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term of office of an incumbent of the office of The person first appointed shall take office on city marshal begins, and rule that the office the expiration of the term of office of the presof city marshal begins the 1st day of April ination or election to fill any vacancy which
ent incumbent, and further provided any nomof the even year; but it was not necessary to shall hereafter occur by reason of the expidecide that question to dispose of the case, ration of the term of one officer, or from any and there was a dissenting opinion filed upon by anything in this act providing for the ter
other cause, and which shall not be created that branch of the case. And the respondent mination of the term of office of any person, contends that, so far as French v. Cowan or persons, now in office, shall be made to the holds, the term of office of the city marshal board of aldermen within ten days from the begins April 1st of the even year, and con- day of the date of any such vacancy, and any
person who shall be appointed to fill any such tinues until the last day of March of the suc vacancy shall hold his office for the unexpired ceeding year; it not being necessary for the term of his predecessor.” decision of the case that the question should The court say: be re-examined.
"This clause places it beyond doubt that an The Opinion of the Justices, 61 Me. 602, appointee to fill a vacancy caused by the death, holds that judges and registers of probate, resignation, or removal of an incumbent durwho are elected to those offices, are entitled such term or period, which, of course, may be
ing his term, holds only for the remainder of to hold them for a term of four years from much less than six years. the 1st day of January next succeeding their
In that case the act expressly provided election, although their elected predecessors that a person appointed to fill a vacancy may have vacated their offices before the ex- should only hold for the unexpired term, piration of the full term for which they were while the act of the Legislature of 1880, now chosen. The opinion shows the distinction under consideration, does not contain any between the case of a person holding an of- such language, but does provide that the city fice for a definite term and where the office marshal shan hold his office for the term or holder is a member of a board whose terms two years, which is clearly distinguishable expire at different times, and holds that the from the New York case, as is the case of court of county commissioners consists of a State v. Mayor of La Porte, 28 Ind. 248, in board of officers, the election of whom was so which case the act of incorporation provided fixed by law as to occur upon different years. "that, after the first general election, said ofThere was to be an annual election of one of ficers shall respectively hold their offices for its members. The mere expiration of time two years each,” and that annually there did not and could not leave the court vacant. shall be chosen, by the legal voters of their Vacancies might occur in the board by death respective wards, “one councilman or resignation. To meet this contingency, and to be determined by lot at the first regular still preserve the annual election of one of meeting after the election, shall hold his office its members, the statute provided for a choice for two years, and the other, to be determined to fill the place that was vacant, explaining in like manner, shall hold his office for four the Opinion of the Justices in 50 Me. 608.
years; and biannually thereafter, one counThe case of Hale v. Brown, 59 N. H. 555, cilman shall be elected by the voters of each 47 Am. Rep. 224, cited in French v. Cowan, ward”; and the court held the evident intent was an action of assumpsit in which a con- of the section cited was that only one counciltractor sought to enforce a lien upon timber man for each ward should be elected every and lumber that the complainant had cut and two years for a period of four years, not the hauled by himself and servants in his employ, case of an officer appointed to the office for and it was sought to enforce the lien both a definite term, but the case of one member for his services and of the men in his employ, of a board going out of office, and, as it was and does not bear upon the question in issue the evident intent of the Legislature that it in this case.
shall be a continuing board, it is clearly disIn People v. McClave, 99 N. Y. 83, 1 N. E. tinguishable from this case, as clearly ex235, cited in French v. Cowan, the question plained in the Opinion of the Justices, 61 Me. in issue was the term of office of a person 602, holding that judges and registers of proappointed as police commissioner of the city bate are appointed to hold their offices for the of New York. Section 25 of the act (Laws term of four years, in the following language: 1873, c. 335) in question
"It will be perceived that no other limita"vested in the mayor the power to nominate tions than four years is imposed, except in the and, with the consent of the board of alder- case of executive appointments. This term men, to appoint heads of departments and all seems to be a fixed and positive term attached commissioners, including the commissioners of to an election. The only mode of permanently police (with certain exceptions not material filling the office, however it becomes vacant, is here), but provided that the officers of all such by election, in which case the Constitution heads of departments, and persons other than says they shall hold their office for four years. those first appointed, shall commence on the These provisions are clear and unambiguous. first day of May, but the heads of departments,
There is no provision of the law of 1889 to consisting of a board of commissioners first appointed after the passage of this act shall, fill the office of city marshal of Lewiston, exexcept as herein otherwise expressly provided, cept by the mayor and aldermen of the city, be two, four and six years, respectively, and and the law states, in clear and unambiguous pointed as aforesaid, shall hold their offices. language, that the marshal shall hold his ofone, two, three and four years, respectively. /fice for the term of two years. There is no
different rule of construction of that act of no grounds for inferring an exception in case the Legislature than of the Constitution; of a person elected or appointed to the office they both speak in clear and unambiguous death, resignation, or removal of his predeces
when it has become vacant reason of the language. The petition urges upon our attention the
The court cites People v. Green, 2 Wend. case of Baker, Governor, v. Kirk, 33 Ind. 523, (N. Y.) 266, Crowell v. Lambert, 9 Minn. 283 but an examination of the case shows that it (Gil
. 267), People v. Burbank, 12 Cal. 378, is not a similar case to the case at bar, and People v. Townsend, 102 N. Y. 430, 7 N. E. that the principles of law governing the case | 360, and Sansbury v. Middleton, 11 Md. 296, are the same that this court applied to the as holding to the same effect. board of county commissioners. In that case
In Winter v. Sayre, 118 Ala. upon page 61, the question was when the term of office of 24 South. 98, McClellan, J., says: one member of the board of prison directors
“For what the Legislature has done, as clearly began, and the court uses this language: shown by the act, is this: They have provided
"It is very manifest that the term of office that each incumbent by executive and senaof a prison director, as fixed by the above law, torial appointment shall hold his office for six after the expiration of the term of office of the years, not that each term shall endure for six person first elected, is for a period of four years the word 'term' is not used in the act, years. It is equally plain that the object of except in reference to the then incumbent who the Legislature in providing that one of the was in for a fixed term of six years), not that directors first elected under this law should the incumbency of the office shall be divided inserve for two years, and that two of them to terms of six years each, but that each judge should serve for four years, was to prevent the so appointed shall be entitled to hold the office directors from all going out of office at the for that period. The Legislature could not same time."
make him hold it for that period; it could not The same question in this case was passed secure to him the right to hold for that length
keep him from dying or resigning; but could upon in Smith v. Cosgrove, 71 Vt. 196, 44 Atl of time if he chose, and lived, to exercise it. 73, and the case is so similar that we quote: And that is what they have done and all they
“Section 215 of the charter, as amended by intended to do in this statute. the act of 1896, provides for 'a regular police have not marked the office off into fixed terms
* * * of election with equal periods between. force for the city, consisting of a chief of police, who shall be appointed by the mayor and shalỉ They have secured to the incumbent the right hold his office for three years, unless sooner
to serve for a given period. If he serves that removed, and such number of other police offi- period, it is all well and good. If he dies, or cers as the mayor shall deem necessary for the resigns, or is removed, the period ceases; welfare of the city, who shall hold office for such the appointee who comes after him takes for term, not exceeding three years nor less than a like period, not for so much of the time his one year, as shall be designated by the mayor in predecessor was entitled to hold as he did not his appointment. By this section it is clear in fact hold, but for the full period of six years that, whenever a chief of police is first appoint- initiated upon his confirmation by the Senate." ed, under the charter, he holds his office for In Hoke v. Richie, 100 Ky. 66, 37 S. W. three years from the date of his appointment, 266, 38 S. W. 132, it was held that where by unless sooner removed ; and we look in vain statute an inspector of illuminating oil “shall for any authority in the charter, as made to read by the act of 1896, for appointing a chief remain in office for four years,” and the inof police for a shorter period. Section 277 of cumbent dies during that period, the appointthe act provides, in part, that the city officials ment of his successor is only for the unex. holding office therein under and by virtue of the general law of the state, or the acts or parts pired part of the term, and not for a full of acts thereby amended or repealed, shall hold term of four years, although the order of apoffice till the expiration of their current term. pointment so recited. *
The opinion in the When it becomes necessary to appoint a chief of police under the new charter by rea- above case cites no cases to support the posison of death, removal, resignation, or to fill the tion taken by the court, and it says, “It is place of one whose term has expired, the ap- conceded that the apparent weight of aupointee holds his office for three years from thority is against the conclusion we have the date of his appointment, unless sooner removed. The language of this section is plain reached,” and quotes from Troop on Public and unmistakable, and there is nothing in the Officers, § 319: charter relating to the filling of a vacancy in "The authorities are not entirely harmonious the office of chief, or appointment to that of- respecting the duration of the term of an officer fice, that in any way limits or qualifies its pro- elected by the people or appointed by the Govvisions. The charter, as amended by the act ernor, or some other officer or board of officers, of 1896, does not fix the time when the term of to fill a vacancy, where the Constitution has office of the chief of police shall commence. failed to specify the duration of his term, or It only provides for his appointment, and that where a provision upon that subject is of doubthe shall hold the office for three years, unless ful construction, but the weight of authorities sooner removed. In the absence of any provi- is decidedly in favor of the proposition that a sion of the charter fixing the time when his person so chosen holds for a full term, and not term shall commence, it must be held that his merely for the unexpired term of his predecesterm begins when he is appointed and qualified, sor's term.” and continues for three years, unless he be sooner removed. When a statute creates an office
It is to be noticed that in the above case and provides that it shall be filled by election or the court said: appointment for a term of years, and is silent “We have concluded, though with some hesitain regard to when the term shall commence, tion, that the apparent purport of the peculiar and makes no special provision for filling a va- language of the statute must yield to the gencancy in the office or respecting the term for eral legislative purpose prevalent in this state. which one appointed to fill a vacancy shall hold the office, and there are no general provisions
The following cases are to the same effect of the statute that are applicable, there are l as the Opinion of the Justices, 61 Me. 602:
Attorney General v. Brunst, 3 Wis. 787; Peo "In the case before us, the statute, it is true, ple v. Coutant, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 132; Keys does not designate any definite point of time
from which the terms of the several officers v. Mason, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 6.
therein mentioned shall commence. Yet the eviIn Mechem on Public Officers, § 386, it is dent purpose of the statute requires, for the stated:
police force at least, that a definite time be "The statutes creating public officers usually fixed from which the several terms shall begin." prescribe the limits of the terms provided for, And at page 433 of 79 Me., at page 337 of fixing the dates at which they will begin and 10 Atl., the opinion reads: end. The date of the commencement of the term is ordinarily fixed for some appreciable period this statute in relation to commencement and
“If we were to give any other construction to after election or appointment, in order to give duration of the terms of office of the marshal affairs and to qualify in the manner prescribed. and the policemen the terms of service of the Where, however, no time is fixed, the term will appointees might soon become such as to enbegin on the date of the election in the case of tirely destroy the force of the provision that an elective officer, and at the date of appoint- one-third, as pear as may be, shall be appointment where the officer is appointed.”
ed each year.” The words of the act of 1880, in fixing the
While the above statement as to the police term of the office of marshal, are: “The city officers may be the accurate interpretation marshal shall hold his office for the term of of the law as to those officers, it is not aptwo years."
plicable to the office of city marshal, which, In State v. Tallman, 24 Wash. 426, page by the statute, is for a fixed and definite 430, 64 Pac. 759, 760, the court, in discussing term of years. There is nothing in the act of the meaning of the word “term,” as applied 1880 providing that one appointed city marto an office, says:
shal to succeed one who had not served a “Term, as applied to time, signifies a fixed full two years shall only serve out the unexperiod, a determined or prescribed duration. A pired term of his predecessor. term of office is a fixed period prescribed for The opinion does not notice the distinction holding office. People v. Brundage, 78 N. Y. between the terms of "office of the city mar403. The word 'term,' when used with reference to the tenure of office, ordinarily refers to a shal,” which is for a fixed and definite term, fixed and definite time. 'Mechem, Public Officers, with authority in the appointing power to fill § 385. In fact, the expression 'term of office
a vacancy in the office by appointment, and well understood, and their meaning so generally that in the office of policemen, who are memaccepted, that it is useless to attempt to fur- bers of a continuing board of public officers, ther define it."
and the plain intent of the act being that Webster's Dictionary defines "term" "as one-third of the members of the police officers a limited or definite extent of time; the time should be appointed each year, so that alfor which anything lasts, as a term of five ways the board should consist of at least twoyears, the term of life, a presidential term.” thirds of experienced officers, a distinction
If the marshal should die, resign, or be re- fully explained in the Opinion of the Justices, moved one week before his term expired, if 61 Me. 602. As the act of 1880 provides that the petitioner's contention is right, then his the city marshal shall hold his office for the successor, if appointed within the week, would term of two years, and does not provide that only hold the office for the balance of the the person appointed to that office to succeed week, although the statute under which he one who did not serve out the full term for was appointed expressly states, “The city which he was appointed, shall serve only the marshal shall hold his office for the term of unexpired term of his predecessor, the plain two years." He could not have held it before and obvious meaning of the act, as well as his appointment, and during the legal term of the weight of authority, is that, whenever his predecessor. If we give to the language there is a vacancy caused by death, removal, of the act the obvious import of the words, resignation, or the failure of the mayor to the ordinary popular significance of which is appoint, or the board of aldermen to conthat the marshal holds his office for the term firm an appointment, to that position, there of two years from his appointment, if he so is a vacancy in the office and not in the term, long live, unless he resigns, is removed, or the and that, when Arsene Callier was appointLegislature changes the law.
ed and confirmed as city marshal on April 1, The word "term" used in the act of 1880, 1911, he was entitled to hold the office, by virdescribing the term of the city marshal, was tue of that appointment, for the term of two used to designate a fixed, definite period of years from his appointment (that is, to April time that a person appointed to the office 1, 1913), and when the respondent was apshould hold the office.
pointed city marshal and confirmed March In French v. Cowan, in discussing the ques. 18, 1913, for the term of two years from the tion of successive terms, the court considered 1st day of April, 1913, he became entitled to both the office of marshal and of police of- hold the office for the full term of two years ficers, as if their terms were the same, as (that is, to April 1, 1915), and the respondent appears from the following from page 433 of is entitled to judgment. 79 Me., page 338 of 10 Atl.:
Petition dismissed, with costs.
(112 Me. 192)
the terms of the lease, which 'reserved the tiHOVEY v. BELL.
tle to said crops to secure the payment of the
said rent,' etc. Under this reservation the (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Sept. 12, defendant' contends that all the crops by whom1914.)
soever cultivated became the property of the 1. REFERENCE (8 99*)—SCOPE-POWERS OF lessor, George L. Pennington, through whom REFEREE.
the defendant, though nominal, derived his tiWhere a rule of reference contains a tle. stipulation that the judgment rendered on the “The defendant further contends that the referee's report shall be final and conclusive, fact that the plaintiff was sublessee, without the the referee has full power to decide all ques written consent of the lessor, as required by tions of law and fact, and in the absence of the terms of the lease, left the plaintiff without fraud, prejudice, or mistake on the referee's any rights greater than those of the lessee, part, to which objections must be raised when Ulmont. Upon this contention I find two the report is offered for acceptance, the deci- things: First, that the lessor had no knowlsion is final.
edge of the operation of the plaintiff as sub[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Reference, lessee; and, second, that the lessor had no tiCent. Dig. SS 148–156; Dec. Dig. $ 99.*]
tle to the premises when he executed the lease
to the lessee, Ulmont. 2. REFERENCE (8 100*)-SUBMISSION.
“Without going into further details, I rule Though a rule of reference provided that as a matter of law, upon the facts found, that the judgment rendered on the referee's report the plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum of should be final and conclusive, it was nev- $245, and interest from the date of the writ. ertheless proper for the referee, in advising a Upon this ruling I reserve the right of excepjudgment for plaintiff, to reserve to defendant tion to the defendant." a right of exception in order that questions of law might be submitted to the Supreme Judi
Upon motion of plaintiff's counsel the cial Court.
justice at nisi prius accepted the report and [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Reference, ordered judgment for the plaintiff. ThereCent. Dig. $$ 157–168; Dec. Dig. $ 100.*]
upon the defendant presented the following 3. APPEAL AND Error ($ 1018*)-REVIEW-bill of exceptions, which was allowed, and FINDINGS-EXCEPTION.
Where there is evidence to support the the case is before us upon these exceptions: findings of fact of a referee, and his findings
“The referee found the facts upon hearing, of fact support his conclusions of law, neither which are set forth in his finding and ruled, are subject to exception.
as a matter of law, that upon the facts found, [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Error, Cent. Dig. $8 4006, 4007; Dec. Dig. the presiding justice ruled that the ruling of
“The report was submitted to the court and § 1018.*]
the referee was right, and ordered judgment Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, for plaintiff, upon the report, to which ruling
and order of the presiding justice the deAroostook County, at Law.
fendant excepts, and prays that the excepAction by Ivory A. Hovey against Burn- tions may be allowed. ham J. Bell. A judgment was rendered in
"The finding of the referee is made a part of favor of plaintiff on a referee's report, and the bill of exceptions." defendant brings exceptions. Overruled.
The record presented to this court consists Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and HAL- only of copies: (1) of the writ; (2) of a EY, HANSON, and PHILBROOK, JJ.
lease from George L. Pennington to Ulmont
H. Hovey of a certain piece of land in HoulHarry M. Briggs and Willard S. Lewin, ton; (3) of a paper signed by said Penningboth of Houlton, for plaintiff. Shaw, Burton acknowledging receipt from Burnham J. leigh & Shaw, of Houlton, for defendant.
Bell, the defendant, of $222, “the same being
the value of 222 barrels of potatoes raised PHILBROOK, J. This is an action in as-on land leased by me to one Ulmont Hovey, sumpsit on the following account annexed: and sold to said Bell by Ivory A. Hovey, the Burnham J. Bell, to Ivory A. Hovey, Dr. title to which said potatoes are in dispute," 1911, June 1.
the paper also containing an agreement by To 222 barrels of potatoes, sold and
hold Bell harmless from delivered you at $1.00 per ’bbl....... $222 00 Pennington to To interest since due and demanded.. 23 00 loss by reason of the claim of any other per
son to the proceeds of the potatoes; (4) $245 00
copy of rule of reference; (5) copy of findThe cause was sent to a referee who re- ings of the referee; (6) bill of exceptions. ported as follows:
In the plaintiff's brief he says that the evi. In this case I find as a matter of fact that dence given before the referee, though Ivory A. Hovey, the plaintiff, was a bona fide taken by a stenographer, is not before this lessee of Ulmont H. Hovey, of the five acres court," and no such evidence is contained in which he claims to have planted to potatoes upon the Pennington farm, and that the 200 the record. barrels of potatoes harvested by him there [1, 2] The rule of reference contains the from 'were his property, as between him and stipulation that judgment rendered on the his son, Ulmont. In other words, I find that the plaintiff's claim was not a fraudulent one report of the referee shall be final and conset up for the purpose of preventing these po- clusive, and the law is well settled that in tatoes from becoming an asset of Ulmont's such a case the referee has full power to bankrupt estate."
**But as a matter of law the defendant claims, decide all questions arising, both of law ven admitting the plaintiff's good faith, that and fact, and in the absence of fraud, prejthe title is prevented from vesting in him by udice, or mistake, on the part of the referee,
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
objections to which should be made when the tempting the crossing, and there was evidence report is offered for acceptance, his decision that the car was suddenly set in motion withis final. Piscataquis Savings Bank v. Her- out warning, when he was on the crossing, the
questions of negligence and contributory neglirick, 100 Me. 494, 62 Atl. 214; Armstrong v. gence were for the jury. Munster, 103 Me. 29, 67 Atl. 573. The pow [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Negligence, ers of the referee were unrestricted. The Cent. Dig. $8 277-353; Dec. Dig. § 136.*] whole case, both as to law and fact, was
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, submitted to his determination. Hooper v.
Luzerne County, Taylor, 39 Me. 224. In the case at bar the referee did not exercise his full powers, for,
Trespass by Michael Kopochik against the
Pennsylvania Coal Company, for personal by reserving right of exception to the de
injuries. fendant, he virtually gave the defendant an
From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed. opportunity to submit questions of law to this court. This course was legitimate and
The facts appear in the following opinion proper. Hooper v. Taylor, supra. The dif- of Strauss, J., refusing motion for judgment ficulty here is to ascertain precisely what n. 0. V.: questions of law are properly presented by obstante veredicto, but not for a new trial.
This is an application for a judgment non the bill of exceptions.
The case has been twice tried, and both times  There are several findings by the ref- it has resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff.
He finds as matter of fact that Ivory After the first trial this court, upon facts subc A. Hovey was a bona fide lessee of Ulmont stantially the same as appeared at the trial now
under consideration, refused to enter judgment H. Hovey. This finding is not exceptionable non obstante veredicto, but allowed the motion if there is any evidence to support it. Pal- for new trial because the evidence of contribumer's Appeal, 110 Me. 411, 86 Atl. 919. In tory negligence was so strong that the verdict the case at bar no report of the evidence is seemed to be against the plain weight of the
evidence. That evidence is again substantially furnished, except as above stated, and we as strong as before. The case in our opinion find nothing in such as is furnished that will must always go to the jury so far as this queswarrant this exception being sustained. tion is concerned. The defendant now presses After stating certain legal claims made by we shall give that somewhat more attention
the motion for judgment non obstante only, and defendant, the referee finds that the lessor than was given to it at the first trial. had no knowledge of the operation of the
The facts are rather simple as we view them plaintiff as sublessee, and that the lessor in the light of the verdict. The defendant op
erates a colliery known as No. 14, where it emhad no title to the premises when he execut- ploys from 1,200 to 1,500 men. A high fence ed the lease to Ulmont. These seem to be has been built around the works, and entrance findings of fact, and for reasons just given to the ground is obtained through gates. With
in the grounds a railroad has been established are not exceptionable. Finally the referee leading from a breaker and washery to weigh rules "as a matter of law, upon the facts scales. Cars filled with coal at the breaker or found, that the plaintiff is entitled to re-washery were habitually run by gravity to the cover,” and upon this ruling reserves the scales. Generally these cars were in charge of a
brakeman who regulated their running through right of exception to the defendant. Here control furnished by a brake. About 700 emagain it would appear that in order to sus- ployés went daily to and from their work over tain his exceptions the defendant must show a road established within the grounds leading that the findings of fact by the referee, as the railroad a regular crossing from 12 to 14
from of the gates across the railroadOver preliminary to his ruling of law based upon feet wide had been established in the line of this those facts, are not sustained by any evi- road for the use of wagons and of employés. dence. The burden at this point is upon a car, standing under the washery to be loaded,
The burden at this point is upon This crossing was so close to the washery that the defendant. Rawson v. Hall, 56 Me. 112. I would reach, and sometimes encroach upon, the In our opinion the burden has not been sus crossing. It seems to have been usual for pertained, and the entry must be:
sons seeking employment to use this road and
crossing in going to the place where the foreExceptions overruled.
man having charge of employment of men might be found.
The plaintiff, who for many years worked at (245 Pa. 489)
this colliery, but who was out of employment KOPOCHIK v. PENNSYLVANIA COAL CO. on April 3, 1908, went in search of employment (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. May 22,
over this road and crossing to the foreman, who 1914.)
sent him into the mine to see several places
at which he might work. On returning, plainNEGLIGENCE (8 136*)-INJCRY TO LICENSEE- tiff, with eight or ten other men, went from QUESTION FOR JURY-EVIDENCE.
the shaft over this crossing with a view of reWhere, in an action for injuries from being turning to his home. There is some conflict in struck by a car on defendant's private railroad, the evidence as to whether the plaintiff stopmaintained in an inclosure surrounded by a ped, looked, and listened, and walked over the high fence containing gates through which it crossing, or whether without these precautions was necessary to pass to reach defendant's of- ran across the railroad track some distance befice, it appeared that plaintiff went to such of low the crossing with a view of catching a fice seeking work and, under the directions of car that was passing on a public road outside the foreman, examined certain places in the of the fence. That question of fact was duly mine at which he might work, and was return- submitted to the jury. The plaintiff claimed ing home over the crossing at the time of his and testified that usually when cars stood under injury, and the testimony was conflicting wheth- the washery, and projected out towards, or over er he stopped, looked, and listened before at- ! the crossing, there was a man on the car at the *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes