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for religious bodies as well as land held by ecclesiastical officers. The section would read:·

"That any real estate dedicated," etc., "and also real estate which has been heretofore granted," etc., "to any ecclesiastical officer," etc.

This is open to objection, as is the prior suggestion, in that it changes the verbiage of the act.

(3) By the use of the words "or otherwise," the section applies to real estate transferred to persons other than ecclesiastical officers for the use of a religious society, and makes the section apply to the matters referred to in section 1 and section 2 of the act. The section makes three classes of persons when read thus:

ated, or intended to be dedicated or appropriat"That any real estate dedicated or appropried, to purposes of religious worship for the use of any congregation or society, and which has been heretofore granted, devised or demised to office (2) by the designation of such office (3) or any person or persons (1) in any ecclesiastical otherwise, shall be deemed to be held in trust for the benefit of the congregation or society using the same,'

operations, land held as James Canby held the land in question, and to relate only to land held by an ecclesiastical officer, which Canby, as trustee, surely was not. This is the contention of the defendant, who urges that it applies only to conveyances theretofore made to an ecclesiastical officer by the designation of his office, and certainly does not include grants to laymen as trustees for an unincorporated religious society. If this be true, then in 1858 on the death of James Canby (whose conveyance in 1856 was ineffectual under section 2) the title did not escheat to the state and did not pass to the complainant by the deed of the Secretary of State. The consequences of so holding were bewildering even to the solicitor for the defendant, who made what was even to him a very unsatisfactory explanation as to the devolution of the beneficial title on the death of James Canby. It leaves the question in a hopelessly confused and incomplete condition. The most reasonable view of section 3, and the one adopted, is this: Section 3 relates to all land dedicated or appropriated, or intended to be dedicated or appropriated, to purposes of religious worship for the use of any congregation or society, whether the dedication or appropriation be made to lay-ignation of any ecclesiastical office, and secmen as trustees in trust for the society, or whether it be transferred to any person in any ecclesiastical office by the designation of such office or otherwise. It was intended to apply to matters referred to in section 1 and section 2. This is obviously the purpose of the act. It was not to pull down, confuse or invalidate rights in land, but to secure them for the use of the religious society or congregation, and also subject the land to certain existing restrictions. This purpose was effected by treating the act in one or the other of several ways, and so far as the particular case in hand is concerned it is unimportant which one of several inconsistent views is correct, so long as by some the title is considered good. Three interpretations of this section are urged:

(1) The complainant urges that the word "or" be substituted for the word "and" where it first occurs in the section, so that it would read thus:

"That any real estate of the description named in the second section of this act, or which has been heretofore granted," etc.

There is authority for such substitution in some cases in construing laws in deference to the meaning of the context, the popular use of the words "or" and "and" being so loose and frequently inaccurate. 2 Lewis on Statutory Construction, § 397. This is plausible and perhaps correct, but is not as satisfactory an interpretation as another to be hereafter considered.

(2) The insertion of the words "also real estate" after the word "and" where first used would be in harmony with the general purpose of the act, and would make the section apply to real estate held by laymen in trust

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Section 1 of the act mentions transfers (1) to or for any person in any ecclesiastical office and (2) to or for any person by the des

tion 3 includes both of these as shown above. The words "or otherwise" must refer to something else than ecclesiastical officers or ecclesiastical offices. Naturally, it relates to transfers to laymen for the benefit of the society. This view of the act is consistent with the general purpose of the act, and its adoption does not involve the substitution or addition of words. For these reasons it seems correct, and is adopted in interpreting the section.

The result would be that by section 2 no title to lot A vested in the new trustees as grantees of the deed made in 1856 by James Canby, but he continued to hold the same until his death in 1858, and as at that time the religious society using, occupying and enjoying the real estate was then unincorporated, the title escheated to the state of Delaware under section 4, and by the deed of the Secretary of State vested in the complainant by virtue of section 5 of the act.

Lot B. The deed from Dure to trustees for the Society being made subsequent to 1855 was clearly within the prohibition of section 2 of the act of that year, and no right, title or interest vested in the persons the grantees therein, but remained in the grantor, and on his death passed under his will. Upon the incorporation of the Society in 1913 the legal and equitable title thereto either passed under-section 5 of the act of 1911, or was conveyed by the deed to the corporation from the heirs and devisees of Dure. It is conceded by the solicitor for the defendant that a good title to this relatively small part of the land was conveyed by the deed from the devisees of Dure.

In view of the conclusions stated above,

and because of the facts of this case, it is not necessary in this case to consider the bearing and effect on either branch of the title of section 5 of the act of March 14, 1911 (chapter 89, volume 26). This act was substantially a re-enactment of the very old statute constituting chapter 39 of the Revised Code; but being enacted subsequent to the act of 1855, with its stringent and radical provisions, it may have an important bearing, and perhaps a controlling influence, on titles to land granted, devised and demised to or for religious societies before and perhaps after 1855. Its provisions were not relied on by the complainant, or much discussed, by him and not at all by the solicitor for the defendant. The need to invoke the benefit of the act to obtain the legal title did not here arise, because there were actual conveyances of both branches of the title made to the complainant as a corporation by the holders of the legal title under James Canby or Henry F. Dure, or by the Secretary of State.

The conclusion reached as to the effect of the act of March 1, 1855, on title to land for religious societies are these: (1) Section 2 of that act applies to grants, conveyances, devises and leases of real estate made after the passage of the act of real estate dedicated prior to the passage thereof to religious worship. (2) Section 3 applies to such real estate so granted, conveyed, devised or leased before the passage of that act, whether the transfer be made to an ecclesiastical officer, or to laymen as trustees for the congregation or society, or otherwise.

ration, which will thereupon be vested with the title to the property.

The complainant is entitled to a decree for specific performance of the contract. Let a decree be entered accordingly.

(123 Md. 497)

FITZJARREL v. BOYD. (No. 5.) (Court of Appeals of Maryland. June 25, 1914.) 1. ACTION (§ 8*)-INDEMNITY INSURANCE RIGHT OF ACTION.

Where plaintiff, while a guest in defendant's automobile, was injured through defendant's negligence, and defendant was protected by liability insurance, that the insurance company was ultimately liable and would have to reimburse defendant for any recovery against him does not deprive the court of jurisdiction though it might not have been brought but for of an action by plaintiff against defendant, the fact of the insurance, and would affect the rights of insurer, who was not a party.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Action, Cent. Dig. §§ 9, 41; Dec. Dig. § 8.*] 2. NEGLIGENCE (§ 4*)-AUTOMOBILE-DUTY OF OWNER.

The owner of a motor car who invites a guest is liable for injuries received by the guest through his negligence; such guest being entitled to demand the exercise of ordinary care.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. § 4.*]

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; Chas. W. Heuisler, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Action by J. Cookman Boyd against Harry A. Fitzjarrel. From a judgment for plain

Transfers made to a person after 1855 of tiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

real estate theretofore or thereafter dedicated or appropriated to purposes of public worship for the use of any congregation or society were made ineffective to vest any title in the person to whom the transfer was made, but all such were valid if made to a religious corporation created under the particular law relating to such corporations. But the beneficial use of real estate which before the act was passed had been so dedicated and appropriated, was preserved for the society or congregation until it became incorporated. This applied to real estate whether it had been theretofore transferred to a person in an ecclesiastical office, or to a person by the designation of such office, or to lay men or trustees, or otherwise. In all such cases the persons holding the title transferred to them prior to 1855 could thereafter transfer it only to a religious corporation so incorporated, but during their lives held it in trust for the congregation or society using it. If no such transfer be made in the lifetime of the transferee the property at the death of the transferee would vest in the religious corporation, if there be one, and if not, then it escheats to the state. If the congregation occupying and enjoying the property afterwards becomes incorporated, the Secretary of State could convey the property to the corpo

Defendant's prayers 2 and 7 are as

follows:

(2) The defendant prays the court to rule, as a matter of law, that it appears from the uncontradicted evidence in this case that the plaintiff does not intend to enforce the collection of any judgment against defendant, and it further appearing that it is not the object or purpose of this suit to have adjudicated by this court any rights as between the plaintiff and the defendant, and it being undisputed that the object and purpose of this suit is solely and entirely to determine and fix the liability on a corporation, which is not a party to this proceeding, that therefore this court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and the verdict of the court shall be for the defendant. (Refused.)

a matter of law, that if it shall believe from the (7) The defendant prays the court to rule, as evidence that the plaintiff has brought this suit against the defendant with the purpose and object of attempting to fix the liability of some court shall find that there is no controversy becorporation not a party to this suit, and if the tween this plaintiff and this defendant with regard to the sum sued for, and that the plaintiff has no intention of making the defendant pay any verdict which may be rendered against him, then the subject-matter of this suit is beyond the jurisdiction of this court, and the verdict of the court shall be for the defendant. (Refused.)

Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, THOMAS, PATTISON, URNER, STOCKBRIDGE, and CONSTABLE, JJ.

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

Walter L. Clark, of Baltimore, for appellant. Peter J. Campbell, of Baltimore, for appellee.

BRISCOE, J. This is an action brought by the appellee against the appellant to recover damages for injuries sustained while riding in the defendant's automobile, as his guest, caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant. The case was tried in the superior court of Baltimore city, before the court sitting as a jury, and, from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $1,750, the de

fendant has appealed.

The declaration contains but one count, and it is as follows:

That the defendant on or about the 16th day of October, 1912, was the owner of and operated an automobile in the city of Baltimore and in Howard county, Md. That this plaintiff, at the invitation of the defendant, entered the automobile for the purpose and with the intention of being carried therein to Laurel, Md. That while riding in the automobile, and while exercising due care and caution on his part, the same was caused to skid and strike against a telegraph pole and overturn, and this plaintiff was thereby thrown from the automobile, his left arm was broken between the shoulder and elbow, his left ankle was sprained, his head was severely cut, his left forearm was badly bruised, he received severe bruises and contusions all over his body, he was severely injured in the left groin, he suffered from general shock to his system, and was further caused to suffer great physical pain and mental anguish. As a result thereof he was put to great cost for medical services, surgeon fees, and hospital charges; he was prevented for a long space of time from attending to his usual avocation, as an attorney at law, and thereby sustained great monetary loss, and other great, serious, and permanent wrongs and injuries were by him thereby sustained. That the said automobile was caused to skid, strike said telegraph pole and overturn by reason of the recklessness, want of care, default and negligence of the defendant, his servant and employé, in attempting to pass a vehicle upon the road on which they were traveling at a high rate of speed and against the protest of this plaintiff made to said defendant immediately before the happening thereof and

in time to have avoided the same.

The record contains a single exception, and that is to the ruling of the court upon the defendant's prayers.

The plaintiff offered no prayers, but the defendant presented eight. Two of these were granted, and six were refused. The exception to the fifth and sixth prayers is waived by the defendant in his brief, so the questions for our consideration are presented by the rulings of the court upon the defendant's first, second, seventh, and eight prayers. [1] The defendant relies upon two grounds as a basis of defense: First, that the court has no jurisdiction, because the proceeding is amicable and pretended and only for the purpose of affecting the rights of strangers not parties to the suit; and, second, because there is no evidence of actionable negligence, on the part of the defendant.

The objections to the jurisdiction were raised by a motion to dismiss and by the de

fendant's second and seventh prayers, offered at the conclusion of the whole evidence. The motion was overruled, and the two prayers were refused. As these prayers will be set out by the reporter in his report of the case, and will be hereafter discussed by us, they need not be set out here in extenso.

It appears that, prior to the alleged accident, the Maryland Casualty Company had issued to the defendant a policy of automobile insurance, indemnifying him from and against loss on account of suits for personal injuries similar in character to the present suit, according to the conditions and provisions of the policy. The policy contains, among others, the following provisions:

"In consideration of one hundred and seventysix dollars ($176.00), the Maryland Casualty Company, of Baltimore, herein called the company, agrees to indemnify Harry A. Fitzjarrel, of Baltimore, state of Maryland, herein called the assured, against loss from liability imposed by law upon the assured for damages on account of bodily injuries, including death resulting therefrom, accidentally suffered, or alleged to have been suffered, by any person or persons and caused by the automobile vehicles owned or operated by the assured. * * * No action shall lie against the company to recover for any loss under this policy unless it shall be brought by the assured personally for loss actually sustained and paid in money by the assured in satisfaction of a final judgment after trial of the issue; nor unless such action is brought within (90) days after such judgment by a court of last resort against the assured has been so paid and satisfied."

While it may be conceded in this case that the result of the litigation will necessarily affect the interest of a third party, the casualty company, who is not a party of record, it does not follow because this is so that the suit is collusive and fictitious, as alleged. If the real and primary object of the suit is to redress the grievance of the plaintiff, and there is an actual controversy, involving real and substantial rights between the parties to the record, the suit would not be dismissed. It is only when the sole object of the suit is to affect third parties, and when the interest of the parties to the suit is not adverse, and when there is no real and substantial controversy between those who appear as adverse parties, that the principles invoked by the appellant here apply.

This case is clearly distinguishable in its facts from those cited and relied upon, in the appellant's brief. 2 Ency. of P. & P. 342, and cases there cited.

If the defendant is primarily liable for the negligence that caused the injury, then it seems clear that the plaintiff would have a right of action for such negligence against the defendant, notwithstanding the fact that the casualty company would be ultimately liable. Eyler v. Co. Com'rs, 49 Md. 257, 33 Am. Rep. 249; Ches. & Ohio Canal Co. v. Allegany Co., 57 Md. 201, 40 Am. Rep. 430; Balto. & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Howard Co., 111 Md. 180, 73 Atl. 656, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1172.

Such being our view of the law, the motion to dismiss this suit was properly overruled,

and there was no error in refusing the sec- be liable for injuries to plaintiff resulting ond and seventh prayers.

[2] The second proposition, as to what duty the owner of an automobile owes to his guest who accepts an invitation to ride with him, is raised by the defendant's eighth prayer. The prayer is as follows:

The defendant prays the court to rule, as a matter of law, that it appears from the uncontradicted evidence in this case that the plaintiff was traveling as an invited guest in the private automobile of the defendant, and that, unless the court shall believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was injured by reason of the gross or willful negligence of the defendant, the verdict of the court shall be for the defendant.

from driving the automobile recklessly.

The reasoning in Foote's Case, supra, was adopted and followed in the Kentucky decision. The cases of Pigeon v. Lane, 80 Conn. 237, 67 Atl. 886, 11 Ann. Cas. 371, Birch v. City of New York, 190 N. Y. 397, 83 N. E. 51, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 595, Mayberry v. Sivey, 18 Kan. 291, and Lochhead v. Jensen (Utah) 129 Pac. 347, are also in point and to the same effect. The rule announced in these cases, we think, is the true and correct rule, and is controlling on this appeal.

The rule of gross or willful negligence sought to be applied by the defendant's eighth prayer was not the correct rule applicable to the case, and this prayer was properly refused.

While the reported cases upon the legal status of a guest who voluntarily accepts an invitation to ride with the owner of an automobile are somewhat limited, the rule adopted by the later decisions as to the degree of care required is against the appel-rer to the evidence, and, as the evidence was

lant's contention in this case.

Mr. Huddy in his work on Automobiles, 113, says:

"Although he pays nothing for riding, he is, nevertheless, in the care and custody of the owner or driver of the machine and is entitled to a reasonable degree of care for his safety. If the driver has negligently run into some obstacle on the highway and thereby injured the guest, undoubtedly the owner and the driver would be liable to civil suit for damages. One who voluntarily accepts an invitation to ride as a guest in an automobile does not relinquish his right of protection from personal injury caused by carelessness, and it should be understood by owners of motor vehicles that they assume quite a serious responsibility when they invite others to ride with them, especially persons who by reason of weaknesses are subject to injury from slight causes."

The defendant's first prayer was a demur

legally sufficient to show actionable negligence, it was properly rejected.

Finding no error in the rulings of the court, the judgment will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed, with costs.

BARTLETT v. CALVERT BANK.
(Court of Appeals of Maryland.
1914.)

(123 Md. 628) (No. 34.) June 25,

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (§ 100*) POWER OF
ATTORNEY-CONSTRUCTION.

A power of attorney executed by a stockholder, whereby he transfers the stock and appoints an attorney to sell, hypothecate, or dispose of in any manner and for any purpose assign and transfer, empowers the grantee in the power to pledge the stock, not only for a debt evidenced by a note contemporaneously executed by the grantee, but also empowers the grantee to pledge the stock for other debts, in the absence of any notice by the creditor of any restrictions placed by the stockholder on the grantee.

and Agent, Cent. Dig. §§ 262-273, 345, 364, [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Principal 368-373; Dec. Dig. § 100.*]

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; Chas. W. Heuisler, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Action by J. Kemp Bartlett against the Calvert Bank. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The following is plaintiff's first prayer:

In Patnode v. Foote, 153 App. Div. 494, 138 N. Y. Supp. 221, the Supreme Court of that state held, as stated in the syllabus of the case, where in an action to recover for personal injuries to the plaintiff resulting from defendant's negligence it appears that the defendant invited the plaintiff, who was a witness in an action to which he was a party, to ride with him to the place of trial in an open buggy drawn by one horse driven by himself, that the defendant drove at a reckless speed, against the plaintiff's protest, and that a collision with another wagon which threw the plaintiff violently to the ground was the result of defendant's careless driving, a judgment for the plaintiff should be If the court, sitting as a jury, shall find that affirmed. The plaintiff was a licensee, and the plaintiff delivered to one Edgar M. Noel the certificate for 30 shares of stock of United it was the duty of the defendant to use States Fidelity & Guaranty Company standing ordinary care not to increase the danger of in the name of and belonging to the plaintiff, riding with him or to create any new danger. offered in evidence, and that at the time of said In Beard v. Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153, 164 plaintiff and the said Noel that Noel was not to delivery it was distinctly agreed between the S. W. 319, decided by the Court of Appeals borrow upon the said certificate from the defendof Kentucky, on March 20, 1914, where the ant a sum exceeding $3,000, and that at the facts are very similar to those in this case, time of said delivery and presentation to the defendant of said certificate by said Noel, if the the court held that it was the defendant's court, sitting as a jury, shall so find, the assignduty, upon inviting plaintiff to ride as a guest ment and power of attorney appearing upon the in defendant's automobile, to use ordinary back of said certificate was not filled in but care not to increase plaintiff's danger or to merely signed in blank by the plaintiff, and that the defendant loaned to said Noel $3,000 upon create any new danger, such as by fast and the said certificate as collateral therefor, with reckless driving, so that defendant would actual knowledge that the said certificate was 1 *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

not the property of said Noel but of the plaintiff, and that subsequently the said original certificate for 30 shares was split up into two certificates, one for 20 shares and the other for 10 shares, the latter certificate being returned to the plaintiff and the former being retained by the defendant, and that the plaintiff subsequently, after the maturity of said loan, and while the said certificate for 20 shares was still in the possession of the defendant, tendered to the defendant $3,000 and all accrued interest unpaid thereon, and thereupon demanded a return of said certificate, and that the defendant refused to return the same unless the plaintiff made a payment also on account of an indebtedness of the said Noel to the said defendant contracted subsequent to the making of the said $3,000 loan, and that the plaintiff had not authorized the pledge of said certificate as security in whole or in part of said second loan of the said Noel, then the verdict must be for the plaintiff.

The following is defendant's second prayer: If the court, sitting as a jury, find that the plaintiff signed the power of attorney dated March 20, 1912, attached to the certificate for 20 shares of stock of the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company offered in evidence, and delivered said power of attorney and certificate of stock to E. M. Noel, and that the same were delivered by E. M. Noel to the Calvert Bank, together with the collateral note of July 23, 1912, offered in evidence, and that said note was signed by E. M. Noel and delivered to said Calvert Bank for a valuable consideration, then the court rules, as a matter of law, that the legal effect of the delivery by E. M. Noel of said stock and said power of attorney attached thereto and said collateral note was to pledge said stock not only for the $3,000 mentioned in said collateral note of July 23, 1912, but also for any other indebtedness then or thereafter owing by the said E. M. Noel to said Calvert Bank. And if the court sitting as a jury find that, at the time of said delivery of said collateral note of July 23, 1912, and said power of attorney and certificate of stock, the said E. M. Noel was indebted to the Calvert Bank upon another note for $3,000, dated July 1, 1909, and that both said notes, with certain interest thereon, remain unpaid, then the court rules, as a matter of law, that the tender made by the plaintiff to defendant, as testified to by him, was not sufficient to entitle the verdict of the court, sitting as a jury, should be for the defendant. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, THOMAS, PATTISON, URNER, and CONSTABLE, JJ.

Edgar Allan Poe, of Baltimore, for appellant. S. S. Field, of Baltimore, for appellee.

BRISCOE, J. This action was brought by the appellant against the appellee bank, in the superior court of Baltimore city, to recover the possession of a certificate dated May 20, 1912, for 20 shares of stock of the United States Fidelity & Guarantee Company, which had been pledged to the appellee bank by one Edgar M. Noel, now deceased, as collateral security for certain loans, made by the bank to Noel, in his lifetime. The certificate of stock belonged to the appellant but had been loaned to Noel, for the purpose of pledging it to the appellee bank, as collateral security, under a blank power of attorney dated the 20th day of May, 1912. The case was tried before the court, sitting as a jury, and, from a judgment in favor of the

defendant, the plaintiff has taken this appeal.

During the trial two bills of exception were taken by the appellant, one to the granting of the defendant's motion to strike out certain testimony which had been admitted subject to exception, and the second to the ruling of the court, in rejecting the plaintiff's first prayer, and in granting the defendant's second prayer. These two exceptions bring up for review the only questions presented by the record, and which will now be considered by us.

As the plaintiff's second exception contains the rulings upon the prayers, and as these present the substantial questions in the case, we will consider it first.

The defendant's second prayer, which was granted by the court, we think, correctly states the law of the case. It ruled as a matter of law, under the facts of the case, that the legal effect of the delivery by E. M. Noel of the stock, and the power of attorney attached thereto, and the collateral note, was to pledge the stock not only for the $3,000 mentioned in the collateral note of July 23, 1912, but also for any other indebtedness then or thereafter owing by E. M. Noel to the defendant bank.

The plaintiff's first prayer was the converse of the defendant's second prayer, and was properly rejected. The Reporter will set out these two prayers in his report of the case.

The substantial facts of this case are practically undisputed, and may be thus stated: The record discloses that some time in July, 1908, the plaintiff loaned Edgar M. Noel 30 shares of the capital stock of the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, belonging to him. Noel subsequently secured a loan of $3,000 from the defendant bank by pledging the stock as collateral security for the loan.

to time; the last renewal note being dated July 23, 1912. The note which was delivered to the bank and signed by E. M. Noel is as follows:

This loan was renewed from time

"$3000.00

Baltimore, July 23, 1912. "Four months after date I promise to pay to the Calvert Bank or order, at the banking house of said bank, three thousand xx-100 dollars, for curity for the same following named securities: value received, having deposited as collateral se20 shares U. S. F. & G. Co.

66

... agree that the above-named securities, and any others needed to or substituted for them, all cash at any time to the credit of our account, and all notes and drafts deposited by us for collection, and all other property of the undersigned in said bank, may be held as collateral security for all the obligations and liabilities of the undersigned and of the indorsers hereof, due to the said bank or to become due, or that may hereafter be contracted, with the understanding that a margin of per curity shall be maintained on demand, and if cent, on the market value of the collateral sesaid demand for margin is not promptly met, or said obligations and said liability are not promptly paid at maturity, ...... hereby authorize said bank or its president or its cashier to sell the collateral security, or the property represented by the same, either at private or

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