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The answer is a solid one. An official oath ought to be confined to the duties of the office. It is not so broad and comprehensive as a general oath of allegiance and fidelity, which embraces all the duties of a citizen or subject. An officer, appointed under the authority of the United States, is to perform only those duties which emanate from it; his obligation is limited by that authority, which, as repeatedly heretofore observed, is not controlled by the constitutions of the several states. An officer appointed under the authority of a state, is bound to support its constitution, but so far as the constitution of the United States in any respect supersedes it, another rule of obligation arises, which he is equally bound to comply with; and, as it is essential to the true interests of the states, that the powers granted to the general government should be effectuated, all their officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, should expressly undertake to do so.
The remarks on this subject may be concluded by drawing the attention of the reader to the liberal alternative of an oath or affirmation. No religious test, it is declared in the same sentence, shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States. Not only a pumerous and respectable sect, but many other persons not of the people called Quakers, feel an invincible repugnance to taking an oath in any form. If the term affirmation had been omitted, all such persons' would have been excluded from public trusts on account of religious opinion. The abstract declaration of perfect equality in matters of religion is thus realized.
Of some arduous parts of the President's duties.
ON a full view of the powers and duties of the president, the reader will probably perceive that they are of more importance in respect to foreign relations than the internal administration of government.
At home, his path though dignified, is narrow. In the tranquillity which we have hitherto in time of peace enjoyed, little more has been requisite, in either his legislative or executive functions than regularly to pursue the plain mandates of laws, and the certain text of the constitution.
In his legislative capacity; the power of objecting to acts of congress, has been fairly exercised, and respectfully submitted to. In the executive department he has had indeed two insurrections to cope with, one of which was inconsiderable, and the other, though more extensive, disappeared before the mere display of the force collected to subdue it. The transaction itself afforded a valuable proof of the patriotism of the people, and their attachment to the constitution. The regular militia of three adjoining states, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, cheerfully co-operated with that of Pennsylvania, in which the opposition existed, and the governor of Pennsylvania as a military officer, obeyed the orders of the governor of Virginia, on whom the president conferred the chief command. A great proportion of this force consisted of volunteers; numbers of whom were men of considerable property, and civil eminence, and the governors of the states we
bave mentioned, except that of Maryland, who was prevented by particular circumstances, voluntarily took the field.
If the pages of our history are soiled in any degree by transient resistance to the laws of the Union, the disgrace is redeemed by the proof of that wisdom, by which the general constitution now appeared to bave been framed, and that determination to support it, by which the majority were actuated. And should instances of insurrection again occur, either against the laws of the Union, or the government of any particular state, it cannot be doubted that the same general and noble animation would be again displayed in support of the great political ark of our safety and happiness.
But it is in respect to external relations; to transactions with foreign nations, and the events arising from them, that the president has an arduous task. Here he must chiefly act on his own independent judgment. The constitution authorizes him indeed to require the opinions of the principal officers in the executive departments, but however useful those opinions may be, they would afford no sanction for any errors he might commit. And although if required, they are to be given in writing, they would involve the officers in no responsibility
In respect to treaties, it is only after they have received the approbation of the senate, that his responsi. bility is diminished by being divided. But he is not obliged to submit the inchoate treaty to them. His instructions to the minister who negociated it may have been misunderstood, or wilfully disregarded; the national interests may have been plainly neglected, and it may be altogether such a compact as he would not ratify if he stood alone. Under such circumstances, it would be a timorous policy to endeavour to fortify his own disapprobation by obtaining the concurrence of the senate. And if he should continue to disapprove it, although it met their approbation, he would not be justified in giving it his further sanction. For by the express words of the constitution, he in concurrence with the senate, and not the senate alone, is to make treaties. In case of an impeachment, it would be no valid defence for him to allege that he submitted his own opinion to that of the senate. If indeed the case was at first of a doubtful nature, if he conscientiously desired the deliberate assistance of the senate, and if an honest conviction was produced in his own mind by the advice he received from them, his compliance with it would be personally honourable to him, and clearly consistent with the constitution.
' The power of receiving foreign ambassadors, carries with it among other things, the right of judging in the case of a revolution in a foreign country, whether the new rulers ought to be recognised. The legislature indeed possesses a superior power, and may declare its dissent from the executive recognition or refusal, but until their sense is declared, the act of the executive is binding. The judicial power can take no notice of a new government, till one or the other of those two departments has acted on it. (87) Circumstances may render the decision of great importance to the interests and peace of the country. A precipitate acknowledg- . ment of the independence of part of a foreign nation, separating itself from its former head, may provoke the resentment of the latter: a refusal to do so, may disgust the former, and prevent the attainment of amity and commerce with them if they succeed. The principles on which the separation takes place must also be
(87) 3 Wheaton, 643. The same rule prevails in England.
taken into consideration, and if they are conformable to those which led to our own independence, and appear likely to be preserved, a strong impulse will arise in favour of a recognition; because it may be for our national interest, which the president is bound preeminently to consult, to promote the dissemination and establishment, at least in our own neighbourhood, of those principles which form the strongest foundations of good government. But the most accurate and authentic information should be procured of the actual state and prospect of success of such newly erected states, for it would not be justifiable in the president to involve the country in difficulties, merely in support of an ahsolute principle, if there was not a reasonable prospect of perseverance and success on the part of those wbo bave embarked in the enterprize. The caution of President Monroe in sending commissioners to South America for the purpose of making inquiries on the spot, in preference to a reliance on vague rumours and partial representations, was highly commendable. The power of congress on this subject cannot be controlled; they may, if they think proper, acknowledge a small and helpless community, though with a certainty of drawing a war upon our country; but greater circumspection is required from the president, who, not having the constitutional power to declare war, ought ever to abstain from a measure likely to produce it.
Among other incidents arising from foreign relations, it may be noticed that congress, which cannot conveniently be always in session, may devolve on the president duties that at first view, seem to belong only to themselves. It has been decided, that a power given to the president to revive an act relating to foreign intercourse, when certain measures, having a described effect should take place on the part of two foreign na