for weighty public reasons, receive their original or final determination in the courts of the Union. To confine, therefore, the general expressions which give appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, to appeals from the subordinate federal courts, instead of allow ing their extension to the state courts, would be to abridge the latitude of the terms, in subversion of the intent, contrary to every sound rule of interpretation.'

"A contemporaneous exposition of the constitution, certainly of not less authority than that which has been just cited, is the judiciary act itself. We know that in the congress which passed that act were many eminent members of the convention which formed the constitution. Not a single individual so far as is known, supposed that part of the act which gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over the judgments of the state courts in the cases therein specified, to be unauthorized by the constitution.

"While on this part of the argument, it may be also material to observe, that the uniform decisions of this court on the point now under consideration, have been assented to, with a single exception, (120) by the courts of every state in the Union, whose judgments have been revised. It has been the unwelcome duty of this tribunal to reverse the judgments of many state courts in cases in which the strongest state feelings were engaged. Judges, whose talents and character would grace any bench; to whom a disposition to submit to jurisdiction that is usurped, or to surrender their legitimate powers, will certainly not be imputed, have yield

(120) Supposed to be the case of Hunter's lessee v. Martin, of which the particulars may be seen in 7 Cranch, 604, and 1 Wheaton, 304. The ultimate acquiescence of the state tribunal restored the harmony of the general system. We are all fellowcitizens, and all have but one interest.

ed without hesitation to the authority by which their judgments were reversed, while they perhaps disapproved the judgment of reversal.

"This concurrence of statesmen, of legislators, and of judges, in the same construction of the constitution, may justly inspire some confidence in that construction." (121)

In this case, as may have been perceived from the course of reasoning, the appellate jurisdiction was exercised over a state court. In 1824, the consideration of the same question was again thrown on the Supreme Court, on an appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Ohio, in an equity case.

In the extract we shall also give of the decision pronounced by the chief justice in this case, we shall perceive some further important principles laid down which will be found serviceable in a future view of the

powers of the United States courts that will be presented to the reader, at the same time we must not be understood to have a design to apply arguments, evidently intended only for cases of a civil nature, further than fair reasoning will justify.

"In support of the clause, in the act incorporating the subscribers to the Bank of the United States, it is said that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, of every well constructed government, are co-extensive with each other. That is, they are potentially co-ex-. tensive. The executive department may constitutionally execute every law which the legislature may constitutionally make, and the judicial department may receive from the legislature the power of construing every such law. All governments which are not extremely defective in their organization, must possess within

(121) 6 Wheaton, 413. Cohens v. Virginia.

themselves the means of expounding as well as enforcing their own laws. If we examine the constitution of the United States, we find that its framers kept this political principle in view. The second article vests the whole executive power in the president, and the third declares, that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority.'

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"This clause enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, when any question respecting them shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it. That power is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law. It then becomes a case,' and the constitution declares that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.'

"The suit of the Bank of the United States v. Osborne and others, is a case,' and the question is, whether it arises under a law of the United States?

"The appellants contend that it does not, because several questions may arise in it, which depend on the general principles of the law, not on any act of congress.

"If this were sufficient to withdraw a case from the jurisdiction of the federal courts, almost every case, although involving the construction of a law, would be withdrawn; and a clause in the constitution relating to a subject of vital importance to the government, and expressed in the most comprehensive terms, would be construed to mean almost nothing. There is scarcely any case, every part of which depends on the consti

tution, laws, or treaties of the United States. The questions whether the fact alleged as the foundation of the action be real or fictitious; whether the conduct of the plaintiff has been such as to entitle him to maintain his action; whether his right is barred; whether he has received satisfaction, or has in any manner released his claims-are questions, some or all of which may occur in almost every case; and if their existence be sufficient to arrest the jurisdiction of the court, words which seem intended to be as extensive as the constitution, laws, and treaties of the Unionwhich seem designed to give the courts of the government, the construction of all its acts, so far as they affect the rights of individuals, would be reduced to almost nothing.

"In those cases in which original jurisdiction is given to the Supreme Court, the judicial power of the United States cannot be exercised in its appellate form. In every other case, the power is to be exercised in its original or appellate form, or both, as the wisdom of congress may direct. With the exception of these cases, in which original jurisdiction is given to this court, there is none to which the judicial power extends, from which the original jurisdiction of the inferior courts is excluded by the constitution. Origi nal jurisdiction, so far as the constitution gives a rule, is co-extensive with the judicial power. We find in the constitution, no prohibition to its exercise, in every case in which the judicial power can be exercised. It would be a very bold construction to say that this power could be applied in its appellate form only, to the most important class of cases to which it is applicable.

"The constitution establishes the Supreme Court, and defines its jurisdiction. It enumerates cases in

which its jurisdiction is original and exclusive; and then defines that which is appellate, but does not insinuate that in any such case the power cannot be exercised in its original form by courts of original jurisdiction. It is not insinuated that the judicial power, in cases depending on the character of the cause, cannot be exercised in the first instance, in the courts of the Union, but must first be exercised in the tribunals of the state; tribunals over which the government of the Union has no adequate control, and which may be closed to any claim asserted under a law of the United States.

"We perceive, then, no ground on which the proposition can be maintained, that congress is incapable of giving the circuit courts original jurisdiction in any case to which the appellate jurisdiction extends.

"We ask, then, if it can be sufficient to exclude this jurisdiction, that the case involves questions depending on general principles? A cause may depend on several questions of fact and law. Some of them may depend on the construction of a law of the United States; others on principles unconnected with that law. If it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title or right set up by the party, may be defeated by one construction of the constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite construction, provided the facts necessary to support the action be made out; then all the other questions must be decided as incidental to this, which gives that jurisdiction. Those other questions cannot arrest the proceedings. Under this construction, the judicial power of the Union extends effectively and beneficially to that most important class of cases, which depend on the character of the cause. On the opposite construction, the judicial power never can be extended to a whole