enforcing the provisions of the sections of the ordinance which were declared invalid, this appeal has been taken.

The court below, by the decree appealed against, held and declared that section 1 of the ordinance, in so far as it repealed and reordained, with amendments, sections 13, 16, and 17 of article 23 of the Baltimore City Code of 1906, title 'Markets,' to be invalid, and that said sections 13, 16, and 17 of article 23 of the Baltimore City Code of 1906, as ordained or attempted to be ordained or be reordained by said section 1 of the ordinance, was invalid, null, and void. Section 3 of the ordinance was also declared to be invalid and void.

The validity of the ordinance is assailed upon a number of grounds, and these objections are set out at considerable length in the plaintiffs' bill. The bill, in substance, charges, as stated by the appellants in their brief: (1) That the title of the ordinance is insufficient; (2) that the fixing of rents for the market stalls is a legislative function, which could not be delegated to the clerk, with the approval of the board of estimates; (3) that the ordinance impairs the obligations of contracts; (4) that said ordinance will produce revenue in excess of the expenses of the markets; (5) that section 3, requiring the license year to date from May 1, 1913, which was prior to the passage of the ordinance, renders the ordinance void; (6) that the charges are arbitrary and unreasonable; and (7) that the ordinance is void because it makes the license date from May 1st instead of January 1st, under section 59 of the charter.

We shall consider these objections in the order as named, and as set out in the bill, in so far as it may be necessary, for the purposes of the conclusion we have reached in the case. Some of them have been settled by previous decisions of this court, and need but a passing comment.

[1] As to the title of the ordinance in question, we need only say, that we think its subject-matter is sufficiently set out and described in the title to answer the requirements of the charter and of the Constitution. It will be seen that sections 4, 13, 16, and 17 are Code sections of the Baltimore City Code of 1906, and they are codified under the head of part 1, "General Provisions Relating to Markets," as article 23 of the Code. Ordinance No. 332, now under consideration, repeals and reordains these Code sections with amendments, and it is difficult to see how any one could be misled by the title in this ordinance as to the sections of the Baltimore City Code dealt with, and intended to be repealed and the amendments thereto.

[2] It is well settled by the numerous cases dealing with this subject that it is only the subject-matter of the act that need be described in the title, and the title need not

indicate or disclose the details, agency, or means by which the subject of the act is to be carried into effect. Bond v. Baltimore, 116 Md. 689, 82 Atl. 978; Levin v. Hewes, 118 Md. 626, 86 Atl. 233; Worcester Co. v. School Comm'rs, 113 Md. 307, 77 Atl. 605; Gould v. Baltimore, 120 Md. 534, 87 Atl. 818.

The object and purpose of the ordinance in question, as its title disclosed, was to repeal certain sections of the Baltimore City Code of 1906, article 23, title "Markets." and to reordain them, with certain amendments.

The amendment to section 4 of article 23 of the City Code transfers the duty of cleaning the market from the clerks of the market to the Commissioner of Street Cleaning and provides as follows:

"4. It shall be the duty of the commissioner of street cleaning to see that all of the markets of Baltimore city are kept well cleaned and free from dirt, filth, snow and rubbish. He shall perform such duties and obey such rules and regulations in respect to keeping the markets clean as may be prescribed from time to time by the board of estimates."

The amendment to section 13 of article 23

of the City Code provides that the market clerks, with the approval of the board of estimates, shall have power to fix the rent of all stalls in any market of Baltimore city, instead of the clerks of the several markets with the consent of the mayor.

Code, art. 23, § 13, was as follows:

"13. The clerks of the several markets, with fix the rent of all stalls, stands and benches, the consent of the mayor, shall have power to not enumerated in this article, provided, that the rent for all street stalls in all markets shall be five dollars ($5) per annum, including license."

Code, § 13, as amended, reads as follows:

"13. The clerks of the several markets, with have power to fix the rent of all stalls, stands, the approval of the board of estimates, shall shambles, benches or places in any market of Baltimore city: provided that no rent shall be charged for street stalls, the occupants of which shall pay an annual license, and an annual charge in lieu of per diem, hereafter provided for. But nothing in this section shall prevent the mayor and city council of Baltimore, at any time hereafter, from fixing by ordinance, the rent of all stalls, stands, shambles, benches or places in any market of Baltimore city."

