ing that this money, $500 in amount, was due from the firm to Mrs. Garrison, as well as another claim, in amount $325, for money loaned by Mrs. Garrison to the firm. Now Mr. Nichols comes here to-day in support of exceptions to those two items, and claims, in effect, that he was more or less coerced into consenting to the allowance of these two items and, as a matter of fact, he did not himself know of their correctness. Against that claim on his part to-day there is the testimony of Mr. Brannan to the effect that Mr. Nichols had, on repeated occasions prior to that time, admitted the correctness of these claims, and the further testimony of Mr. Brannan to the effect that before the receiver the matter was fully discussed and acquiesced in by Mr. Nichols, and the testimony of Mr. Leaming to the effect that he understood at the time that account was submitted and the stipulation was prepared that Mr. Nichols fully understood what he was signing and what he had agreed to and what had been determined upon before him as a fact, and I am not able, as I stated before, to doubt that what Mr. Leaming did at that time he believed to be right. I think he believed Mr. Nichols understood the situation fully before he permitted him to accede to the stipulation which was then made and signed. Now I can't think that in view of these circumstances a court would be justified in declaring, under the testimony now before me, that any part of the accounts which were in fact considered were inaccurately considered or improperly adjusted. I am unable to believe that I would be justified in reaching the conclusion that any matters contained in those accounts, which were arrived at in the manner I have stated, are inaccurate or wrong as to any items that were in fact under consideration by the parties. Of course, if the parties overlooked some items, if items exist which were not considered at all, the statement which was then made or the accounts that were then stated should not be regarded as a bar, but as to matters actually considered by the receiver and discussed by the parties and reduced to figures and to stipulations, I am convinced that no court would be justified in finding, on the testimony as it now stands that the exception should be sustained. So I feel obliged to find, so far as the exceptions are concerned, that the account as it is stated by the receiver is, in all things, correct so far as the items which were considered in that account are concerned. There are, however, some items that Mr. Nichols testifies were overlooked by him. He says there are some items of moneys, which were expended by him in payment of partnership bills after the receiver was appointed, which he did not present to the receiver, and which he should have presented. Ten dollars he claims was paid A. Brosus on March 14, 1912; $3.50 to Charles Miller March 23d: $15.13 to James L. Hand April 6. 1912; $15.05 to James G. Stiles April 10, 1912, making a total of $33.88. I think with reference to those items the receiver should be directed, in making his final account, to pass upon their accuracy and allow them or disallow them as he finds they are right or wrong. If he has already considered them and passed upon them, I think they should not be allowed. If he has not considered them at all, then he should give them consideration. As to the other class of items forming the basis of the exception, I feel convinced that the testimony does not justify any modification of the receiver's report. So my decree will be, so far as the relations of the receiver and the partner who is surviving and the representative of the deceased partner are concerned, and also so far as Mrs. Garrison as a creditor is concerned, that the receiver's report be confirmed. These matters, however, are not conclusive upon the client represented by Mr. Miller, who has filed a bill by which it is sought to set aside the title or to impress the lien of the judgment of the complainant upon certain real estate standing in the name of Mrs. Garrison. It is with reference to this real estate and with reference to the pecuniary relations of Mr. Garrison and his wife that I had more particularly reference to when I said I did not believe the human mind was able to solve accurately the exact truth of the entire situation. It is undoubtedly true that before her marriage Mrs. Garrison had some means. I think the evidence must be said to justify the conclusion that she was then the possessor of perhaps $2,000 or $3,000. It may be that she had some debts that would reduce those assets to some extent, but I think I am justified in assuming that she had some considerable property, and that she had a business which appears to have been reasonably prosperous. I think it may also be assumed with a fair degree of accuracy that Mr. Garrison was a man without means and a man who has never been successful in making any progress in the world's affairs. [1] The judgment which the complainant holds against Mr. Garrison was entered May 18, 1896, some eight years before Mr. Garrison's marriage to his wife, so that at the time he married her he was not only apparently without means, but was, as well, a judgment debtor and has continued to be a judgment debtor, at least so far as that judgment is concerned, ever since. His identity has been, during the period from his marriage down to at least the beginning of his partnership, just about that which we usually find in a husband who is a judgment debtor who has a wife with some money. The husband becomes a nonentity, and the bank account is in the name of the wife and the husband's privileges extend to transacting business in the wife's name. Usually we find such a husband taking orders from his wife. Sometimes they have a little more independence and become really active in the management of affairs, but we always find the affairs carried on in the name of the wife; and the suspicion is usually aroused that the business which is being conducted is his business and not the business of the wife, and this suspicion is sometimes well founded. But when the task is imposed upon a court to ascertain the truth, to ascertain whether the activities of the husband are in his own behalf or whether they are in behalf of the wife, it is usually a task that almost defies solution with entire accuracy. There is no reason in the law why a husband shall not transact business in the name of his wife and become just as active in that business as he cares to be, providing the business really belongs to his wife. A judgment creditor of a husband has no right and no means to compel a husband to work, nor has he any right or power to compel a husband to charge for the services he, renders to others. Unfortunately a judgment creditor has no right to complain if his judgment debtor sees fit to work for his mere living or if he sees fit to work for nothing. A judgment creditor has no right to complain, as I understand the law, if the judgment debtor sees fit to work for his wife and charge nothing for his labors. In other words, he can contribute his labors to his wife; if in fact he does so and the business really belongs to the wife, the judgment creditor has no remedy. That has been gone over in a very elaborate and wellconsidered opinion in the Court of Appeals written, as I recall it, by Justice Reed. The inquiry and sole inquiry is whether as a matter of fact the business, the capital in the business, the proceeds of the business, and the profits of the business belonged to the wife, or did they belong wholly or in part to the husband, and was the wife's name used as a sub February 11, 1911, for $152.10 or a total of $174.10. These checks were drawn on the account in the Marine Trust Company which stood in the name of E. F. Garrison. If the money in that account was the money of Mr. Garrison, this was a gift from him to his wife, and such a gift cannot be sustained as against a judgment creditor of the donor. If it was her money, then there is no way that the complainant can complain of the transaction, or in any way enforce his claim against these lots. terfuge? Now there is nothing here that justifies a conclusion that prior to the date of this partnership there was any business conducted in the name of Mrs. Garrison, or otherwise, that belonged to Mr. Garrison. It is true there is a peculiar circumstance in connection with the bank accounts of Mrs. Garrison as early as 1902 or 1903. An account then standing in her name as Emma F. Garrison, a time account, was transferred to a new account in the name of E. F. Garrison, and another account which stood in her name as Emma F. Garrison was I find a good deal more difficulty in solving transferred to a time account on the same day the status of that E. F. Garrison account in in the name of E. F. Garrison. I am not sure the Marine Trust Company than I do the other that I have stated that quite correctly, but at matters relating to this case. I scarcely know any rate $301.48 which stood in the name of what to think about it, or how to arrive at the wife in the bank was transferred to her any conclusion in which I can feel entire conown account under the name of E. F. Garri- fidence. Mr. Garrison seems to have been in son, the same being a time account, and another business for himself as a partner of Mr. Nichtime account was opened on the same day under ols, and they appear to have had settlements the same name. It is impossible to do more from time to time, in which half of the profthan guess at what the truth_might have been its of the business would be apportioned to touching that transaction. There is nothing Mr. Nichols and the other half to Mr. Garrithat occurred along about that time, so far as son and checks drawn on a firm partnership I know or may be able to anticipate, that af- account in favor of each of the partners. Just fords any particular light upon what the proba- how often that occurred I do not know. The ble purpose of that transfer was, but be that checks were here, and it was impossible to go as it may Mr. Garrison was privileged to and through all the partnership checks to ascertain did use that name and that account from that how many checks have been drawn by the firm time on, but whether he used it for his wife of Garrison & Nichols to the order of Mr. Garin his wife's behalf in the conduct of her busi- rison in the name of E. F. Garrison, but all of ness, or whether he used it for himself and that kind that have been drawn, so far as it used her name simply as a blind, is an inquiry appears and as I will assume, have been drawn that would be of the greatest service to us if we to Mr. Garrison in the name of E. F. Garcould solve it with accuracy. There does not rison, and in the Marine Company was this acappear to have been any prosperous activity count in the name of E. F. Garrison against upon his part that called for the concealment which he had, by power of attorney, the right of his assets at any time until the beginning of from the wife to draw checks. The suggestion this partnership, and I doubt whether we are is undoubtedly a forceful one that if this was justified in concluding that prior to that date, his business, and if the profits of that busiat any rate, there ever was a time when we can ness were paid to him by checks to the order say with confidence that Mr. Garrison was us- of E. F. Garrison, and those checks were deing his wife's name in conducting his own busi- posited in the Marine Trust Company_in_the ness, and that money or proceeds of his labors name of E. F. Garrison, the name E. F. Garwhich went to his wife's credit were really his. rison represented Firman Garrison, and that If that be true, and I am convinced that the money in the account of E. F. Garrison nothing will justify a conclusion to the con- was the money of Firman Garrison, and it trary, then the ownership of the Wildwood would follow that the money which went to Crest property which the bill seeks to attack pay for these lots was the money of Firman cannot be successfully attacked upon the theory Garrison; but that conclusion is not a necesof the bill, because the Wildwood Crest prop-sity. Those facts can carry that suggestion erty was purchased and the title taken in the name of Mrs. Garrison June 19, 1907. Prior to that time I am sure nothing could justify the conclusion that any assets that had been or that were in the name of Mrs. Garrison had been really the property of her husband. It [3] We are not informed that it does not must be said, also, that the testimony touching seem to be practicable for us to be informed that transaction, if it is to be believed, discloses whether such checks as were drawn to Mr. almost conclusively that that property was pur- Garrison in the name of E. F. Garrison as chased by Mrs. Garrison in her own behalf. part of the profits of that concern were in At the time of the purchase she received $1,000 fact deposited in the account in the Marine from her brother-in-law which he owed her, and Trust Company. They may have been and he has testified that he paid her the money, as they may not have been. There seems to be I recall it now, in two checks; the money that no way of at present ascertaining, but asshe received from her brother-in-law was used suming that such checks as he did receive that to buy that property, and, according to the tes- represented profits were deposited in that actimony, a little later, when the improvements count, it does not necessarily follow that the were made upon the property, a loan was made account was his, and that such deposits were by the same brother-in-law to her of $1,600, not taken into account in settlements between which was used by her in two amounts of him and his wife, and in the absence of any $1,000 and $600 in paying for wages and lum-evidence to fully establish all of those details ber in connection with the improvements. That one way or the other, I doubt whether a mere $1,600 loan was subsequently repaid to him out circumstance that he found it convenient to of a mortgage which she placed upon the prop- take his dividend checks-I will call them-in erty. If the testimony to the effect that I have stated is true, then, of course, there is no doubt in the world but that the Wildwood Crest property belonged to Mrs. Garrison and must be held to be hers. [2] The North Wildwood property consists of two lots which were purchased of Mr. Ottens and title taken in the name of Mrs. Garrison February 10, 1911. That property appears to have been paid for by two checks drawn, one September 5, 1910, for $22, and the other with a great deal of force, but I am not prepared to say that the conclusion of gift would be justified or even necessarily follow from the mere circumstances that the money in that account belonged to Firman Garrison. the name of his wife can be treated as a cir| cumstance to justify an affirmative conclusion that the title to the land standing in the name of his wife belonged to him because it was purchased with two checks drawn on that account, or the conclusion that whatever balance was found in that account after the date of his death belonged to him. It is one of those situations where it seems almost impossible to reach a conclusion that does not find some argument against its soundness; but whatever conclu sion may be reached, on the whole I feel convinced that it would be making a mistake to declare that real estate to belong to one other than her in whose name the title stands from the circumstances or evidence which appears in this case. The other tract of land which is in controversy has already been referred to, and that is a tract of wood land standing in the name of Mrs. Garrison, and also two lots at Cape May courthouse. The wood land has been sold by the receiver, and has been converted into cash and the lots have not yet been sold. I have already stated that my conclusion is that the findings of the receiver to the effect that there is due to Mrs. Garrison a balance of $500 on this wood land and $325 for money loaned is sustained. While that is not binding against the judgment creditor, it is necessarily binding against him unless there is evidence adduced to show something to the contrary. The judgment creditor is not bound by the testimony of Mr. Nichols to the effect that that money is due. He is not bound by the admission of Mr. Nichols to the effect that that money is due, but there is nothing in the evidence submitted on behalf of the judgment creditor that in any way suggests, to my mind, any doubt of the accuracy of the conclusion of the receiver that that money is due, or in any way suggests a doubt upon my own view that that money is properly due to Mrs. Garrison. My disposition, then, of the entire case, entertaining the views that I do, is that there must be a decree denying to the complainant any lien upon the real estate which is attacked by the bill. If there is a surplus which is due to the representative of the deceased partner, the judgment will, of course, become entitled to be heard or to be represented in the distribution of that fund. It does not seem to me that that question need be taken up or considered at this time. Before any distribution is made by the receiver of that fund if a surplus is found, the rights of the judgment creditor will be vouchsafed and protected, either by an adjudication at that time as to what distribution shall be made, or else by a payment into court in such manner that no disposition can be made of it until the claim of the judgment creditor is passed upon and such rights as he may have be protected. That will be the disposition that I will make of the case, and I think it covers all the features of the case. Mr. Miller: Might I suggest there is a 17acre tract of land the title to which stands in the name of John M. Nichols and which he testified is the property of Garrison & Nichols, that should be sold by the receiver as well as the two lots at the courthouse. Mr. Zeller: There is a tract of 17 acres in Dennis township held now by Mr. Nichols, and that was also gone into, and I think your reference to the fact the receiver's duties were not quite finished would include that. I The Vice Chancellor: I do not understand there is any dispute touching that land. will sign an order directing its sale by the receiver. See, also, 91 Atl. 828, 829. Louis H. Miller, of Millville, for appellant. William E. Zeller, of Vineland, for respondents. PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from will be affirmed for the reasons stated in the opinion filed in the court below by Vice Chancellor Leaming. PIERSON v. GARRISON et al. (Court of Chancery of New Jersey. June 24, 1913.) EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (§ 94*)-ASSETS OF ESTATE-INTEREST OF DECEASED PARTNER-PAYMENT TO ADMINISTRAOR. On determination of the interest of a deceased partner in the assets of a firm on an accounting in equity, the amount found due is payable to the decedent's administrator. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. § 409; Dec. Dig. § 94.**] Action by Alfred M. Pierson, as administrator, etc., against Emma F. Garrison and others. On application for the determination of the terms of final decree. Granted. See, also, 91 Atl. 824, 829. Louis H. Miller, of Millville, for complainant. Walter H. Bacon, of Bridgeton, for defendants. LEAMING, V. C. 1. I deem it important that the decree embody a specific statement that the real estate in the name of Emma F. Garrison and John M. Nichols is the property of the copartnership and also embody a specific description of such real estate. I have accordingly embodied that feature in the decree which I have advised. 2. I think it improper to award an execution against John M. Nichols prior to the coming in of the master's report. It may be found by the master that he is entitled to further credits and at distribution he may also have a substantial credit to be applied against his indebtedness. The decree as entered so provides. 3. The decree as entered adjudges that the real estate referred to in the cross-bill of John M. Nichols as standing in the name of Emma F. Garrison is an asset of the firm, but subject to the payment to Emma F. Garrison of $825, as is set forth in her answer. 4. The decree as advised also dismisses the bill as to Wildwood Crest and North Wildwood real estate. 5. I have made no direction looking to the payment by the receiver to cómplainant of the ultimate share found to be due to Garrison. That question may remain open, but I presently see no authority to deny the administratrix of Garrison the right to administer the share. See Sullivan v. Horner, 41 N. J. Eq. 299, 7 Atl. 411. 6. The respective claims and interests of the several parties are so interwoven and interdependent that I have thought it proper to deny costs to either litigant as against the other. 7. A copy of the decree will be sent to Mr. Miller and Mr. Bacon. *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. § 409; Dec. Dig. § 94.*] 2. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (§ 324*)INCUMBERED REAL PROPERTY-SALE TO PAY DEBTS DEBT." The "debts" of a testator or intestate, referred to in 3 Comp. St. 1910, p. 3847, § 97a, providing for the sale of incumbered real property of a decedent to pay debts, do not include funeral expenses, which in the settlement of a decedent's estate are entitled to preference over a judgment lien. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 1337, 1338, 1342; Dec. Dig. § 324.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1864-1886; vol. 8, p. 7628.] 3. PARTNERSHIP (§ 341*)-DISSOLUTION-ESTATE OF DECEASED PARTNER-DISTRIBUTION IN EQUITY. Where the interest of a deceased partner in the assets of a firm are ascertained in a suit in equity for an accounting, the proper practice is to order payment of the amount found due to the administrator, without determining priorities of alleged lienors; the orphans' court being the appropriate tribunal to settle such questions. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. § 809; Dec. Dig. § 341.*] Suit by Alfred M. Pierson as administrator, etc., against Emma F. Garrison, etc., and others. On motion to frame decree. Granted. See, also, 91 Atl. 824, 828. Louis H. Miller, of Millville, for complainant. Walter H. Bacon, of Bridgeton, for defendants. LEAMING, V. C. [1] I am convinced that the share of Garrison of the partnership assets should be paid to his substituted administrator. [2] Sullivan v. Horner, 41 N. J. Eq. 299, 7 Atl. 411, has long been regarded as conclusive to the effect that funeral expenses are preferred over a judgment lien in the settlement of a decedent's estate. The “debts” of a testator or intestate referred to in the act of 1903 (3 Comp. St. 1910, p. 3847, § 97a) may be appropriately understood as not including funeral expenses. [3] But I think the orderly course is to pay the share to the administrator without in any way determining the order of priority; the orphans' court is the appropriate tribunal to settle estates of deceased persons, and has full jurisdiction to protect such lien as may exist, and no loss can result in consequence. I will advise an order to that effect. 1. (123 Md. 675) AROLD v. SUPREME CONCLAVE, IMPROVED ORDER OF HEPTASOPHS. (No. 41.) (Court of Appeals of Maryland. 1914.) June 26, INSURANCE (§ 719*)-MUTUAL BENEFIT IN SURANCE-EFFECT OF BY-LAWS. Where a member of a beneficial society, in his application for membership, has agreed to be bound by the rules or laws then in force or thereafter adopted, the society may bind him by after-adopted by-laws, even though not retroactive in terms, if reasonable in character. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1855; Dec. Dig. & 719.*] 2. INSURANCE (§ 719*)-MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE EFFECT OF BY-LAWS. A by-law of a benefit insurance society providing that no action could be brought or maintained on any cause or claim arising out of any certificate, unless brought within one year from the time when such right of action accrued, and that such right of action should accrue 60 days after all proofs of death should have been furnished, was reasonable and binding on the beneficiary of a member, who became such prior to its adoption, and who by his application agreed to conform in all respects to the laws and rules of the order then in force or thereafter adopted. Cent. Dig. § 1855; Dec. Dig. § 719.*] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, Appeal from Baltimore Court of Common Pleas; John J. Dobler, Judge. "To be officially reported." Action by Mary Arold against the Supreme Conclave, Improved Order of Heptasophs. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BURKE, THOMAS, PATTISON, URNER, and STOCKBRIDGE, JJ. George Washington Williams and John Holt Richardson, both of Baltimore, for-appellant. John C. Tolson, of Baltimore, and Olin Bryan, of Philadelphia (Albert C. Tolson, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee. STOCKBRIDGE, J. George J. Arold became a member of the Improved Order of Heptasophs on the 12th of March, 1895, and received a certificate of membership by which, upon his death, his wife, Mary, was entitled to receive as beneficiary the sum of $1,000. The application for membership contained, among other matters, this provision: "I agree to make punctual payment of all dues and assessments for which I may become liable, and to conform in all respects to the laws, rules and usages of the order now in force, or which may hereafter be adopted by the same." Two years later, in 1897, the order adopted the following by-law: "Sec. 329. No action at law or in equity in any court can be brought or maintained on any or benefit certificate, unless such action is cause or claim arising out of any membership brought within one year from the time when such right of action accrues. Such right of acfor in case of the death of a member shall have tion accrues sixty days after all proofs called been furnished. In all cases where no proofs of death have been furnished by a beneficiary, *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes as required within twelve months after such I had become such prior to its adoption? The death, all claims that might have been made shall be regarded as abandoned, and no proofs thereafter shall be received or any claim made thereon accepted; and in all cases where blank proofs of death have been refused by the Supreme Secretary to the beneficiary or beneficiaries, such right of action accrues sixty days from and after the day of the death of a member." No question is presented of the regularity of the adoption of section 329 of the by-laws just quoted. On November 26, 1908, George Arold met his death as the result of a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Proofs of death were promptly made out and forwarded to the order. Then ensued a correspondence between Mr. Arold and the general counsel of the order, in which the latter took the ground that the beneficiary, Mrs. Arold, by reason of a by-law relating to suicide, was not entitled to the $1,000 named in the certificate, but only the sum of $487. This correspondence continued until the latter part of February, 1909, and was concluded by the payment on March 15, 1909, to Mrs. Arold of the $487. There the matter rested until January 28, 1913, when this suit was brought to recover the difference between $1,000 and the amount actually paid. The defendant filed various pleas, among them one setting up as a bar the limitation of time within which suit might be brought as provided in section 329. At the trial, on conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the defendant offered a prayer to direct a verdict for the defendant upon the ground that the suit had not been brought within the time provided by the by-laws of the order, and the action of the court in granting this prayer is the sole ground of appeal in this case. same question was before this court in the case of Mathieu v. Mathieu, 112 Md. 625, 77 Atl. 112, the opinion being written for the court by the late Judge Schmucker, and in that it is said: ciary by a member of a mutual benefit society "The mere designation of a person as benefi does not confer upon the person so designated any vested right in the fund payable on the death of the member." And a little further on the opinion continued: "The acknowledged rule of construction of legislative statutes, by which they are held to be prospective in their operation, in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to give them retroactive force, has been generally applied to the by-laws and regulations of corporate bodies. But the courts have frequently held that bylaws of mutual benefit and similar societies, in view of the nature of the associations adopting them and the character of the by-laws themtion of existing members to the society and their selves, operated upon and controlled the relarights to its future benefit, although such laws are not expressed in retroactive terms. Such has generally been held to be the rule where the member has agreed to be bound by such laws as might be enacted." The question was before this court again in the case of The Heptasophs v. Rehan, 119 Md. 92, 85 Atl. 1035, and the by-law there considered was one which attempted to limit the right of recovery in case of suicide. In that case this court, through Judge Burke, said, there appears to be a general concurrence of authority in the proposition "that where a member of a fraternal benefit society agrees in his application for membership to be bound by the rules or laws then in force, or which might be thereafter adopted, the society, after he has become a member, may enact reasonable rules and amendments and It was alleged that the long inaction of the bind him to their observance." It is thereappellant was induced by the fraud and de- fore the recognized law of this state that ceit of the appellee, but there is no evidence where a member of a beneficial society in whatever tending in the slightest degree to his application for membership has agreed sustain this allegation. The contention of to be bound by the rules or laws then in the plaintiff is that the rights of the parties force, or which might thereafter be adopted, were fixed as of the time when the deceased the society has the right to bind him by such became a member of the order, that certain after-adopted by-law even though the by-law vested rights then attached, which could not is not in its terms made retroactive, limited be in any manner affected by the subsequent-only by the qualification that such by-law ly adopted by-laws, and that the by-law as adopted contained nothing to show any intent that it should have a retroactive effect, and so could only be applicable to those who joined the order after the date of its passage. The case was argued with great earnestness on both sides and very voluminous citation of authorities, but in view of two recent decisions of this court the law of this state is clearly defined, and no good purpose would be served by a discussion of the various cases cited. Suffice it to say that the decisions elsewhere are very far from being harmonious, nor is it possible in any way to reconcile them. [1] The first and most important question now presented is: Was section 329 of the bylaws binding upon members of the order who must be reasonable in its character. This rule is supported by reason as well as by authority. The very foundation of organizations of this character is their mutual character, and, if a member or his beneficiary is bound only by such regulations as are in force at the time when he joins the order, the result will inevitably follow that different members will have entirely separate and distinct rights as between themselves and the order according to the time when they became members of it, and the mutuality of the organization would be destroyed. [2] The only remaining question with which this case is concerned is whether section 329 of the by-laws is or is not a reasonable regulation. By that it is provided that a right of action should accrue 60 days after |