statute does. This subject has been elsewhere somewhat fully consid ered (Claims assignment case, 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 13). The case of Bailey and others v. The United States (109 U. S., 432) further decides, that, if the officers of the Treasury Department, upon the invitation, and by the unrevoked authority, of the claimant entitled to payment, do, in violation of law, make a payment to an attorney, such claimant, who iş in pari delicto, is estopped from saying that the payment was illegal. The law leaves both parties, the officers of the Treasury and the claimant, where it finds them, according to the maxim, in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis et possidentis. Thus, the Government is saved from liability, and is protected, not because the act of its officers in making payment was legal, but because the claimant is in a position, in which he cannot assert the illegality. The principle of estoppel, thus asserted, is too well known to require a citation of authorities in support of it. "The law will not assist any one in recovering a demand which originates in a breach or violation, on his part, of its principles and enactments" (Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend., 46, Simpson v. Bloss, 7 Taun., 246). This principle, so applied, is necessary to prevent collusion between a claimant and his attorney, by means of which payment might be demanded by each in succession. It is not necessary to decide whether the Government could escape liability to the original claimant, if its officers should make payment to an agent after notice of the revocation of the power of attorney, which in terms purported to authorize him to receive such payment. A claimant, having given a power of attorney void in law, may, perhaps, have a locus penitentiæ-a right to repudiate his illegal action, on proper notice to the Treasury Department at any time before the execution of the purpose, for which such power of attorney was given. If section 3477 of the Revised Statutes can be held as inapplicable to a decree or judgment, it certainly is applicable to such claim as the one in this case, which purports to be assigned by Grant to Davis. It is urged on behalf of the claimant, Davis, citing Dowell v. Cardwell (4 Sawyer, 228), that section 3477 only applies to "something in the nature of a demand for damages arising out of some alleged act or omission of the Government, not yet provided for or acknowledged by law." Such construction has never been adopted in the Treasury Department, and is in direct opposition to the statute, and to the opinions of the Supreme Court. It would practically nullify the statute. But if such construction be adopted, it is fatal to the claimant, Davis. The claim, which Grant assumed to have when he made the so-called assignment to Davis, certainly was "not provided for or acknowledged by law." The assignment of such claim, if recognized as valid, will defeat the purposes which the statute was designed to carry out. Thus, the Supreme Court in Goodman v. Niblack (102 U. S., 560) said that the mischiefs designed to be remedied by the statute "are mainly two": "First. The danger that the rights of the government might be embarrassed by having to deal with several persons instead of one, and by the introduction of a party who was a stranger to the original transaction. 9 DEC, VOL 5 Second. That, by a transfer of such a claim against the government to one or more persons not originally interested in it, the way might be conveniently opened to such improper influences in prosecuting the claim before the departments, the courts, or the Congress, as desperate cases, when the reward is contingent on success, so often suggest. Both these considerations, as well as a careful examination of the statute, leave no doubt that its sole purpose was to protect the government, and not the parties to the assignment." 66 If the assignment to Davis be recognized, the Government will be embarrassed by the introduction of a party who was a stranger to the original transaction." The assignment might open the way "to such improper influences in prosecuting the claim before the courts, or the Congress, as desperate cases, when the reward is contingent on success, so often suggest." It is urged that an assignment does not offend against the statute, unless the claim involves "establishment by act or participation of the claimant." This claim does involve such establishment, unless it be assumed that the original claimant will be indifferent to its success; and what is worse, it invites all the influences, which its purchaser could exert upon Congress and the courts. The statute was manifestly designed to prevent the enlistment of outside influences in favor of a claim that is, the influence "of a party who was a stranger to the original transaction." It is claimed that the power of attorney to Davis is irrevocable. But it is void, and needs no revocation; and it is inoperative for other rea. sons (Clift's case, 2 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d ed., 187). Such power of attorney cannot be operative against the "regulations', of the Treasury Department. These provide, as to drafts issued in pay. ment of judgments of the Court of Claims, that: "The persons certified by said court as the attorneys of record shall be regarded as such by this [the Treasury] Department, and be entitled to receive the drafts in such cases" (Clift's case, 2 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d ed., 193). The Court of Claims has certified another party as such attorney. He is dead. His legal representative has no right to the custody of the draft, which may be issued to pay the judgment in this case; because the regulations create a personal trust in the attorney of record, which is not transferable. But it does not follow that such draft must neces. sarily be given to a party having a power of attorney to receive it, executed prior to the rendition of a judgment, and in direct conflict with the "regulations." On grounds of public policy, without reference to the statute, it is by no means certain that the assignment and power of attorney are not void; because the subject-matter thereof was without legal existence when they were executed. This question has not been argued in the present case, and it is unnecessary to decide it. A standard elementary writer, in treating of the law of sales, has said, as to tangibilities, that : "The existence of the thing to be sold, or the subject-matter of the contract, is essential to the validity of the contract A mere contingent possibility, not coupled with an interest, is no subject of sale" (1 Parsons, Cont., 6th ed., 522, 523, citing authorities; Screws v. Roach, 22 Ala., 675; Carleton v. Leighton, 3 Meriv., 667). In Hart v. Gregg (32 Ohio, St., 502) it-was held, that :— "The conveyance by a son of his expectancy in land, owned by his father, is the conveyance of a mere naked possibilty not coupled with an interest, and passes no estate or interest in the land." It was said, per Lawrence arguendo, that: * "This is so on grounds of public policy, (a) to prevent the sacrifice of expectant estates; ; (c) to prevent clouds on title passing by devise and descent; (d) and for the safety of life, which requires that the law should give no inducement to those who are without the ties of kindred and of blood to the holders of property to desire their death." And the court said: "It is well settled that, where no estoppel arises from warranty, recital, or otherwise, a release or conveyance operates only on existing rights." See Fussell v. Hughes, decided by Matthews, J., in circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Ohio, August, 1881 (68 Federal Reporter, 384; House Mis. Doc., No. 42-1st session, 47th Congress). The same principle applies to intangibilities, as choses in action. Thus, in Robinson v. Macdonnell (5 Mau. and Sel., 228), "it was held, that an assignment of the freight, earnings, and profits of a ship, does not extend to the profits not in existence, actual or potential” (1 Parsons, Cont., 6th ed., 522, note). In that case C. assigned to S. the freight, earnings, and profits of the ship W., which ship afterwards, in a voyage to the South Seas, obtained a quantity of oil, the produce of whales taken in the voyage. The question was, whether the oil passed to S. by the assignment. The decision did not turn solely on the construction of the terms of the assignment as to the intention of the parties to it; but the court decided upon the effect of the assignment, if its purpose had been to pass the oil. Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said that:— "There is still another objection, however, to the claim of theoil under the deed of 15th December, 1810, which is this, that the oil had no existence, actual or potential, at the time this deed was made; and to make a grant or assignment valid, the thing which is the subject of it must have an existence, actual or potential, at the time of such grant or assignment; and upon this principle, an assignment of sheep which a lessee was to deliver to the assignor at the end of the lessee's term, or of the wool which should grow upon such sheep as the assignor should thereafter buy, has been held inoperative, because the assignor had not, at the time of the assignment, that which he was professing to assign, either actually or potentially, but in possibility only. Wood and Foster's case, 1 Leon. 42, and Grantham v. Hawley, Hob. 132. Now here, at the time of this assignment, Clarkson and Parker had no property, actual or potential, in this oil; it was altogether matter of chance whether any of it would have been obtained; and even the voyage in which it was obtained does not appear to have been in contemplation. For these reasons, we think the defendants have no claim under the deed of 15th December, 1810." The assignment and power of attorney from Grant to Davis were without any existing right, or which to operate; that is, there was no right existing at law, or on principles of equity jurisprudence. The argument for Davis puts and answers an inquiry thus: "After the judgment of the Court of Claims in the premises, what had Grant in respect of which he might assert a 'claim upon the United States'? Absolutely nothing." This is true. The real question, therefore, which is now presented, is, whether an assignment of "absolutely nothing" amounts to something? Ex nihilo nihil fit. The expectancy arising from "hope deferred" is not vendible. It rests in nubibus. It is not the subject-matter of a power of attorney. In somewhat similar cases it might often be described as "such stuff as dreams are made on," as in "Tempest," in which, after the end has been reached the parties soliloquizing say: "Our revels now are ended. These our actors, Are melted into air, into thin air: And, like the baseless fabric of this vision, Is rounded with a sleep." The speculation in such airy possibilities must inevitably be attended with sacrifice by the vendor or loss by the purchaser. In effect in the event of failure, such speculation may be even more unjust to the vendee than champerty, in which he only risks his services and the cost of prosecuting a suit, while in such case as this he may lose, be sides these, the consideration paid the vendor. Even in the event of success, the vendor will generally be in cases of this sort, subjected to enormous sacrifice. It cannot be possible, that the policy of the law sanctions, or gives effect to, such transactions, which have the legal character of a bet on future possibilities. When parties are legally in pari delicto, the law leaves them as it finds them and gives no relief to either. The legal effect of these transactions is alone referred to, since the good faith of the parties, who are highly respectable, is not at all called in question. It may be safely concluded, that contracts will, by construction, generally be held as only intended to apply to existing rights; that, when in terms they are made and intended to be applicable to expectancies, which are merely naked possibilities, they are inoperative, at least, unless made operative by warranty or recital, in good faith upon a sufficient consideration; and that, when in terms they are made and intended to apply to rights, which have no legal existence, and which can have none, except by force of a law to be thereafter passed, they are void on grounds of public policy. The claimant, Davis, is not entitled, either to payment, or to the possession of any draft, which may be issued in this case. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, First Comptroller's Office, May 23, 1884. IN THE MATTER OF POWERS OF ATTORNEY TO INDORSE AND COLLECT TREASURY DRAFTS AND DISBURSING OFFICERS' CHECKS.-ATTORNEYINDORSEMENT CASE. 1. Section 3477 of the Revised Statutes declares that a power of attorney to indorse a Treasury draft issued to make payment of any claim against the United States is "absolutely null and void,” unless such power of attorney is made and executed "after the allowance of such a claim, the ascertainment of the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant for the payment thereof." 2. No valid power of attorney can be made in any case or at any time to indorse the name of the payee on a disbursing officer's check, issued to pay a claim against the United States, not yet audited and allowed by the proper accounting officers; and this is applicable to corporations as well as to natural persons. 3. But the proper financial officer of a corporation, whose authority is subsisting, may, without reference to the time of his appointment, receive payment of a Treasury warrant, or indorse and collect a draft issued to make payment thereof, and may also indorse and collect a disbursing officer's check. 4. A valid power of attorney may be executed, however, at any time, to indorse negotiable Treasury drafts and disbursing officers' checks, not originally payable to the maker of such power, and which have already been indorsed by the payee. March 11, 1884, a power of attorney was duly executed by a party, in terms authorizing the agent therein named to indorse, and receive payment of, all drafts and checks payable by the Treasurer, assistant treasurer, or any designated depositary, of the United States. The Treasurer of the United States asks the First Comptroller to decide whether the agent can, under this power of attorney, indorse drafts and checks of the character mentioned. OPINION BY WILLIAM LAWRENCE, First Comptroller: Section 3477 of the Revised Statutes provides, as follows:— "All transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the United States, or of any part or share thereof, or interest therein, whether absolute or conditional, and whatever may be the consideration therefor, and all powers of attorney, orders, or other authorities for receiving payment of any such claim, or of any part or share thereof, shall be absolutely null and void, unless they are freely made and executed in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses, after the allowance of such a claim, the ascertainment of the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant for the payment thereof. Such transfers, assignments, and |