It is contended upon the part of the plaintiffs below that "the fixing of rent" of market stalls is a legislative, and not an administrative, power and duty, and cannot be lawfully delegated by the mayor and city council of Baltimore to the clerks of the markets, with the approval of the board of estimates, as provided by the ordinance.

The court below held that the delegation of power or duty as contained in the amendment to section 4 of the ordinance was a ministerial or administrative function, and that this amendment was valid, but struck down. the amendment to section 13, as a legislative function which could not be delegated.

[3, 4] The rule is plain and well established that legislative or discretionary powers or trusts devolved by law or charter on a council or governing body cannot be delegated to others, but ministerial or administrative functions may be delegated to subordinate

officials.

"That stalls, tables or space in this market shall be rented to butchers or others desiring to period as may be desirable, upon such terms hire the same by the month or such longer and for such sums as the board of public works shall determine." Kramrath v. City of Albany, 127 N. Y. 575, 28 N. E. 400.

[6] We come now to Code, §§ 16, 17, as amended by the ordinance. Section 16, as amended, deals with the per diem charge, and, as stated, imposes an annual charge in lieu of the ten cents per day formerly collected, or supposed to be collected, by the market clerk, the annual charge to be payable either all at once or monthly to the comptroller, this annual charge amounting to a little less than the per diem formerly chargeable; but the amended ordinance puts this charge on all the stall owners, not excepting the butchers, heretofore excepted in the prior provision.

In Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341, 24 L. Ed. 659, the Supreme Court, in dealing with a delegation of power by ordinance,

said:

"If the city council had lawful authority to construct the sidewalks, involved in it was the right to direct the mayor and the chairman of the committee on streets and alleys to make a contract on behalf of the city doing the work. *** It is true the council could not delegate all the power conferred upon it by the Legislature, but, like every other corporation, it could do its ministerial work by agents. Noth ing more was done in this case," and "there was therefore no unlawful delegation of power."

The right to delegate power by municipal authorities rests upon the same principle and is controlled in the same way as the delegation of legislative power by the state. Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 26 Fla. 193, 7 South. 885, 9 L. R. A. 69, 23 Am. St. Rep. 558; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 294; Gregg v. Laird, 121 Md. 1, 87 Atl. 1111; People v. Trunk Ry. Co., 232 Ill. 292, 83 N. E. 839; Charleston v. Goldsmith, 2 Speers (S. C.) 428; Baltimore City v. Gahan, 104 Md. 152, 64 Atl. 716.

[5] We think that fixing the rent of market stalls in the city of Baltimore is an administrative, and not a legislative, function, and may be delegated to the clerks of the markets, as provided by the ordinance in question. The power to rent the stalls in the markets of Baltimore city was delegated by ordinance approved April 11, 1797, to the clerks of the several markets, and the power has been continued in some form by subsequent city legislation. City Code, 1869, 1879, 1893, and 1906.

In Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 26 Fla. 193, 7 South. 885, 9 L. R. A. 69, 23 Am. St. Rep. 558, a public market ordinance containing somewhat similar provisions as those in section

stitutes the board of estimates for the mayor. It is a copy of Code, § 17, with the exception that the license is made $10 per annum instead of $5, and the board of estimates is substituted for the comptroller.

These sections, we think, are free from the objections urged against them, and the court below committed an error in holding them invalid.

The mayor and council could not by ordinance authorize the clerks of the markets, with the approval of the board of estimates, to increase the rent of any stall, where the annual rent had been fixed by the contract of sale and purchase. It is admitted by the appellants that the ordinance only empowers the fixing of the rent of all stalls not fixed by contract. The ordinance as thus construed-that is, as applying only to stalls as to which the rent is not fixed by contractwould not be open to the contention that its enforcement would impair the obligation of a contract, and with this construction it will not be necessary for us to discuss further this objection to the ordinance.

As was said by this court, in Bond v. M. & C. C. of Baltimore, 116 Md. 690, 82 Atl. 978, it cannot be assumed in this case that the city will undertake to condemn or take property for purposes other than those authorized by law. The presumption is that the city will act within its rights, and not beyond them.

[7] Section 3 of the ordinance provides that the license fees hereinbefore provided for shall be due and payable as of May 1, 1913. The ordinance was approved on July 25, 1913.

It is earnestly insisted that this section is invalid: First, because it retroactively changes vested rights conferred by existing laws; and, secondly, because it is in con

"That all licenses imposed by ordinances shall be due and collectible in the first week in January in each year, and it shall be the duty of said collector of water rents and licenses to see that said licenses were paid at that time." While we do not think that the market li

The decree will be reversed, and the bill dismissed.

Decree reversed, and bill dismissed, with costs.

(123 Md. 249)

under an ordinance passed and approved on July 25, 1913, there can be no difficulty, however, in holding that the ordinance would take effect and operate prospectively. At least this objection would not be a ground or reason for holding the ordinance as invalid in this case and thus declaring it void.

[8] Nor do we think that section 59 of the charter, set out herein, applies to market licenses. In Meushaw v. State, 109 Md. 92, 71 Atl. 457, we held that this section applies to purely license taxes. The license fee, as provided by the ordinance, is for the use of a stall * for a definite period, and the license is also evidence of title in the grantee or assignee thereof to the stall, and does not fall within the provisions of section 59 of the city charter. The section provides that it shall be the duty of the collector of water rents and licenses to see that the licenses are paid at that time, and it appears, therefore, that this section applies to licenses to be collected by the collector of water rents and licenses, and not to market license. Market licenses in the city of Baltimore have been collected for many years by the comptroller, and have been dated as of May 1st: City Code 1906, art. 23, §§ 71, 101; sections 82, 91, and 92, as amended by Ordinance 283, May 20, 1907. [9] The fourth and sixth objections are clearly without force. The necessity and reasonableness of an ordinance when passed in pursuance of the charter powers of a municipality is primarily committed to the council, and, unless the ordinance is purely arbitrary, oppressive, or capricious, the courts will not interfere to prevent its enforcement. Gould v. Baltimore, 120 Md. 534, 87 Atl. 818; Richmond R. R. v. City of Richmond, 96 U. S. 521, 24 L. Ed. 734; Meushaw v. State, 109 Md. 91, 71 Atl. 457; Etchison v. Mayor of Frederick, 123 Md. 283,, 91 Atl. 161.

TO THIRD PERSONS

TRACTOR.

INDEPENDENT CON

The owner of a building contracted with a painter to paint it, he to furnish the appliances and employ the labor therefor, the owner not retaining any supervision of the work or any control over the men, and the contractor used a stage fastened by guy lines which were not tight enough, and which allowed the stage to slip, so that he fell therefrom and struck plaintiff as she was passing on the sidewalk below. Held, that the negligence was the negligence of an independent contractor, for which the owner was not liable.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1242, 1243; Dec. Dig. § 316.*]

2. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 316*)-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS-PUBLIC NUISANCE-ENDANGERING PUBLIC STREET.

pendent contractor to paint it, and the contracThe owner of a building employed an indetor negligently fastened the guy ropes so that the stage on which he was painting slipped, and he fell and struck plaintiff on the sidewalk below. It appeared that the work was done in the usual way, and there was no evidence that it was customary to erect guards over sidewalks above which men were painting from a while an abutting owner causing a nuisance to suspended stage during the work. Held that, be erected on his property, is not excused from liability for an injury therefrom to a person using the street because he employs an independ ent contractor to do the work, yet, as the suspension of the stage above the sidewalk was not such a menace to the safety of those using it as to amount to a nuisance, the owner was not liable.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1242, 1243; Dec. Dig. § 316.*]

3. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 321*)-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS-USE OF BUILDING-ENDANGERING PUBLIC STREETS.

Such conditions were not such that the in

jury might have been anticipated by the owner as the probable consequence of the work if he failed to take proper precaution to prevent it, and hence the owner was not liable; although, if the injury had been such that he should have anticipated it, he would have been liable.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1262; Dec. Dig. § 321.*] 4. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 321*)-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS-PUBLIC NUISANCE-ENDANGERING PUBLIC STREET.

tied.

The question whether an injury might reasonably have been anticipated by the owner of a building abutting on a public street as a probable consequence of work, such as painting and repairing, which he has done by an independent contractor is generally a question of fact for the jury.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1274-1277; Dec. Dig. § 832.*]

6. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 330*)-ACTION FOR INJURY PRESUMPTION AND BURDEN OF

PROOF.

Plaintiff, in an action for injury from being struck by an independent contractor who fell from a painter's stage suspended from defendant's building over the sidewalk, by reason of his negligent fastening of the guy ropes, had the burden of showing that defendant owner was guilty of negligence; and the mere fact that the contractor fell and injured him would not justify an inference of defendant's negligence.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1270-1272; Dec. Dig. § 330.*]

7. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 330*)—ACTION FOR INJURY PRESUMPTION AND BURDEN OF PROOF "RES IPSA LOQUITUR."

The maxim "res ipsa loquitur," meaning that, although there must be reasonable evidence of negligence, yet where the thing is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those in control use proper care, affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the accident arose from want of care, could not apply to the owner of a building who had no control over a contractor engaged in painting it, through whose negligence plaintiff was injured.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1270-1272; Dec. Dig. § 330.*

Where witnesses stated that it was not generally necessary to erect barriers on the sidewalk to prevent persons from using it when painting from a suspended stage, and that he had never seen a man fall from a stage, his opinion as to whether the suspension of the stage above the sidewalk made the sidewalk dangerous or more dangerous was incompetent, since it was the very question the jury had to decide on all the evidence in the case.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 2186-2195, 2248; Dec. Dig. § 472.*]

11. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1056*)—HARMLESS ERROR-ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE.

The exclusion of such opinion, if error, was harmless, where it appeared that the witness had seen a man fall from a different kind of scaffold, which fact would not have aided the jury in determining whether there was any reason for defendant to anticipate injury from the falling of a man from a staging such as was used in the present case.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4187-4193, 4207; Dec. Dig. § 1056.*]

Appeal from Baltimore City Court; Henry D. Harlan, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Action by Carrie P. Weilbacher against the J. W. Putts Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BURKE, THOMAS, PATTISON, URNER, STOCKBRIDGE, and CONSTABLE, JJ.

R. Lee Slingluff and Thomas Foley Hisky, both of Baltimore, for appellant. Clarence A. Tucker, of Baltimore (Samuel J. Harman, Charles H. Knapp, and Joseph N. Ulman, all of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

In an action for damages by being struck by an independent contractor who fell from a staging suspended over the sidewalk by reason of his own negligence in fastening the guy ropes, where the president of the defendant owner testified for plaintiff that the contract for painting was given to the contractor and that the owner had nothing to do with the work, did not employ the men engaged in it, or control the methods, the plaintiff had a right to ask on redirect who owned the appliances used in the work, but not to inquire whether defendant took any precaution to safeguard travel on the sidewalk below; since the latter question did not relate to any matter covered by the cross-examination.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1270-1272; Dec. Dig. § 330.*]

9. MASTER AND SERVANT (§ 330*)-ACTION FOR INJURY EVIDENCE RELEVANCY - SIMILAR OCCURRENCE.

Evidence as to whether witness had ever known paint buckets, brushes, or ropes to fall from ladders or scaffolds used in painting buildings was irrelevant and inadmissible. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Note.-For Servant, Cent. Dig. 88 1270-1272; Dec. Dig. § 330.*]

ed by the negligence of the J. W. Putts Company, a corporation, the defendant below and appellee in this court, and, as the case was withdrawn from the jury at the close of the plaintiff's testimony, on the ground that there was no "evidence in the case legally sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover under the pleadings," it will be necessary to refer to the pleadings and evidence.

the roof of said building, over and above the sidewalk along said building on Park avenue, in a negligent and unskillful manner, in that the defendant, its servants and agents, neglected to make said scaffold fast by proper guy lines," and that, as a result of such neglect, the ladder or scaffold slipped, and one of the defendant's servants, who was working on the ladder, was precipitated to the sidewalk, and, in falling, struck the plaintiff, who was passing along the sidewalk, and seriously and permanently injured her.

