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spondent moves that the said cause be continued to the next term of the Supreme Judicial Court to be held within and for said county having jurisdiction of the offense alleged."

as amended reads as follows:

"Laws of 1913, chap. 220, sec. 3. The original and appellate jurisdiction in all criminal matters in said counties of Cumberland and Kennebec, and all powers incident thereto, originally exerfore conferred upon and exercised by said supecised by the Supreme Judicial Court, but heretorior courts, are continued."

again changed, providing that a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court be designated to preside at such trials. In 1899, the provision requiring indictments to be certified to this Counsel for the respondent argues: (1) court was restored, and remained in force That it has never been the policy of the state until 1913, when the section providing for to allow a court of limited and inferior juris- certifying and transmitting indictments to diction to determine the rights of a man this court was repealed, and section 90, c. 79, charged with murder. (2) That the respond-R. S., was amended by chapter 220, § 3, and ent was denied the constitutional right to a change of venue; that, if such change were sought and ordered, he would then receive only what the law insures, the right to a trial before a justice of this court. (3) That he is entitled thereto, because "the law of April 11, 1913, attempted to repeal section 2 of chapter 132, R. S., which gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction, must relate back to the time of the shooting, namely, March 20, 1913"; that therefore the amendment in question was not in force on that day; and that, as to his client, such amendment was entirely inoperative in any event until after the expiration of 90 days from the date of its approval. (4) While supporting his exceptions as stated in the foregoing, counsel concludes his brief with this statement:

* *

"We do not undertake to argue upon the unconstitutionality of the law on this question.

"Our contention is not whether the law is ex

post facto, but we claim that the attempt of the state to control the situation as it was March 20, 1913, was futile, and, under the 90 days' provision, of no force or effect. In other words, we say it was not an ex post facto law of which we complain, but 'no law' which could take effect until long after the shooting took place on that fateful day of March 20th near the reservation at Togus, Me.

"And concerning the fifth section of page 12 of the printed case, wherein it is set forth that the respondent declined to plead in the superior court, while a ruling of the superior court may be open to exceptions, we think comment un necessary and depend more fully upon the attempt of the prosecution to keep the case away from a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court in the manner hereinbefore stated."

As to the first objection raised by the respondent's counsel, it is sufficient to say that, when the superior court for Kennebec county was established in 1878 (Laws 187880, c. 10), it had full jurisdiction in criminal cases. At the same session, the act creating that court was amended as follows:

"Sec. 19. When any indictment is found for any of the offences described in sections one and two of chapter 117 of the Revised Statutes, sections two, three, four, five, six, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fifteen, twenty-five and twenty-seven of chapter 118 of the Revised Statutes, sections one, two and three of chapter 119 of the Revised Statutes, the clerk of said superior court shall certify and transmit the indictment to the Supreme Judicial Court for said county, at the next term, when it shall be entered. The Supreme Judicial Court shall have cognizance and jurisdiction thereof, and proceedings shall be had thereon in the same manner as if the indictment had been found in that court." (Laws 1878-80, c. 48.)

[1] Full jurisdiction was restored in 1881, and so continued until 1891, when the provision relating to the trial of murder cases was

The following section was added, and the principal contention in this case arises thereunder:

"Sec. 4. Any indictment for murder returned by the grand jury in said superior court at the April term thereof, in the year nineteen hundred and thirteen, shall be in order for trial at the next September term of said court, which shall have jurisdiction of all matters pertaining thereto."

It is urged in the motion that this provision, "in its attempt to reach the case at bar, is retroactive legislation and ex post facto in its nature." If the point raised related to the crime charged, or to the constitutional rights of the respondent thereunder, our conclusion would not be reached so easily, but the provision in question, directed, as it plainly is, to procedure, and relating entirely to the remedy, and having for its obvious purpose the conduct and disposition of a pending case, is constitutional, and wholly within the legislative power and control, and is not as to this case an ex post facto law, or retroactive in its nature or tendency. Cooley's Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) p. 326; Bishop's Crim. Law, vol. 1, §§ 279, 277, 280, 282, 283; Commonwealth v. Phelps, 210 Mass. 78, 96 N. E. 349, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 567, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1119; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L. Ed. 648; Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 386, 18 Sup. Ct. 922, 43 L. Ed. 204.

The motions were made a part of the exceptions, and the brief made by other counsel follows substantially the remaining points made in the motions. Both urge the right to a change of venue, and say that the right was denied. It does not appear that any reason existed why change of venue should be had, that a fair trial could not be had, or was not in fact had.

[2] The right to a change of venue is not a common-law right. It is created and regulated by statute, and is also a matter of procedure authorized by the Legislature under its sole and plenary power to determine what course shall be pursued in the administration of justice, as well as in all other matters concerning the public good. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 4 Sup. Ct. 202, 28 L. Ed. 262; Gibson v. Miss., 162 U. S. 589, 16 Sup. Ct. 904, 40 L. Ed. 1075; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 351, 18 Sup. Ct. 620, 42 L. Ed. 1061.

[3] The right to have a jury selected from another county or district is not one of the rights within the words and intent of the Constitution prohibiting the passage of ex post facto laws, under article 1, §§ 9 and 10. Chase, J., in the leading case (Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 [1 L. Ed. 648]), stated the laws included thereunder as follows:

"(1) Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action. (2) Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when commit ted. (3) * ** (4) Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. All these and similar laws are manifestly unjust and oppressive, * * but I do not consider any law ex post facto, within the prohibition that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law, but only those that create or aggravate the crime, or increase the punishment, or change the rules of evidence, for the purpose of conviction." Cooley's Const. Lim. (7th Ed.) 373, 374.

[4] It is well settled that a mere change in the Constitution of the trial court, which leaves unchanged all the substantial protections which the law in force at the time of the commission of the alleged offense threw about the accused, is not ex post facto. Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 14 Sup. Ct. 570, 38 L. Ed. 485. Nor is a change in the place of trial. Gut v. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. Ed. 573, quoted and affirmed in Cook v. United States, 138 U. S. 157, 11 Sup. Ct. 268, 34 L. Ed. 906; Cooley's Const. Lim. (7th Ed.) 375, note.

The remaining objection is to the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that the act of April 7, 1913, did not become a law until 90 days after its passage, to wit, July 11, 1913, and that, the crime having been committed on March 20, 1913, the statute which that law was intended to amend in part and repeal in part was itself then in force, and urges that the respondent should have been tried thereunder; the justice presiding to be a justice of this court. We do not so hold. We think the reasons already given are sufficient to justify the ruling of the presiding justice in this as well as in the other claims of the respondent's counsel, and we may add that the practice is uniform, and it is well settled that:

"So far as mere modes of procedure are concerned, a party has no more right, in a criminal than in a civil action, to insist that his case shall be disposed of under the law in force when the act to be investigated is charged to have taken place. Remedies must always be under the control of the Legislature, and it would create endless confusion in legal proceedings if every case was to be conducted only in accordance with the rules of practice, and heard only by the courts in existence when its facts arose. The Legislature may abolish courts and create new ones, and it may prescribe altogether different modes of procedure, in its discretion, though it cannot lawfully, we think, in so doing, dispense with any of those substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime. Cooley's Const. Lim.

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(7th Ed.) 381, and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Phillips, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 32.

The fact that the crime was committed before the passage of the act in question, and that 90 days must elapse before such act has the force of law, does not avail the respondent. He had violated the law. There is no pretense that the law so violated had been changed. The only change effected was in the manner in which he should be tried for that offense against the law. That change was made by the law-making power whose will is paramount and whose right to shape the policy of the state is not to be questioned by the court, nor is the administration thereof to be dictated by the offender. He has no vested right in the matter of procedure. Cooley's Const. Lim. (7th Ed.) p. 381; Cyc. vol. 8, § 1031. The rules and orders provided for the conduct of courts, officials, and community generally are to be observed by all alike as the law, unless they interfere with some substantial right guaranteed by the fundamental law.

A careful examination of the questions involved convinces the court that the respondent was not deprived of the full protection to which he was entitled under existing law. The entry must therefore be: Exceptions overruled.

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COURTS (§ 243*)-CASE CERTIFIED TO SUPREME COURT REMITTING TO SUPERIOR COURT.

A cause certified to the Supreme Court on constitutional questions will, upon motion of defendants, be remitted to the superior court, to permit there a motion to dismiss as to them without prejudice to the rights of others. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Dec. Dig. § 243.*1

Action by William E. Anderson against On motion by Gabriel Salant and others. Gabriel Salant and others to remit the cause, certified on a constitutional question to the Supreme Court, to the superior court, to permit a motion there to dismiss as to the moving defendants. Motion granted.

Fred A. Otis, of Providence, for plaintiff. Irving Champlin, James Harris, and Herbert A. Rice, all of Providence, for defendants. Gardner, Pirce & Thornley, of Providence, for moving defendants, appearing specially for the purposes of this motion, and not otherwise.

PER CURIAM. The motion of Gardner, Pirce & Thornley is hereby granted, and the case is remitted to the superior court, to permit said Gardner, Pirce & Thornley to make a motion in said superior court that said action be dismissed as to Gabriel Salant, Aaron B. Salant, and Solomon J. Wallach without prejudice to the rights of any party properly before the court in said action to

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

have the constitutional question, upon which |2. CRIMINAL LAW ($ 1056*) - APPEAL — INthe action has been certified to this court,

hereafter heard and determined by this court. After hearing and determining said motion to dismiss, said superior court is directed to transmit the papers in said action to this court, for the purpose of enabling

this court to hear and determine said constitutional question upon which said action has been heretofore certified to this court.

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INATION.

Mandamus would not lie to compel the sec. retary of state to certify relators' names as candidates for office on the Progressive party ticket, where the testimony did not show that relators had been duly selected as candidates for such offices by any legally constituted body representing the electors of that party qualified to vote for candidates for such offices.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mandamus, Cent. Dig. § 37; Dec. Dig. § 10.*]

Petitions for writs of mandamus by Walter G. Hartford and others, by Harry L. Saunders and others, and by William F. Tripp and others against J. Fred Parker, Secretary of State, to compel defendant to certify relators' names as candidates for office on the Progressive party ticket.. Writs denied.

Greenough, Easton & Cross, of Providence (William B. Greenough, of Providence, of counsel), for petitioners. Herbert A. Rice, Atty. Gen., for respondent. Lewis A. Waterman, of Providence, for certain interested parties.

STRUCTIONS-NECESSITY OF EXCEPTIONS. court's charge cannot be considered on appeal, Assignments of error with reference to the where no exception was taken to the instructions at the trial.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2663, 2670; 1056.*]

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Criminal Dec. Dig. §

John H. Morgan was convicted of criminal assault, and appealed to the Supreme Court, where the judgment was affirmed, from which judgment he again appeals. Affirmed.

The opinion of the Supreme Court is as follows:

[1] This case is argued by counsel for the plaintiff in error as if it was before us for review under the provisions of section 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act (2 Comp. St. 1910, p. 1863). This, however, is not the fact, for the record of the proceedings had upon the trial of the cause has not been certified to us by the

trial court.

The questions argued by counsel are none of them raised by any bill of exceptions. The testimony of Helen Brown, showing that she was present with Louisa Carey at the time of the alleged criminal assault upon the latter, and that on the same occasion the defendant committed an assault upon her (the timony of these two girls, that on an earlier ocwitness), was not objected to; nor was the tescasion the defendant committed a similar as

sault upon them, objected to.

