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Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 441, where, at page 443, ( necessary for the complainant to follow all Chancellor Kent says:

the changes in ownership that may occur while "There is no principle better established, nor

the bill is pending. Clearly this contention

would be untenable. The same necessity which one founded on more indispensable necessity, than that the purchase of the subject-matter requires that all of the owners should be joined in controversy, pendente lite, does not vary the to begin with requires that all the owners rights of the parties in that suit, who are not Otherwise it might be possible for the widow

should be kept continually before the court. to receive any prejudice from the alienation. Story, Eq. Pỉ. § 156; 1 Dan. Ch. Pl. & Pr. to bring her bill against all of the owners at

the time of filing of the bill, and then subse280.

quently to discontinue as to some of them. Such An assignee under a voluntary assignment discontinuance would, of course, relieve those as may be made a party, when desirable, at the to whom the bill is discontinued of any liabilelection of the plaintiff. Story, Eq. Pl. & 156. ity for dower, and thus the widow might main

tain a bill for dower against certain ones while [2] Purchasers pendente lite cannot be at the same time relieving others who were made parties without the complainant's con- just as liable. She would thus be able to acsent. Steele v. Taylor, 1 Minn. 274 (Gil. complish by indirection the result which the

statute plainly prohibits, that is, the choice of 210).

certain persons out of whom dower is to be "The rule is that it is proper to make par-collected and the release of others. ties all incumbrancers whose claims arose before "This court has already decided that all of the commencement of the suit, but not those the owners of all the land out of which dower who purchased pendente lite." Miller v. Ker- is sought must be joined. To allow the owners shaw, Bailey, Eq. (S. C.) 469, 471, 23 Am. Dec. of a part of the land out of which dower is 183.

sought to be unrepresented because of alienaIn this state the law as to purchasers tion of the land, or because of the death of the pendente lite has, however, been modified by obviously leave matters in the same position as

parties against whom the bill is brought, would chapter 315, P. L. § 2, passed April 21, 1882. if the bill were brought against all to begin The provision has remained the same in the with and then were discontinued as to some. revisions since its passage, and is now section We have already seen that that would enable

the widow to accomplish by indirection what 13 of chapter 291, Gen. Laws 1909, which the statute forbids. Since the allowing of reads as follows:

alienees or heirs at law and devisees to be un“Sec. 13. No proceeding in court, hereafter represented accomplishes the same result as taken, whether by filing bill, petition, declara- would a discontinuance as to certain of the tion, or other complaint, or rule of court, or parties, and that course must be held to be otherwise, and no final order, decree, or judg- forbidden because it would work a circumvention ment, concerning the title to any real estate, of the statute, it must follow that the cause in this state, or to any interest or easement, cannot proceed while alienees or heirs at law therein, shall affect such title (excepting as to and devisees are not represented before the parties thereto and their heirs and devisees, court.' and those having actual notice thereof) as to It does not seem clear that a discontinuany rights acquired before notice of the filing, ance as to any respondent or the failure to or entry, of the same shall be recorded in the records of land evidence in the town or city make the alienee or heir at law or devisee of where such real estate is situated; such notice a respondent a party would enable the comto be copied in a book duly indexed and kept plainant, as counsel says: for that purpose. The notice shall briefly state the names of all the parties, the court wherein which the statute plainly prohibits, that is, the

"To accomplish by indirection the result filed, the date of filing, and the substance of the choice of certain persons out of whom dower is bill,' petition, declaration, or other complaint, to be collected and the release of others.” rule, order, decree, or judgment, and a description of the real estate thereby affected, so far The statute makes no such prohibition. It as may be necessary to warn any person subse- provides that the widow may bring a suit in quently dealing with the title to the land."

equity against all of the persons owning the [3] Therefore, by the terms of the stat- said lands. She could have brought sepaute, the title of purchasers pendente lite of rate suits against all the several owners or the lands prior to the recording of the notice against any of them, leaving out any that provided in the statute, and not having actụal she saw fit to leave out. She could thus notice, cannot be affected by any proceeding have accomplished exactly what respondents' in the suit. No reason appears, therefore, counsel say is prohibited by the statute perfor making them parties to the suit, as such mitting her to bring a suit against all the a proceeding would avail nothing. They persons owning the said lands. would not be affected by the decree. Those

The right of the complainant to bring a sephaving actual notice are excepted by the arate suit against each of the owners of the statute, and are therefore left in the same several parcels into which the lands of her position as though the statute had not been husband have been divided, and to obtain passed. They are necessary parties. her dower from each, if she shows that she They take cum onere, and would be bound is dowable out of the land held by such ownby the decree.

er, is not disputed. In the absence of a statThe necessity of making heirs or devisees ute permitting her to bring a suit against of a deceased respondent parties to the all the owners, she would have been confined suit, before the suit can proceed, is argued to such separate suits against the several by respondents' counsel, as follows:

owners, as a suit against all would have been "It may be contended that all that the statute requires is that all of the owners of the lands open to the objection of being multifarious. ont of which dower is sought should be joined To relieve this situation, the statute was when the bill is brought, but that it is not passed providing that:

"Whenever a widow shall be entitled to dow- have been passed for the purpose of facili

} er in several parcels of land, whether the fee tating the recovery of dower rather than of of the same be in the heir at law, devisee, grantee or a subsequent holder, she may bring a

impeding it. suit in equity against all the persons owning

In 5 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 840, h. Suits in the said lands."

Equity—(1) Generally, it is said: Having brought suit under the statute "The death of one of several defendants to a against all the owners, how is the right suit in equity abates the suit as to him; but which she before had to recover her dower the surviving defendants when there are such

the suit may proceed without revivor against from the owner of each of said parcels affect- persons before the court as make it possible to ed? When this case was formerly before render a final decree in the cause. But where this court, 32 R. I. 361, 79 Atl. 972, in an- the deceased defendant was a necessary party swer to the sixteenth question then submitted, death abates the suit."

to the determination of the controversy, his the court held, that suit being brought under

[5] In this state Gen. Laws 1909, c. 285, said statute, it “must be brought against all

§ 5, provides: persons owning the land out of which dower

“In any case where there are two or more is sought." The court, however, said:

plaintiffs or defendants, if one or more of them “We do not mean by this that it is neces- shall die, and the cause of action shall survive sary to include in the suit all the land out of to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or against which the widow was originally entitled to be the surviving defendant or defendants, the writ

It may well have happened that be- or action shall not be thereby abated, but the fore this suit was brought some of the owners death being suggested upon the record, the acof the land did set off the widow's dowel there- tion shall proceed at the suit of the surviving in, or agreed with her upon some substantial plaintiff or plaintiffs, or against the surviving equivalent in lieu thereof. In such a case there defendant or defendants.” would be no necessity for the widow to include

Gen. Laws 1909, c. 289, § 11, provides: those with whom settlements had been made as parties respondent in her bill."

"No supplemental bill, or bill of revivor, shall

be necessary in equity, but the superior court, Would this right of the widow to effect a by general rule or by special order, may provide settlement with any of the respondents and for the introduction of any supplemental matthus obtain her dower or a satisfactory equiv- ter inte the suit by way of addition to or amend

ment of the bill, and for entering upon the recalent therefor cease upon her bringing a suit ord the decease of any party, and for bringing against all? Her dower in each of said in the heirs, personal representatives, and othparcels is still the object of her suit, although ers interested.” it is brought under the statute, against all And Gen. Laws 1909, c. 329, § 14, provides: the owners of the several parcels out of "No action of dower shall abate by the death which she is seeking dower.

of the defendant named therein, where the de[4] Is her right to the recovery of dower fendant is tenant of the freehold, if the property

devise or from the owners of the several parcels affected such death being suggested, the heir or devisee by the bringing of the suit against all? In ef- shall be summoned to appear within a certain fect, does the statute do anything more than time, to be prescribed in the discretion of the

in enable her to bring suit, upon her several upon him the defense of the suit, and the suit rights to have dower out of the several par- shall proceed against him in the same mancels against the several owners of said parcels ner as if he had been the original defendant.” together, in form, one suit, but in reality, so The provision in chapter 289, § 11, "for far as her right to recover dower from the entering upon the record the decease of any owners of the several parcels is concerned, an party, and for bringing in the heirs, personal aggregation of the several suits against the representatives, and others interested,” apseveral owners? Are the rights of dower plies of necessity to the bringing in of perwhich she had before suit against each owner sons interested, as well in the case of "heirs, . so tied together upon her bringing one suit devisees or personal representatives," as in against all, under the permission given by the the case of others interested.Heirs or statute, that thereafter she cannot recover her devisees would ordinarily be interested, but dower against any owner, unless all persons in the case at bar it would not be to their who may have acquired an interest in any of interest to be brought in and made subject the several parcels of land as heir, devisee, to the decree, but quite the reverse. If the or alienee of any respondent are brought in complainant wanted to subject them to the and kept before the court? Have the rights decree, her interest would be to have them to have dower out of each parcel been fused brought in; but, if she was not willing to by the suit brought against all the owners take the trouble to do so, none of the other into one right recoverable against all or parties to the suit would be interested to none? That appears to be the effect of the have them brought in, unless their not becontention of counsel for respondents. Is ing so brought in would injuriously affect this a necessary conclusion? Such a conclu- such other parties. Outside of that consion would render it necessary to decide that sideration, it would not seem to be necessary

, the right which she had before suit to re- to make them parties, and that the suit could cover her dower from the owners severally proceed against the other parties respondent of each of the parcels of land was destroyed who are before the court. The provision in the moment that she brought suit against all chapter 329, 8 14, providing that upon the

§ under a statute which it would seem must suggestion of the death of a party "the heir or devisee shall be summoned to appear with-, onere, and need not be made a party. Conin a certain time, to be prescribed in the sequently no necessity exists, so far as his discretion of the court in which the action rights are concerned, of making him a party. is pending, and take upon him the defense If he acquired the land with actual notice, of the suit, and the suit shall proceed against he will be bound by the decree, and, if he him in the same manner as if he had been acquired it without actual notice, he will not the original defendant,” clearly applies to be affected by the decree. In case of the the prosecution of the suit against such heir death of a party respondent, if the complainor devisee in seeking the object of the suit, ant causes the heir or devisee to be made a in the same manner as if he had been the party, then the cause proceeds against such original defendant. The section immediately heir or devisee. If the complainant does not precedes the section under which this action cause the heir or devisee to be made a party, is brought. Prior to that chapter 329 had then she can have no decree affecting him. dealt only with cases brought against the The decree, therefore, can cause no injustice individual owner of the land. In the case of to him. one defendant, manifestly it would be neces

It is true that upon the entry of decree sary to have his heir or devisee made a party there might be some parcels of the land held upon the death of the defendant being sug- by alienees of respondents not having actual gested, and the complainant would plainly notice, and by heirs or devisees of deceased be interested in suggesting the death and respondents who had not been brought in having him made a party in order to proceed and made parties. Such alienees, heirs, or effectually to a decree against him. The devisees would not be affected by the decree.

. section, however, in our opinion does not The complainant, however, would be concludaffect the question of the prosecution of the ed by the decree, and such alienees, heirs at suit against the other defendants, if any be- law, or devisees would not be injured. fore the court. Such other defendants would

Would the other respondents, those who rebe interested only where the failure to bring mained parties to the suit at the entry of desuch heir or devisee before the court and cree, be prejudiced by the decree? subject him to the decree would injuriously

The court, in proceeding to "cause the dowaffect them. In order to show that such er of the complainant in all of the said parother respondents would be injuriously af- cels to be assigned in one parcel or in contigfected by the failure to make the alienee of uous parcels out of the lands,” could not a respondent or the heir or devisee of a de- well include in such parcel or parcels, so asceased respondent a party, counsel for re- signed, the lands out of which · dower or spondents cite the provision in said chapter ed by the complainant before suit, as the

a satisfactory equivalent had been secur329, § 15, that in any such suit:

“The court, according to the course of equity owners of such lands were not required to in marshaling incumbrances, may cause the be made parties. Sprague v. Stevens, 32 R. dower of such widow in all of the said parcels I. 361, 376, 79 Atl. 972. If any respondent to be assigned in one parcel or in contiguous has, after suit brought, conveyed his parcel or devisee of such deceased husband, or other to one not having actual notice, or if the wise according to equity.

heir or devisee of any deceased respondent And they argue as follows:

has not been brought in and made a party to “Under this statute the court or master to the suit, no dower can be recovered by the whom the case might be assigned might pro- complainant from the parcels so conveyed, ceed, if it be found that the widow is dowable, descended to the heir, or devised. Therefore to set off her dower by having transferred to no dower from such parcels could be charged her some one or more of the parcels of land,

and charge the owners of other par: upon the owners of the other parcels. If cels so as to cause them to bear their propor- dower should be assigned by the court in one tion of the burden. But, if all of the owners parcel or in contiguous parcels, it could be so were not represented before the court, the de- assigned out of the parcels of the parties re

thus it might and inevitably would follow that at spondent at the time of the decree. The the conclusion of the action numerous claims statute, after providing that the dower may would still remain unadjusted.”

be assigned in a contiguous parcel or parcels, In this case, all the owners of the several out of the lands of the heirs at law or devparcels of land were joined as parties under isee of such deceased husband, adds the the statute. This having been done, and all words "or otherwise according to equity," inhaving been brought before the court the dicating clearly that the court is to be free right of the complainant to dower out of the to assign the dower in such way as under the parcel of each owner, we think, must be con- circumstances will do equity. Is it to be sup. cluded by this suit. If a party respondent posed that under such circumstances a court conveys the parcel owned by him, then if of equity would proceed to cause the dower such conveyance is made before the record of of the widow to be assigned in one parcel or notice of lis pendens required by Gen. Laws in contiguous parcels out of those lands from 1909, c. 294, § 13, the title of the alienee is which, by failure to make such alienees, heirs, not affected by any proceeding in this suit, or devisees parties, she had failed to secure unless the alienee had actual notice. If he her dower, or, on the other hand, that the had actual notice, he takes the land cum court would in such assignment charge upon

* *

the respondents remaining and subject to the this very subject of parties, as containing a saldecree any burden for the dower which the utary admonition and instructive lesson, that complainant had thus failed to recover? it is the duty of every court of equity to adapt

its practice and course of proceeding, as far as Such assignment could only be made out of possible, to the existing state of society, and to the lands of the respondents remaining par- apply its jurisdiction to all new cases which, ties at the time of the decree, and would from the progress daily making in the affairs of work no hardship, as such lands would only strict an adherence to forms and rules estab

men, must continually arise, and not, from too be subjected to the burden of the dower re- lished under very different circumstances, to decovered from such lands.

cline to administer justice, and to enforce rights, [6] We therefore do not think that, be- for which there is no other remedy"--citing cause the statute permits the complainant to Lord Cottenham in Mare v. Malachy, '1 Myl. & join all the owners of the lands, it therefore

[7] As to the questions relative to the apfollows that it is necessary that every alienee pendente lite of a respondent and every heir plicability of rules 14 and 15 of the superior or devisee of a deceased respondent should court in the cases cited in the questions cerbe brought before the court before the suit tified, we do not think that said rules are apbe brought before the court before the suit plicable. These rules do not refer to or procan proceed. We think the provisions, as to vide for the procedure in case of the death parties, of the statutes we have cited, supra, of parties or the alienation by parties of apply to this proceeding as to other suits in equity. The subject of parties in suits in lands in suit. Both rules embody exceptions equity is too broad and the exceptions are long acted upon by courts of equity.

to the rule as to parties which have been too numerous for extended comment; but, as illustrative of some of the principles upon founded upon the utter impracticability of

The exception embodied in rule 14 is the subject under consideration, we quote making the new proper or necessary parties, from Story's Eq. Pl. $ 77, as follows:

“Let us, therefore, before entering upon the as when such new parties are not within the more particular considerations applicable to jurisdiction. this subject, examine into and consider the gen- The exception embodied in rule 15 is eral nature of the exceptions which have been founded upon the case of exceedingly numerpersons legally or beneficially interested in the ous parties, where it would be impracticable subject matter of a suit should be made parties, to join them without manifest inconvenience or, if the expression be deemed more exact and and oppressive delays. Both, however, refer satisfactory, that all persons who are interested to and provide for the exception of parties, in the object of the bill are necessary and proper parties. All these exceptions will be found proper and necessary, who would have to be

. to be governed by one and the same principle, made parties but for the exception. In this which is that, as the object of the general rule case the persons who were necessary and is to accomplish the purposes of justice between all the parties in interest, and it is a rule found proper parties have been made parties to the ed, in some sort, upon public convenience and suit. When parties respondents convey their policy, rather than upon positive principles of lands, or die, then the decision of the quesmunicipal or general jurisprudence, courts of tion whether the alienees in the one case and equity will not suffer it to be so applied as to the heirs or devisees in the other must be defeat the very purposes of justice, if they can dispose of the merits of the case before them made parties depends, not upon the number without prejudice to the rights or interests of of said persons or the difficulty of making other persons who are not parties, or if the cir- them parties, but upon the question whether cumstances of the case render the application of the rule wholly impracticable. On the other they are necessary parties without the preshand, if complete justice between the parties ence of whom the court will not proceed to a before the court cannot be done without others decree; and upon that question said rules being made parties whose rights or interests 14 and 15 afford no assistance, and are not will be prejudiced by a decree, then the court will altogether stay its proceedings, even though applicable. those other parties cannot be brought before the

In accordance with the reasons above excourt, for in such cases the court will not, by pressed, said questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, its endeavors to do justice between the parties 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are answered in the before it, risk the doing of positive injustice to other parties not before it whose claims are or negative. may be equally meritorious."

Having thus answered the questions certiAnd also the remark in section 76, C, Id.: fied, the papers in the cause, with our deci“And here it may be proper to state the re- sion certified thereon, are sent back to the mark of a learned chancellor, speaking upon superior court for further proceedings.