The amended second count charges that the injury to the plaintiff was caused by the negligence of the defendant, "its agents and servants, in erecting, using, and operating said ladder or scaffold, in that the defendant, its agents and servants, in charge thereof negligently failed and omitted to properly fasten said ladder or scaffold with guy lines," by reason of which negligence the defendant's servant "slipped and fell from said ladder" to the sidewalk, and struck the plaintiff.

The third count avers that the defendant caused the ladder or scaffold to be suspended from the roof of the building over and above the sidewalk for the purpose of painting the building; that the erection and use of the ladder or scaffold "endangered the travel" on the sidewalk, and that it became the duty of the defendant to "guard said work" and sidewalk for the protection and safety of persons using the sidewalk, which the defendant failed to do, and that by reason of said failure on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff, while passing along the sidewalk, "was struck by the defendant's servant in falling from said ladder," and seriously injured.

It appears from the evidence in the case that the appellee owned, and was conducting, a store in the building on the northwest corner of Park avenue and Fayette street, two of the public streets of Baltimore city, and in August, 1911, contracted with Crooks, Zick & Co. for the painting of the outside or exterior wood and metal work of the building. Crooks, Zick & Co. submitted a bid for the work in writing on the 24th of August, and the bid was accepted by the defendant verbally. The building was six stories high, and the painting was done in the usual way from a "stage" or scaffold about 24 by 30 feet long (which resembles a ladder in a horizontal position with boards on it), suspended on the outside of the building above the sidewalk by ropes fastened to each end of the stage and attached to L-shaped hooks, which were hooked to the cornice of the building and kept in place by guy lines extending over the roof and tied to a chimney. On the day of the accident Zick, a member of the firm of Crooks, Zick & Co., the contractors, and two employés of the firm were engaged in doing the painting. After working in the morning they changed the position of the stage, so that at the time of the accident the stage,

was at the top of the fourth floor of the building, just outside of and about on a level with the cornice of a bay window which extended beyond the building line and over the sidewalk. Zick and one of the employés of the firm were on the stage, and Zick was kneeling with one knee on the stage and the other knee on the top of the bay window, when the rope slipped, one end of the stage was slightly lowered, and Zick lost his balance and fell to the sidewalk. The man on the stage with Zick did not fall, nor did anything fall from the stage, and the other employé of Crooks, Zick & Co., who was painting from the cornice above, testified that the lowering of one end of the stage, which caused Zick to lose his balance, was due to the fact that the guy rope was "not tied tight enough”—that is, it was not taut—and that as soon as it was "stretched tight enough" the stage stopped; that shortly before the accident he was on the roof of the building and noticed that the guy line was not "tied tight enough"; and that when he went down he told Mr. Zick so. In falling from the stage Zick struck the plaintiff's foot as she was walking along the sidewalk, and seriously injured her. The evidence further shows that the stage extended beyond the building line and over the sidewalk; that the defendant knew of the position of the stage, and did not erect any barrier on the street or "rope the street off" to prevent persons walking on the pavement under the stage; that defendant did not employ the men engaged in painting the building, had nothing to do with the methods used in the performance of the work, did not exercise any control "over the appliances, methods or men used or engaged in the work," and that the appliances belonged to Crooks, Zick & Co.

As we have said, the case was withdrawn from the jury at the close of the testimony offered by the plaintiff, so that in reviewing that ruling we are dealing with the case as presented by the pleadings and the plaintiff's evidence.

[1] The first and amended second counts of the declaration declare that the injury complained of was caused by the negligence of the defendant's servants in failing to make the stage or scaffold fast by "proper guy lines," and in neglecting to "properly fasten" the scaffold "with guy lines." The evidence shows that the accident was, as alleged, due to the fact that the guy lines were not properly fastened, or, as the witness expressed it, were not "tied tight enough," but it also shows that the work was not done by the defendant, but by Crooks, Zick & Co., who contracted to do it and furnish the appliances and employed the labor for that purpose, and that the defendant did not have supervision of the work or any control over the men engaged in it. The negligence of which the plaintiff complains in the first two counts was not, therefore, the negligence of the defendant or its servants, but the negligence