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bridge, shall seasonably drive his carriage or concealment on the part of the beneficiary's vehicle to the right of the center of the traveled heirs of the fact that she died ieaving a living part of the road, so as to enable such person husband, and that, on discovering the facts, he to pass with his carriage or vehicle without proceeded diligently to take action, was not a interference or interruption. Every person trav- bill of review, but a bill in the nature of a bill eling with any carriage or other vehicle who of review, and was therefore not objectionable shall overtake any other person so traveling on because not filed within a year from the entry any highway or bridge shall pass on the left of the final decree. side thereof, and the person so overtaken shall [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. as soon as practicable drive to the right so as to Dig. $$ 1065–1070; Dec. Dig. § 442.*] allow free passage on the left. “Sec. 2. Every person who shall willfully vio- 3. JUDGMENT (§ 460*)-DECREE-FRAUD.

Since it is incumbent on a trustee, in prolate the provisions of the preceding section shall be fined five dollars, and shall be liable for ceedings to terminate the trust, to fully advise all damages sustained in consequence, of any | distribution of the estate upon the determina

the court as to all material facts affecting the neglect to comply with said provisions.”

tion of the trust and to satisfy himself beyond Marsh v. Boyden, 33 R. I. 519, 82 Atl. 393, doubt of the persons legally and equitably en40. L. R. A. (N. S.) 582, cited in the majority titled to the fund, a bill to set aside a decree opinion, is not in point. In that case, at page erty, alleging that complainant, the husband of

terminating the trust and distributing the prop523 of 33 R. I., at page 395 of 82 Atl. (40 L. the beneficiary for life, was entitled to the trust R. A. [N. S.] 582), the court said:

fund, but that, by fraudulent concealment of “If the rule of the road had any application the fact that the beneficiary died leaving a husat all it must have been with reference to the band, he was not made a party to the bill, and street car or the people thereon, but the plain it was made to appear to the court that the tiff at the time of

the accident had ceased to be wife's heirs were the only parties in interest, a passenger on the car, and there was no inter- and for this reason the property was ordered ference with the car 'or collision in which it distributed to them, sufficiently charged fraud and the automobile of the defendant were in- in procuring the original decree to stato a cause volved. The plaintiff was not injured in con- of action for equitable relief. sequence of the neglect of any duty which the [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see_Judgment, defendant owed to the car or its occupants. Of Cent. Dig. 88 879, 880, 882–891; Dec. Dig. Ś course the defendant was bound to take notice of 460.*] the fact that a street car had stopped to allow 4. EQUITY (8 442*)-BILL OF REVIEW-DESpassengers to alight and to so conduct his vehicle as not to run down persons who had so

IGNATION. alighted, but that is not a duty, imposed by a decree for alleged fraud in failing to make

Where a bill by a third person to set aside the statutes hereinbefore referred to as pre- complainant a party to the suit stated a cause scribing the rule of the road."

of action appropriate to a bill in the nature of This language precedes that quoted in the a bill of review and not to a strict bill of remajority opinion.

view, the use of the word "review" in the prayer The foregoing discussion involves excep-plied to a justice for leave to file the bill, did

of the bill, and the fact that complainant aptions 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.

not require the court to consider the bill a All of defendant's exceptions should be strict bill of review. overruled, and the case should be remitted to [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. the superior court for the entry of judgment Dig. 88 1065–1070; Dec. Dig. § 442.*]* for the plaintiff upon the verdict.


Court & Practice Act 1905, § 4 (Gen. Laws SWEETLAND, J., concurs in opinion of 1909, c. 273, § 1), provides thať there shall be JOHNSON, C. J.

a superior court which shall consist of a presiding justice and five associate justices. Oth

er sections require the holding of sessions of the (37 R. I. 56)

court by a single justice in one or more places QUINN v. HALL et al. (No. 278.)

at the same time and at stated times in the dif

ferent counties of the state for convenience of (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. July 7,

litigants; the various sessions in the several 1914.)

counties being held by the same justices. Held 1. EQUITY (8 457*)—BILL OF REVIEW-RIGHT that, where complainant, in a suit in the nature TO FILE-PARTIES.

of a bill of review to set aside a decree terA strict bill of review can be filed only by minating a trust and distributing the property, a party to the original cause or by one in priv- was a nonresident, and the trustee was a resiity with such party; other persons aggrieved dent of N. county, the bill was properly filed in by the decree sought to be reviewed being re- that county, as provided by Gen. Laws 1909, c. quired to proceed by original bill in the nature 283, § 2, regardless of the fact that the decree of a bill of review.

attacked was rendered and of record in P. coun[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. ty, the court having full jurisdiction in the suit Dig. $ 1099; Dec. Dig. $ 457.*]

in N. county to nullify such decree and to show 2. EQUITY ($_442*)—BILL IN THE NATURE OF such nullification by a certified copy of the deA BILL OF REVIEW-RIGHTS OF THIRD PER


[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, SONS-FILING.

Where, after the death of the life bene-Cent. Dig. $8 860–862; Dec. Dig. $ 455.*1 ficiary of a trust, her heirs, without notice to 6. Wills ($ 634*) - CONSTRUCTION — RIGHTS complainant, who was her husband, obtained a OF SURVIVING HUSBAND-TRUST ESTATEdecree terminating the trust and directing dis- PERSONAL PROPERTY—"INHERIT.” tribution of the trust fund to them, a subse- Gen. Laws 1909, c. 312, § 10, provides that quent bill brought by complainant to set aside administration of the estate of a person dying such decree and to recover the property on the intestate shall be granted, if the deceased is a ground that it was distributable to him, alleg- married woman, to her husband, if competent, ing that he had no knowledge of the existence who shall not be compelled to distribute the surof the trust and had not been made a party to plus of the personal estate after the payment the prior proceedings because of fraudulent of her debts, but shall be entitled to retain the *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

same for his own use. Testator bequeathed estate be paid to this complainant, who al$5,000 and certain real estate to a trustee in leges his right to the surplus of said trust trust for the benefit of C. for life, with power estate as surviving husband of the life beneto manage the same generally and to sell and reinvest the proceeds if desirable. A subsequent ficiary. clause of the will declared that in all cases The essential allegations in said bill of where testator had given property in trust for complaint are as follows: That Hezekiah the benefit of other persons, and had not specially provided for its disposition on their

death, Anthony, late of the city of Providence, by the trustee, on such event, should pay and con- his will duly admitted to probate January vey the property in fee, discharged of all trusts, 22, 1884, provided in section 17 thereof as to the persons who, by the laws of Rhode Is

follows: land, would inherit it had the persons, for whose benefit it was so given, died seised and possessed "I give, devise and bequeath to Sarah Ann thereof in fee. Held that, the real property Cook in trust for Helen Cook widow of Enos having been converted into personalty by the A. Cook, the sum of five thousand dollars and trustee during the lifetime of the beneficiary for also the house and land where said Enos A. life, the word "inherit” could not be construed Cook formerly lived on Almy street in Fall as having been used by testator in its strict le- River, commonwealth of Massachusetts, To have gal sense as designating those persons only who and to hold the same to her the said Sarah Ann would inherit real property from an intestate Cook, her heirs, executors, and administrators ancestor, but the word was used in the sense for the use and benefit of Helen Cook widow of of "take"; and hence, on the death of the bene- Enos A. Cook her heirs, executors and adminficiary for life, the remainder of the trust fund istrators with power to manage the same genso bequeathed to her passed to her husband and erally and if need be in her opinion to sell the not to her heirs.

same and reinvest the proceeds thereof and with [Ed. Note.–For other cases, see Wills, Cent. power to change the investment thereof whenDig. $$ 1488–1510; Dec. Dig. § 634.*]

ever in her opinion it shall seem best, and with

power also to convey said real estate to her, Baker, J., dissenting.

her heirs and assigns at any time when she may

think proper and with power to pay over to Appeal from Superior Court, Providence her said money or any part thereof according and Bristol Counties; Willard B. Tanner, to her discretion." Presiding Justice.

The bill further sets forth that the will Bill in the nature of a bill of review by also provided in an unnumbered paragraph William C. Quinn against Benjamin Hall, following section 22, as follows: Jr., trustee, and others. From a decree in "In all cases where I have given property in favor of defendants, complainant appeals. trust for the use and benefit of other persons, Reversed and rendered.

and have not specially provided for its disposi

tion on their decease, my will is that the trusCrane, Munro & Barry and Thomas A. tee holding such property shall on such decease Barry, all of Providence (Wm. G. Rowe, of pay and convey the same in fee simple dischargBrockton, Mass., of counsel), for complainant. of the state of Rhode Island would inherit it

ed of all trusts to the persons who by the laws Irving Champlin, Alfred Wilson, and Claude had the persons for whose benefit it was so givC. Ball, all of Providence (John C. Knowles, en died seised and possessed thereof in fee. of Providence, of counsel), for defendants

It is further alleged that said Sarah Ann Morton and another. Burdick & MacLeod, of Cook qualified as said trustee and sold the Newport, for defendant Hall.

real estate in Fall River, the proceeds from

said sale becoming a part of the trust fund; PARKHURST, J. This is an appeal from that the original trustee died September 7, a final decree entered in the superior court 1858, and by a decree of the Appellate Diviin the above-entitled cause. Said cause was sion of the Supreme Court of the state of heard in the superior court before the pre- Rhode Island entered November 22, 1890, siding justice September 15, 1913, on the de- Hezekiah Anthony Cook was appointed trusmurrers to the bill of complaint filed by tee in her stead; that Hezekiah Anthony Cook Benjamin Hall, Jr., trustee, George Morton, died November 8, 1900, and by decree of said Helen M. Morton, and Hezekiah A. Cook, court entered October 14, 1901, Benjamin and upon hearing thereof said demurrers Hall, Jr., defendant in the present case was were sustained upon all points contained appointed trustee; that Helen Cook, the bentherein. On September 27, 1913, a final de eficiary under said trust, became the wife of cree was entered in said superior court sus- the complainant, William C. Quinn, in Septaining said demurrers upon all points and tember, 1905, and died intestate on April 3, dismissing said bill as to said respondents, 1911, said William C. Quinn being appointed with costs. Within the time prescribed by as administrator of her estate. law, the complainant filed his claim of appeal The bill further alleges that on June 26, from said final decree, together with his rea- 1911, George Morton, Helen M. Morton, sons therefor, and thereupon the papers in Frank Pierce, Sarah Pierce, Robert E. Maher, said cause were certified to this court for Hattie E. Maher, Hezekiah Anthony Cook, determination of said appeal.

Jennie E. Cook, Hattie E. Cook, Stanley 0. This is a bill in equity praying that the Holden, Nancy A. Holden, and Reuben C. defendant Benjamin Hall, as trustee under Small brought a bill in equity No. 2348, in the will of Hezekiah Anthony, be required the superior court of the state of Rhode to account as said trustee; that said trust Island against Benjamin Hall, Jr., trustee, be terminated; and that the balance of said setting forth that said Joseph A. P. Cook,

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes Helen M. Morton, Sarah A. Pierce, Hattie of nonresidence; that these pleas were susE. Maher, Hezekiah Anthony Cook, Jennie tained by a judge of the superior court, and E. Cook, and Nancy A. Holden were the sole the bill was dismissed as to them; that, of heirs at law of said Helen Cook; that said the remaining respondents, one was not trust had been fully completed, and nothing served with process and entered no appearfurther remained to be done in pursuance ance; that there were consequently 5 rethereof, and praying that:

spondents left in the case. Three of these, "As there is no reason for the further con- namely, George Morton, Helen M. Morton, tinuance of said trust, a decree of this honor- and Hezekiah A. Cook, joined in a demurrer

, a able court may be entered ordering the termination of said trust and a distribution of the to the bill, stating their causes of demurrer trust funds among the several distributees to as follows: each one equal share, and further ordering the "I st. The complainant does not state a trustee discharged from further responsibility cause of action entitling him to relief. in the premises.'

"Second. It appears by said bill that the This bill further alleges with reference to matters complained of have been finally adjudithe bill in equity No. 2348 that said Benja- cated by a court of competent jurisdiction.


"Third. It appears that the complainant's min Hall, Jr., respondent, therein waived is claims in said bill contained are stale. suance and service of subpoenas, admitted "Fourth. It appears that said bill was not the allegations set forth in the bill of com- brought within the time required by law.

"Fifth. It does not appear in what county plaint, consented that the trust might be said cause in equity No. 2348 was brought. terminated, the trust fund be distributed, "Sixth. It appears that the complainant was and prayed that he be discharged from lia- not a party, and was not a privy of a party to bility thereunder. Following the above pro- said cause in equity No. 2318. “

"Seventh. It appears that the complainant ceedings, a decree was entered in said cause

was not a necessary party to said cause in on July 10, 1911, by consent, empowering and equity No. 2348. directing the trustee to sell certain shares

"Eighth. It does not appear that the comof stock owned by the estate and to pay the plainant is entitled to any of the proceeds of

said trust fund. trust fund in equal shares to the above- "Ninth. It does not appear that the complainnamed parties, and declaring the trust ter- ant was aggrieved by the decree entered in said minated and the trustee discharged.

cause in equity No. 2348.” The complainant in this bill further alleges The respondent Benjamin Hall, Jr., also that he had no knowledge of the pendency demurred to the bill on grounds which were of the above proceedings and no knowledge substantially the same as those stated above. of the existence of said trust; that, upon Both demurrers were heard before Mr. Justhe discovery of the same, he diligently filed tice Tanner on September 15, 1913, and a a request to file a bill of review in equity, decision was announced sustaining the same which was granted; and that on July 9, on all points; and thereafter on September 1912, he filed a bill of review in equity No. 27, 1913, a final decree was entered sustain2603, which bill has been discontinued and ing these demurrers upon all points and disdismissed. The complainant further states missing the bill; from this decree this apin this bill that at the time of her decease, peal is taken, the reasons of appeal being and at the time of the institution of said set forth as follows: (1) That said decree is suit and the entry of final decree therein, against the law; (2) that said decree is it was well known to the trustee and other against the rights of the complainant as parties therein that the said Helen Cook, disclosed by the pleadings; (3) that the the life beneficiary, was the wife of William court erred in sustaining the respondents' C. Quinn; that none of the parties to said several demurrers to the bill of complaint, proceeding made known to the court that and thereby deciding that the complainant said Helen Cook left a husband surviving was not entitled to the whole or any part of her and living at the time of the said pro- the trust fund therein described. ceedings; that the complainant did not know It is contended on behalf of the defendants of the existence of said trust nor of the that this is a bill of review; that therefore pendency of said proceedings, and was not it should have been filed within one year made a party thereto; and that the decree after the entry of the final decree sought to entered was a fraud both upon the com- be reviewed; that, being filed later, it canplainant and upon the court.

not be sustained (citing Williams v. StarkThe bill concludes with a prayer that said weather, 24 R. I. 512, 53 Atl. 870; Id., 25 R. decree be reviewed, reversed, set aside, and 1. 77, 54 Atl. 931; Id., 28 R. I. 145, 66 Atl. declared to be fraudulent and void; that an 67); that it is not brought in the same county account be taken, the trust terminated, and where the original decree was enrolled, and that the complainant be declared entitled therefore cannot be sustained; that being to the balance of the trust fund.

a bill of review, and being brought by one It appears that the bill, as filed, named who is neither a party nor the privy of a fourteen several respondents, of whom eight party to the original suit, it cannot be suswere not residents of the state of Rhode Is- tained. All these questions are raised under land; that those eight nonresidents appeared the grounds of demurrer second to sixth, inspecially and severally filed their pleas to clusive, above set forth, and must stand or the jurisdiction of the court on the ground fall together; they all depend upon the question whether this is a bill of review. In our ant was the living husband of the beneficiary

| opinion, after careful consideration of the Helen Cook named in Hezekiah Anthony's briefs and arguments of counsel, this is not will, whereby it was made to appear to the a bill of review; it is an original bill in the court that the only parties in interest were nature of a bill of review.

the parties named in the original bill, and [1, 2] It was long since held by this court, that the decree for termination of the trust in accord with well-settled principles of equity and distribution of the fund was obtained by procedure, that a bill of review can be filed reason of such fraudulent concealment. only by a party to the original cause or by [3] The above facts constitute a complete one in privity with such party; and that and sufficient allegation of fraud in procur“other persons aggrieved must proceed by ing the decree in the original suit. It was original bill in the nature of a bill of re- the duty of the trustee to fully advise the view" (Doyle, Petitioner, 14 R. I. 55, 56), and court as to all material facts affecting the it is one of the chief grounds of complaint distribution of the estate upon the determinain this bill that this complainant was not tion of the trust. made a party, although it was well known "It is incumbent upon the trustee to satisfy to the parties to said suit that the said Helen himself beyond doubt, before he parts with the Cook, named as a beneficiary in the will of legally and equitably entitled to it.” Lewin on

possession of the property, who are the parties Hezekiah Anthony, had married the com- Trusts (12th Ed.) 402. plainant, and that he survived her; that by Likewise, in instances of the distribution of referring to said beneficiary by the name of a trust estate through court proceedings, it Helen Cook, instead of by the name of Helen is stated that: Cook Quinn, although knowing her to have "Whether the trustee be plaintiff or defendmarried the complainant, and by neglecting ant, he should take care, before an order is to make this complainant a party to said suit, made, that all proper parties are before the the parties to said original suit deceived the point out the proper parties, it might be held

court, for, if the trustee fail in his duty to court. And the bill further alleges that this that the order of the court under such circumcomplainant had no knowledge of the pro- stances did not indemnify him.” Lewin on ceedings by the parties claiming as heirs at Trusts (6th Ed.) '924; Story, Eq. Pl. (10th

Trusts (12th Ed.) 422. See, also, Perry on law of Helen Cook to have the trust terminat- Ed.) 427. ed and the fund distributed, and had no knowledge of the existence of the trust; and 426, the author says:

In Story on Equity Pleading (10th Ed.) § that upon discovery thereof he proceeded

“There is no doubt of the jurisdiction of diligently to take action. It further appears courts of equity to grant relief against a forthat he first sought leave to file a bill of mer decree, where the same has been obtained review and did attempt to file such a bill, judgments at law and decrees of all courts, but which was afterwards dismissed; evidently they annul the whole in the consideration of the complainant discovered that a bill of courts of equity. * * * Where a decree has review was not the proper remedy for him, been so obtained, the court will restore the and therefore he proceeded to file this origi- parties to their former situation, whatever their

rights may be.” nal bill in the nature of a bill of review.

See, also, to the same general effect, Kerr There is no ground for the claim set up by

on Fraud & Mistake, p. 293; Fletcher, Eq. the defendants that this complainant has been guilty of laches in filing his bill. It Pleading, p. 1005.

A bill impeaching a decree for fraud is an appears that he proceeded with diligence as soon as he was informed of what had taken original bill in the nature of a bill of review. place; and, although his first attempt to relief in cases of this kind is defined in

The nature of the bill necessary to obtain file a bill of review was ill advised, it must Story's Equity Pleading (10th Ed.) 8 426, as ,

( at least have operated to give prompt notice

follows: of his claim to the parties in interest. It further appears by certain pleas on file in the A bill of this sort is an original bill in the

"Fourthly, bills impeaching decrees for fraud. case that the trustee, Benjamin Hall, Jr., nature of a bill of review. There is no doubt distributed the trust fund in said bill men of the jurisdiction of courts of equity to grant tioned, under the decree entered in said has been obtained by fraud and imposition, for

relief against a former decree, where the same cause on the 10th day of July, 1911, during these will infect judgments at law and de

, said month of July, 1911, to the parties nam- crees of all courts; but they annul the whole ed in said decree, so that it was impossible in the consideration of courts of equity. This for this complainant, not being informed of must be done by original bill.” said proceedings, to have filed his bill before

So in 3 Encyc. Pl. & Pr. 608, it is stated said fund was distributed. It therefore as follows: clearly appears that the delay arising from

"It is a well-settled rule of equity jurispruthis complainant's ignorance, and incident to by fraud or collusion between the parties, it

dence that, where a decree has been obtained his procedure, could have worked no harm to may be impeached by an original bill filed for the parties respondent, and would not be a that purpose. valid ground of defense to this suit. This The rule is stated in Daniell's Chancery bill is based upon allegations of fraudulent Pleading & Practice (6th Am. Ed.) vol. 2, concealment of the fact that this complain-1 p. *1584, as follows:




"If a decree has been obtained by fraud, it may be impeached by original bill, without the even if the fraud consist in the want of no


“The object and effect of a bill for fraud, leave of the court; the fraud used in obtaining | tice, are to vacate the former decree in toto, the decree being the principal point in issue, not to retry the cause, whereas the object and and necessary to be established by proof, before effect of a bill of review are to reverse the dethe propriety of the decree can be investigated.” cree, so far as it is erroneous, and to retry the

cause upon the original record, or the original A bill to impeach a decree for fraud is and new proof, according as the bill is for eran original bill in the nature of a bill of ror apparent or newly discovered evidence." review. Mussel v. Morgan, 3 Bro. Ch. 74; In Gordon v. Ross, 63 Ala. 363, 365, the Ex parte Smith, 34 Ala. 455; Person v. court said: Nevitt, 32 Miss. 180; Sequin v. Maverick, "The objects and effect of a bill of review, 24 Tex, 526, 76 Am. Dec. 117. So in cases and of a bill impeaching a decree for fraud, are .


If entertained where, as in the case at bar, the decree is essentially different.

as a bill of review, the former decree, so far obtained without making the persons parties as erroneous, would be reversed, and the court to the suit whose rights are affected, such would proceed to retry the cause, rendering decree is void as to those parties, and the lif fraud has infected the decree, it must be

the decree the evidence would authorize. But, remedy is an original bill in the nature of vacated entirely; there is no retrial of the a bill of review.

cause." In Dunklin v. Harvey, 56 Ala. 177, it was [5] One point raised by defendant's deheld that a decree in chancery was fraudu- murrers is that this bill is not brought in lent and void as to persons who were not the proper county. It appears upon inspecmade parties to the suit, and whose rights tion of the papers on file that the original were known to be involved, and that an suit, in which the decree was entered orderoriginal bill in the nature of a bill of review ing distribution of the trust fund, and which is the proper mode by which to impeach such said decree is now attacked by this suit and decree for fraud, at the instance of a stran- sought tơ be set aside, was brought in the ger to the original suit.

superior court in the county of Providence; So in Bailey v. Holden, 50 Vt. 14, it was and that the bill in this cause was filed in held that a person whose rights had been the superior court in the county of Newport. prejudiced by a decree in a suit to which he We think this is quite immaterial. By the was not a party, and as to the pendency of Court and Practice Act, under which the which he had no knowledge, might impeach superior court was created, chapter 2, § 4, said decree by an original bill for fraud.

provides : The real nature of the bill is to be deter- consist of a presiding justice and five associate

“There shall be a superior court which shall mined by its substance rather than by its justices." Gen. Laws 1909, c. 273, § 1. mere form.

Further sections of the same and other [4] It has been suggested by the defend- chapters provide for the holding of sessions ants that the use of the word “review” in of the superior court by a single justice in the prayer of the present bill of complaint one or more places at the same time, and at and the application to a justice for leave to stated times in the different counties of the file the bill renders it a bill of review, and state, and this is for the convenience of litihence subject to the one-year limitation. gants. But as was said in Paull v. Paull, 30 While the use of the word might equally R. I, 253, 256, 74 Atl. 1016, 1017, "In this point to the fact of its being an original bill state the superior court is one court for the in the nature of a bill of review, neverthe entire state." The various sessions in the less under the authorities no doubt can arise. several counties are held by the same jus

In Ex parte Smith, 34 Ala. 455, the court tices; and it is customary for equity causes said:

filed in one county to be heard in another for “The real nature of a bill is to be determined convenience of the court or parties. In fact rather by its substance (that is, by its allega- it appears that the hearing of this cause, tions and object) than by the title which the although filed in Newport county, was ac

in this case is called by the complainant a bill of re- tually had in Providence, where the original view. It is obvious, however, that it is not a suit was filed. Inasmuch as the complainbill of review, for that cannot be filed, except ant in this suit was a nonresident and the upon the ground of error on the face of the de- principal defendant, Benjamin Hall, Jr., truscree, or of new matter which has arisen or been discovered since the publication of testimony in tee, was a resident of Newport county, this the original suit. Nor is it what is termed a bill was properly filed in Newport county supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of under the provisions of Gen. Laws R. I. 1909, review, for this also is founded upon the occ. 283, § 2. If the decree attacked in this currence or discovery of new facts. The object of the bill is to impeach a final decree for suit is set aside, there is no difficulty in fraud; and this can only be done by an original making such an order as shall cause the debill filed for that purpose. Such a bill is some- cree in this suit to appear by way of a certimes called an original bill in the nature of a tified copy in the records of the county of bill of review.'

Providence, so as to effectually nullify the In Berdanatti v. Sexton, 2 Tenn. Ch. 704, decree entered in said county of Providence. the essential difference between a bill of re- [6] The sole further question of importance view and an original bill in the nature of a in this case is whether the complainant has bill of review is aptly stated as follows: by the allegations of his bill shown that he

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