91 A-4

(37 R. I. 141)

“The owner of shares of stock or of bonds or RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL TRUST Co. of debentures of any corporation liable to a tax v. RHODES et al., City Assessors.

upon its corporate excess under the foregoing

provisions shall be exempt from taxation in this (No. 4722.)

state thereon." (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. June 30,

And section 39 of said chapter, paragraph 1914.)

8, provides that: TAXATION ($ 164*)-CORPORATIONS.

"No person, copartnership or corporation shall A New Jersey holding company, organized be taxed for shares of stock held in, or for to carry on business without the state and au- bonds or debentures of, any corporation liable thorized to purchase, hold, and dispose of the se- under the laws of this state to a tax upon the curities of any government railroad or public corporate excess of such corporation." service corporation, acquired the stock of street railway and railroad corporations in Rhode Is- Corporations liable to a tax upon its corland. Most of its directors resided in Rhode porate excess are pointed out in section 9 of Island and notices of directors' meetings were sent out from its Rhode Island Office. The only said tax act, which section is preceded by the business it carried on was the collection of rent caption as part of the act: “Taxation of from its Rhode Island property. Held, that Manufacturing, Mercantile and Miscellanethe holding company was carrying on business ous Corporations.” So much of said section

(, c. 769), providing that every corporation car" 9 as shows the basis for the claim of exemprying on business for profit in the state shall be tion from taxation is as follows: subject to taxation upon its corporate assets, "Sec. 9. Every corporation and joint stock liable for such taxes, and stockholders, under company or association, wherever incorporated, the direct provisions of section 20, held their carrying on business for profit in this state, all shares free from taxes.

hereinafter referred to under the term 'corpora[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, tion,'

in addition to taxes on its real Cent. Dig. § 286; Dec. Dig. & 164.*]

estate and tangible personal property locally

or otherwise assessed, shall pay an annual tax Exceptions from Superior Court, Provi- to the state upon the value of that portion of dence and Bristol Counties;

Charles F. its intangible property hereinafter called its

corporate excess." Stearns, Judge.

Petition by the Rhode Island Hospital Trust The meaning of the expression "corporate Company against Elisha H. Rhodes and excess" and the method of determining its others, as assessors of taxes of the city of value are set forth in said tax act, but their Providence, for relief from an assessment. consideration is not involved in the present Petition was denied, and petitioner excepted. inquiry. Exceptions sustained.

The parties agree that the sole issue or quesClaude R. Branch, Edward P. Jastram,

tion in this case is whether or not the United and Edwards & Angell, all of Providence Traction & Electric Company was during the (Tillinghast & Collins, of Providence, of coun- year 1912 a corporation “carrying on business

for profit in this state" within the meaning sel), for petitioner. Albert A. Baker, City Sol., and Elmer S. Chace, Asst. City Sol., that the United Traction & Electric Company

of said Tax Act of 1912. It is also agreed both of Providence, for respondents.

is a corporation, and that it was incorporated BAKER, J. This is a petition for relief in New Jersey in May, 1893.

Article 2 of its certificate of incorporation from an assessment made by the assessors of taxes of the city of Providence. Jury trial provides that: was waived, and the case was tried October be conducted and carried on beyond the limits

"A part of the business of said company is to 15, 1913, before a justice of the superior of the state of New Jersey and the places where court, who denied the prayer of the petition. such part of its business is to be conducted and The petitioner excepted to said decision and carried on are the District of Columbia, and

states of New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island afterwards duly took the steps necessary to and Massachusetts, and the principal office or bring the matter before this court on its place of business of said company out of this bill of exceptions.

state is to be situated in the city of Providence The petitioner asks for relief from a tax in the state of Rhode Island.” which it, as trustee under the will of Walter Article 3 specifies and enumerates the obA. Peck, paid under protest October 18, 1912, jects for which the company was formed. on 350 shares of the capital stock of the These objects are numerous, and the comUnited Traction & Electric Company. The pany's powers are broad and comprehensive. assessors assessed the petitioner on account Among the enumerated objects for which of these shares of stock on a valuation of it is authorized to carry on business are $37,012 at the rate of $4 a thousand. The these : United Traction & Electric Company in 1912 "To purchase, hold, use, dispose of and sell made the return required of corporations the securities of any government or of any liable to a tax upon their corporate excess. railway or other corporation, private, public or

municipal, whether such securities shall be The petitioner claims that it is entitled to ex- bonds, mortgages, debentures, notes or shares of emption from taxation on these shares of capital stock and to exercise all the rights of stock under the provisions of the Tax Act of stockholders as to such capital stock. 1912. Section 20 of said act (chapter 769, to pledge or mortgage, if necessary, its fran

to borrow money with or without security and Pub. Laws 1912) provides that:

chises and property of every kind whatsoever;

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

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