from the south, the assault being made simultaneously from every force had been largely reinforced post. The principal attack was against the south, on Cæsar's Camp, where the ground is prised our pickets, and rushed the hill, which was only occupied then by a fatigue-party, who had just placed a Hotchkiss gun in position: they raced up the hill for the gun, which had only time to fire a few shots. About fifty men who happened to be scattered on Waggon Hill, on the west, ran up just in time, the enemy having charged to within 25 yards: rush after rush followed through the darkness with the utmost bravery, to be met on each occasion by the bayonet. At daybreak they reached Waggon Hill, but were met by the 2nd Gordon Highlanders and Royal Rifles, who had come up, and kept them in check pending the arrival of reinforcements, till at 5.30 the Boers began to waver, and retreated slowly down the hill: seeing this, our men at the top pushed on to a line of koppjes in front, and so met them at short range, succeeding in keeping them at a distance at 7.30 every Boer had retired out of sight, but they still kept up a heavy fire from the neighbouring rocks. At 3.30 P.M., just as a heavy thunderstorm burst, which flooded the trenches and shrouded the hills in cloud, the Boers made their most desperate dash on Cæsar's Camp. Our pickets were driven in, and, in spite of the fire of our guns, they succeeded in gaining the crest, when, as they poured into the work, the 2nd Gordon Highlanders and 1st Devonshire regiment made a gallant charge with the bayonet, which sent them back down the hill in a struggling, disorganised mass, and the day was won. The position on the east was held by the 1st Manchester, 2nd Gordon, and 2nd Rifle Brigade regiments; at the centre by the Naval Brigade and Natal Volunteers; and on the west by the Imperial Light Horse and King's Royal Rifles. Our losses prove the desperate character of the fighting-15 officers killed and 26 wounded, and 379 rank and file killed and wounded. The Boers admitted 54 killed and 96 wounded; Sir G. White reports, however, that their losses greatly exceeded our own. On January 10th Lord Roberts and his staff landed at Cape Town, and the nation rose up reassured that military considerations would take first place in a campaign where the one bright spot was the cheerful bravery of our soldiers. To allow political reasons or directions, whether they come across 6000 miles of sea or from the nearest post-town, is to court disaster. Newspapers at home and abroad had been filled with criticisms from "all sorts and conditions of men "-attacks on the incapacity of our generals, the inferiority of our guns, the mobility of the Boers, the unsuitability of the force that had landed, on the War Office, the Horse Guards, the ignorance of our Government about the Boers. Boers. To all this wrangle of angry voices our soldiers had been deaf-it was no affair of theirs: in front were the Boers, the clamour of people and politicians behind; they knew that a soldier had come to lead them, and they were content to follow him. advance. On the afternoon of the 16th General Lyttelton's Lyttelton's brigade marched down to the drift, some men of the South African Light Horse swam across under fire and got the punt - cable over, when the infantry, taking hands, waded waist - deep through the water, and at once effected a lodgment on a low ridge, where they bivouacked, being joined during the night by a howitzer battery. Meantime Sir C. Warren had marched to Trichardt's drift, seven miles west, reaching it on the 17th. The Boers tried to bar the passage with a battery; but the naval guns above Potgeiter's drift brought a flanking fire to bear-the guns with the division taking it in front and they were driven back. A strong detachment was ferried across in a pontoon to effect a lodgment on the north bank, followed by others, who rapidly intrenched themselves so as to cover the construction of a bridge, which the Engineers completed in two hours, across which the whole division marched to take post on the western spurs of Spion Kop-the Boers holding a strong position five miles north. Thus on the evening of the 17th January a division and a brigade were safely intrenched on the north bank, and the crossing of the Tugela had been accomplished. it been concealed and distorted intrenchments across our line of in order to baffle the Boers, that it was a week later before we in England knew that a wide turning movement to the west was in progress by General Warren's division, while General Buller himself held the enemy in check in front with a brigade, and that the movement had been quietly and successfully carried out. On the 10th January General Warren with his division, probably about 15,000 men, left Estcourt, joining General Buller in command of about 7000 men at Frere, each accompanied by a considerable artillery force, when both united and marched on the 11th towards Springfield, where the column halted for a day to allow the baggage to come up. The advance was covered by Lord Dundonald's cavalry brigade, which formed an impenetrable screen in front, while thoroughly investigating the country on both sides, which was well adapted to Boer tactics; and it was refreshing to see reconnaissance and scouting at last efficiently carried out. Rain fell heavily, the roads everywhere were deep in mud, but the troopers pressed on; and on the morning of the 12th the hills overlooking Potgeiter's drift were occupied. Next morning 500 Colonial cavalry and a Field Artillery battery moved down to the river's bank without meeting any Boers. The Tugela was in flood, and the enemy contented themselves with holding the hills on the opposite bank, being reinforced by 1000 burghers, who set to work without delay to construct In order to cover the right and protect the camp at Chieveley, a considerable force under General Barton continued in a position fronting Colenso. General From a strategical point the scheme must be considered as well planned and skilfully executed. The columns were some five miles apart, a distance not too great for mutual assistance; the turning movement against the Boer right by a powerful column threatened their communications with the Free State, and should prevent the retreat of the Free-Staters, or indeed of any of the Boer army, by the passes of the Drakensberg, while the assault by a smaller force from the south, on a body facing the Tugela, would hold it be tween two attacks Buller on the south and Sir G. White on the north. A successful action would drive the enemy into the neck of the bottle, which stretches between him and Pretoria, across Lang's Nek, from which, once committed with his heavy guns and numerous waggons, he could only emerge in disaster. General Buller's risk was the Tugela in his immediate rear, interposing between his columns on the north bank and the reserves on the south; but success in war must always be attended by certain risks: to work only on a certainty is halfhearted in tactics as in most other things. In the Zulu war General Crealock did not move till that last ounce of pepper had been served out, and so lost the pleasure of taking part in the battle of Ulundi. A principle of tactics is not to fight with an obstacle in your rear; but in this case, as we know that Boer tactics are opposed to attack, it would not be difficult to occupy defensive positions to cover the passage of our de VOL. CLXVII.-NO. MXII. feated army, to give time for the reserve to move up, or in turn to render assistance to it. The magnitude of the prize rendered the risk microscopic. Of course such risks are independent of traps, which we may be sure will be set when least expected; but General Buller has had some experience of Boer slimness. That he is awake to such underhand tactics he tells his men in his own words, advising them, when they charge, as to the conditions upon which they should receive the surrender of any of the enemy, warning them that the Boers are treacherous in the use they make of the white flag, concluding with the stirring appeal, "We are going to the relief of our comrades at Ladysmith; there will be no turning back.” On the 18th Lord Dundonald's cavalry brigade, reinforced by the 1st Dragoons, pushed on to Acton Homes, where he found the PretoriaHeilbron commando on a koppje commanding the road in order to intercept him; but the Natal Carabineers galloped up and gained it, unseen by the Boers, who were driven off with a loss of twenty killed and wounded and twenty-three prisoners, the position remaining in our hands. On the same day General Warren, who had been joined by Sir C. Clery with part of his division, bivouacked two miles north of the river. On the 20th he advanced to within 500 yards of the enemy's position on a long ridge four miles northwest of Trichardt's drift, the defences consisting chiefly of X |