« ՆախորդըՇարունակել »
spondent moves that the said cause be continued again changed, providing that a justice of to the next term of the Supreme Judicial Court the Supreme Judicial Court be designated to to be held within and for said county having ju- preside at such trials. In 1899, the provision risdiction of the offense alleged."
requiring indictments to be certified to this Counsel for the respondent argues: (1) court was restored, and remained in force That it has never been the policy of the state until 1913, when the section providing for to allow a court of limited and inferior juris- certifying and transmitting indictments to diction to determine the rights of a man this court was repealed, and section 90, c. 79, charged with murder. (2) That the respond- R. S., was amended by chapter 220, § 3, and ent was denied the constitutional right to a
as amended reads as follows: change of venue; that, if such change were
"Laws of 1913, chap. 220, sec. 3. The original sought and ordered, he would then receive and appellate jurisdiction in all criminal matters only what the law insures, the right to a in said counties of Cumberland and Kennebec, trial before a justice of this court. (3) That and all powers incident thereto, originally exer he is entitled thereto, because "the law of fore conferred upon and exercised by said supe
cised by the Supreme Judicial Court, but heretoApril 11, 1913, attempted to repeal section 2 rior courts, are continued." of chapter 132, R. S., which gives the Su
The following section was added, and the preme Court jurisdiction,
must re-principal contention in this case arises therelate back to the time of the shooting, namely, under: March 20, 1913”; that therefore the amend
"Sec. 4. Any indictment for murder returned ment in question was not in force on that by the grand jury in said superior court at the day; and that, as to his client, such amend- April term thereof, in the year nineteen hundred
and thirteen, shall be in order for trial at the ment was entirely inoperative in any event next September term of said court, which shall until after the expiration of 90 days from have jurisdiction of all matters pertaining the date of its approval. (4) While support thereto." ing his exceptions as stated in the foregoing, It is urged in the motion that this provicounsel concludes his brief with this state- sion, "in its attempt to reach the case at bar, ment:
is retroactive legislation and ex post facto in "We do not undertake to argue upon the un- its nature.” If the point raised related to constitutionality of the law on this question. the crime charged, or to the constitutional
“Our contention is not whether the law is ex post facto, but we claim that the attempt of rights of the respondent thereunder, our conthe state to control the situation as it was clusion would not be reached so easily, but March 20, 1913, was futile, and, under the 90 the provision in question, directed, as it days' provision, of no force or effect. In other plainly is, to procedure, and relating entirely words, we say it was not an ex post facto law of which we complain, but ‘no law which could to the remedy, and having for its obvious take effect until long after the shooting took purpose the conduct and disposition of a place on that fateful day of March 20th near the pending case, is constitutional, and wholly reservation at Togus, Me.
"And concerning the fifth section of page 12 within the legislative power and control, and of the printed case, wherein it is set forth that is not as to this case an ex post facto law, or the respondent declined to plead in the superior retroactive in its nature or tendency. Coolcourt, while a ruling of the superior court may ey's Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) p. 326; Bishop's be open to exceptions, we think comment un. necessary and depend more fully upon the at. Crim. Law, vol. 1, 88 279, 277, 280, 282, 283; tempt of the prosecution to keep the case away Commonwealth v. Phelps, 210 Mass., 78, 96 from a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court N. E. 349, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 567, Ann. Cas. in the manner hereinbefore stated."
1912C, 1119; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, As to the first objection raised by the re- 390, 1 L. Ed. 648; Thompson v. Missouri, 171 spondent's counsel, it is sufficient to say U. S. 386, 18 Sup. Ct. 922, 43 L. Ed. 204. that, when the superior court for Kennebec The motions were made a part of the excounty was established in 1878 (Laws 1878- ceptions, and the brief made by other coun80, c. 10), it had full jurisdiction in criminal sel follows substantially the remaining points cases. At the same session, the act creating made in the motions. Both urge the right to that court was amended as follows:
a change of venue, and say that the right "Sec. 19. When any indictment is found for was denied. It does not appear that any any of the offences described in sections one and reason existed why change of venue should
of tions two, three, four, five, six, eight, nine, ten, be had, that a fair trial could not be had, or eleven, twelve, thirteen, fifteen, twenty-five and was not in fact had. twenty-seven of chapter 118 of the Revised Stat
 The right to a change of venue is not a utes, sections one, two and three of chapter 119 common-law right. It is created and regulatof the Revised Statutes, the clerk of said superior court shall certify and transmit the in- ed by statute, and is also a matter of procedictment to the Supreme Judicial Court for said dure authorized by the Legislature under its county, at the next term, when it shall be en- sole and plenary power to determine what tered. The Supreme Judicial Court shall have cognizance and jurisdiction thereof, and proceed course shall be pursued in the administraings shall be had thereon in the same manner as tion of justice, as well as in all other matters if the indictment had been found in that court.” concerning the public good. Hopt v. Utah, (Laws 1878–80, c. 48.)
110 U. S. 574, 4 Sup. Ct. 202, 28 L. Ed. 262;  Full jurisdiction was restored in 1881, Gibson v. Miss., 162 U. S. 589, 16 Sup. Ct. and so continued until 1891, when the provi- 904, 40 L. Ed. 1075; Thompson v. Utah, 170 sion relating to the trial of murder cases was U. S. 351, 18 Sup. Ct. 620, 42 L. Ed. 1061.
 The right to have a jury selected from (7th Ed.) 381, and cases cited; Commonwealth another county or district is not one of the v. Phillips, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 32. rights within the words and intent of the The fact that the crime was committed Constitution prohibiting the passage of ex before the passage of the act in question, and post facto laws, under article 1, $$ 9 and 10. that 90 days must elapse before such act has Chase, J., in the leading case (Calder v. Bull, the force of law, does not avail the respond3 Dall. 386, 390 [1 L. Ed. 648]), stated the ent. He had violated the law. There is no laws included thereunder as follows:
pretense that the law so violated had been "(1) Every law that makes an action done be- changed. The only change effected was in the fore the passing of the law, and which was in- manner in which he should be tried for that nocent when done, criminal, and punishes such offense against the law. That. change was action. (2) Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when commitmade by the law-making power whose will is ted. (3)
(4) Every law that alters paramount and whose right to shape the polithe legal rules of evidence, and receives less, cy of the state is not to be questioned by the ' or different, testimony than the law required at court, nor is the administration thereof to be der to convict the offender. All these and simi- dictated by the offender. He has no vested lar laws are manifestly unjust and oppressive, right in the matter of procedure. Cooley's
* * but I do not consider any law ex post Const. Lim. (7th Ed.) p. 381; Cyc. vol. 8, $ facto, within the prohibition that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law, but only those that 1031. The rules and orders provided for the create or aggravate the crime, or increase the conduct of courts, officials, and community punishment, or change the rules of evidence, for generally are to be observed by all alike as the purpose of conviction." Cooley's Const. the law, unless they interfere with some subLim. (7th Ed.) 373, 374.
stantial right guaranteed by the fundamental  It is well settled that a mere change law. in the Constitution of the trial court, which
A careful examination of the questions inleaves unchanged all the substantial protec- volved convinces the court that the respondtions which the law in force at the time of ent was not deprived of the full protection the commission of the alleged offense threw to which he was entitled under existing law. about the accused, is not ex post facto. Dun
The entry must therefore be: can v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 14 Sup. Ct.
Exceptions overruled. 570, 38 L. Ed. 485. Nor is a change in the place of trial. Gut v. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. Ed. 573, quoted and affirmed in Cook v. United States, 138 U. S. 157, 11 Sup. Ct.
ANDERSON v. SALANT et al. (No. 455.) 268, 34 L. Ed. 906; Cooley's Const. Lim. (7th (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Oct. 21, Ed.) 375, note.
1914.) The remaining objection is to the jurisdic- COURTS (S 243*)—CASE CERTIFIED TO SUPREME
COURT-REMITTING TO SUPERIOR COURT. tion of the court, on the ground that the act of April 7, 1913, did not become a law until constitutional questions will, upon motion of
A cause certified to the Supreme Court on 90 days after its passage, to wit, July 11, defendants, be remitted to the superior court, to 1913, and that, the crime having been com- permit there a motion to dismiss as to them mitted on March 20, 1913, the statute which without prejudice to the rights of others. that law was intended to amend in part and Dig. § 243.*]
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Dec. repeal in part was itself then in force, and urges that the respondent should have been
Action by William E. Anderson against tried thereunder; the justice presiding to be Gabriel Salant and others. On motion by a justice of this court. We do not so hold. Gabriel Salant and others to remit the cause, We think the reasons already given are suffi- certified on a constitutional question to the cient to justify the ruling of the presiding Supreme Court, to the superior court, to perjustice in this as well as in the other claims mit a motion there to dismiss as to the movof the respondent's counsel, and we may add ing defendants. Motion granted. that the practice is uniform, and it is well Fred A. Otis, of Providence, for plaintiff. settled that:
Irving Champlin, James Harris, and Herbert "So far as mere modes of procedure are con- A. Rice, all of Providence, for defendants. cerned, a party has no more right, in a criminal Gardner, Pirce & Thornley, of Providence, for than in a civil action, to insist that his case shall be disposed of under the law in force when moving defendants, appearing specially for the the act to be investigated is charged to have tak- purposes of this motion, and not otherwise. en place. Remedies must always be under the control of the Legislature, and it would create endless confusion in legal proceedings if every
PER CURIAM. The motion of Gardner, case was to be conducted only in accordance Pirce & Thornley is hereby granted, and with the rules of practice, and heard only by the case is remitted to the superior court, to The Legislature may abolish courts and create permit said Gardner, Pirce & Thornley to new ones, and it may prescribe altogether differ- make a motion in said superior court that ent modes of procedure, in its discretion, though said action be dismissed as to Gabriel Salant, it cannot lawfully, we think, in so doing, dis- Aaron B. Salant, and Solomon J. Wallach pense with any of those substantial protections without prejudice to the rights of any party with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime.' Cooley's Const. Lim. J properly before the court in said action to have the constitutional question, upon which 2. CRIMINAL LAW ($ 1056*) — APPEAL-INthe action has been certified to this court,
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
STRUCTIONS-NECESSITY OF EXCEPTIONS. hereafter heard and determined by this court's charge cannot be considered on appeal,
Assignments of error with reference to the court. After hearing and determining said where no exception was taken to the instrucmotion to dismiss, said superior court is di- tions at the trial. rected to transmit the papers in said action
[Ed. Note. For other cases,
see Criminal to this court, for the purpose of enabling Law, Cent. Dig. 88 2663, 2670; Dec. Dig. 8
1056.*] this court to hear and determine said constitutional question upon which said action
Appeal from Supreme Court. has been heretofore certified to this court.
John H. Morgan was convicted of criminal assault, and appealed to the Supreme Court, where the judgment was affirmed, from which
judgment he again appeals. Affirmed. HARTFORD et al. v. PARKER, Secretary of State. SAUNDERS et al. v. SAME.
The opinion of the Supreme Court is as TRIPP et al. v. SAME.
follows: (Nos. 226–228.)
 This case is argued by counsel for the
plaintiff in error as if it was before us for re. (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Oct. 14, view under the provisions of section 136 of the 1914.)
Criminal Procedure Act (2 Comp. St. 1910, p. MANDAMUS (8 10*)–CERTIFICATION OF Nom-1863); This, however, is not the fact, for 'the INATION.
record of the proceedings had upon the trial of Mandamus would not lie to compel the sec. the cause has not been certified to us by the
trial court. retary of state to certify relators' names as can
The questions argued by counsel didates for office on the Progressive party ticket, are none of them raised by any bill of excepwhere the testimony did not show that relators tions. The testimony of Helen Brown, showing had been duly selected as candidates for such that she was present with Louisa Carey at the offices by any legally constituted body repre-time of the alleged criminal assault upon the senting the electors of that party qualified to latter, and that on the same occasion the devote for candidates for such offices.
fendant committed an assault upon her (the (Ed. Note. For other cases, see Mandamus, timony of these two girls, that on an earlier oc
witness), was not objected to; nor was the tesCent. Dig. § 37; Dec. Dig. § 10.*]
casion the defendant committed a similar asPetitions for writs of mandamus by Walter sault upon them, objected to. G. Hartford and others, by Harry L. Saun-raised by the second assignment of error is
 The criticism upon the charge of the court ders and others, and by William F. Tripp and not based upon any exception, for no exception, others against J. Fred Parker, Secretary of either general or special, was taken to the in State, to compel defendant to certify relators' struction to the jury.
The judgment under review will be affirmed, names as candidates for office on the Progressive party ticket. Writs denied.
Frank H. Sommer, of Newark, for appel
lant. Louis Hood, of Newark, for the State. Greenough, Easton & Cross, of Providence (William B. Greenough, of Providence, of counsel), for petitioners. Herbert. A. Rice,
PER CURIAM. The judgment under rę. Atty. Gen., for respondent. Lewis A. Water view will be affirmed, for the reasons set man, of Providence, for certain interested par- forth in the opinion of the Supreme Court. ties.
PER CURIAM. It does not appear from
(85 N. J. L. 389) the testimony presented at the hearing that
STATE v. SICILIANO. the persons alleged to have been nominated (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. for the respective offices set forth in said pe
Nov. 17, 1913.) titions were duly selected as candidates for said offices by any legally constituted body 1. CRIMINAL LAW (8 1149*)—INDICTMENT AND
INFORMATION ($ 136*)-MOTION TO QUASH representing the electors of the Progressive
INDICTMENT-MATTERS REVIEWABLE. party qualified to vote for said candidates
A motion to quash an indictment is adfor said offices.
dressed to the discretion of the court, and is The said petitions are therefore denied and not reviewable on strict writ of error. dismissed.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. $$ 3039–3043, 3058; Dec. Dig.
§ 1149;* Indictment and Information, Cent. (85 N. J. L. 387)
Dig. $8 470, 471; Dec. Dig. § 136.*]
2. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION (8 125*) (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
An indictment charging the crime of keep
ing a disorderly house, in that defendant ha1. CRIMINAL LAW (8 1036*)-APPEAL-RUL- bitually sold, or permitted to be sold, intoxicat. INGS ON EVIDENCE-OBJECTIONS AT TRIAL. ing liquors on his premises contrary to law,
Rulings on evidence cannot be reviewed on drawn in conformity with Criminal Procedure appeal, where no objection was made at the Act (P. L. 1898, p. 894) § 74, was not bad for trial.
duplicity. (Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Indictment Law, Cent. Dig. $8 1631–1640, 2639–2641; and Information, Cent. Dig. $$ 331-400; Dec. Dec. Dig. $ 1036.*1
Dig. § 125.*]
Appeal from Supreme Court.
claims exemption from the payment of colGarino Siciliano was convicted of keeping lateral inheritance taxes as legatee and deva disorderly house by permitting the illegal isee under the will of Susan Van Neste, who sale of intoxicating liquors. From a judg- died in this state on February 28, 1912, and ment of the Supreme Court, affirming the con- whose will was admitted to probate in the viction, he appeals. Affirmed.
county of Middlesex. The opinion in the Supreme Court was as
This claim is based upon the supplement to follows:
the Collateral .Inheritance Tax Act of 1894 The plaintiff in error was found guilty upon (P. L. 318) approved March 15, 1898 (Pamph. an indictment charging him with the crime of L. p. 106), which, if still in force, entitles the keeping a disorderly house, the disorder con- prosecutor to the exemption claimed by it. sisting solely in the habitual selling, or permitting to be sold, on his premises, intoxicating Court in the case of In re Estate of Gopsill,
This question was before the Prerogative liquor contrary to law. There was a motion to Court in the case of In re Estate of Gopsill, quash the indictment on the ground of duplic- 77 N. J. Eq. 215, 77 Atl. 793, in which Vice ity. The motion was refused, and the sole er- Ordinary Walker (now Chancellor) held that ror assigned is based upon this refusal. [1, 2] The judgment should be affirmed.
since the passage of the amendment to the
In the first place, a motion to quash an indictment Collateral Inheritance Tax Act of 1906 (at is addressed to the discretion of the court, and page 432) the supplemental act of 1898 was is not reviewable on strict writ of error. State no longer in force. We agree with the vice v. Hageman, 13 N. J., Law, 314: Proctor v ordinary that the act of 1898 has been elimState, 55 N. J. Law, 472.1 In the second place, the assertion that the indictment is faulty for inated, not by its repeal, but by its being duplicity is not justified by the fact. It is superseded by later legislation covering the drawn in conformity with the seventy-fourth subject matter. Eldridge v. Philadelphia & section of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1898 (P. L. 1898, p. 894), and is similar
in form to Reading Railroad Co., 83 N. J. Law, 463, that which received the approval of this court 85 Atl. 179. in State V. Wahle, 82 N. J. Law, 184, 82 The assessment and tax brought up by Atl. 300.
this writ are affirmed. The judgment under review will be affirmed.