[2] The criticism upon the charge of the court raised by the second assignment of error is not based upon any exception, for no exception, either general or special, was taken to the instruction to the jury.

The judgment under review will be affirmed,

Frank H. Sommer, of Newark, for appellant. Louis Hood, of Newark, for the State.

PER CURIAM. The judgment under review will be affirmed, for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

(85 N. J. L. 389)

STATE v. SICILIANO.

Nov. 17, 1913.)

PER CURIAM. It does not appear from the testimony presented at the hearing that the persons alleged to have been nominated (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. for the respective offices set forth in said petitions were duly selected as candidates for said offices by any legally constituted body representing the electors of the Progressive party qualified to vote for said candidates for said offices.

1. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 1149*)-INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION (§ 136*)-MOTION TO QUASH

INDICTMENT-MATTERS REVIEWABLE.

A motion to quash an indictment is addressed to the discretion of the court, and is

The said petitions are therefore denied and not reviewable on strict writ of error. dismissed.

(85 N. J. L. 387)

STATE V. MORGAN.

(Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. Nov. 17, 1913.)

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3039-3043, 3058; Dec. Dig. § 1149;* Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 470, 471; Dec. Dig. § 136.*]

2. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION (§ 125*)— DUPLICITY.

An indictment charging the crime of keeping a disorderly house, in that defendant ha1. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 1036*)-APPEAL-RUL-bitually sold, or permitted to be sold, intoxicatINGS ON EVIDENCE OBJECTIONS AT TRIAL. Rulings on evidence cannot be reviewed on appeal, where no objection was made at the trial.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1631-1640, 2639-2641; Dec. Dig. & 1036.*]

ing liquors on his premises contrary to law, drawn in conformity with Criminal Procedure Act (P. L. 1898, p. 894) 8 74, was not bad for duplicity.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 334-400; Dec. Dig. 125.*]

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Gavino Siciliano was convicted of keeping a disorderly house by permitting the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors. From a judgment of the Supreme Court, affirming the conviction, he appeals. Affirmed.

The opinion in the Supreme Court was as follows:

The plaintiff in error was found guilty upon an indictment charging him with the crime of keeping a disorderly house, the disorder consisting solely in the habitual selling, or permitting to be sold, on his premises, intoxicating liquor contrary to law. There was a motion to quash the indictment on the ground of duplicity. The motion was refused, and the sole error assigned is based upon this refusal.

In

[1, 2] The judgment should be affirmed. the first place, a motion to quash an indictment is addressed to the discretion of the court, and is not reviewable on strict writ of error. State v. Hageman, 13 N. J. Law, 314: Proctor v. State, 55 N. J. Law, 472.† In the second place, the assertion that the indictment is faulty for duplicity is not justified by the fact. It is drawn in conformity with the seventy-fourth section of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1898

(P. L. 1898, p. 894), and is similar in form to that which received the approval of this court in State v. Wahle, 82 N. J. Law, 184, 82 Atl. 300.

The judgment under review will be affirmed. Wilbur A. Heisley, of Newark, for appellant. John S. Applegate, Jr., of Red Bank, for the State.

PER CURIAM. The judgment under review will be affirmed, for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

(85 N. J. L. 24)

BOARD OF DOMESTIC MISSIONS OF
THE REFORMED CHURCH IN AMER-
ICA v. EDWARDS, Comptroller.
(Supreme Court of New Jersey. Nov. 3, 1913.)
TAXATION (§ 876*)-COLLATERAL INHERITANCE
TAX-CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS-EXEMP-
TIONS-STATUTES.

The Supplement of March 15, 1898 (P. L. p. 106), to the Collateral Inheritance Tax Act of May 15, 1894 (P. L. p. 318), having been superseded by Act May 15, 1906 (P. L. p. 432), a bequest to a charitable corporation in a foreign state was not exempt from payment of the tax.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1693-1699; Dec. Dig. § 876.*] Certiorari by the Board of Domestic Missions of the Reformed Church in America, Prosecutor, against Edward I. Edwards, Comptroller. Writ denied, and assessment confirmed.

claims exemption from the payment of collateral inheritance taxes as legatee and devisee under the will of Susan Van Neste, who died in this state on February 28, 1912, and whose will was admitted to probate in the county of Middlesex.

This claim is based upon the supplement to the Collateral Inheritance Tax Act of 1894

(P. L. 318) approved March 15, 1898 (Pamph. L. p. 106), which, if still in force, entitles the prosecutor to the exemption claimed by it.

Court in the case of In re Estate of Gopsill, This question was before the Prerogative 77 N. J. Eq. 215, 77 Atl. 793, in which Vice Ordinary Walker (now Chancellor) held that since the passage of the amendment to the Collateral Inheritance Tax Act of 1906 (at page 432) the supplemental act of 1898 was no longer in force. We agree with the vice ordinary that the act of 1898 has been eliminated, not by its repeal, but by its being superseded by later legislation covering the subject-matter. Eldridge v. Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Co., 83 N. J. Law, 463, 85 Atl. 179.

The assessment and tax brought up by this writ are affirmed.

(85 N. J. L. 377) MUPO v. CREW LEVICK CO. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. Oct. 17, 1913.)

APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1011*)-FINDINGSCONCLUSIVENESS.

The findings by the trial court upon disputed facts are conclusive on appeal, when there is any evidence to support them.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3983-3989; Dec. Dig. § 1011.*]

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Action by Dominick Mupo against the Crew Levick Company. A judgment for plaintiff being affirmed by the Supreme Court, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The opinion in the Supreme Court was as follows:

The action was brought in the district court of the city of New Brunswick to recover damages for negligently driving and overdriving a horse of the plaintiff, bailed by him to the defendant for hire. The horse died before the

bailment terminated.

The court, sitting without a jury, found the defendant guilty of negligence; "that the defendant agreed to return the horse in as good a condition as it was when bailed, as an inducement to the plaintiff" to make the bail

Argued before GARRISON, TRENCHARD, ment; and that the value of the horse was and MINTURN, JJ.

Collins & Corbin, of Jersey City, for prosecutor. Theodore Backes, of Trenton, and Edmund Wilson, Atty. Gen., of Red Bank, for defendant.

GARRISON, J. The prosecutor is incorporated under the laws of the state of New

$200. Judgment accordingly was rendered for proof of misuse of the horse. The findings of the plaintiff. The defense is that there was no the judge upon the disputed facts are conclusive here, when there is any evidence, as in this case, to support them.

The judgment will be affirmed.

George S. Silzer, of New Brunswick, for appellant. Theodore Strong, of New BrunsYork as a charitable society and as such wick, for respondent.

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

† 26 Atl. 804.

PER CURIAM. The judgment under re- I now proposed, as the whole includes every part. view is affirmed, for the reasons set forth in Counsel for the prosecutors in his brief does the per curiam opinion filed in the Supreme tion, and I think this reason fails. not suggest that there was any change or varia

Court.

(85 N. J. L. 370)

HOLDEN et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
OF KEARNY et al.

(Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

[2] The second reason urged also fails, and for substantially the same reasons. The total expenditure has already been sanctioned by the board of school estimate. No increase of cost is involved.

[3] It is, however, urged that the board of education has no power to award a contract for the completion of the building, but can only Oct. 17, 1913.) contract for building, enlarging, or repairing a 1. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS (§ 85*) school house. It would require no great strain SCHOOLHOUSE-CONSTRUCTION-APPROVAL of language to hold that the completion of a

OF PLANS.

2. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS (§ 80*) SCHOOLHOUSE CONSTRUCTION - EXPENDI

TURE.

Where the total expenditure necessary for the construction of a schoolhouse had been sanctioned by the board of school estimate, and no increase of cost was involved in a contract to complete the building after the original contractor had abandoned it, it was not necessary that the board sanction the expenditure of the amount required to complete the work.

schoolhouse in an advanced stage of construcWhere plans and specifications for the erec- tion was an enlarging or repairing, but it is tion of a schoolhouse had been approved by the unnecessary to rest on this language. Section state board, the contractor having abandoned 52 (4 Comp. St. 1910, p. 4741), to which referthe work, it was not necessary to secure a ence is made, is not the section giving power to further approval of the plans and specifications the board of education. It is the section requirfor the completion of the unfinished work asing advertisement before awarding the contract. preliminary to a contract to complete the build- The power is given by section 126, which makes ing without change in the original plans. it the duty of the school board to provide suit[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Schools and able school facilities, which are to include propI can think of no better School Districts, Cent. Dig. § 202; Dec. Dig. er school buildings. § 85.*] way to do this than to proceed to complete a building already owned by the board of education. As counsel for the defendant forceably argues, it cannot be that the board cannot complete a building which has been abandoned by the contractor, or which he is unable to finish by reason of bankruptcy. I cannot accede to the suggestion of counsel for the prosecutor that this opens the door to the award of a contract illegally, and the carrying out of that illegal contract by a new contract for the finishing of the work. The question involved here is not whether the contractor under the illegal contract can recover for his work, nor whether moneys paid under that contract can be recovered. Here the board of education owns an unfinished schoolhouse on its land. Whether it acquired it legally or illegally, whether it has paid for it or not, whether any one is liable to refund money already paid therefor or not, it cannot be required to destroy or remove the existing structhe loss of the land as the alternative or equivature, nor can the public be required to suffer lent to keeping it as the site of a useless buildstands and complete it. Who shall suffer the ing. The board may accent the building as it pecuniary loss growing out of the fact that the original contract was illegal is another question that may well be settled in another form of action. To hold otherwise would put it in the power of a board of education to deprive the public of any beneficial use of public property, except at the cost of removing the building thereon.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. §§ 191-194; Dec. Dig. 80.*]

3. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS (§ 79*) — SCHOOL BUILDINGS-CONSTRUCTION-POWER OF BOARD.

Under School Law (4 Comp. St. 1910, p. 4768) $ 126, making it the duty of a school board to provide suitable school facilities, including proper school buildings, where the con-lent tractor abandoned a school building unfinished, because of bankruptcy, the board had complete authority to contract with another to finish the building.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. §§ 188-191; Dec. Dig. 79.*]

Action by Henry Holden and others against the Board of Education of Kearny and others. From a judgment dismissing a writ of certiorari, plaintiff's appeal. Affirmed.

See, also, 83 N. J. Law, 551, 83 Atl. 954. The opinion of Swayze, J., in the Supreme Court, is as follows:

At the time of the decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals in Kay v. Board of Education of Kearny, 83 N. J. Law, 551, 83 Atl. 954, the schoolhouse was partially completed. Further work was halted by the judgment of the court. The contract now under review is a contract for the completion of the building.

[I] I think the approval of the plans and specifications for the schoolhouse by the state board sufficed, and that it was not necessary to secure a further approval of the plans and specifications for the completion of the unfinished work, as long as no change was made thereby in the original plans and specifications. It would be mere idle ceremony for the state board to approve once more what they had already approved. The approval of the original plans and specifications must have included the work

I think the writ of certiorari should be dismissed, with costs.

lants. McCarter & English, of Newark, for Pierre P. Garven, of Jersey City, for appelrespondents.

PER CURIAM. The judgment under review is affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion filed in the Supreme Court by Mr. Justice Swayze.

(85 N. J. L. 379) MINICHINO v. PUBLIC SERVICE RY. CO. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, Oct. 8, 1913.)

RAILROADS (§ 400*)-INJURIES TO PERSONS ON
TRACK-NEGLIGENCE.

Where the motorman of an interurban car saw an object on the track which he thought was a dirty piece of paper, but made no effort to bring his car under control so that it could

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

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