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made by counsel, but find no merit in them. [ ville as aforesaid, the above piece or parcel is No error appearing, the entry will be: Exceptions overruled.

(112 Me. 245)

conveyed on condition and in consideration of promise made by said inhabitants that a good and substantial fence shall be forever maintained by them inclosing the said premises." The plaintiff contends that the foregoing

INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF FRENCH- language should be regarded as a covenant

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Even the use of apt words to create a condition subsequent in a deed will not be construed to do so, if the language of the whole instrument shows a contrary intent of the par[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. §§ 488-495; Dec. Dig. § 155.*] 3. DEEDS (§ 155*) - CONSTRUCTION TION SUBSEQUENT.

CONDI

A condition subsequent may be created in a deed without the use of either a forfeiture clause or a clause of re-entry.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. §§ 488-495; Dec. Dig. § 155.*]

4. DEEDS ( 145*) - CONSTRUCTION-CONDITION SUBSEQUENT.

Where a deed conveyed premises to be used for school purposes, and stated that, in addition to the cash consideration, the conveyance was made "on condition and in consideration of the promise" of the grantee to keep the lot fenced, the language at least leaves it doubtful whether the parties intended to create a condition or a covenant, and the doubt must be resolved in favor of the covenant.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. § 471; Dec. Dig. § 145.*]

merely, for breach of which an action would lie. On the other hand, the defendant says that it is a condition subsequent. And, acting upon that assumption, in 1912 he entered and took possession of the premises, as for a breach of condition, with the intention of revesting title in himself. This constitutes the trespass complained of. Whether the language in the deed constitutes a covenant or a condition, in either event the case shows a breach. It follows that if it be a covenant, and not a condition, the title remains in the plaintiff, even though there has been a breach, and the town is entitled to judgment. On the contrary, if it be a condition subsequent, the title is in the defendant; he committed no trespass; and he must have judg

ment.

[1-3] Courts are reluctant to declare forfeitures. Conditions subsequent as the basis of forfeiture are not favored in law. This is the rule in this state and everywhere else. Bray v. Hussey, 83 Me. 329, 22 Atl. 220. Langauge in a deed will not be construed into a condition subsequent, unless the terms of the grant will admit of no other reasonable interpretation. The language is to be construed strictly against the grantor. No language will be construed into a condition subsequent, contrary to the intention of the parties, when the intent can be gathered from the whole instrument, read in the light of surrounding conditions. Wier v. Simmons, 55 Wis. 637, 13 N. W. 873. The strongest words of condition will not work a forfeiture of the

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Aroos-estate, unless they were intended so to operate. took County, at Law.

Trespass by the Inhabitants of Frenchville against Michael Gagnon. On report from the Supreme Judicial Court. Judgment entered for the plaintiff.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and CORNISH, BIRD, HALEY, HANSON, and PHILBROOK, JJ.

Hersey & Barnes, of Houlton, for plaintiff. Peter C. Keegan, of Van Buren, and Madigan & Pierce, of Houlton, for defendant.

SAVAGE, C. J. Trespass quare clausum. The case comes before this court on report, with a stipulation that, if the plaintiff is entitled to recover, the damages shall be assessed at $20. The premises in question were conveyed by the defendant to the plaintiff town in 1898 for a schoolhouse lot by a warranty deed which contained, between the description and the habendum, the following language:

Bragdon v. Blaisdell, 91 Me. 326, 39 Atl. 1036. Apt words, from which a clear implication arises, are necessary for the creation of a conditional grant, but the use of apt words does not always create a condition. Bray v. Hussey, supra. The intention shown by the whole deed controls. Sometimes the use of words, such as "null and void," indicative of an intention of forfeiture, or the insertion of a clause of re-entry, are held conclusive on the question of intention. But a condition subsequent may be created without either a forfeiture clause or clause of re-entry. Thomas v. Record, 47 Me. 500, 74 Am. Dec. 500.

[4] In the clause under consideration, the words "on condition" are apt words to create a condition; but the additional words "and in consideration of promise made by said inIn a deed, they are habitants" are not. When the

words appropriate to covenant. language in a deed makes it doubtful whether a condition or a covenant be meant, it is always to be construed as a covenant. Bragdon v. Blaisdell, supra; Hoyt v. Kimball, 49

"In addition to the consideration of $225 paid by the inhabitants of the town of French*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

N. H. 322; Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N. J. 16. FRAUD (§ 53*)—ACTIONS-ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE.
Eq. 349, 16 Atl. 4, 1 L. R. A. 380.

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It is sufficient, for the purposes of this case, to say that the language used, if it be not construed strictly as a covenant, leaves it in doubt whether the parties intended to create a condition or a covenant; whether they intended the grantor's remedy for breach should be by forfeiture, whereby the town would lose not only the land, but the schoolhouse, if any, upon it; or whether it should be by ordinary action at law for damages. In accordance with the principles already stated, that doubt must be resolved in favor of a covenant and against a condition, so as to avoid forfeiture.

Judgment for plaintiff for $20.

(112 Me. 223)

ROSS v. REYNOLDS. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

1914.)

In an action for fraud in the sale of an

automobile which the seller agreed to overhaul and put in first-class condition, testimony by the plaintiff that he took the car to defendant's garage on account of some newly discovered defect was relevant to show that the representation that the car was in good running order was false.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraud, Cent. Dig. § 49; Dec. Dig. § 53.*1

7. EVIDENCE (§ 182*)-SECONDARY EVIDENCEPRELIMINARY PROOF-RECEIPT OF LETTER.

Proof that a letter properly addressed to facie its delivery to the addressee, and evidence the defendant was mailed establishes prima of the contents of the letter is not inadmissible because of failure to show that the defendant received it.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 601-604; Dec. Dig. & 182.*]

8. EVIDENCE (§ 220*)- SELF-SERVING LETTER. In an action for fraud in the sale of an auOct. 8, tomobile, a letter written by the buyer to the seller, stating that he had misrepresented the car, though self-serving in a sense, is admis

1. FRAUD_(§ 12*)—FRAUDULENT REPRESENTA-sible as being calculated to evoke a reply so TIONS-PROMISE.

In an action for deceit in the sale of a secondhand automobile, the buyer cannot recover for a breach by the seller of his agreement to overhaul the car and put it in first-class shape.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraud, Cent. Dig. 14; Dec. Dig. § 12.*]

2. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1050*)—HARMLESS ERROR-ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE — IRRELEVANT TESTIMONY.

Irrelevant testimony if not prejudicial is no ground for reversal.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. $$ 1068, 1069, 4153-4157, 4166; Dec. Dig. § 1050.*]

as to afford an inference of the truth of the charge if no reply was made.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 771-785; Dec. Dig. § 220.*] 9. WITNESSES (§ 372*)-IMPEACHMENT-BIAS. A witness may be asked on cross-examination if he had not, during the preceding year, been in litigation with the opposite party, in order to show his bias or prejudice.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1192-1199; Dec. Dig. § 372.*1 10. FRAUD (§ 18*) - ACTIONABLE MISREPRE SENTATION-AGE OF AUTOMOBILE.

A representation, made as an inducement. in the sale of a secondhand automobile as to its age, or the length of time it had been used, 3. CONTRACTS (§ 28*)-ACTIONS-ADMISSIBIL- is material and, if false, is actionable. ITY OF EVIDENCE.

When the terms of an oral contract are in dispute, the whole conversation concerning the trade and the various negotiations leading up to it are, as a rule, admissible in evidence, though much that is said may not bear directly upon the disputed points.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases. see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 133-140, 1755, 1782-1784, 17852, 1820, 1821; Dec. Dig. § 28.*]

4. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1048*)-HARMLESS ERROR-QUESTION NOT ANSWERED.

Where the defendant objected to a question asked by the plaintiff for a specific purpose, and the court ruled the evidence admissible for

that purpose, an exception to the ruling will not be sustained where the question was not answered and no further question on that line was asked at that time.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4140-4145, 4151, 41584160; Dec. Dig. § 1048.*]

5. APPEAL AND ERROR ($_1050*)-HARMLESS ERROR-ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE-IMMATERIAL EVIDENCE.

Dig. § 16; Dec. Dig. § 18.*]
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Fraud, Cent.

11. FRAUD (§ 11*)- MISREPRESENTATIONS-
STATEMENT OF OPINION-CONDITION OF AU-
TOMOBILE.

A representation, made as an inducement in the sale of a secondhand automobile, that it was in good running order, while not actionable if the statement was a mere expression of opinion, might be a statement of a fact, and if, being fairly susceptible of being so understood, it was understood by the buver as a statement of fact, the misrepresentation is actionable.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Fraud, Cent. Dig. §§ 12, 13; Dec. Dig. § 11.*]

On Motion and Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Washington County, at Law.

Action by George W. Ross against Foster S. Reynolds. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepts and moves for a new trial. Exceptions and motion overruled.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and CORNISH, BIRD, HANSON, and PHILBROOK,

In an action for fraud in the sale of a secondhand automobile, testimony by the plain- JJ. tiff that defendant wanted a mortgage on certain real estate for security, though immaterial, was not harmful.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1068, 1069, 4153-4157, 4166; Dec. Dig. § 1050.*]

H. E. Saunders, of Lubec, W. R. Patten

gall, of Waterville, and R. J. McGarrigle, of Calais, for plaintiff. J. H. Gray, of Lubec,

for defendant.

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

SAVAGE, C. J. Action for deceit in the sale of an automobile. The verdict was for the plaintiff, and the case comes up on the defendant's exceptions and motion for a new trial.

tiff testifying that he, the defendant, wanted a mortgage on certain real estate for security. Though the evidence was immaterial, it could not have been harmful.

[6] 4. The plaintiff was permitted to testify that he took the car to the defendant's garage to be overhauled. Whether it was because of the agreement to make repairs, or because of some newly discovered defect in the car, the record fails to disclose. If the car was taken to the garage on account of some newly discovered defect, the evidence of it would be relevant to the alleged false representation that the car was in good running

[1] In his writ the plaintiff alleged that the defendant in making the sale to him deceived him in three respects, namely, that he said the car had not been in use for more than a year, and that it was in good running order and condition, and that the defendant agreed that he would give the car a thorough overhauling and put it in first-class shape. The presiding justice properly ruled that no recovery could be had in this case for fail-order and condition. If the car was taken to ure to keep this agreement.

The exceptions are eight in number and relate to the admission and exclusion of evidence.

[2, 3] 1. The plaintiff testified that in one of the conversations he had with the defendant relative to the purchase of the car, the defendant suggested that he make a trade with a Mr. Calkins with regard to the security to be given. Exception was taken to the admission of this testimony. This evidence may not be relevant to the issue of deceit, but it is not perceived how it can be regarded as prejudicial. To secure the reversal of a ruling, on exceptions, it is necessary to show, not only that the ruling was erroneous, but also that it was harmful. Bath v. Reed, 78 Me. 276, 4 Atl. 688. Besides, when the terms of an oral contract are in dispute, it is proper, as a general rule, to let in the whole conversation concerning the trade, and the various negotiations leading up to the trade. Though much that is said may not bear directly upon the disputed points, it may nevertheless throw valuable light upon the inquiry; it may help to strengthen the probabilities and improbabilities, the one way or the other. When a witness is asked to narrate a conversation which ended in a contract, it is impossible to tell in advance how much of it may be wheat, and how much chaff. It must be left to the discretion of the court to keep the witness within as narrow limits as reasonably may be, for the eliciting of the truth and the whole truth. It is within bounds to say that few verdicts could stand if the admission of merely irrelevant evidence were a good ground for reversal.

[4] 2. There were certain obvious defects in the car, which the plaintiff knew about and which he alleges the defendant agreed to repair. His counsel was asking him about them in detail, for the purpose, as he stated to the court, of explaining why the plaintiff took the car immediately to the defendant's garage. The defendant then objected. The court ruled the evidence admissible for that purpose. But no answer was made to the question objected to, and no further question on this line was asked at that time.

[5] 3. The defendant objected to the plain

the garage for the repair of defects as agreed to be made, the evidence of it was immaterial, but, in view of the express ruling of the court, not prejudicial.

[7] 5. The plaintiff was permitted to testify as to the contents of a letter which he said he wrote to the defendant, to the effect that he had misrepresented the car; that it was in bad condition, and not in running order. The letter itself was not produced, and notice to produce was waived. The defendant objected that it was not competent to show the contents of the letter, until it was shown that the defendant received it. And in this contention the defendant was right. But the plaintiff testified that he mailed the letter properly addressed to the defendant. That is prima facie evidence of delivery by due course of mail to the addressee. Chase v. Surrey, 88 Me. 468, 34 Atl. 270; Johnson v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Railroad, 111 Me. 263, 88 Atl. 988.

[8] 6: The next exception is to the contents of the letter itself. Such a letter is clearly admissible. Though in a sense self-serving, it is admissible because, if the charge contained in it is untrue, it is calculated to evoke a reply. If no reply is made, that fact, unexplained, may afford an inference that the charge is true.

7. The subject-matter of this exception is the same as that stated under exception 4, and this exception must fall with that one.

[9] 8. The plaintiff, on cross-examination of one of the defendant's witnesses was permitted to draw out from him the fact that he had within the preceding year been in litigation with the plaintiff. This was admissible to show bias or prejudice in the witness. It is a common and proper mode of impeachment.

No one of the defendant's exceptions should be sustained.

We will briefly discuss the motion for a new trial. The false representations relied upon as alleged are that the car had not been in use for more than one year, and that it was in good running order and condition. The trade was in 1912. The plaintiff claims that the defendant told him that the car was one year old then, and that in fact it was two years old. The defendant admits that

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UTES.

review in civil actions may be granted on petiRev. St. c. 91, § 1, cl. 3, provides that a tion of a party in interest who was not a party to the record, setting forth the fact of such interest, and on filing a bond, etc. Held, that where petitioner inherited the assets of a grantor under a warranty, and a real action was brought against the party succeeding to her ancestor's title, and he vouched petitioner to defend, but she failed to do so, and judgment was rendered against such grantee, petitioner was authorized by such section to file a writ of review.

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[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Review, Cent. Dig. § 14; Dec. Dig. § 13.*] 4. REVIEW (§ 8*)-GROUNDS "FRAUD, ACCIDENT, MISTAKE, OR MISFORTUNE."

the car was a 1910 car and claims that he 3. REVIEW (§ 13*) — CAPACITY TO SUE - STATtold the plaintiff so. The plaintiff claims that the defendant represented that the car was in good running order and condition, and that in fact it was not. The defendant admits that he told the plaintiff that the car was in good running condition; and claims that it was so in fact. These are the issues. [10, 11] A representation made as an inducement in the sale of an automobile, as to its age or the length of time it has been in use is undoubtedly material as affecting value; and, if false, it is actionable. A representation under like circumstances that it is in good running order may be the expression of an opinion, or it may be the statement of a fact. If the former, it is not actionable; The words "fraud, accident, mistake, or if the latter, and false, it is actionable. If misfortune," as used in Rev. St. c. 91, § 1, cl. 7, providing that a writ of review may be the representation is capable of being under- granted where, through fraud, accident, mistake, stood either as an expression of opinion or as or misfortune, justice has not been done, ima statement of fact, which it is must be de- port something outside of petitioner's own contermined in accordance with the understand-trol, or at least something which a reasonably prudent man would not be expected to guard ing of the parties. If it was made as a state- against or provide for, and hence do not justify ment of fact and was so understood, it lays the issuance of such writ to review a judgment the basis for an action of deceit. So, if the in a real action where petitioner had been seasonably vouched to defend under her ancestor's statement was fairly susceptible of being un- covenant of warranty, but omitted to defend derstood to be a statement of fact, and not because of her own personal neglect. a mere opinion; and the other party did so understand it. Hotchkiss v. Coal & Iron Co., 108 Me. 34, 46, 78 Atl. 708. If an automobile is represented to be in good running condition, when in fact, as is claimed in this case, there are hidden defects which prevent its proper operation, it is difficult to see why the representation may not be deemed to be a statement of fact, so far as those defects are concerned.

A careful examination of the evidence leads us to conclude that a jury would be warranted in finding for the plaintiff upon either issue presented. It cannot be said, we think, that the verdict is so manifestly wrong as to require or permit the interference of the court.

Motion and exceptions overruled. (112 Me. 238)

FARNSWORTH v. KIMBALL et al.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Oct. 8, 1914.)
1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION (§ 128*)-LIA-
BILITY OF HEIR
BREACH OF ANCESTOR'S
WARRANTY.

An heir is liable for breach of her ancestor's warranty of title to land conveyed, to the extent of the property and assets which came to her as such heir.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Descent and Distribution, Cent. Dig. §§ 473-477; Dec. Dig. § 128;* Covenants, Cent. Dig. § 92.] 2. COVENANTS (§ 121*) CONCLUSIVENESSPERSONS CONCLUDED-HEIRS BREACH OF ANCESTOR'S WARRANTY.

Where a real action was brought as to real property which had been conveyed to the defendant therein by petitioner's ancestor, whose property and assets she had inherited, and she was vouched in to defend the suit by reason of her ancestor's warranty of title, but failed to do so, she was bound by the judgment.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Covenants, Cent. Dig. §§ 221-223; Dec. Dig. § 121.*]

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Review, Cent. Dig. § 8; Dec. Dig. § 8.*1 5. MORTGAGES (§ 226*)-MORTGAGEE IN POSSESSION-CONVEYANCE-EFFECT.

the property by deed, the deed will operate as Where a mortgagee in possession conveys the property by deed, the deed will operate as an assignment of the mortgage the same as if the mortgage debt was assigned or transferred with the deed.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 457, 611-617; Dec. Dig. § 226.*] 6. MORTGAGES (§ 274*)-MORTGAGEE OUT OF POSSESSION-CONVEYANCE.

A deed by a mortgagee, not having made entry and being out of possession, conveys no title, unless accompanied by a transfer of the mortgage debt, since until entry the mortgagee's interest is a chattel interest and not realty.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 718-724, 728; Dec. Dig. § 274.*] 7. MORTGAGES (§ 292*)—Transfer of PROPERACTION BETWEEN OWNER OF EQUITY AND GRANTEE-DEFENSES.

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equity of redemption in mortgaged premises In a real action by the owner of the against a grantee of the mortgagee before entry and while out of possession, such grantee for that reason being a mere stranger to the title, it was no defense that he had a claim against petitioner for breach of his grantor's covenant of warranty.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 762-771, 790; Dec. Dig. § 292.*1

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Hancock County, at Law.

Petition by Lucy A. Farnsworth for a writ of review of a former action by Samuel S. Kimball and another against George B. Dorr, in which defendants Kimball and another recovered judgment. Petition denied.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and CORNISH, BIRD, HALEY, HANSON, and PHILBROOK, JJ.

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

White & Carter, of Lewiston, and Hale, We merely mention the situation that it & Hamlin, of Ellsworth, for petitioner. may not serve as a precedent.

Deasy & Lynam and E. S. Clark, all of Bar Harbor, for defendants.

SAVAGE, C. J. This is a petition for a review of a real action in which the present defendants, Kimball and Coffin, were plaintiffs and one George B. Dorr was defendant, and comes before this court on report. That case was tried and went to judgment at the April term, 1913, of the Supreme Judicial Court in Hancock county. It is admitted It is admitted that during the pendency of that action and before trial or judgment, the record title of Dorr, the defendant, passed to the Bar Harbor Water Company, and that the title of Kimball and Coffin, the plaintiffs, had been bought and paid for by the Bar Harbor Water Company and had been conveyed to a trustee for the benefit of that company. So that the water company at the time of the trial owned in law, or in equity, all the title of all the parties of record in the suit. It is also admitted that the suit was prosecuted to judgment by that company, at its expense; and inasmuch as it owned also the defendant's title, it is a fair inference that the same company maintained the defense. Except as the judgment might furnish the basis for ulterior proceedings against this present petitioner, it was entirely a moot case.

[1, 2] The Dorr title was deraigned from the warranty deed of William A. Farnsworth, the petitioner's father, and the petitioner, as she is the sole living heir of her father, and the owner of property and assets which came to her as such heir, and thus liable upon the covenants of warranty, if broken, was sufficiently vouched in to defend the original suit, but failed to do so, and is accordingly bound by that judgment, as it now stands.

[3] It will be noticed that the petitioner was not a party of record in the original suit, and that Dorr, who was a party there, is not made a party to this proceeding. For her right to institute the proceeding, the petitioner relies upon R. S. c. 91, § 1, cl. 3, which provides that a review in civil actions may be granted "on petition of a party in interest who was not a party to the record, setting forth the fact of such interest, and upon filing a bond" and so forth. The petitioner's right to petition is not challenged, but we deem it proper to say that we think that her case fairly comes within the provision of the statute. It is probable that by strict construction the original defendant, Dorr, should have been made a party to this proceeding, but the point has not been made. And as he, as well as his former adversaries, are represented by the Bar Harbor Water Company, their grantee, which is making this defense, and makes no point of want of proper parties, we will pass the question.

It should be stated further, as preliminary to a discussion of the questions involved, that the Bar Harbor Water Company, the present defendant in interest, has commenced an action against her as heir, upon her father's covenant of warranty, and the action is now pending.

[4] A review may be granted "where through fraud, accident, mistake or misfortune, justice has not been done." R. S. c. 91, § 1, cl. 7. But the words "fraud, accident, mistake or misfortune" are not without limitation. This court said in Pickering v. Cassidy, 93 Me. 139, 44 Atl. 683, that: thing outside of the petitioner's own control, or * * ordinarily import someat least something which a reasonably prudent man would not be expected to guard against or provide for. It has long been regarded as esthat, when parties have had their full day in sential to public order, security, and confidence court,

"The words *

* *

*

* * *they should abide the result. It cannot have been the intention of

the Legislature to destroy this rule and destroy all reliance upon court judgments, by requiring or even authorizing the court to open them as often as the defeated party discovers some new evidence or argument."

Following this rule, a review is denied when it appears that the petitioner's predicament is due to his own fault and want of reasonable diligence. Mere mistakes in opinion or judgment do not bring a case within the statute.

The petitioner was seasonably vouched to defend. She then had in her possessiou all the evidence that she has now, for want of which, as she claims, an erroneous order of judgment was made. She showed it to her personal counsel. She furnished copies of it to the counsel defending the Dorr title. She says she was advised by her attorney that it was not necessary for her to respond to the voucher, and that the attorneys for Dorr had told her attorney that they would do all they could in defense. If we should assume that her attorney did not give her good advice, as we do not, that would not be such mistake or misfortune as the statute contemplates. The statute certainly does not mean that when a lawyer gives poor advice it is a cause for review. But the record leads us to think that disinclination to be at any expense about it was the prime reason for failing to appear and defend. Notwithstanding the advice which she says was given her, she undertook to employ a firm of Ellsworth attorneys, but, being unable to get them to name a price for which they would take care of the suit for her, she seems to have decided to let the matter go. For these reasons we might properly hold, we think, that the failure of the petitioner to act after being vouched was due to her own personal, palpable neglect, for which the statute of reviews affords no remedy. But there are reasons why we think it proper to consider the

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