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ing that this money, $500 in amount, was due These matters, however, are not conclusive from the firm to Mrs. Garrison, as well as an- upon the client represented by Mr. Miller, who other claim, in amount $325, for money loan- has filed a bill by which it is sought to set ed by Mrs. Garrison to the firm. Now Mr. aside the title or to impress the lien of the Nichols comes here to-day in support of ex- judgment of the complainant upon certain real ceptions to those two items, and claims, in ef-estate standing in the name of Mrs. Garrison. fect, that he was more or less coerced into It is with reference to this real estate and with consenting to the allowance of these two items reference to the pecuniary relations of Mr. Garand, as a matter of fact, he did not himself rison and his wife that I had more particularly know of their correctness. Against that claim reference to when I said I did not believe the on his part to-day there is the testimony of human mind was able to solve accurately the Mr. Brannan to the effect that Mr. Nichols exact truth of the entire situation. It is unhad, on repeated occasions prior to that time, doubtedly true that before her marriage Mrs. admitted the correctness of these claims, and Garrison had some means. I think the evithe further testimony of Mr. Brannan to the dence must be said to justify the conclusion that effect that before the receiver the matter was she was then the possessor of perhaps $2,000 fully discussed and acquiesced in by Mr. Nich- or $3,000. It may be that she had some debts ols, and the testimony of Mr. Leaming to the ef- that would reduce those assets to some extent, fect that he understood at the time that ac- but I think I am justified in assuming that count was submitted and the stipulation was she had some considerable property, and that prepared that Mr. Nichols fully understood she had a business which appears to have been what he was signing and what he had agreed reasonably prosperous. I think it may also be to and what had been determined upon before assumed with a fair degree of accuracy that him as a fact, and I am not able, as I stat- Mr. Garrison was a man without means and a ed before, to doubt that what Mr. Leaming man who has never been successful in making did at that time he believed to be right. I any progress in the world's affairs. think he believed Mr. Nichols understood the  The judgment which the complainant holds situation fully before he permitted him to ac- against Mr. Garrison was entered May 18, 1896, cede to the stipulation which was then made some eight years before Mr. Garrison's marand signed.
riage to his wife, so that at the time he marNow I can't think that in view of these cir- ried her he was not only apparently without cumstances a court would be justified in declar- means, but was, as well, a judgment debtor and ing, under the testimony now before me, that has continued to be a judgment debtor, at least any part of the accounts which were in fact con- so far as that judgment is concerned, ever since. sidered were inaccurately considered or im- His identity has been, during the period from properly adjusted. I am unable to believe his marriage down to at least the beginning that I would be justified in reaching the con- of his partnership, just about that which we clusion that any matters contained in those usually find in a husband who is a judgment accounts, which were arrived at in the man- debtor who has a wife with some money. The ner I have stated, are inaccurate or wrong as husband becomes a nonentity, and the bank acto any items that were in fact under consid-count is in the name of the wife and the huseration by the parties. Of course, if the par- band's privileges extend to transacting business ties overlooked some items, if items exist which in the wife's name. Usually we find such a were not considered at all, the statement which husband taking orders from his wife. Somewas then made or the accounts that were then times they have a little more independence and stated should not be regarded as a bar, but as to become really active in the management of afmatters actually considered by the receiver and fairs, but we always find the affairs carried discussed by the parties and reduced to figures on in the name of the wife; and the susand to stipulations, I am convinced that no picion is usually aroused that the business court would be justified in finding, on the tes- which is being conducted is his business and timony as it now stands that the exception not the business of the wife, and this suspishould be sustained.
cion is sometimes well founded. But when So I feel obliged to find, so far as the ex- the task is imposed upon a court to ascertain ceptions are concerned, that the account as it the truth, to ascertain whether the activities is stated by the receiver is, in all things, cor- of the husband are in his own behalf or whethrect so far as the items which were consid- er they are in behalf of the wife, it is usually ered in that account are concerned. There are, a task that almost defies solution with entire however, some items that Mr. Nichols testi- accuracy. There is no reason in the law why fies were overlooked by him. He says there are a husband shall not transact business in the some items of moneys, which were expended name of his wife and become just as active by him in payment of partnership bills after in that business as he cares to be, providing the the receiver was appointed, which he did not business really belongs to his wife. A judgpresent to the receiver, and which he should ment creditor of a husband has no right and no have presented. Ten dollars he claims was means to compel a husband to work, nor has paid A. Brosus on March 14, 1912; $3.50 to be any right or power to compel a husband to Charles Miller March 230; $15.13 to James charge for the services he , renders to others. 1. Hand April 6. 1912; $15.05 to James G. Unfortunately a judgment creditor has no right Stiles April 10, 1912, making a total of $33.88. to complain if his judgment debtor sees fit to I think with reference to those items the re-work for his mere living or if he sees fit to ceiver should be directed, in making his final work for nothing. account, to pass upon their accuracy and al A judgment creditor has no right to complain, low them or disallow them as he finds they are as I understand the law, if the judgment debtor right or wrong. If he has already considered sees fit to work for his wife and charge nothing them and passed upon them, I think they should for his labors. In other words, he can contribnot be allowed. If he has not considered them ute his labors to his wife; if in fact he does so at all, then he should give them consideration. and the business really belongs to the wife, the
As to the other class of items forming the judgment creditor has no remedy. That has basis of the exception, I feel convinced that been gone over in a very elaborate and wellthe testimony does not justify any modification considered opinion in the Court of Appeals writof the receiver's report.
ten, as I recall it, by Justice Reed. So my decree will be, so far as the relations The inquiry and sole inquiry is whether as a of the receiver and the partner who is surviv- matter of fact the business, the capital in the ing and the representative of the deceased part- business, the proceeds of the business, and the ner are concerned, and also so far as Mrs. Gar-profits of the business belonged to the wife, or sison as a creditor is concerned, that the receiv- did they belong wholly or in part to the huser's report be confirmed.
band, and was the wife's name used as a sub
terfuge? Now there is nothing here that justi- | February 11, 1911, for $152.10 or a total of fies a conclusion that prior to the date of this $174.10. These checks were drawn on the acpartnership there was any business conducted count in the Marine Trust Company which in the name of Mrs. Garrison, or otherwise, that stood in the name of E. F. Garrison. If the belonged to Mr. Garrison. It is true there is money in that account was the money of Mr. a peculiar circumstance in connection with the Garrison, this was a gift from him to his wife, bank accounts of Mrs. Garrison as early as and such a gift cannot be sustained as against a 1902 or 1903. An account then standing in her judgment creditor of the donor. If it was her name as Emma F. Garrison, a time account, money, then there is no way that the complainwas transferred to a new account in the name ant can complain of the transaction, or in any of E. F. Garrison, and another account which way enforce his claim against these lots. stood in her name as Emma F. Garrison was I find a good deal more difficulty in solving transferred to a_time account on the same day the status of that E. F. Garrison account in in the name of E. F. Garrison. I am not sure the Marine Trust Company than I do the other that I have stated that quite correctly, but at matters relating to this case. I scarcely know any rate $301.48 which stood in the name of what to think about it, or how to arrive at the wife in the bank was transferred to her any conclusion in which I can feel entire conown account under the name of E. F. Garri- fidence. Mr. Garrison seems to have been in son, the same being a time account, and another business for himself as a partner of Mr. Nichtime account was opened on the same day under ols, and they appear to have had settlements the same name. It is impossible to do more from time to time, in which half of the profthan guess at what the truth might have been its of the business would be apportioned to touching that transaction. There is nothing Mr. Nichols and the other half to Mr. Garrithat occurred along about that time, so far as son and checks drawn on a firm partnership I know or may be able to anticipate, that af- account in favor of each of the partners. Just fords any particular light upon what the proba- how often that occurred I do not know. The ble purpose of that transfer was, but be that checks were here, and it was impossible to go as it may Mr. Garrison was privileged to and through all the partnership checks to ascertain did use that name and that account from that how many checks have been drawn by the firm time on, but whether he used it for his wife of Garrison & Nichols to the order of Mr. Garin his wife's behalf in the conduct of her busi- rison in the name of E. F. Garrison, but all of ness, or whether he used it for himself and that kind that have been drawn, so far as it used her name simply as a blind, is an inquiry appears and as I will assume, have been drawn that would be of the greatest service to us if we to Mr. Garrison in the name of E. F. Garcould solve it with accuracy. There does not rison, and in the Marine Company was this acappear to have been any prosperous activity count in the name of E. F. Garrison against upon his part that called for the concealment which he had, by power of attorney, the right of his assets at any time until the beginning of from the wife to draw checks. The suggestion this partnership, and I doubt whether we are is undoubtedly a forceful one that if this was justified in concluding that prior to that date, his business, and if the profits of that busiat any rate, there ever was a time when we can ness were paid to him by checks to the order say with confidence that Mr. Garrison was us- of E. F. Garrison, and those checks were deing his wife's name in conducting his own busi- posited in the Marine Trust Company in the ness, and that money or proceeds of his labors name of E. F. Garrison, the name E. F. Garwhich went to his wife's credit were really his. rison represented Firman Garrison, and that
If that be true, and I am convinced that the money in the account of E. F. Garrison nothing will justify a conclusion to the con- was the money of Firman Garrison, and it trary, then the ownership of the Wildwood would follow that the money which went to Crest property which the bill seeks to attack pay for these lots was the money of Firman cannot be successfully attacked upon the theory Garrison; but that conclusion is not a necesof the bill, because the Wildwood Crest prop- sity. Those facts can carry that suggestion erty was purchased and the title taken in the with a great deal of force, but I am not prename of Mrs. Garrison June 19, 1907. Prior to pared to say that the conclusion of gift would that time I am sure nothing could justify, the be justified or even necessarily follow from the conclusion that any assets that had been or mere circumstances that the money in that acthat were in the name of Mrs. Garrison had count belonged to Firman Garrison. been really the property of her husband. It  We are not informed that it does not must be said, also, that the testimony touching seem to be practicable for us to be informed that transaction, if it is to be believed, discloses whether such checks as were_drawn to Mr. almost conclusively that that property was pur- Garrison in the name of E. F. Garrison as chased by Mrs. Garrison in her own behalf. part of the profits of that concern were in At the time of the purchase she received $1,000 fact deposited in the account in the Marine from her brother-in-law which he owed her, and Trust Company. They may have been and he has testified that he paid her the money, as they may not have been. There seems to be I recall it now, in two checks; the money that no way of at present ascertaining, but asshe received from her brother-in-law was used suming that such checks as he did receive that to buy that property, and, according to the tes- represented profits were deposited in that actimony, a little later, when the improvements count, it does not necessarily follow that the were made upon the property, a loan was made account was his, and that such deposits were by the same brother-in-law to her of $1,600, not taken into account in settlements between which was used by her in two amounts of him and his wife, and in the absence of any $1,000 and $600 in paying for wages and lum- evidence to fully establish all of those details ber in connection with the improvements. That one way or the other, I doubt whether a mere $1,600 loan was subsequently repaid to him out circumstance that he found it convenient to of a mortgage which she placed upon the prop- take his dividend checks—I will call them-in erty. If the testimony to the effect that I have the name of his wife can be treated as a cirstated is true, then, of course, there is no doubt cumstance to justify an affirmative conclusion in the world but that the Wildwood Crest prop- that the title to the land standing in the name erty belonged to Mrs. Garrison and must be of his wife belonged to him because it was held to be hers.
purchased with two checks drawn on that ac The North Wildwood property consists of count, or the conclusion that whatever balance two lots which were purchased of Mr. Ottens was found in that account after the date of his and title taken in the name of Mrs. Garrison death belonged to him. It is one of those situaFebruary 10, 1911. That property appears to tions where it seems almost impossible to reach have been paid for by two checks drawn, one a conclusion that does not find some argument September 5, 1910, for $22, and the other against its soundness; but whatever conclu
sion may be reached, on the whole I feel convinced that it would be making a mistake to
PIERSON v. GARRISON et al. declare that real estate to belong to one other than her in whose name the title stands from (Court of Chancery of New Jersey. June 24, the circumstances or evidence which appears in
1913.) this case. The other tract of land which is in controversy has already been referred to, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS ($ 94*)-Asand that is a tract of wood land standing in SETS OF ESTATE-INTEREST OF DECEASED the name of Mrs. Garrison, and also two lots PARTNER-PAYMENT TO ADMINISTRAOR. at Cape May courthouse. The wood land has On determination of the interest of a debeen sold by the receiver, and has been con- ceased partner in the assets of a firm on an verted into cash and the lots have not yet been accounting in equity, the amount found due is sold. I have already stated that my conclu- payable to the decedent's administrator. sion is that the findings of the receiver to the effect that there is due to Mrs. Garrison a
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors balance of $500 on this wood land and $325 for and Administrators, Cent. Dig. $ 409; Dec. money loaned is sustained. While that is not Dig. § 94.*] binding against the judgment creditor, it is necessarily binding against him unless there
Action by Alfred M. Pierson, as adminisis evidence adduced to show something to the trator, etc., against Emma F. Garrison and contrary. The judgment creditor is not bound others. On application for the determination by the testimony of Mr. Nichols to the effect of the terms of final decree. Granted. that that money is due. He is not bound by the admission of Mr. Nichols to the effect that
See, also, 91 Atl. 824, 829. that money is due, but there is nothing in the evidence submitted on behalf of the judgment
Louis H. Miller, of Millville, for complaincreditor that in any way suggests, to my mind, ant. Walter H. Bacon, of Bridgeton, for deany doubt of the accuracy of the conclusion of fendants. the receiver that that money is due, or in any way suggests a doubt upon my own view that that money is properly due to Mrs. Garrison.
LEAMING, V. C. 1. I deem it important My disposition, then, of the entire case, entertaining the views that I do, is that there that the decree embody a specific statement must be a decree denying to the complainant that the real estate in the name of Emma F. any lien upon the real estate which is attack- Garrison and John M. Nichols is the property ed by the bill. If there is a surplus which is of the copartnership and also embody a spedue to the representative of the deceased part cific description of such real estate. I have ner, the judgment will, of course, become entitled to be heard or to be represented in the accordingly embodied that feature in the dedistribution of that fund. It does not seem cree which I have advised. to me that that question need be taken up or considered at this time. Before any distribu- tion against John M. Nichols prior to the com
2. I think it improper to award an execution is made by the receiver of that fund if a surplus is found, the rights of the judgmenting in of the master's report. It may be creditor will be vouchsafed and protected, ei- found by the master that he is entitled to further by an adjudication at that time as to ther credits and at distribution he may also what distribution shall be made, or else by a payment into court in such manner that no dis- have a substantial credit to be applied position can be made of it until the claim of against his indebtedness. The decree as enthe judgment creditor is passed upon and such tered so provides. rights as he may have be protected. That will be the disposition that I will make of the case,
3. The decree as entered adjudges that the and I think it covers all the features of the real estate referred to in the cross-bill of case.
John M. Nichols as standing in the name of Mr. Miller: Might I suggest there is a 17- Emma F. Garrison is an asset of the firm, but acre tract of land the title to which stands in the name of John M. Nichols and which he subject to the payment to Emma F. Garrison testified is the property of Garrison & Nichols, of $825, as is set forth in her answer. that should be sold by the receiver as well as 4. The decree as advised also dismisses the the two lots at the courthouse.
bill as to Wildwood Crest and North WildMr. Zeller: There is a tract of 17 acres in Dennis township held now by Mr. Nichols. wood real estate. and that was also gone into, and I think your 5. I have made no direction looking to the reference to the fact the receiver's duties were payment by the receiver to complainant of not quite finished would include that.
the ultimate share found to be due to 'GarThe Vice Chancellor: I do not understand there is any dispute touching that land. I
rison. That question may remain open, but I will sign an order directing its sale by the re- presently see no authority to deny the adceiver.
ministratris of Garrison the right to adminisSee, also, 91 Atl. 828, 829.
ter the share. See Sullivan v. Horner, 41 Louis H. Miller, of Millville, for appellant. N. J. Eq. 299, 7 Atl. 411. William E. Zeller, of Vineland, for respond
6. The respective claims and interests of ents.
the several parties are so interwoven and
interdependent that I have thought it proper PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from to deny costs to either litigant as against the will be affirmed for the reasons stated in the other. opinion filed in the court below by Vice Chan 7. A copy of the decree will be sent to Mr. cellor Leaming.
Miller and Mr. Bacon.
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
(123 Md. 675) PIERSON v. GARRISON et al.
AROLD V. SUPREME CONCLAVE, IM(Court of Chancery of New Jersey. July 31,
PROVED ORDER OF HEPTA1914.)
SOPHS. (No. 41.) 1. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS ($ 94*)— (Court of Appeals of Maryland. June 26, ASSETS OF ESTATE-INTEREST OF DECEASED
1914.) PARTNER-PAYMENT TO ADMINISTRATOR. After determination of the interest of a de-1. INSURANCE ($ 719*)—MUTUAL BENEFIT IN
SURANCE-EFFECT OF BY-LAWS. ceased partner in the firm, it is payable by the
Where a member of a beneficial society, in surviving partner to the deceased partner's ad- his application for membership, has agreed to ministrator.
be bound by the rules or laws then in force or [Ed. Note.-- For other cases, see Executors thereafter adopted, the society may bind him and Administrators, Cent. Dig: $ 409; Dec. by after-adopted by-laws, even though not retroDig. & 94.*]
active in terms, if reasonable in character. 2. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS ($ 324*) [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Insurance,
INCUMBERED REAL PROPERTY--SALE TO PAY Cent. Dig. & 1855; Dec. Dig. $ 719.*]
2. INSURANCE ($ 719*)—MUTUAL BENEFIT INThe "debts" of a testator or intestate, re
SURANCE-EFFECT OF BY-LAWS. ferred to in 3 Comp. St. 1910, p. 3847, § 97a,
A by-law of a benefit insurance society proproviding for the sale of incumbered real prop- viding that no action could be brought or mainerty of a decedent to pay debts, do not include tained on any cause or claim arising out of any funeral expenses, which in the settlement of a certificate, unless brought within one year from decedent's estate are entitled to preference over the time when such right of action accrued, and a judgment lien.
that such right of action should accrue 60 days [Ed. Note.- For other cases, see Executors after all proofs of death should have been furand Administrators, Cent. Dig. 88 1337, 1338, nished, was reasonable and binding on the bene1342; Dec. Dig. § 324.*
ficiary of a member, who became such prior to For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, its adoption, and who by his application agreed vol. 2, pp. 1864-1886; vol. 8, p. 7628.]
to conform in all respects to the laws and rules
of the order then in force or thereafter adopted. 3. PARTNERSHIP ($ 341*)-DISSOLUTION-EsTATE OF DECEASED PARTNER-DISTRIBUTION Cent. Dig. S 1855; Dec. Dig. $ 719.*]
[Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Insurance, IN EQUITY.
Where the interest of a deceased partner Appeal from Baltimore Court of Common in the assets of a firm are ascertained in a Pleas; John J. Dobler, Judge. suit in equity for an accounting, the proper practice is to order payment of the amount
"To be officially reported.” found due to the administrator, without deter Action by Mary Arold against the Supreme mining priorities of alleged lienors; the or- Conclave, Improved Order of Heptasophs. phans court being the appropriate tribunal to Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff apsettle such questions. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Partnership,
peals. Affirmed. Cent. Dig. § 809; Dec. Dig. § 341.*]
Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BURKE,
THOMAS, PATTISON, URNER, and Suit by Alfred M. Pierson as administrator, STOCKBRIDGE, JJ. etc., against Emma F. Garrison, etc., and
George Washington Williams and John others. On motion to frame decree.
Holt Richardson, both of Baltimore, for-apGranted. See, also, 91 Atl. 824, 828.
pellant. John C. Tolson, of Baltimore, and
Olin Bryan, of Philadelphia (Albert C. Tolson, Louis H. Miller, of Millville, for complain- of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee. ant. Walter H. Bacon, of Bridgeton, for defendants.
STOCKBRIDGE, J. George J. Arold be
came a member of the Improved Order of LEAMING, V. C.  I am convinced that Heptasophs on the 12th of March, 1895, and the share of Garrison of the partnership as received a certificate of membership by sets should be paid to his substituted admin- which, upon his death, his wife, Mary, was istrator.
entitled to receive as beneficiary the sum of  Sullivan v. Horner, 41 N. J. Eq. 299, 7 $1,000. The application for membership conAtl. 411, has long been regarded as conclusive tained, among other matters, this provision: to the effect that funeral expenses are pre "I agree to make punctual payment of all ferred over a judgment lien in the settlement dues and assessments for which I may become of a decedent's estate. The “debts” of a tes- liable, and to conform in all respects to the
laws, rules and usages of the order now in force, tator or intestate referred to in the act of or which may hereafter be adopted by the 1903 (3 Comp. St. 1910, p. 3847, § 97a) may same.” be appropriately understood as not includ Two years later, in 1897, the order adopted ing funeral expenses.
the following by-law:  But I think the orderly course is to "Sec. 329. No action at law or in equity in pay the share to the administrator without any court can be brought or maintained on any in any way determining the order of priority; or benefit certificate, unless such action is
cause or claim arising out of any membership the orphans' court is the appropriate tribunal brought within one year from the time when to settle estates of deceased persons, and has such right of action accrues. Such right of acfull jurisdiction to protect such lien as may for in case of the
death of a member shall have
tion accrues sixty days after all proofs called exist, and no loss can result in consequence. been furnished. In all cases where no proofs I will advise an order to that effect.
of death have been furnished by a beneficiary,
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in
ec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
as required within twelve months after such | had become such prior to its adoption? The death, all claims that might have been made same question was before this court in the shall be regarded as abandoned, and no proofs thereafter shall be received or any claim made case of Mathieu v. Mathieu, 112 Md. 625, thereon accepted ; and in all cases where blank 77 Atl. 112, the opinion being written for the proofs of death have been refused by the Su-court by the late Judge Schmucker, and in preme Secretary to the beneficiary or beneficia- that it is said: ries, such right of action accrues sixty days from and after the day of the death of a member.”
“The mere designation of a person as benefi.
ciary by a member of a mutual benefit society No question is presented of the regularity does not confer upon the person so designated of the adoption of section 329 of the by-laws any vested right in the fund payable on the just quoted.
death of the member." On November 26, 1908, George Arold met
And a little further on the opinion conhis death as the result of a self-inflicted tinued: gunshot wound. Proofs of death were
"The acknowledged rule of construction of promptly made out and forwarded to the or- legislative statutes, by which they are held to be
prospective in their operation, in the absence of der. Then ensued a correspondence between a clearly expressed intention to give them retroMr. Arold and the general counsel of the active force, has been generally applied to the order, in which the latter took the ground by-laws and regulations of corporate bodies. that the beneficiary, Mrs. Arold, by reason laws of mutual benefit and similar societies, in of a by-law relating to suicide, was not enti- view of the nature of the associations adopting tled to the $1,000 named in the certificate, them and the character of the by-laws thembut only the sum of $487. This correspond- tion of existing members to the society and their
selves, operated upon and controlled the relaence continued until the latter part of Feb- rights to its future benefit, although such laws ruary, 1909, and was concluded by the pay- are not expressed in retroactive terms. Such ment on March 15, 1909, to Mrs. Arold of the has generally been held to be the rule where
the member has agreed to be bound by such $487. There the matter rested until January laws as might be enacted." 28, 1913, when this suit was brought to re
The question was before this court again in cover the difference between $1,000 and the the case of The Heptasophs v. Rehan, 119 amount actually paid. The defendant filed Md. 92, 85 Atl. 1035, and the by-law there various pleas, among them one setting up as considered was one which attempted to limit a bar the limitation of time within which the right of recovery in case of suicide. In suit might be brought as provided in section that case this court, through Judge Burke, 329. At the trial, on conclusion of the plain-said, there appears to be a general concurtiff's case, the defendant offered a prayer to rence of authority in the proposition “that direct a verdict for the defendant upon the where a member of a fraternal benefit society ground that the suit had not been brought agrees in his application for membership to within the time provided by the by-laws of be bound by the rules or laws then in force, the order, and the action of the court in or which might be thereafter adopted, the granting this prayer is the sole ground of society, after he has become a member, may appeal in this case.
enact reasonable rules and amendments and It was alleged that the long inaction of the bind him to their observance." It is thereappellant was induced by the fraud and de- fore the recognized law of this state that ceit of the appellee, but there is no evidence where a member of a beneficial society in whatever tending in the slightest degree to his application for membership has agreed sustain this allegation. The contention of to be bound by the rules or laws then in the plaintiff is that the rights of the parties force, or which might thereafter be adopted, were fixed as of the time when the deceased the society has the right to bind him by such became a member of the order, that certain after-adopted by-law even though the by-law vested rights then attached, which could not is not in its terms made retroactive, limited be in any manner affected by the subsequent- only by the qualification that such by-law ly adopted by-laws, and that the by-law as must be reasonable in its character. This adopted contained nothing to show any intent rule is supported by reason as well as by authat it should have a retroactive effect, and thority. The very foundation of organizaso could only be applicable to those who join- tions of this character is their mutual chared the order after the date of its passage. acter, and, if a member or his beneficiary is The case was argued with great earnestness bound only by such regulations as are in force on both sides and very voluminous citation at the time when he joins the order, the result of authorities, but in view of two recent de- will inevitably follow that different members cisions of this court the law of this state is will have entirely separate and distinct rights clearly defined, and no good purpose would as between themselves and the order accordbe served by a discussion of the various cases ing to the time when they became members cited. Suffice it to say that the decisions of it, and the mutuality of the organization elsewhere are very far from being harmoni- would be destroyed. ous, nor is it possible in any way to reconcile  The only remaining question with them.
which this case is concerned is whether sec The first and most important question tion 329 of the by-laws is or is not a reasonnow presented is: Was section 329 of the by- able regulation. By that it is provided that laws binding upon members of the order who a right of action should accrue 60 days after