The wise utterances of President Grant in his memorable message of December 7, 1875, are signally relevant to the present situation in Cuba, and it may be wholesome now to recall them. At that time a ruinous conflict had for seven years wasted the neighboring island. During all those years an utter disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and of the just demands of humanity, which called forth expressions of condemnation from the nations of Christendom, continued unabated. Desolation and ruin pervaded that productive region, enormously affecting the commerce of all commercial nations, but that of the United States more than any other by reason of proximity and larger trade and intercourse. At that juncture General Grant uttered these words, which now, as then, sum up the elements of the problem: * * * a "Turning to the practical aspects of a recognition of belligerency and reviewing its inconveniences and positive dangers, still further pertinent considerations appear. In the code of nations there is no such thing as a naked recognition of belligerency unaccompanied by the assumption of international neutrality. Such recognition without more will not confer upon either party to a domestic conflict a status not theretofore actually possessed or affect the relation of either party to other states. The act of recognition usually takes the form of a solemn proclamation of neutrality which recites the de facto condition of belligerency as its motive. It announces a domestic law of neutrality' in the declaring state. It assumes the international obligations of a neutral in the presence of a public state of war. It warns all citizens and others within the jurisdiction of the proclaimant that they violate those rigorous obligations at their own peril and can not expect to be shielded from the consequences. The right of visit and search on the seas and seizure of vessels and cargoes and contraband of war and good prize under admiralty law must under international law be admitted as a legitimate consequence of a proclamation of belligerency. While according the equal belligerent rights defined by public law to each party in our ports disfavors would be imposed on both, which while nominally equal would weigh heavily in behalf of Spain herself. Possessing a navy and controlling the ports of Cuba her maritime rights could be asserted not only for the military investment of the Island but up to the margin of our own territorial waters, and a condition of things would exist for which the Cubans within their own domain could not hope to create a parallel; while its creation through aid or sympathy from within our domain would be even more impossible than now, with the additional obligations of international neutrality we would perforce assume. a Here follows the passage given above, pp. 196-197. "The enforcement of this enlarged and onerous code of neutrality would only be influential within our own jurisdiction by land and sea and applicable by our own instrumentalities. It could impart to the United States no jurisdiction between Spain and the insurgents. It would give the United States no right of intervention to enforce the conduct of the strife within the paramount authority of Spain according to the international code of war. "For these reasons I regard the recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents as now unwise and therefore inadmissible. Should that step hereafter be deemed wise as a measure of right and duty the Executive will take it." President McKinley, Annual Message, Dec. 6, 1897. Referring to the foregoing passage, President McKinley, in his special message to Congress, April 11, 1898, on the relations of the United States to Spain by reason of the warfare in Cuba, said: "Nothing has since occurred to change my views in this regard; and I recognize as fully now as then that the issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by which process the so-called recognition of belligerents is published, could, of itself and unattended by other action, accomplish nothing toward the one end for which we labor-the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicts the island." (H. Doc. 405, 55 Cong. 2 sess. 8.) 10. COLOMBIA. § 68. "A 'state of war' has not in a formal sense, either before or after the 20th of April last, been recognized by the GovernInsurrection, 1885. ment of the United States as existing in the United States of Colombia, nor have the insurgents now in arms against the latter Government been recognized by the Government of the United States as belligerents, nor, so far as the Government of the United States is advised, have the insurgents in question been recognized by the United States of Colombia as belligerents." Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Garland, Attorney-General, July 1, 1885, 156 MS. Dom. Let. 151. This letter relates to the insurrection in Colombia, which formed a subject of discussion in the case of the Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. Rep. 443. In that case the court held that the Secretary of State of the United States had given an "implied recognition" of the belligerency of the insurgents in a note addressed to the Colombian minister at Washington, April 24, 1885. A criticism of the decision of the court may be found in 33 Albany Law Journal, Feb. 13, 1886, p. 125. With reference to the insurrection prevailing in Colombia in 1900, Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, advised the Colombian minister at Washington, August 1, 1900, that the United States had not at any time considered the status of the insurgents such as to require an examination of any possible claim on their part to belligerent rights. (For. Rel. 1900, 405.) 11. HAYTI. Factional contest, 1889. § 69. "On the 18th day of February, 1889, neither of the parties claiming ascendency in Hayti was recognized as a belligerent. Belligerent recognition is usually effected by the President's proclamation of neutrality as between two hostile parties, and no such proclamation has been made in respect of the existing troubles in Hayti. "No formal recognition of either of the Haytian factions as a Government by the Government of the United States had been made subsequent to the downfall of President Salomon and prior to the 18th of February 1889. De facto relations with the authorities in possession of power at Port au Prince have been kept up through the United States minister at Port au Prince and through the representative of General Legitime's Government in the United States for the necessary transaction of business." Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to the Attorney-General, Mar. 18, 1889, 172 MS. This was in response to an inquiry of the Attorney-General, made in connec- tary of State, March 16, 1889, MSS. Dept. of State.) "Various documents issued from the Department of State have been put in evidence, containing certain expressions which Requisite evidences the court is invited to examine in order to find therein of recognition. an implied recognition of the faction of Legitime as representing the Government of Hayti. I do not think that in a case like this the court is required to deal with uncertain implications contained in such documents as have been here presented. The fact of public recognition of any prince, state, colony, district, or people as a belligerent is one to be made known to all men by public proclamation from the Executive or some public act by necessary implication equiyalent to such a proclamation." Benedict, J., The Conserva, 38 Fed. Rep. 431, 437 13. BRAZIL. $ 70. At the beginning of September, 1893, a Brazilian squadron, consisting of the warships Aquidaban, Jupiter, and Republica, and a number of merchant vessels which had been seized, revolted under the command of Admiral José Custodio de Mello, Naval revolt, 1893. and assumed control of the waters of the inner harbor of Rio de Janeiro. The Government retained Fort Santa Cruz, which commands the entrance to the harbor, and held the shore line of the inner harbor, with artillery, infantry, and police forces. The army remained loyal, and the government was supported by the Congress.a representatives. From time to time firing took place between the loyal forts and the squadron. On October 1, however, the commanders Action of foreign of the English, Italian, American, Portuguese, and French naval forces at Rio de Janeiro, acting upon the concurrent advice of their diplomatic representatives, notified Admiral de Mello, who had threatened to bombard the city, that they would if necessary use force to prevent it; and the ministers at the same time requested the Government to avoid doing anything to afford a pretext for hostile action against the city." Mr. Thompson, United States minister at Rio de Janeiro, published a notice to American citizens that "lighters, launches, sloops, barges, and all other means of navigation used in embarking or disembarking passengers or in loading or unloading freight, should carry the flag of the United States of America at the prow in order that their traffic may be performed safely and under the protection of American war vessels." c nition; refusal. October 23 Admiral de Mello wrote Mr. Thompson, from on board the Aquidaban, that the insurgents had set up a proDemand for recog-visional government at Desterro, which is on the island of Santa Catharina and the capital of the State of that name, and asked that they be recognized as belligerents. Mr. Thompson was instructed that such recognition would be an unfriendly act toward Brazil, and a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion, the insurgents having not, apparently, up to date established and maintained a political organization which would justify such recognition on the part of the United States." He was instructed "to observe, until further advised, the attitude of an indifferent spectator. Subsequently Mr. Thompson was instructed: "There having been no recognition by United States of the insurgents as belligerents, and there being no pretense that the port. of Rio is blockaded, it is clear that if an American ship anchored in the harbor employs barges and lighters in transferring her cargo to the shore in the usual way and in so doing does not cross or otherwise interfere with Mello's line of fire and he seizes or attempts to seize the barges or lighters, he can and should be resisted. You Limitation of insurgent operations. a For. Rel. 1893, 45-46. For. Rel. 1893, 51-52, 56, 66–68 e For. Rel. 1893, 53. d Telegram, Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Thompson, Oct. 25, 1893, For. Rel. 1893, 63. will deliver or send a copy of this instruction to the commander of the insurgents." a "While our Government recognizes the existence of war between Brazil and the insurgents, it does not accord to the latter belligerent rights. It is not claimed that the harbor at Rio is blockaded, and your right to transfer merchandise from an American or other neutral ship anchored there, to the shore, is clear, provided in doing so you do not cross the line of fire or otherwise interfere with the military operations of the insurgents. Barges and lighters thus employed will doubtless be protected by our naval forces there should Mello attempt to seize them." (Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Messrs. Lanman & Kemp, Nov. 2, 1893, 194 MS. Dom. Let. 174.) November 6, 1893, the commanders of the German, English, French, Portuguese, American, and Italian naval forces communicated to Admiral de Mello the following decision: "1. They do not recognize the right of the insurgent forces to interfere in any way with commercial operations in the bay of Rio de Janeiro, operations which should be allowed to be accomplished everywhere except in the actual lines of fire of the batteries of the land fortifications. "In consequence they have decided to protect merchandise, not only on board their countries' vessels or those that put themselves under their flag, but also on lighters, barges, and other means of maritime transport, whatever may be the nationality to which they belong, provided they be employed by these same ships in commercial operations. 2. In order to avoid all disputes, these means of transportation or their tugs shall carry at their prow the flag of the country under whose protection they may be. "3. The commanders of the foreign naval forces strongly hope that these measures will put an end to unfortunate incidents that they would find it necessary to repress." Action of Admiral December 1, 1893, de Mello left Rio de Janeiro on the Aquidaban, and about the 12th of the same month the command of the remaining ships of the squadron was assumed by Admiral Saldanha da Gama, who, besides intimating an intention to bombard the city, announced that he would endeavor to prevent the passage of goods to the custom house or to the shore. Although the "decision" of the 6th of November was not withdrawn, it seems that for some time da Gama was permitted to interfere with the landing of merchandise. On the 29th of January, 1894, however, Admiral Benham, who had lately taken command of the United States naval forces, gave notice of his intention to protect all American ships proceeding to or discharging at the docks, and caused an insurgent a Telegram, Mr. Gresham, Sec. of State, to Mr. Thompson, Nov. 1, 1893, For. Rel.. 1893, 64. For. Rel. 1893, 95-96. c For. Rel. 1893, 121-122. |