« ՆախորդըՇարունակել »
(83 N. J. Eq. 510)
against the defendants in accordance with RUBBER & CELLULOID HARNESS TRIM- the prayer of the bill. 81 N. J. Eq. 419, 88 MING CO. v. RUBBER-BOUND
Atl. 210. The decree was affirmed on appeal. BRUSH CO. et al.
81 N. J. Eq. 519, 88 Atl. 210. (Court of Chancery of New Jersey. July 18, The defendants now seek to review the 1914.)
decree in that case and set the same aside 1. CORPORATIONS ($ 37*)-EXISTENCE-TERM– upon the ground that, at the time of the filREINCORPORATION.
ing of the bill and of the making of the deComplainant was incorporated, under the cree and of the affirmance on appeal, there general corporation act (P. L. 1849, p. 300), January 23, 1873; its franchise to 'terminate was no such corporation as the Rubber & January 1, 1900. In 1874 the Legislature pass-Celluloid Harness Trimming Company; its ed a special act (P. L. 1874, p. 1071) to ex- franchise to be a corporation having expired tend and amend its corporate powers and privi- on the 1st day of January, 1900. They alleges, section 11 of which provided that the corporation should not, from the date of the lege that they did not discover the fact act, be bound or affected by the act of 1849, until after the affirmance, and they allege, under which it was incorporated, or its supple- therefore, that the fact is a newly discovered ments, except as prescribed by the act of 1874. fact and amounts to newly discovered eviHeld, that complainant's corporate existence under the act of 1874 continued indefinitely, and dence, within the rules touching the filing of did not therefore terminate in accordance with bills of review. its origiral articles.
 The facts are these. The complainant [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Corpora- was incorporated under the general corporations, Cent. Dig. 105; Dec. Dig. § 37.*]
tion laws of this state on January 23, 1873, 2. STATUTES (8 113*)-PLURALITY OF OBJECTS by virtue of an act of the Legislature enti-SPECIAL LAWS.
Act March 17, 1874 (P. L. 1874, p. 1071), is tled "An act to authorize the establishment entitled "An act to extend, amend, and increase and to prescribe the duties of companies for the corporate powers and privileges of the Cel- manufacturing and other purposes," approvluloid Harness Trimming Company,” and sec-ed March 2, 1849 (P. L. p. 300). The incortion 11 of the act provides that the company shall not, from the date of the approval of the poration papers provided that the company act, be bound, controlled, or in any wise af
wise af- would commence its existence on February fected by the general corporation act of 18498, 1873, and terminate on January 1, 1900. (P. L. p. 300), under which it was organized, or
In 1874 the Legislature passed an act enany provisions_thereof not incorporated in the act of 1874. Held, that such act is not invalid titled "An act to extend, amend and increase as containing an object not expressed in its the corporate powers and privileges of the title.
Celluloid Harness Trimming Company''; it [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, was approved on March 17, 1874 (P. L. 1874, p. Cent. Dig. $$ 141-144; Dec. Dig. 8 113.*]
1071). This act recited the organization of 3. EQUITY (8 447*) - BILL OF REVIEW
the company under the act of 1849, and ratiGROUNDS NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.
Where the date of the alleged expiration fied and confirmed the incorporation and the of a corporation's charter appeared from the election of directors, and further constituted public records, the fact that its corporate life the company a body corporate in fact and in had expired at the time it brought suit against law by the name which it had chosen, for defendant for unlawful competition could not be said to constitute newly discovered evi- the purpose of manufacturing and selling dence sufficient to sustain a bill to review a celluloid harness trimmings and articles used judgment against defendant.
therewith and for carrying on any business [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, incident thereto in this state. The eleventh Cent. Dig. $$ 1091-1094; Dec. Dig. § 447.*]
section of that act provided that the comSuit by the Rubber & Celluloid Harness pany should not, from the date of the apTrimming Company against the Rubber- proval of the act, be bound, controlled, or in Bound Brush Company and others. On de- any wise affected by the said act of 1849 or fendants' motion for leave to file a bill of any of its provisions or any supplements review. Denied.
thereto, except as is in the act of 1874 preSee, also, 81 N. J. Eq. 519, 88 Atl. 210. scribed. On November 29, 1877, the name of
the company was changed to Rubber & CelCarl V. Vogt, of Morristown, for the mo- lluloid Harness Trimming Company, being tion. Thomas M. Kays, of Newton, and Al- the name now used by it in the prosecution of fred F. Skinner, of Newark, opposed.
From these facts the defendants conceived HOWELL, V. C. In 1911 the Rubber & that the company ceased to exist on JanuCelluloid Harness Trimming Company filed ary 1, 1900, and that therefore the decree its bill in this court against the Rubber- in this suit should not and in fact could not Bound Brush Company and others, to re- have been made in its favor; there being no strain the defendants from the commission legal entity, bearing the name assumed by of certain acts which it was alleged amount the complainants, in whose favor the decree ed to unfair trade and unfair competition could be made. on the part of the defendants, and such pro- I think the motion should be denied upon ceedings were had therein that on December the ground that the act of 1874 continued the 6, 1912, a final decree was entered therein existence of the complainant corporation in
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
definitely, and that by the plainest construction consists of certain public records to tion. After reciting the incorporation of the which every person has free access. The evicompany under the act of 1849 and the elec-dence so called was as accessible to the detion of directors and the completion of the fendant at the time this suit was brought as organization thereunder, it proceeds to ratify it is to-day. The public offices in which it all that had been done in the past with re- resides remain to-day as they were then, and, gard to those matters and to reincorporate it so far as I can see, the only possible reason (section 1), and then it provides in the elev- for calling the evidence newly discovered evienth section that, after the approval of the dence is that it was not searched for at the act of 1874, the company should cease to be time when it should have been set up by propbound, controlled, or in any wise affected by er pleading in the cause. The whole subject the act of 1849, or by any of its provisions, of newly discovered evidence, so far as it or by any supplements thereto, except as is applies to bills of review, was discussed by prescribed in the act of 1874. I do not see Vice Chancellor Garrison in Richards v. how words could make it plainer that it was Shaw, 77 N. J. Eq. 399, 77 Atl. 618; quoting the intention of the Legislature to withdraw from earlier cases, he says: the corporation from the operation of the “When application is made to file a bill of general corporation laws and place it under review upon the discovery of new matter, the the supervision of the act of 1874.
rule is that the matter must not only be new,
but must be such as the party, by the use of  It is claimed, however, that this act reasonable diligence, could not have known” of is unconstitutional, for the reason that it it. "If there be any laches or negligence in violates a provision of the Constitution then this respect, that destroys the title to the re
lief.” in force, which required that every law should embrace but one object, and that such
Such a bill (of review) must rest upon some object should be expressed in the title. Par. new matter which has been discovered after ticularly is this objection urged to section 11. the decree and could not possibly have been On this point the facts are quite similar to used when the decree was made.
In my those in the case of State ex rel. Walter v. opinion the evidence, which is now claimed to Town of Union, 33 N. J. Law, 350. There be newly discovered, is not such in any sense the act complained of was entitled "An act to whatever. It cannot be called newly discovamend an act to incorporate the town of Un-ered evidence for the purpose of a bill of reion in the township of Union in the county view, because it did not occur to the defendof Hudson, approved March 29, 1864.” P. L. ant to make a search for it. 1868, p. 351. This act validated an ordinance The motion must be denied. passed by the town of Union, but passed irregularly, for the construction of a sewer in the Hackensack plank road. It is claimed
SCHARF v. REISER. that this purpose was not expressed in the title. The Supreme Court, however, held the Supreme Court of New Jersey. June, 1914.) contrary. The opinion says:
1. STATUTES (8 51*)-INCORPORATING LAW BY "The unity of the object must be sought in REFERENCE. the end which the legislative act purposes to P. L. 1912, p. 630, as to jurisdiction of accomplish, and not in the details provided to "disputes involving the domestic relation,” in reach that end. The degree of particularity defining such term to mean all complaints for which must be used in the title of an act rests violation of the Disorderly Persons Act of 1898 in the legislative discretion, and is not defined (P. L. 1898, p. 942), does not provide that any by the Constitution. There are many cases existing law, or part thereof, shall be made or where the object might with great propriety be deemed a part of the act, or shall be applicable, more specifically stated; yet the generality of within the prohibition of the Constitution that the title will not be fatal to the act if, by fair this shall not be done, except by inserting it. intendment, it can be connected with it."
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, And it holds the general title, which was Cent. Dig. $ 48; Dec. Dig. § 51.*] given to the act, to be in accordance with the 2. STATUTES (8 64*)-EFFECT OF PARTIAL INprovisions of the Constitution. To the same
VALIDITY. effect is State ex rel. Doyle v. Newark, 34 If P. L. 1912, p. 630, as to jurisdiction of N. J. Law, 236, also a case in the Supreme disputes involving the domestic relation,” in
defining such term by reference to an existing Court. The same rule was announced by the law, be considered in violation of the ConstituCourt of Errors and Appeals in Newark v. tion, it could be disregarded as a separable proMount Pleasant Cemetery Company, 58 N. J. vision, leaving in effect the further definition Law, 168, 33 Atl. 396, and by Chancellor Mc- thereof, as all charges against any person for
abandonment of wife or children. Gill in this court in Stockton v. Central Railroad, 50 N. J. Eq. 52, 69;† Sawter v. Shoen-Cent. Dig. 98 58-66; Dec. Dig. '$ 64.*]
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, thal, 83 N. J. Law, 499, 83 Atl. 1004; Shultise v. O'Neill (Sup.) 88 Atl. 854. Following these 3. STATUTES (88 107, 117*)-TITLE AND SUB
JECT. authorities I must conclude that the act is The title of P. L. 1912, p. 630, "An act proconstitutional.
viding for the hearing and determination of dis There is another reason why this mo- putes or matters affecting the domestic relation,
and conferring jurisdiction on the county juvetion cannot prevail. It is claimed that the nile courts,” not only embraces, but expresses, evidence of the nonexistence of this corpora- the single object of the act, the hearing and de•For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
† 24 Atl. 964, 17 L. R. A. 97.
termination of disputes or matters affecting the giving of the bond is suspended. The judgdomestic relation.
ment in this case did not follow the language [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, of the act, but provided that "in default of Cent. Dig, $121-134, 154-157; Dec. Dig. $$ payments to the overseer of the poor, Reiser 107, 117.*] 4. HUSBAND AND WIFE (8 315*)—ABANDON- should be committed to the county jail, there MENT - SUPPORT - ORDERS -'COMMITMENT to stand committed until the further order TO JAIL,
of the court, unless he shall sooner be disUnder the Poor Law (P. L. 1911, p. 403, 8 charged by due process of law.” This 33), providing that an order for support shall pro- amounts to committing him at the discretion vide for a bond, and that in default thereof accused shall be committed till it be given, unless, of the court, and I find no statutory authorin the discretion of the magistrate, the giving ity for that procedure. of it be suspended, a provision of the judgment that in default of payments to the overseer
The judgment, therefore, I think must be of the poor, defendant be committed to jail, reversed. there to stand committed till the further order of the court, amounting to a committing at the discretion of the court, is unauthorized.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Husband and
O'NEILL. † Wife, Cent. Dig. 88 679–682; Dec. Dig. 8 315.* ]] Supreme Court of New Jersey. Nov. 19, 1913.)
Proceeding by Jacob Scharf, overseer of the poor of the town of Union, against Albert
(Syllabus by the Court.) Reiser. There was a judgment against de- MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 182*)-CHIEF OF
POLICE-UNCLASSIFIED SERVICE. fendant, and he brings certiorari. Reversed.
The chief of police in cities governed by the Harlan Besson, of Hoboken, for prosecutor. charter act of 1908, p. 486 (2 Comp. St. 1910, Merritt Lane, of Jersey City, for defendant. department, and therefore in the unclassified
p. 1239), is by said act constituted a head of
service under section 11 of the Civil Service SWAYZE, J. [1-4] This is a proceeding un- Act of 1908, p. 235 (3 Comp. St. 1910, p. der chapter 360 of the Laws of 1912.
I see no 3795). force in the objection to the constitutionality
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal of this act. The reference to the act relating Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 466-471; Dec. Dig.
$ to disorderly persons does not amount to a provision that any existing law, or any part
Application by Edmund Wilson, Attorney thereof, shall be made or deemed a part of General, on the relation of the Civil Service the act, nor does it intend that any existing Commission of New Jersey, for a writ of quo
Delaw, or part thereof, shall be applicable. All warranto against William H. O'Neill. it does is to define the words “disputes in- murrer to information sustained. Judgment volving the domestic relation” by a reference affirmed by Court of Errors and Appeals, 91
Atl. 644. to the Disorderly Persons Act of 1898 (P. L. 1898, p. 942). Even if this were objection
Argued before GUMMERE, O. J., and able under the constitutional provision (and PARKER and KALISCH, JJ. I think it is not), it is a severable provision Nelson B. Gaskill, Asst. Atty. Gen., for reof the act of 1912, which would still suffice to lator. Borden D. Whiting, of Newark, for give the juvenile court jurisdiction of all respondent. charges against any person for abandonment or nonsupport of wives or children. That is PARKER, J. The controversy relates to quite enough to cover the present case. Nor the office of chief of police of the city of East do I find any difficulty in the title of the act. Orange. The information attacks the apIt seems to me that it not only embraces, but pointment of respondent, O'Neill, by the expresses the object of the legislation, and mayor and his confirmation by the council as has but a single object in view, viz., the hear- in contravention of the Civil Service Act of ing and determination of disputes or matters 1908 (C. S. p. 3795), 'which was adopted by affecting the domestic relation. As a part | East Orange. The information sets up that of that scheme jurisdiction is conferred upon East Orange adopted as its charter the referthe juvenile courts. The procedure now is endum charter act of 1908 (P. L. P. 486; C. governed by Poor Law of 1911, c. 196. This s. p. 1239), and also adopted the Civil Service makes a change in that it permits the wife Act: that the Commission classified the ofof a deserting husband to make a complaint fice of chief of police in the competitive class, without the intervention of the overseer of and gave due notice thereof, but that disthe poor. That was done in this case, and I regarding the Civil Service Act the mayor see no objection to it. The procedure is that nominated respondent to the council as chief pointed out in sections 27 to 33, inclusive, of police, the nomination was confirmed by and the procedure seems to have been care- the council, and that he assumed and still fully followed in all respects except one. The exercises said office unlawfully in violation order authorized by section 33 provides for of said act. The demurrer specifies several a bond, and, in default thereof, that accused grounds, of which only the first and third shall be committed to the county jail or pen- need be considered. The first is, in substance, itentiary until such bond shall be given, un- that the classification of the office in question less, in the discretion of the magistrate, the by the Commission was without warrant of
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am, Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
† Duplicate opinion of 88 Atl. 946,
law; the third, that the Civil Service Act constituted to perform them. On the other does not apply to said office.
hand the citizens might prefer to have such The charter act provides, among other special agency, and in that case by voting things, that one of the city officers shall be for and organizing the police commission they a chief of police (section 5); that he shall could obtain a body created expressly and be the head of the police department (section exclusively for the purposes specified in the 27); that all city officers except such as are act and already set forth. This leaves the to be elected or otherwise appointed shall be chief of police as still the head of the departappointed by the mayor, subject to confirma- ment, subject to the executive and legislation by the council. By subsections 37 and tive and supervisory action of the board of 39 of section 37 it is made the duty of the police commissioners, just as he was theretocouncil when so directed as a result of an fore subject to the legislative and executive election based on petition of voters, etc., to and supervisory action of the mayor and organize a board of police commissioners, who council. shall be city officers, and "whose powers and This result makes it unnecessary to decide duties shall be to control and regulate the whether after the organization of a police appointment, suspension and dismissal of the commission the appointment of the chief reofficers, men and employés of the police de- mains with the mayor or is transferred to partment of said city, to fix their compensa- the Commission. There seems to be good tion, make rules and regulations for the gov- ground for an argument that the chief is but ernment of the department,” etc. It is stipu- one of the “officers, men and employés of the lated that on May 4, 1909, these provisions police department” whose appointment is exwere submitted to the voters and adopted, pressly committed to the board of police comand that a board of police commissioners was missioners when organized; but the point organized accordingly. The Civil Service is not strictly before us and we refrain from Act was adopted in 1910, and the appointment passing upon it. of O'Neill followed in 1911.
There will be judgment for the respondent We are clear that whatever weakness may on the demurrer. inhere in respondent's title to the office, it is invulnerable to the attack made by the pres
(86 N. J. L. 377) ent information. By section 11 of the Civil CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. Service Act, all heads of departments of mu
O'NEILL. (No. 88.) nicipalities adopting the act are in the un-(Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. classified service, and therefore the Com
May 8, 1914.) mission has no official voice in their appoint
Appeal from Supreme Court. ment. The chief of police in cities governed
Application by Edmund Wilson, Attorney by the charter act of 1908 is, as we have seen, General, on the relation of the Civil Service the head of a department, viz., the police de- Commission of New Jersey, for a writ of quo partment, by the express language of the act. warranto against William H. O'Neill. DemurWith these major and minor premises, the relator appeals.
rer to information sustained (91 Atl. 643), and syllogism can be completed in no other way
Nelson B. Gaskill, of Trenton, for appellant. than by concluding that the chief of police Borden D. Whiting, of Newark, for respondent. in cities governed by the act of 1908 is in the unclassified service. This result we consider
PER CURIAM. The judgment under review to be perfectly plain notwithstanding the pressed in the opinion delivered by Mr. Jus
herein should be affirmed for the reasons exorganization of the board of police commis- tice Parker in the Supreme Court. 91 Atl. 643. sioners pursuant to the election. The point suggests itself that by reason of the creation
(88 Conn. 494) of the police board the chief of police ceases
EASTON V. CONNECTICUT CO. et al. to be the head of the department, and that the board is substituted as such head. We (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. July think, however, there is no force in this point.
17, 1914.) The scheme of the charter act is obvious- 1. APPEAL AND ERBOR ($ 664*)_REVIEW_RECly to provide an alternative system for the ORD-ERROR. supervision of the entire police department
Where, upon defendants' motion, the entire by a municipal agency. In cases where the St. 1902, § 797, the transcript of the evidence
testimony was certified up as provided by Gen. charter act is adopted generally, the plan pro- supersedes the findings. vided by that act is that the mayor or the [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and council, or both, shall act as a supervisory Error, Cent. Dig. $8 2856–2859; Dec. Dig. 8
664.*] power and make the necessary rules and regulations for the conduct of the department. 2. APPEAL AND ERROR ($ 219*) REVIEW
PRESENTATION OF GROUNDS OF REVIEW IN This is the course generally pursued in the COURT BELOW-NECESSITY. smaller municipalities, and was evidently in- Where defendant made no application in tended by the Legislature to be pursued in the court below to amend the findings of the cities coming within the classification of the trial court, he cannot on appeal attack the find797, for it superseded the findings and rendered the north of the tracks at the time of the formal corrections immaterial.
ings as being unsupported by the evidence, paract where it was not thought worth while to ticularly where the entire testimony was cerassign these duties to an agency exclusively tified up in accordance with Gen. St. 1902, 8
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Kéy-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
accident was a fine macadam pavement about [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and 26 feet wide. On the south side the roadError, Cent. Dig. $$ 1315, 1317–1320, 1322, 1323; Dec. Dig. $ 219.*]
way was rough and narrow, and all travel 3. TRIAL (S253*)
was on the north. The land north of the INSTRUCTIONS IGNORING ISSUES.
street line slopes off precipitately to the West In a personal injury action by a passenger river. To the south of the street line the on an auto bus, hurt in a collision between the land of the adjoining property is practically bus and a street car, where the court charged level with the street. There are a few housthat the passenger was bound to show by a preponderance of the evidence that she was ines on the south side; the fifth building west the exercise of due care, and was not guilty of of Dayton street is a hotel. any act proximately contributing to her injury,
When the collision occurred the lights on , the , sider the case against both the proprietor of the the car and automobile were lighted, and bus and the street railway company separately each vehicle was visible to and seen by the and together, and that, if either or both was driver of the other when they were over 1,000 negligent, judgment should be accordingly, and feet apart. that, in considering the negligence of the driver of the bus, his failure to begin to turn out
After the collision the trolley car came to promptly might be considered, the question of a stop in the vicinity of the hotel driveway. proximate cause was not ignored.
As a result of the collision, the plaintiff was [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trial, Cent. thrown into the trolley car, and was found Dig. $$ 613-623; Dec. Dig. § 253.*]
unconscious lying on one of 'the forward 4. TRIAL ($ 260*)-INSTRUCTIONS-REFUSAL.
Where the court's general charge sufficient- seats of the car, with her head toward the ly presents the law applicable to the issues, it is south side and her feet toward the north not improper for it to refuse further charges.
side of the car. All the upright posts on the [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trial, Cent. north side of the car were broken away, exDig. 88 651-659; Dec. Dig. 8 260.*]
cept the front post back of the motorman, 5. APPEAL AND ERROR ($ 1002*)_REVIEW - and a sliver was broken from the rear of this VERDICT-CONFLICTING EVIDENCE.
post. Where the evidence is conflicting, the verdict cannot be disturbed on appeal, unless it
The left running board of the trolley car appears that the jury could not, as reasonable at the time of the collision was turned up, men, have reached the decision rendered.
and was uninjured, except that the rear part [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and was broken, and there was a scratch runError, Cent. Dig. $$ 3935–3937; Dec. Dig. 8 ning the entire length from a point about 1002.*]
3 feet from the front end. Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven
The plaintiff seeks to recover damages for County; William L. Bennett, Judge.
the concurrent negligence of both defendants. Action by Emma L. Easton against the Both of them denied the acts of negligence Connecticut Company and another. Judg- alleged against them in the complaint. The ment was for plaintiff for $2,300, and de- defendant Wolven also alleged in his answer fendants appeal. Affirmed.
that it was the negligence of the Connecticut Harrison T. Sheldon and Thomas M. Company that caused the injury. Steele, both of New Haven, for appellant The verdict was against both defendants. Connecticut Co. William F. Alcorn, of New
After the verdict was rendered both deHaven, for appellant Wolven. Walter J. fendants moved to set aside the verdict, Walsh and Charles J. Martin, both of New which motion was denied. Both of the deHaven, for appellee.
fendants appealed. The defendant Wolven as
signed but one error. This related to the RORABACK, J. This action was brought refusal of the superior court to set aside the to recover damages for injuries sustained verdict. by the plaintiff in a collision between an The plaintiff (appellee) filed a plea in open double-track trolley car of the defend- abatement in this court to the appeal of the ant the Connecticut Company and the de- defendant Wolven, which plea was sustained. fendant Wolven's automobile bus, in which The Connecticut Company appealed from the plaintiff was riding, as a passenger, for the refusal of the court to set aside the verhire.
dict, and, as additional reasons of appeal, asIt was conceded that the collision occurred signed the refusal of the court to charge the about 8:30 p. m. on September 9, 1913, on jury as requested. Whalley avenue, in New Haven, at a point [1, 2] Three of the reasons of appeal of some distance west of Westville Center. The the defendant company relate to alleged erautomobile bus in which the plaintiff was rors of the court below in finding without riding was proceeding in a westerly direction evidence that the plaintiff offered evidence and the trolley car in an easterly direction. to prove and claim to have proved certain The collision occurred about midway between facts. No correction of the finding in these Dayton street and West Prospect street. The particulars is asked for in the assignment defendant company maintains a single-track of errors, as is provided in section 797 of the trolley line on Whalley avenue at this point General Statutes, but, upon the defendant's where the accident occurred. The roadway to motion, the entire testimony has been certi
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes