pistols, and our friends returned and shouted to us to look out for a Kaffir path, a strip of bare earth through the high grass along which the natives walk in single file: the path was found, and it led to the chasm, where it zigzagged through the scrub to the bottom and up the other side. I found afterwards it was two miles in lengththat was a "donga," and so koppjes and dongas give themselves airs in South Africa.

The risk attending a series of night-attacks has been alluded to, and the disadvantages under which such attacks are made to the men attacking are vividly illustrated in the reports of the march of the Highlanders on Magersfontein. They were asked to do a thing which an army of well-bred giants would have failed to accomplish. Absolute secrecy is essential to success, and in a country swarming with spies that is almost impossible. There is little doubt that their advance was flashed to the Boers from a farmhouse within our lines. The sorties by night from Ladysmith succeeded because the force employed and the distance to be travelled were small, and spies could be kept under control. But night-attacks are made by men, not machines. You start off a party to march through the night across ground which is difficult going by day, nerves strained to observe the precautions necessary; at the moment of assault the human system is at its lowest point, and the men will nearly always fight on empty stomachs.

Here is a personal experience. I accompanied a party of about eighty men to attack a position. The way there had been carefully marked, all precautions were taken, so the men arrived where it was wished, and lay down in the long, wet grass just as day was breaking: they had had a good supper before starting, and were in excellent spirits. They lay in the grass for half an hour, and it was very cold; my teeth chattered, so I thought they would think that I funked. A false attack was made, and the Boers rode straight for us, as was intended, preceded by a scout, a big man on a big horse, who rode on the top of us. I jumped up and gave the word to fire a volley, and that Boer turned and fled as any other man would do with eighty bullets after him, but not one of them touched him-the men were so deadly cold, shivering. Five minutes afterwards, when they had swung their arms round, they got at the Boers and scored bull's-eyes. That was a comfortable night-attack.

Now take the Highlanders at Magersfontein. All Saturday night they bivouacked in the open 4000 yards from the enemy's lines; they had a cold ration, no fire or smoking was allowed, and it rained hard all night. The ground was studded with bushes and cactus hedges. At one o'clock in the morning after this cheerless night they moved off in quarter-column: it was pitch dark, the rain poured down, the wet ground was very miserable; the column was packed in as solid a block as

it was possible to pack men; a guide rope stretched from front to rear to keep them together. In the dark a certain amount of confusion naturally occurred, and the companies got a little mixed up. Then at 3.45 A.M. the usual terrific firing in front broke out, and there was instant confusion was anything else to be expected? In what condition were men who twelve hours previously had a cold ration, had lain on the squelching ground without cover, fires, or pipes, and for the last three hours had stumbled in thick darkness through pouring rain over sloppy ground, packed as tight as herrings in a barrel? What fight was left in these men? They had struggled within 200 yards of the trenches; one brave soldier was found 100 yards nearer. If men can do as much as that in the dark, what would they have done in daylight? Troops can advance in open order under cover of their own artillery without excessive loss. Lord Methuen did not recognise that Highlanders are men, not machines.

As the month wore on the tension became intense. All England knew that General Buller with about 30,000 men was facing an equal number of Boers strongly entrenched, the Tugela between them, and Sir George White with his brave but fading-away garrison in rear, and that any moment the spark might light the volcano. Men had cheerfully acquiesced in the reticence of the telegraphwire, waiting day after day

till the strain on their minds became almost unbearable. News dribbled through of "demonstrations" and trifling “reconnaissances" by Thorneycroft's Horse, of the number of shells fired daily, and of the narrow escape of officers sketching, but nothing more. Days had passed, weeks had followed, and Boers were still south of the Tugela, and we took it for granted they were not in the way because no attempt was made to clear them out. It was always known they held Inhlawe on the west, the cavalry had been to look at them; when General Buller attempted to cross at Colenso 1000 cavalry with a battery of Field Artillery were detailed to move towards that hill and endeavour to turn the Boers out: it was gallantly attempted, but its capture was beyond the power of mounted men. General Barton's brigade was sent after them in support, but the Boers were found in strength with guns in position on Inhlawe and on the higher range behind; yet no assistance came to the Colonial troopers, who were set to attempt an infantry task, so they had to retire after wellnigh winning the position. It seemed strange that this isolated hill, swarming with Boers and heavy guns, the Tugela in flood in their rear, and 30,000 British troops in front, did not fall into their hands. A correspondent who was present at the action of the 15th December describes how the 2nd Queen's, 2nd Devonshire, three batteries of Field Artillery in line, and six naval 12-pounders in OX

waggons trying to range alongside them, advanced towards the outlying houses of Colenso. The batteries might have been moving down the Long Valley at Aldershot, so excellently were they aligned, the timberfringed bank of the river 600 yards in their front, when suddenly burst out an awful crash of Boer musketry, "as usual," from buildings, lines of trenches south of the river, and from the river's bank itself. "Unfortunately, it had not been suspected that the Boers had ventured to construct cover upon the south side of the river." But we held it with 30,000 men, and had held it ever since November 25th, when General Clery reoccupied Frere, ten miles south of Colenso. For some time it was reported that a large force, with guns, was intrenching itself at Springfield, seventeen miles south-west of Colenso, yet the Boers were allowed to construct their works undisturbed except by some reconnoitring cavalry, which always retired on the apparition of Boers: could not a brigade with a battery or two have been spared to interrupt them, to be followed by an attack when the river was in flood? Men at a distance reasoned that to allow the Boers undisputed possession of the south bank of the Tugela certainly was an oversight, although the picture seen through 6000 intervening miles is different to that which paints itself in its framework of koppjes, and bush, and boulders, and it was recognised that if the object-glass was blurred it was for some good reason. The art of war consists in doing some

thing which the enemy cannot foresee: the intended plan must anticipate that of the other side, or it will not succeed. Secrecy and silence are essential, and with the telegraph flashing the smallest details in South Africa to the uttermost parts of the world, that is not possible. So the Boers possessed in peace our side of the river, wondered, with us, at the strange oversight, and went their ways without suspicion. So we watched and waited.

Then on Sunday, 7th Janu

ary,

came a telegram from Ladysmith that set every heart to beat: "Enemy attacked Cæsar's Camp at 2.45 A.M. in considerable force. Enemy everywhere repulsed.”

11 A.M. "Attack continues, and enemy has been reinforced from south."

12.45 P.M. "Have beaten enemy off at present, but they are still round me in great numbers. I think renewed attack very probable."

3.15 P.M. "Attack renewed. Very hard pressed."

The sun failed, and we were left to wait in darkness. But in the afternoon news arrived: "The attack continued until 7.30 P.M. The enemy were repulsed everywhere, with very heavy loss."

At 2 P.M. General Buller made a demonstration towards Colenso.

The telegrams referred to a new departure in Boer tactics, hitherto purely defensive. At dawn on the 6th January they commenced a most determined attack on the works round Ladysmith. The containing

prised our pickets, and rushed the hill, which was only occupied then by a fatigue-party, who had just placed a Hotchkiss gun in position: they raced up the hill for the gun, which had only time to fire a few shots. About fifty men who happened to be scattered on Waggon Hill, on the west, ran up just in time, the enemy having charged to within 25 yards: rush after rush followed through the darkness with the utmost bravery, to be met on each occasion by the bayonet. At daybreak they reached Waggon Hill, but were met by the 2nd Gordon Highlanders and Royal Rifles, who had come up, and kept them in check pending the arrival of reinforcements, till at 5.30 the Boers began to waver, and retreated slowly down the hill: seeing this, our men at the top pushed on to a line of koppjes in front, and so met them at short range, succeeding in keeping them at a distance at 7.30 every Boer had retired out of sight, but they still kept up a heavy fire from the neighbouring rocks. At 3.30 P.M., just as a heavy thunderstorm burst, which flooded the trenches and shrouded the hills in cloud, the Boers made their most desperate dash on Cæsar's Camp. Our pickets were driven in, and, in spite of the fire of our guns, they succeeded in gaining the crest, when, as they poured into the work, the 2nd Gordon Highlanders and 1st Devonshire regiment made a gallant charge with the bayonet, which sent them back down the hill in a struggling, disorganised mass, and the day

was won. The position on the east was held by the 1st Manchester, 2nd Gordon, and 2nd Rifle Brigade regiments; at the centre by the Naval Brigade and Natal Volunteers; and on the west by the Imperial Light Horse and King's Royal Rifles. Our losses prove the desperate character of the fighting-15 officers killed and 26 wounded, and 379 rank and file killed and wounded. The Boers admitted 54 killed and 96 wounded; Sir G. White reports, however, that their losses greatly exceeded our own.

On January 10th Lord Roberts and his staff landed at Cape Town, and the nation rose up reassured that military considerations would take first place in a campaign where the one bright spot was the cheerful bravery of our soldiers. To allow political reasons or directions, whether they come across 6000 miles of sea or from the nearest post-town, is to court disaster. Newspapers at home and abroad had been filled with criticisms from "all sorts and conditions of men "-attacks on the incapacity of our generals, the inferiority of our guns, the mobility of the Boers, the unsuitability of the force that had landed, on the War Office, the Horse Guards, the ignorance of our Government about the Boers. Boers. To all this wrangle of angry voices our soldiers had been deaf-it was no affair of theirs: in front were the Boers, the clamour of people and politicians behind; they knew that a soldier had come to lead them, and they were content to follow him.