Sea nor in its other bordering waters, an extent of jurisdiction greater than a marine league from its shores, but bases its claims to such jurisdiction upon the following principle: "The Government of the United States claims and admits the jurisdiction of any state over its territorial waters only to the extent of a marine league unless a different rule is fixed by treaty between two states; even then the treaty states are alone affected by the agreement." The arbitrator, after observing that there existed between the United States and Russia at the time of the seizure no convention regulating the taking of fur seals in such manner as to affect the ordinary rules of jurisdiction under the law of nations, declared that, whether the seizure took place 20 or only 11 miles from land, it was made outside Russian territorial waters; that the contention that a ship of war might pursue outside territorial waters a vessel whose crew had committed an unlawful act in the territorial waters or on the territory of the state, was not in conformity with the law of nations, since the jurisdiction of the state could not be extended beyond the territorial sea, unless by express convention; and that it was therefore unnecessary to consider the alleged grounds for inferring that the vessel had been guilty of the illegal hunting of seals in the territorial waters or on the territory of Russia. An award was made in favor of the claimants for $28,588, with interest at 6 per cent. In the case of the schooner C. H. White, it was admitted on the part of Russia that the seizure took place about 23 miles from the Russian coast, but was alleged, as in the preceding case, that it was to be inferred from a series of circumstances that the vessel had been guilty of hunting seals illegally in Russian territorial waters. The arbitrator, applying the same principles as in the case of the James Hamilton Lewis, awarded $32,444, with interest at six per cent per annum. August 12, 1892, the American schooner Kate and Anna, when on the high seas about 30 miles from the nearest Russian land, was brought to by a Russian cruiser, whose commander, after requiring the master of the schooner to bring his papers on board for examination, ordered 124 sealskins which were then on the schooner to be delivered up and declared them to be confiscated, on the assumption that the master had been sealing in Russian territorial waters. The Russian Government, in view of the lack of " positive proofs " of the master's guilt, and as evidence of a desire to maintain the most friendly relations with the American Government, admitted its obligation to make indemnity for the loss, to the amount of $1.240 (124 skins at $10), with interest at 6 per cent from August 12, 1902. The arbitrator awarded $1,488 (124 skins at $12), with interest. H. Doc. 551-59 Acts at sea. VII. VESSELS. $174. It is often stated that a ship on the high seas constitutes a part of the territory of the nation whose flag it flies. In the physical sense, this phrase obviously is metaphorical. In the legal sense, it means that a ship on the high seas is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the nation to which, or to whose citizens, it belongs. The jurisdiction is quasi territorial. Woolsey, Int. Law, § 54; Field, Int. Code, § 309; 95 North Am. Rev. (July 1862), 8; Crapo r. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610; Wilson r. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572, 574; Re Moncan, 14 Fed. Rep. 44. The belligerent right of visitation and search forms an exception to this rule. The only general exception, in time of peace, is that of piracy jure gentium. The scene of the pirate's operations being the high seas, and his crime being treated as a renunciation of the protection of the flag which he may carry, he is treated as an outlaw, whom any nation may capture and punish. Dr. F. de Martens, as arbitrator in the case of the Costa Rica Packet, held that the Dutch courts were incompetent to entertain a prosecution of the master of a British whaler for taking some liquor from an alleged Dutch prauw (native boat), which was floating derelict at sea, outside territorial waters. (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, V. 4953.) "I have no doubt that an offence, committed on board a public ship of war, on the high seas, is committed within the jurisdiction of the nation to whom the ship belongs." President Adams to Mr. Pickering, Sec. of State, May 21, 1799, John See Moore on Extradition, I. 135, § 104. A sentry on the U. S. S. Inde- Complaint having been made that the marine court of the city of New York had assumed jurisdiction to try and punish the master of a Sardinian vessel for an assault and battery alleged to have been committed by him upon two of his seamen on the high seas, the following reply was made: "If this was the position of the Phebo when the alleged assault was committed the jurisdiction of this matter belongs exclusively to the Government of Sardinia, and such would no doubt have been the decision of the court of appeals in New York if the case had been brought before it. . . . Were there such a law of New York as is alleged, it would not give jurisdiction over the case, ... but the law has been misapprehended. Upon examination of sec. 4, title 7, of the New York Code of Procedure giving jurisdiction ; to the marine court it does not appear that this law was designed to confer on that court power to decide cases arising on board foreign merchant vessels on the high seas. It provides that the marine court shall have jurisdiction in an action by or against any person belonging to or on board of a vessel in the merchant service, for an assault and battery or false imprisonment committed on board such vessel upon the high sea or in a place without the United States of which the ordinary courts of law of this State have jurisdiction.' The vessels referred to in that law can only mean merchant vessels of the United States. The jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law therein alluded to is that derived from the laws of the United States. The acts of Congress authorize State courts to take cognizance of certain cases arising on merchant vessels, but it is always understood to mean vessels of the United States only, as Congress could neither exercise nor extend its control over any other; and the object of the law of New York was to include the marine court among those authorized to enforce the act of Congress." Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Chevalier Bertinatti, Sardinian min., Dec. 1, 1858, MS. Notes to Italian States, VI. 178. See, to the same effect, Mr. Forsyth, Sec. of State, to Mr. Harrison, Dec. 7, 1837, 7 MS. Desp. to Consuls, 180. "Both the public and private vessels of every nation on the high seas and out of the territorial limits of any other state are subject to the jurisdiction of the state to which they belong, and this jurisdiction is exclusive so far as respects offences against the local laws of the vessel's nation." Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Gen. Schenck, min. to England, Nov. 8, 1873, "Merchant vessels on the high seas being constructively considered as for most purposes a part of the territory of the nation to which they belong, they are not subject to the criminal laws and processes of another nation; and any attempt of the officers or citizens of the latter to execute and serve such laws and processes on board of them can only be regarded as an illegal proceeding which their masters and crews are justified not only in disregarding but also in resisting." Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Ryan, min. to Mexico, Nov. 27, 1889, This instruction related to the case of the American schooner Robert The allegation in an indictment that the offence was committed "on the high seas and within the jurisdiction of this court and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the said United States of America, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State of the said United States of America, in and on board of a certain American vessel, the same being then and there a schooner called and named Olive Pecker,' then and there belonging to a citizen or citizens of the said United States of America whose name or names is or are to the grand jurors aforesaid unknown," was held to constitute a sufficient allegation as to the locality of the offence. Andersen v. United States, 170 U. S. 481, 490-493. See, as to the cir cumstances of this case, Mr. Cridler, Third Assist. Sec. of State, to Messrs. Peabody & Co., Oct. 16, 1897, 221 MS. Dom. Let. 514; Mr. Adee, 2nd Assist. Sec. of State, to the Attorney-General, Oct. 27, 1897, 222 MS. Dom. Let. 43. That crimes committed on board merchant vessels on the high seas are subject to the jurisdiction of the nation to which the vessel belongs, see United States v. Sharp, 1 Peters C. C. 118, 121; Cushing. At.Gen., Sept. 6, 1856, 8 Op. 73. The master of a British ship was held liable to conviction for false imprisonment for transporting from Chile to England certain persons whom the Chilean Government had banished and had employed him to take to England. (Reg. v. Lesley (1860), Bell's C. C. 220, 8 Cox C. C. 269.) "I inclose herewith a copy of a dispatch recently received from A. C. Litchfield, esq., consul-general of the United States at Calcutta, in relation to the case of one John Anderson, an ordinary seaman on board the American bark C. O. Whitmore, who, it appears, stabbed and killed the first officer of the ship on the 31st of January last, while that vessel was on her way from New York to Calcutta, sixteen days from her port of departure, and on the high seas in latitude 25° 35′ N. and longitude 35° 50′ W. 66 You will perceive that the consul-general invoked the aid of the local police authorities in securing the safe custody of the accused, who was a prisoner of the United States, until he could complete the necessary arrangements for sending him to this country for trial, against whose municipal laws only he was accused of having offended, and that while thus in the temporary custody of the local police, the colonial authorities took judicial cognizance of the matter, claiming, under the advice of the advocate-general of the colony, that, under a colonial statute, which confers upon the courts of the colony jurisdiction of crimes committed by a British subject on the high seas, even though such crimes be committed on the ship of a foreign nation, and that inasmuch as the accused, although appearing on the ship's articles under the name of John Anderson, subject of Sweden, had declared that his real name was Alfred Hussey, and that he was a native of Liverpool and therefore a British subject, the case came within the jurisdiction of those courts. "The matter is now believed to have reached that point in the judicial proceedings where effective measures for asserting the jurisdictional rights of the United States would be unavailable in this particular case. And whilst I entertain no doubt that the accused will receive as fair a trial in the high court of Calcutta, where it is understood he is to be tried, as he would in the circuit court of the United States, in which tribunal he would be arraigned were he sent here for trial, I deem it proper, at the same time, to instruct you to bring the question to the attention of Her Majesty's Government, in order to have it distinctly understood that this case cannot be admitted by this Government as a precedent for any similar cases that may arise in the future. No principle of public law is better understood nor more universally recognized than that merchant vessels on the high seas are under the jurisdiction of the nation to which they belong, and that as to common crimes committed on such vessels while on the high seas, the competent tribunals of the vessel's nation have exclusive jurisdiction of the questions of trial and punishment of any person thus accused of the commission of a crime against its municipal laws; the nationality of the accused can have no more to do with the question of jurisdiction than it would had he committed the same crime within the geographical territorial limits of the nation against whose municipal laws he offends. The merchant ship, while on the high seas, is, as the ship of war is everywhere, a part of the territory of the ration to which she belongs. "I pass over the apparent breach of comity in the proceedings of the colonial officials as being rather the result of inadvertence and possible misconception on the part of the government law officer of the colony, than any design to question the sovereignty of the United States in this or cases of a similar nature.” Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Welsh, min. to England, No. 328, July 11, The foregoing argument, so far as it rests on the supposition that a nation |