, arbitrary, or unreasonable. all discretionary powers.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. $81536-1541; Dec. Corporations, Cent. Dig. $$ 153, 154; Dec. Dig. Dig. § 720.*] § 62.*]
Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Balti5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ($ 720*)-MAR- more City; James P. Gorter, Judge. KET STALLS-FIXING RENT-DELEGATION OF
"To be officially reported." POWER. The fixing of the rent of market stalls in the
Suit by Edward C. Wollman and others city of Baltimore is an administrative function, against the Mayor and City Council of Baltiwhich may be delegated to the clerks of the mar- more and another. From a decree granting kets, as provided by an ordinance of the city; relief, defendants appeal. Reversed, and
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. $S 1536-1541; Dec. bill dismissed. Dig. & 720.*]
Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRIS6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ($ 121*)-MUNICIPAL COE, BURKE, THOMAS, URNER, STOCK.
CORPORATIONS (8 720*)_IMPAIRING OBLIGA-BRIDGE, and CONSTABLE, JJ.
S. S. Field, City Sol., of Baltimore (Robert An ordinance of the city of Baltimore re- F. Leach, Jr., Asst. City Sol., of Baltimore, Jating to markets which authorizes the clerks of on the brief), for appellants. Isaac Lobe
, board of estimates, to fix the rent of all stalls Straus, of Baltimore (Robert H. Carr, of or places in any market, providing that no rent Baltimore, on the brief), for appellees. shall be charged for street stalls, the occupants of which shall pay an annual license fee and an annual charge in lieu of the per diem previously BRISCOE, J. The present appeal involves provided for, must be construed to apply only to the validity and the construction of Ordistalls as to which the rent is not fixed by contract, and, so construed, its enforcement will nance No. 332, passed by the mayor and city not impair the obligation of any contract. council of Baltimore city, approved July 25,
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitu- 1913, and the several provisions thereof, pretional Law, Cent. Dig. 88 285, 301-311, 312- scribing certain regulations of the markets 348; Dec. Dig. § 121;* Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. $$ 1536-1541; Dec. Dig. $ 720.*]
in Baltimore city. 7. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (720*)—MAR- record as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, and its
The ordinance in question is set out in the KETS-ORDINANCES—VALIDITY.
An ordinance of the city of Baltimore reg. title is as follows: ulating markets, and providing that license fees “An ordinance to repeal sections 4, 13, 16, shall be due as of May 1, 1913, can only oper: 17, 112 and 113, of the Baltimore City Code of ate prospectively, and, when so construed, it 1906, article 23, title Markets, and reordain is not invalid on the ground that license fees the same with amendments." provided for are made payable as of May 1st, while the ordinance was passed on July 25th
The plaintiffs below are owners, tenants, following.
and licensees of certain stalls in the markets [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal of the city, and seek by this proceeding to Corporations, Cent. Dig. $$ 1536–1541; Dec. enjoin and restrain by injunction the deDig. 8 720.*]
fendants below from in any way enforcing 8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (8 720*)-MAR- the ordinance, upon the ground that it is KETS-ORDINANCES-VALIDITY. Baltimore City Charter, $ 59, providing
unconstitutional, illegal, and void. that all licenses imposed by ordinance shall be
The case was heard upon bill, answer, due and payable the first week of January in and proof, and the court-below held certain each year, applies only to license taxes, and sections of the ordinance to be invalid, null, not to market licenses imposed by ordinance.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal and void, and from its decree, dated the 1st Corporations, Cent. Dig. $8 1536-1541; Dec. day of December, 1913, directing an injuncDig. § 720.*]
tion to issue restraining the defendants from
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes