Page images
PDF
EPUB

bridge, shall seasonably drive his carriage or vehicle to the right of the center of the traveled part of the road, so as to enable such person to pass with his carriage or vehicle without interference or interruption. Every person traveling with any carriage or other vehicle who shall overtake any other person so traveling on any highway or bridge shall pass on the left side thereof, and the person so overtaken shall as soon as practicable drive to the right so as to allow free passage on the left.

"Sec. 2. Every person who shall willfully violate the provisions of the preceding section shall be fined five dollars, and shall be liable for all damages sustained in consequence of any neglect to comply with said provisions."

Marsh v. Boyden, 33 R. I. 519, 82 Atl. 393, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 582, cited in the majority opinion, is not in point. In that case, at page 523 of 33 R. I., at page 395 of 82 Atl. (40 L. R. A. [N. S.] 582), the court said:

"If the rule of the road had any application at all it must have been with reference to the street car or the people thereon, but the plaintiff at the time of the accident had ceased to be a passenger on the car, and there was no interference with the car or collision in which it and the automobile of the defendant were involved. The plaintiff was not injured in consequence of the neglect of any duty which the defendant owed to the car or its occupants. Of course the defendant was bound to take notice of the fact that a street car had stopped to allow passengers to alight and to so conduct his vehicle as not to run down persons who had so alighted, but that is not a duty imposed by the statutes hereinbefore referred to as prescribing the rule of the road."

This language precedes that quoted in the majority opinion.

The foregoing discussion involves excep

tions 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.

All of defendant's exceptions should be overruled, and the case should be remitted to

the superior court for the entry of judgment for the plaintiff upon the verdict.

concealment on the part of the beneficiary's heirs of the fact that she died leaving a living husband, and that, on discovering the facts, he proceeded diligently to take action, was not a bill of review, but a bill in the nature of a bill of review, and was therefore not objectionable because not filed within a year from the entry of the final decree.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. §§ 1065-1070; Dec. Dig. § 442.*] 3. JUDGMENT (§ 460*)-DECREE-FRAUD. Since it is incumbent on a trustee, in proceedings to terminate the trust, to fully advise distribution of the estate upon the determinathe court as to all material facts affecting the tion of the trust and to satisfy himself beyond doubt of the persons legally and equitably entitled to the fund, a bill to set aside a decree terminating the trust and distributing the propthe beneficiary for life, was entitled to the trust erty, alleging that complainant, the husband of fund, but that, by fraudulent concealment of the fact that the beneficiary died leaving a husband, he was not made a party to the bill, and it was made to appear to the court that the wife's heirs were the only parties in interest, and for this reason the property was ordered distributed to them, sufficiently charged fraud in procuring the original decree to stato a cause of action for equitable relief.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 879, 880, 882-891; Dec. Dig. § 460.*]

4. EQUITY (§ 442*)-BILL OF REVIEW-DES

IGNATION.

a decree for alleged fraud in failing to make Where a bill by a third person to set aside complainant a party to the suit stated a cause of action appropriate to a bill in the nature of a bill of review and not to a strict bill of review, the use of the word "review" in the prayer plied to a justice for leave to file the bill, did of the bill, and the fact that complainant apnot require the court to consider the bill a strict bill of review.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. §§ 1065-1070; Dec. Dig. § 442.*]

5. JUDGMENT (§ 455*)-EQUITABLE RELIEFBILL OF REVIEW-VENUE.

Court & Practice Act 1905, § 4 (Gen. Laws SWEETLAND, J., concurs in opinion of 1909, c. 273, § 1), provides that there shall be JOHNSON, C. J.

(37 R. I. 56)

QUINN v. HALL et al. (No. 278.) (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. July 7, 1914.)

1. EQUITY (§ 457*)-BILL OF REVIEW-RIGHT TO FILE-PARTIES.

A strict bill of review can be filed only by a party to the original cause or by one in privity with such party; other persons aggrieved by the decree sought to be reviewed being required to proceed by original bill in the nature

of a bill of review.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. 1099; Dec. Dig. § 457.*] 2. EQUITY (§ 442*)—BILL IN THE NATURE OF

A BILL OF REVIEW-RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS-FILING.

Where, after the death of the life beneficiary of a trust, her heirs, without notice to complainant, who was her husband, obtained a decree terminating the trust and directing distribution of the trust fund to them, a subsequent bill brought by complainant to set aside such decree and to recover the property on the ground that it was distributable to him, alleging that he had no knowledge of the existence of the trust and had not been made a party to the prior proceedings because of fraudulent

a superior court which shall consist of a presiding justice and five associate justices. Other sections require the holding of sessions of the court by a single justice in one or more places at the same time and at stated times in the different counties of the state for convenience of litigants; the various sessions in the several counties being held by the same justices. Held that, where complainant, in a suit in the nature of a bill of review to set aside a decree terminating a trust and distributing the property, was a nonresident, and the trustee was a resident of N. county, the bill was properly filed in that county, as provided by Gen. Laws 1909, c. 283, § 2, regardless of the fact that the decree attacked was rendered and of record in P. coun

ty; the court having full jurisdiction in the suit in N. county to nullify such decree and to show such nullification by a certified copy of the decree rendered, filed in P. county.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 860-862; Dec. Dig. § 455.*] 6. WILLS (§ 634*) - CONSTRUCTION RIGHTS OF SURVIVING HUSBAND-TRUST ESTATEPERSONAL PROPERTY-"INHERIT."

Gen. Laws 1909, c. 312, § 10, provides that administration of the estate of a person dying intestate shall be granted, if the deceased is a married woman, to her husband, if competent, who shall not be compelled to distribute the surplus of the personal estate after the payment of her debts, but shall be entitled to retain the

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

The essential allegations in said bill of complaint are as follows: That Hezekiah Anthony, late of the city of Providence, by his will duly admitted to probate January 22, 1884, provided in section 17 thereof as

follows:

same for his own use. Testator bequeathed | estate be paid to this complainant, who al$5,000 and certain real estate to a trustee in leges his right to the surplus of said trust trust for the benefit of C. for life, with power estate as surviving husband of the life beneto manage the same generally and to sell and reinvest the proceeds if desirable. A subsequent ficiary. clause of the will declared that in all cases where testator had given property in trust for the benefit of other persons, and had not specially provided for its disposition on their death, the trustee, on such event, should pay and convey the property in fee, discharged of all trusts, to the persons who, by the laws of Rhode Island, would inherit it had the persons, for whose benefit it was so given, died seised and possessed thereof in fee. Held that, the real property having been converted into personalty by the trustee during the lifetime of the beneficiary for life, the word "inherit" could not be construed as having been used by testator in its strict legal sense as designating those persons only who would inherit real property from an intestate ancestor, but the word was used in the sense of "take"; and hence, on the death of the beneficiary for life, the remainder of the trust fund so bequeathed to her passed to her husband and not to her heirs.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1488-1510; Dec. Dig. § 634.*]

Baker, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Willard B. Tanner, Presiding Justice.

Bill in the nature of a bill of review by William C. Quinn against Benjamin Hall, Jr., trustee, and others. From a decree in favor of defendants, complainant appeals. Reversed and rendered.

Crane, Munro & Barry and Thomas A. Barry, all of Providence (Wm. G. Rowe, of Brockton, Mass., of counsel), for complainant. Irving Champlin, Alfred Wilson, and Claude C. Ball, all of Providence (John C. Knowles, of Providence, of counsel), for defendants Morton and another. Burdick & MacLeod, of Newport, for defendant Hall.

PARKHURST, J. This is an appeal from a final decree entered in the superior court in the above-entitled cause. Said cause was heard in the superior court before the presiding justice September 15, 1913, on the demurrers to the bill of complaint filed by Benjamin Hall, Jr., trustee, George Morton, Helen M. Morton, and Hezekiah A. Cook, and upon hearing thereof said demurrers were sustained upon all points contained therein. On September 27, 1913, a final decree was entered in said superior court sustaining said demurrers upon all points and dismissing said bill as to said respondents, with costs. Within the time prescribed by law, the complainant filed his claim of appeal from said final decree, together with his reasons therefor, and thereupon the papers in said cause were certified to this court for determination of said appeal.

This is a bill in equity praying that the defendant Benjamin Hall, as trustee under the will of Hezekiah Anthony, be required to account as said trustee; that said trust be terminated; and that the balance of said

"I give, devise and bequeath to Sarah Ann Cook in trust for Helen Cook widow of Enos A. Cook, the sum of five thousand dollars and also the house and land where said Enos A. Cook formerly lived on Almy street in Fall River, commonwealth of Massachusetts, To have and to hold the same to her the said Sarah Ann Cook, her heirs, executors, and administrators for the use and benefit of Helen Cook widow of Enos A. Cook her heirs, executors and administrators with power to manage the same generally and if need be in her opinion to sell the same and reinvest the proceeds thereof and with power to change the investment thereof whenever in her opinion it shall seem best, and with power also to convey said real estate to her, her heirs and assigns at any time when she may think proper and with power to pay over to her said money or any part thereof according to her discretion."

The bill further sets forth that the will also provided in an unnumbered paragraph following section 22, as follows:

"In all cases where I have given property in trust for the use and benefit of other persons, and have not specially provided for its disposition on their decease, my will is that the trustee holding such property shall on such decease pay and convey the same in fee simple dischargof the state of Rhode Island would inherit it ed of all trusts to the persons who by the laws had the persons for whose benefit it was so given died seised and possessed thereof in fee.'

It is further alleged that said Sarah Ann Cook qualified as said trustee and sold the real estate in Fall River, the proceeds from said sale becoming a part of the trust fund; that the original trustee died September 7, 1888, and by a decree of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the state of Rhode Island entered November 22, 1890, Hezekiah Anthony Cook was appointed trustee in her stead; that Hezekiah Anthony Cook died November 8, 1900, and by decree of said court entered October 14, 1901, Benjamin Hall, Jr., defendant in the present case was appointed trustee; that Helen Cook, the beneficiary under said trust, became the wife of the complainant, William C. Quinn, in September, 1905, and died intestate on April 3, 1911, said William C. Quinn being appointed as administrator of her estate.

The bill further alleges that on June 26, 1911, George Morton, Helen M. Morton, Frank Pierce, Sarah Pierce, Robert E. Maher, Hattie E. Maher, Hezekiah Anthony Cook, Jennie E. Cook, Hattie E. Cook, Stanley O. Holden, Nancy A. Holden, and Reuben C. Small brought a bill in equity No. 2348, in the superior court of the state of Rhode Island against Benjamin Hall, Jr., trustee, setting forth that said Joseph A. P. Cook,

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

Helen M. Morton, Sarah A. Pierce, Hattie of nonresidence; that these pleas were susE. Maher, Hezekiah Anthony Cook, Jennie E. Cook, and Nancy A. Holden were the sole heirs at law of said Helen Cook; that said trust had been fully completed, and nothing further remained to be done in pursuance thereof, and praying that:

"As there is no reason for the further continuance of said trust, a decree of this honorable court may be entered ordering the ter

mination of said trust and a distribution of the trust funds among the several distributees to each one equal share, and further ordering the trustee discharged from further responsibility in the premises."

tained by a judge of the superior court, and the bill was dismissed as to them; that, of the remaining respondents, one was not served with process and entered no appearance; that there were consequently 5 respondents left in the case. Three of these, namely, George Morton, Helen M. Morton, and Hezekiah A. Cook, joined in a demurrer to the bill, stating their causes of demurrer

as follows:

"First. The complainant does not state a cause of action entitling him to relief.

"Second. It appears by said bill that the matters complained of have been finally adjudi"Third. It appears that the complainant's claims in said bill contained are stale.

This bill further alleges with reference to the bill in equity No. 2348 that said Benja-cated by a court of competent jurisdiction. min Hall, Jr., respondent, therein waived issuance and service of subpoenas, admitted the allegations set forth in the bill of complaint, consented that the trust might be terminated, the trust fund be distributed, and prayed that he be discharged from liability thereunder. Following the above proceedings, a decree was entered in said cause on July 10, 1911, by consent, empowering and directing the trustee to sell certain shares of stock owned by the estate and to pay the trust fund in equal shares to the abovenamed parties, and declaring the trust terminated and the trustee discharged.

"Fourth. It appears that said bill was not brought within the time required by law. "Fifth. It does not appear in what county said cause in equity No. 2348 was brought.

"Sixth. It appears that the complainant was not a party and was not a privy of a party to said cause in equity No. 2348.

The complainant in this bill further alleges that he had no knowledge of the pendency of the above proceedings and no knowledge of the existence of said trust; that, upon the discovery of the same, he diligently filed a request to file a bill of review in equity, which was granted; and that on July 9, 1912, he filed a bill of review in equity No. 2603, which bill has been discontinued and dismissed. The complainant further states in this bill that at the time of her decease, and at the time of the institution of said suit and the entry of final decree therein, it was well known to the trustee and other parties therein that the said Helen Cook, the life beneficiary, was the wife of William C. Quinn; that none of the parties to said proceeding made known to the court that said Helen Cook left a husband surviving her and living at the time of the said proceedings; that the complainant did not know of the existence of said trust nor of the pendency of said proceedings, and was not made a party thereto; and that the decree entered was a fraud both upon the complainant and upon the court.

The bill concludes with a prayer that said decree be reviewed, reversed, set aside, and declared to be fraudulent and void; that an account be taken, the trust terminated, and that the complainant be declared entitled to the balance of the trust fund.

It appears that the bill, as filed, named fourteen several respondents, of whom eight were not residents of the state of Rhode Island; that those eight nonresidents appeared specially and severally filed their pleas to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground

"Seventh. It appears that the complainant was not a necessary party to said cause in equity No. 2348.

"Eighth. It does not appear that the complainant is entitled to any of the proceeds of

said trust fund.

"Ninth. It does not appear that the complainant was aggrieved by the decree entered in said cause in equity No. 2348."

The respondent Benjamin Hall, Jr., also demurred to the bill on grounds which were substantially the same as those stated above. Both demurrers were heard before Mr. Justice Tanner on September 15, 1913, and a decision was announced sustaining the same on all points; and thereafter on September 27, 1913, a final decree was entered sustaining these demurrers upon all points and dismissing the bill; from this decree this appeal is taken, the reasons of appeal being set forth as follows: (1) That said decree is against the law; (2) that said decree is against the rights of the complainant as disclosed by the pleadings; (3) that the court erred in sustaining the respondents' several demurrers to the bill of complaint, and thereby deciding that the complainant was not entitled to the whole or any part of the trust fund therein described.

It is contended on behalf of the defendants that this is a bill of review; that therefore it should have been filed within one year after the entry of the final decree sought to be reviewed; that, being filed later, it cannot be sustained (citing Williams v. Starkweather, 24 R. I. 512, 53 Atl. 870; Id., 25 R. I. 77, 54 Atl. 931; Id., 28 R. I. 145, 66 Atl. 67); that it is not brought in the same county where the original decree was enrolled, and therefore cannot be sustained; that being a bill of review, and being brought by one who is neither a party nor the privy of a party to the original suit, it cannot be sustained. All these questions are raised under the grounds of demurrer second to sixth, inclusive, above set forth, and must stand or fall together; they all depend upon the ques

tion whether this is a bill of review. In our opinion, after careful consideration of the briefs and arguments of counsel, this is not a bill of review; it is an original bill in the nature of a bill of review.

[1, 2] It was long since held by this court, in accord with well-settled principles of equity procedure, that a bill of review can be filed only by a party to the original cause or by one in privity with such party; and that "other persons aggrieved must proceed by original bill in the nature of a bill of review" (Doyle, Petitioner, 14 R. I. 55, 56), and it is one of the chief grounds of complaint in this bill that this complainant was not made a party, although it was well known to the parties to said suit that the said Helen Cook, named as a beneficiary in the will of Hezekiah Anthony, had married the complainant, and that he survived her; that by referring to said beneficiary by the name of Helen Cook, instead of by the name of Helen Cook Quinn, although knowing her to have married the complainant, and by neglecting to make this complainant a party to said suit, the parties to said original suit deceived the court. And the bill further alleges that this complainant had no knowledge of the proceedings by the parties claiming as heirs at law of Helen Cook to have the trust terminated and the fund distributed, and had no knowledge of the existence of the trust; and that upon discovery thereof he proceeded diligently to take action. It further appears that he first sought leave to file a bill of review and did attempt to file such a bill, which was afterwards dismissed; evidently the complainant discovered that a bill of review was not the proper remedy for him, and therefore he proceeded to file this origi

nal bill in the nature of a bill of review. There is no ground for the claim set up by the defendants that this complainant has been guilty of laches in filing his bill. It appears that he proceeded with diligence as soon as he was informed of what had taken place; and, although his first attempt to file a bill of review was ill advised, it must at least have operated to give prompt notice of his claim to the parties in interest. It further appears by certain pleas on file in the case that the trustee, Benjamin Hall, Jr., distributed the trust fund in said bill mentioned, under the decree entered in said cause on the 10th day of July, 1911, during said month of July, 1911, to the parties named in said decree, so that it was impossible for this complainant, not being informed of said proceedings, to have filed his bill before said fund was distributed. It therefore clearly appears that the delay arising from this complainant's ignorance, and incident to his procedure, could have worked no harm to the parties respondent, and would not be a valid ground of defense to this suit. This bill is based upon allegations of fraudulent concealment of the fact that this complain

ant was the living husband of the beneficiary Helen Cook named in Hezekiah Anthony's will, whereby it was made to appear to the court that the only parties in interest were the parties named in the original bill, and that the decree for termination of the trust and distribution of the fund was obtained by reason of such fraudulent concealment.

[3] The above facts constitute a complete and sufficient allegation of fraud in procuring the decree in the original suit. It was the duty of the trustee to fully advise the court as to all material facts affecting the distribution of the estate upon the determination of the trust.

"It is incumbent upon the trustee to satisfy himself beyond doubt, before he parts with the possession of the property, who are the parties legally and equitably entitled to it." Lewin on Trusts (12th Ed.) 402.

Likewise, in instances of the distribution of a trust estate through court proceedings, it is stated that:

"Whether the trustee be plaintiff or defendant, he should take care, before an order is made, that all proper parties are before the point out the proper parties, it might be held court, for, if the trustee fail in his duty to that the order of the court under such circumstances did not indemnify him." Lewin on Trusts (6th Ed.) § 924; Story, Eq. Pl. (10th Trusts (12th Ed.) 422. See, also, Perry on Ed.) § 427.

In Story on Equity Pleading (10th Ed.) § 426, the author says:

"There is no doubt of the jurisdiction of courts of equity to grant relief against a former decree, where the same has been obtained by fraud and imposition, for these will infect judgments at law and decrees of all courts, but they annul the whole in the consideration of courts of equity. * * * Where a decree has been so obtained, the court will restore the parties to their former situation, whatever their rights may be."

See, also, to the same general effect, Kerr on Fraud & Mistake, p. 293; Fletcher, Eq. Pleading, p. 1005.

A bill impeaching a decree for fraud is an original bill in the nature of a bill of review. The nature of the bill necessary to obtain relief in cases of this kind is defined in

Story's Equity Pleading (10th Ed.) § 426, as

follows:

"Fourthly, bills impeaching decrees for fraud. A bill of this sort is an original bill in the nature of a bill of review. There is no doubt of the jurisdiction of courts of equity to grant has been obtained by fraud and imposition, for relief against a former decree, where the same these will infect judgments at law and decrees of all courts; but they annul the whole in the consideration of courts of equity. This must be done by original bill."

So in 3 Encyc. Pl. & Pr. 608, it is stated as follows:

"It is a well-settled rule of equity jurisprudence that, where a decree has been obtained by fraud or collusion between the parties, it may be impeached by an original bill filed for that purpose."

The rule is stated in Daniell's Chancery Pleading & Practice (6th Am. Ed.) vol. 2, p. *1584, as follows:

"If a decree has been obtained by fraud, it even if object and effect of a bill for fraud, may be impeached by original bill, without the even if the fraud consist in the want of noleave of the court; the fraud used in obtaining | tice, are to vacate the former decree in toto, the decree being the principal point in issue, not to retry the cause, whereas the object and and necessary to be established by proof, before effect of a bill of review are to reverse the dethe propriety of the decree can be investigated." cree, so far as it is erroneous, and to retry the cause upon the original record, or the original A bill to impeach a decree for fraud is and new proof, according as the bill is for eran original bill in the nature of a bill of ror apparent or newly discovered evidence." review. Mussel v. Morgan, 3 Bro. Ch. 74; In Gordon v. Ross, 63 Ala. 363, 365, the Ex parte Smith, 34 Ala. 455; Person v. court said: Nevitt, 32 Miss. 180; Sequin v. Maverick, 24 Tex. 526, 76 Am. Dec. 117. So in cases where, as in the case at bar, the decree is obtained without making the persons parties to the suit whose rights are affected, such decree is void as to those parties, and the remedy is an original bill in the nature of a bill of review.

*

*

"The objects and effect of a bill of review, and of a bill impeaching a decree for fraud, are If entertained essentially different. as a bill of review, the former decree, so far as erroneous, would be reversed, and the court would proceed to retry the cause, rendering if fraud has infected the decree, it must be the decree the evidence would authorize. But, vacated entirely; there is no retrial of the cause."

[5] One point raised by defendant's demurrers is that this bill is not brought in the proper county. It appears upon inspection of the papers on file that the original suit, in which the decree was entered order

In Dunklin v. Harvey, 56 Ala. 177, it was held that a decree in chancery was fraudulent and void as to persons who were not made parties to the suit, and whose rights were known to be involved, and that an original bill in the nature of a bill of reviewing distribution of the trust fund, and which is the proper mode by which to impeach such decree for fraud, at the instance of a stranger to the original suit.

So in Bailey v. Holden, 50 Vt. 14, it was held that a person whose rights had been prejudiced by a decree in a suit to which he was not a party, and as to the pendency of which he had no knowledge, might impeach said decree by an original bill for fraud. The real nature of the bill is to be determined by its substance rather than by its mere form.

[4] It has been suggested by the defendants that the use of the word "review" in the prayer of the present bill of complaint and the application to a justice for leave to file the bill renders it a bill of review, and hence subject to the one-year limitation. While the use of the word might equally point to the fact of its being an original bill in the nature of a bill of review, nevertheless under the authorities no doubt can arise. In Ex parte Smith, 34 Ala. 455, the court said:

said decree is now attacked by this suit and sought to be set aside, was brought in the superior court in the county of Providence; and that the bill in this cause was filed in the superior court in the county of Newport. We think this is quite immaterial. By the Court and Practice Act, under which the superior court was created, chapter 2, § 4,

provides:

consist of a presiding justice and five associate "There shall be a superior court which shall justices." Gen. Laws 1909, c. 273, § 1.

Further sections of the same and other chapters provide for the holding of sessions of the superior court by a single justice in one or more places at the same time, and at stated times in the different counties of the state, and this is for the convenience of litigants. But as was said in Paull v. Paull, 30 R. I. 253, 256, 74 Atl. 1016, 1017, "In this state the superior court is one court for the entire state." The various sessions in the several counties are held by the same justices; and it is customary for equity causes filed in one county to be heard in another for convenience of the court or parties. In fact it appears that the hearing of this cause, although filed in Newport county, was ac

"The real nature of a bill is to be determined rather by its substance (that is, by its allegations and object) than by the title which the pleader chooses to give it. The bill in this case is called by the complainant a bill of re-tually had in Providence, where the original view. It is obvious, however, that it is not a bill of review, for that cannot be filed, except upon the ground of error on the face of the decree, or of new matter which has arisen or been discovered since the publication of testimony in the original suit. Nor is it what is termed a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, for this also is founded upon the occurrence or discovery of new facts. The object of the bill is to impeach a final decree for fraud; and this can only be done by an original bill filed for that purpose. Such a bill is sometimes called an original bill in the nature of a bill of review."

In Berdanatti v. Sexton, 2 Tenn. Ch. 704, the essential difference between a bill of review and an original bill in the nature of a bill of review is aptly stated as follows:

suit was filed. Inasmuch as the complainant in this suit was a nonresident and the principal defendant, Benjamin Hall, Jr., trustee, was a resident of Newport county, this bill was properly filed in Newport county under the provisions of Gen. Laws R. I. 1909, c. 283, § 2. If the decree attacked in this suit is set aside, there is no difficulty in making such an order as shall cause the decree in this suit to appear by way of a certified copy in the records of the county of Providence, so as to effectually nullify the decree entered in said county of Providence.

[6] The sole further question of importance in this case is whether the complainant has by the allegations of his bill shown that he

« ՆախորդըՇարունակել »