Wilbur A. Heisley, of Newark, for appellant. John S. Applegate, Jr., of Red Bank,
(85 N. J. L. 377) for the State.
MUPO V. CREW LEVICK CO. PER CURIAM. The judgment under re- (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. view will be affirmed, for the reasons set
Oct. 17, 1913.) forth in the opinion of the Supreme Court. APPEAL AND ERROR (8 1011*)-FINDINGS
The findings by the trial court upon dis(85 N. J. L. 24)
puted facts are conclusive on appeal, when there BOARD OF DOMESTIC MISSIONS OF is any evidence to support them. THE REFORMED CHURCH IN AMER
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and ICA V. EDWARDS, Comptroller.
Error, Cent. Dig. $$ 3983-3989; Dec. Dig. 8
1011.*] (Supreme Court of New Jersey. Nov. 3, 1913.) TAXATION (§ 876*)-COLLATERAL INHERITANCE
Appeal from Supreme Court. Tax-CIARITABLE CORPORATIONS-EXEMP
Action by Dominick Mupo against the Crew TIONS-STATUTES.
Levick Company. A judgment for plaintiff The Supplement of March 15, 1898 (P. L. being affirmed by the Supreme Court, defendp. 106), to the Collateral Inheritance Tax Act of May 15, 1894 (P. L. p. 318), having been ant appeals. Affirmed. superseded by Act May 15, 1906 (P. L. p. 432), The opinion in the Supreme Court was as a bequest to a charitable corporation in a for
follows: eign state was not exempt from payment of the tax.
The action was brought in the district court [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation of the city of New Brunswick to recover damCent. Dig. $$ 1693–1699; Dec. Dig. $ 876.*]
ages for negligently driving and overdriving a
horse of the plaintiff, bailed by him to the Certiorari by the Board of Domestic Mis-defendant for hire. The horse died before the
bailment terminated. sions of the Reformed Church in America, Prosecutor, against Edward I. Edwards, defendant guilty of negligence; "that the de
The court, sitting without a jury, found the Comptroller. Writ denied, and assessment fendant agreed to return the horse in as good confirmed.
a condition as it was when bailed, as an inArgued before GARRISON, TRENCHARD,
ducement to the plaintiff” to make the bail
ment; and that the value of the horse was and MINTURN, JJ.
$200. Judgment accordingly was rendered for Collins & Corbin, of Jersey City, for pros- the plaintiff. The defense is that there was no
. The ecutor. Theodore Backes, of Trenton, and the judge upon the disputed facts are conclusive Edmund Wilson, Atty. Gen., of Red Bank, here, when there is any evidence, as in this for defendant.
case, to support them.
The judgment will be affirmed. GARRISON, J. The prosecutor is incorpo- George S. Silzer, of New Brunswick, for rated under the laws of the state of New appellant. Theodore Strong, of New BrunsYork as a charitable society and as such wick, for respondent.
*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
+ 26 Atl. 804.
PER CURIAM. The judgment under re- now proposed, as the whole includes every part. view is affirmed, for the reasons set forth in Counsel for the prosecutors in his brief does the per curiam opinion filed in the Supreme tion, and I think this reason fails.
not suggest that there was any change or variaCourt.
 The second reason urged also fails, and for substantially the same reasons.
expenditure has already been sanctioned by the (85 N. J. L. 370)
board of school estimate. No increase of cost HOLDEN et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION is involved. OF KEARNY et al.
 It is, however, urged that the board of (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. education has no power to award a contract for
the completion of the building, but can only Oct. 17, 1913.)
contract for building, enlarging, or repairing a 1. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS (8 85*) school house. It would require no great strain
SCHOOLHOUSE - CONSTRUCTION APPROVAL of language to hold that the completion of a OF PLANS.
schoolhouse in an advanced stage of construcWhere plans and specifications for the erec- tion was an enlarging or repairing, but it is tion of a schoolhouse had been approved by the unnecessary to rest on this language. Section state board, the contractor having abandoned 52 (4 Comp. St. 1910, p. 4741), to which referthe work, it was not necessary to secure a ence is made, is not the section giving power to further approval of the plans and specifications the board of education. It is the section requirfor the completion of the unfinished work as ing advertisement before awarding the contract. preliminary to a contract to complete the build- The power is given by section 126, which makes ing without change in the original plans.
it the duty of the school board to provide suit[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Schools and able school facilities, which are to include propSchool Districts, Cent. Dig. § 202; Dec. Dig. er school buildings. I can think of no better § 85.*]
way to do this than to proceed to complete a
building already owned by the board of educa2. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS (8 80*)
tion. As counsel for the defendant forceably arSCHOOLHOUSE CONSTRUCTION EXPENDI
gues, it cannot be that the board cannot comTURE.
plete a building which has been abandoned by Where the total expenditure necessary for the contractor, or which he is unable to finish the construction of a schoolhouse had been by reason of bankruptcy. I cannot accede to sanctioned by the board of school estimate, and the suggestion of counsel for the prosecutor that no increase of cost was involved in a contract this opens the door to the award of a contract to complete the building after the original con- illegally, and the carrying out of that illegal tractor had abandoned it, it was not necessary contracť by a new contract for the finishing of that the board sanction the expenditure of the the work. The question involved here is not amount required to complete the work.
whether the contractor under the illegal con[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Schools and tract can recover for his work, nor whether monSchool Districts, Cent. Dig. $S 191–194; Dec. eys paid under that contract can be recovered. Dig. 80.*]
Here the board of education owns an unfinished 3. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS (S 79*)
schoolhouse on its land. Whether it acquired it SCHOOL BUILDINGS-CONSTRUCTION-POWER legally or illegally, whether it has paid for it or OF BOARD.
not, whether any one is liable to refund money Under School Law (4 Comp. St. 1910, p. already paid therefor or not, it cannot be re4768) § 126, making it the duty of a schooi quired to destroy or remove the existing strucboard to provide suitable school facilities, in- ture, nor can the public be required to suffer cluding proper school buildings, where the con- lent to keeping it as the site of a useless build
the loss of the land as the alternative or equivatractor abandoned a school building unfinished, because of bankruptcy, the board had complete ing. The board may accent the building as it authority to contract with another to finish the stands and complete it. Who shall suffer the building.
pecuniary loss growing out of the fact that the
original contract was illegal is another question [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Schools and that may well be settled in another form of acSchool Districts, Cent. Dig. 88 188-191; Dec. tion. To hold otherwise would put it in the Dig. $ 79.*]
power of a board of education to deprive the Action by Henry Holden and others against public of any beneficial use of public property,
except at the cost of removing the building the Board of Education of Kearny and oth-thereon. ers. From a judgment dismissing a writ of
I think the writ of certiorari should be discertiorari, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
missed, with costs. See, also, 83 N. J. Law, 551, 83 Atl. 954. lants. McCarter & English, of Newark, for
Pierre P. Garven, of Jersey City, for appelThe opinion of Swayze, J., in the Supreme
respondents. Court, is as follows: At the time of the decision of the Court of
PER CURIAM. The judgment under reErrors and Appeals in Kay v. Board of Edu- view is affirmed, for the reasons stated in cation of Kearny, 83 N. J. Law, 551, 83 Atl. 954, the schoolhouse was partially completed. the opinion filed in the Supreme Court by Further work was halted by the judgment of Mr. Justice Swayze. the court. The contract now under review is a contract for the completion of the building.  I think the approval of the plans and spec
(85 N. J. L. 379) ifications for the schoolhouse by the state board MINICHINO V. PUBLIC SERVICE RY. CO. sufficed, and that it was not necessary to secure (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, a further approval of the plans and specifications for the completion of the unfinished work,
Oct. 8, 1913.) as long as no change was made thereby in the RAILROADS ($ 400*)—INJURIES TO PERSONS ON original plans and specifications. It would be TRACK-NEGLIGENCE. mere idle ceremony for the state board to ap- Where the motorman of an interurban car prove once more what they had already approv- saw an object on the track which he thought ed. The approval of the original plans and was a dirty piece of paper, but made no effort specifications must have included the work to bring his car under control so that it could *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes